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The Political Dynamics of Turkish Accession to the EU:

A European Success Story or the EU's Most Contested Enlargement?

Sieps
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies

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PREFACE

The Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, Sieps, conducts and commissions research on European policy issues. The institute is based in Stockholm but aims at involving researchers from all over Europe as well as reaching a European-wide audience.

This report is to be the first of a number of reports concerned with the Turkish accession process to the European Union. Being the first, its primary task has been a horizontal overview to identify and analyse issues that are likely to be important during the 10 years to come, problems as well as opportunities. Based on the findings in this report Sieps will commission at least a couple of additional reports on selected topics related to the Turkish accession process, to be published during 2005 and 2006. By issuing this report we hope to make a positive contribution to the European discussion on Turkish EU membership.

Stockholm, December 2004

Tomas Dahlman
Director of Sieps

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Kirsty Hughes is a writer and commentator on European political affairs, based in London. She is also Visiting Fellow at the European Institute, London School of Economics, and Associate Fellow at Birkbeck College, University of London. From 2002-2004, she was Senior Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, and coordinator of the European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) – a network of think-tanks across the 28 EU member states and candidate countries. From 1999 to September 2001 she worked in the European Commission as Deputy Head of cabinet to the European Commissioner for employment and social affairs. Previously, she was Director of the European Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), and Senior Fellow at the Policy Studies Institute. Before that she was research fellow at the Social Science Centre Berlin (WZB) and lecturer in economics at the universities of East Anglia and Manchester in the UK.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper looks at the key political dynamics involved in the process of Turkish accession to the EU, on both the Turkish and the EU sides. It asks: whether Turkish political reforms will be successfully completed and what are the main challenges; what will be the most important issues in negotiations and how the political dynamics around the negotiation process may develop, and what political impact Turkey will have on the EU, given its size, location, and its ongoing and radical political, economic and social transition?

Section One: Political Reform Dynamics in Turkey

Turkey is moving in the direction of establishing a modern, pluralistic democratic system and a stable, growing and modernising economy. Much has been done but much remains to be done. It is clear that Turkey's relationship with the EU since 1999 has had a very important effect on the reforms, in part through the EU acting as a catalyst for reform. But the extent to which Turkish accession has been contested within the EU means that the Union has failed to explain its considerable soft power success story both internally and internationally. The EU decision in December 2004 to open accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005 represents a major new phase in EU-Turkey relations.

Extensive Reforms

Turkey's extensive reform process has covered a wide range of areas and institutions. Major changes have been made to civil-military relations and in the broad area of human rights, from the abolition of the death penalty, to a new policy of zero-tolerance of torture, removal of many but not all restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly, and improvements to Kurdish and other minority rights. Major legislative improvements and changes have been made in women's rights and gender equality, in particular through the extensive revision of the penal code.

Much Still to Be Done

The European Commission in its October 2004 report, highlights the need for further: "strengthening and full implementation of provisions related to the respect of fundamental freedoms and protection of human rights, including women's rights, trade union rights, minority rights and problems faced by non-Muslim religious communities. Civilian control over the military needs to be asserted, and law enforcement and judicial practice aligned with the spirit of the reforms".

Will Political Transition Succeed?

The process of reform has sparked wide-ranging debate and argument in Turkey – from debate over how strict secularism should remain (political Islam, the symbolism of the head-scarf) to debate over Kurdish and other minority rights, how to ensure effective implementation of human rights reforms, to the role and position of women, and the future role of the military. The ongoing success of economic reforms and continuation of strong economic growth is also vital here. The paper suggests four possible scenarios for Turkey's political future, and argues that its current direction of reform means it is heading towards the first or second scenarios (i.e. that it will become a modern European democracy respecting human rights and recognising diversity).

The overall impact in Turkey of finally having a date and starting accession negotiations will be strongly positive and reinforce the power of all the reforming elements in Turkish society, in particular strengthening the Erdogan government relative to the military and to opponents in the bureaucracy. This should allow more rapid and deeper steps to complete and implement fully political reforms. But managing public opinion and different social and political interest groups as reforms and negotiations proceed will not be easy.

Section Two: The Politics of Negotiations

One key question is whether, having decided in December 2004 to open accession negotiations in 2005, the EU will now resolve, or at least sideline, the debates over the desirability of Turkish membership and enter into a positive, dynamic negotiation process or whether the doubts and opposition will remain. If the EU's internal debates are not resolved, this could be the most contested enlargement the EU has seen. Despite the EU emphasis that negotiations are 'open-ended' – which is factually correct in that noone can guarantee that a negotiation process will conclude successfully – it is an *accession* negotiation. Negotiations for membership are not, and cannot technically be, the same as negotiations for a special partnership.

Member states showing the clearest positive support for Turkey, especially in the run up to the December 2004 decision on opening negotiations, included, to varying degrees, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Member states where either government and/or opposition and public are seen as having particular doubts include Austria, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the Republic of Cyprus. With the exception of Cyprus, the new member states who joined in 2004 are seen as mostly not wanting to upset an important prior decision of the European Council, and at the same time as having some sympathy for the positive attraction of accession given their own recent experiences.

The 17th December 2004 Summit

The European Council on the 16th-17th December 2004 concluded that "Turkey sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria to open accession negotiations". This agreement launches a new phase in EU-Turkey relations and one which will considerably change the political dynamics of the relationship.

Key points in the summit agreement included that: the objective of negotiations is accession, but the outcome is

open-ended as success cannot be guaranteed in advance; political reforms and implementation will continue to be monitored closely; serious and persistent breach of the EU's main political criteria can lead to suspension of negotiations; accession negotiations cannot be concluded until the financial framework for 2014 and after is agreed; Turkey is expected to extend the Ankara Agreement to all 25 member states before the start of accession negotiations; Turkey is expected to work towards resolution of any border disputes with member states.

Overall, this is a clear and positive summit outcome and a good basis to move towards negotiation. While the Cyprus issue was the most contentious at the summit – and Cyprus has the opportunity to stalemate the negotiations chapter by chapter – an equally or more problematic issue, as negotiations unfold, may prove to be the possibility the conclusions open for permanent safeguards and derogations in particular in the areas of free movement of people, structural funds and agriculture, which could imply second class membership in those areas.

Issues in Negotiations

Adopting all the relevant *acquis* for the internal market from product specifications to regulatory regimes and health and safety conditions will take considerable time and involve considerable costs. Other difficult areas will include: agriculture, environment, social legislation, free movement of labour and the area of freedom, security and justice.

If Turkey joined the EU in 2015, overall gross budget costs for the first three years could be about €45 billion on unchanged policies. But the EU has been decreasingly generous in subsequent enlargements so Turkey is likely to get a much lower budget allocation than these estimates – quite possibly closer to €10 billion gross than €20 billion.

The Commission intends to link the pace of negotiations with the ongoing speed and success of political reforms – these negotiations will be tougher than those with the 2004 new member states, with the Commission insisting on evidence of implementation of the acquis.

Section Three: The Political Impact of Turkish Accession on the European Union

The overall impact of Turkey on the EU if it joins as a member state in around 2015 depends on three main sets of factors: firstly, certain relatively fixed or slow-changing characteristics of Turkey – its size, geographical location, and history; secondly, what sort of country Turkey will have become in the next ten years – politically, economically, socially and culturally, and thirdly, what sort of Union the EU will have become and in what direction it will be moving in ten years time.

Foreign and Security Policy – Strategic Asset or Strategic Risk?

Turkey's geographical location makes it a crossroads between a number of strategically important but often unstable countries and regions. It borders the Black Sea, the southern Caucasus – Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – Iran, Iraq and Syria, the Mediterranean and Aegean, and Greece and Bulgaria. For the EU, it is strongly in its wider foreign policy and security interests, that Turkey is stable and friendly and helping to project peace and stability across its various borders, rather than one more problematic, unstable or unfriendly country in the neighbourhood.

Turkey's location also means that it is a transit route – and source – for illegal immigration to the EU, for asylum seekers, and for people trafficking and other major problems of international crime including drug smuggling. The EU accession process means that the Union can expect, and is already seeing, positive and growing cooperation from Turkey on all these issues.

Turkey will be expected to have good and/or normal relations with neighbours, in particular EU neighbours – including Armenia, Cyprus and Greece – before accession. Some hope that the inclusion of Turkey as a member state and the extension of the Union's borders to the Middle East will impact positively on the region and on the EU's ability to

influence the region's development. They suggest Turkey could be a bridge to the Middle East or at least an interpreter but many, not least in Turkey, do not wish to exaggerate the role Turkey could play. Turkey's relations with its Middle East neighbours have improved relative to a few years ago but they are mixed. Turkey has also inevitably been strongly affected by the conflict in Iraq and deeply concerned by the ongoing instability in that country.

Turkey's relations with Russia, though often somewhat tense in the past, have improved, and Russia is Turkey's second-largest trading partner after Germany. Russia may look with some suspicion on the whole process of Turkey's EU membership bid although Turkey is already a member of NATO. Turkey is not as sensitive geopolitically for Russia as Ukraine, but combined with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, Turkish membership of the EU would mean a significant new presence of the European Union in the Black Sea region – and through the vital Bosphorus strait

What role Turkey may play in the EU's future foreign, security and defence policies will depend inevitably on how those policies do develop in the coming decade. Turkey will want to play an active and positive role in the EU foreign and defence policies but will be reluctant to move away from an intergovernmental approach in this area.

Size and Impact on the EU Institutions

Turkey, with a population of around 70 million, is larger in population terms than all the EU member states except Germany (currently 82 million). By 2015, Turkey could be the same size as Germany in population terms. This suggests that the EU is not being asked to face a new challenge. With Germany, the EU already operates with a country of 82 million people and has also agreed both appropriate weights in its different institutions and decision-making procedures

On an individual country basis, there is nothing in the inclusion of Turkey in the EU's voting system that dramatically

shifts the relative power of different countries – even with the new double-majority voting system. While today Germany has 18.1% of the population share of votes in an EU of 25, France 13.2% and the UK 13.0%, looking to 2015, in an EU of 28 including Turkey, then Germany would have 14.5% of the population vote, Turkey 14.4%, France and the UK almost 11.0%. Indeed with the reduction in Germany's voting weight, the system could be said to be more evenly balanced.

The other main institutional impact of Turkish accession will be on the European Parliament where Turkey will join Germany as the country with the largest number of seats. It is estimated that Germany and Turkey would both get 84 seats, with Germany's share of seats falling from 13.5% to 11.2%. As with the Council of Ministers, the impact of Turkey's accession is in fact to reduce the size of the largest country's share. So again this is not a situation of unbalanced dominance by one or two larger countries.

What Sort of Member State?

It is too early to give a precise answer as to what sort of member state Turkey will be, but a preliminary analysis suggests it will be a positive and committed player, recognising the political as well as economic goals of the EU while also remaining conscious of its own national interests. As such it may resemble more France or Spain than the UK.

Key Areas to Monitor as Negotiations and Political Reforms Proceed – A Checklist

- Ongoing political reform in Turkey: the success of democratic reforms – their implementation, acceptance and practice; the completion and full implementation of fundamental rights reforms, including zero-tolerance of torture; Kurdish and other minority rights; freedom of expression; the situation of women in Turkey (including levels of violence, illiteracy and women's representation in politics); the ending of conflict in the South East; further development and acceptance of organised civil society; the professionalisation of the military and end of its political role.

- Turkish politics: effectiveness of government and opposition; maintenance of wide consensus around reforms and the accession process; public support for the political process; levels of corruption.
- Economic progress: continued macro-economic stability and growth, and micro-reforms; levels of foreign direct investment; levels of skills and training; higher female employment rates, income inequality and regional inequalities; negotiations over structural funds including transition periods and whether or not permanent safeguards are proposed.
- Agriculture: management in Turkey of rural-urban migration and the agriculture/services transition, including development of regional urban poles and infrastructure; modernisation of agriculture to meet requirements of a (reformed) Common Agricultural Policy; decisions over transition periods and over whether or not permanent safeguards are proposed.
- Migration pressures: employment and unemployment; reform of education and levels of education and skill; EU political and economic debates about migration as the EU population ages; decisions over transition periods for free movement of labour and over whether or not permanent safeguards are proposed.
- EU Budget: what sort of deal for 2007-2013, especially what funding goes to the central and east European member states, and what deal is done on agriculture and structural funds. What sort of deal is done for 2014-2020.
- Public opinion in EU and Turkey: what is happening to public opinion, does Turkish support remain strong. Which EU countries' publics have most doubts. Impact of negotiations and adjusting to the acquis on Turkish public opinion.
- EU political debates over Turkish accession: which countries, governments or opposition parties or individual politicians are supporting and explaining positively the process of Turkish accession and which opposing and/or pushing for derogations during negotiations. Impact of government or

leadership changes in different countries, especially in France, Germany, and Cyprus. Is there a French and/or an Austrian referendum on Turkish accession.

- Turkish political debate on the EU: does opposition grow (and how much) and remain obstructionist. What sort of wider debates develop in Turkey on what the EU is and should become as a political organisation. What sort of member state does Turkey look like being.
- EU constitutional treaty: is it ratified. What role if any does the question of Turkish accession play in referendum campaigns.
- Turkish and EU foreign policy: how do both develop. What happens in the Middle East, including in Iraq and Iran. As Turkish reforms progress is there a peace dividend (i.e. lower military spending). What progress in relations and disputes with Armenia, Greece and Cyprus. Is the Ankara Agreement extended to all 25 EU member states and consequences of this.
- Dynamics of negotiations: positive but tough or various EU players stalling and creating problems (whether individual member states, officials in the Commission, new governments coming in). Are permanent safeguards and derogations proposed, suggesting a second class membership. How do bilateral political relations develop between Turkey and each of the 25 member states – more political dialogue and support for joint projects.

INTRODUCTION[1]

In the last 5 years, and most notably in the last two years, Turkey has been undergoing a radical process of political, economic and social change. Turkey is moving in the direction of establishing a modern, pluralistic democratic system and a stable, growing and modernising economy. But it is still in the middle of this dynamic reform process: much has been done but much remains to be done.

Turkey's own internal political, economic, social and cultural characteristics underpin and explain much of this radical process of change. At the same time, it is clear that Turkey's relationship with the EU since 1999 has had a very important effect on the reforms, in part through the EU acting as a catalyst – and *demandeur* – for reform, and in part through the positive impact the goal of EU accession has had on providing a framework within which different groups in Turkish society have come together to debate and promote reform. As such, Turkey's reform process is a major credit to the Turkish government and society as a whole, and is also a considerable plus for the EU, demonstrating how the EU's enlargement policy can impact positively on countries wishing

[1] This report draws on a large number of interviews carried out in November 2004 in Ankara, Istanbul Diyarbakir, Brussels and London with a range of Turkish, Kurdish and other European and international commentators, including politicians, officials, journalists, academics, NGOs, thinktanks and businesspeople. These interviews were carried out on an off-the-record basis so no attributions are given. I also benefited from attending the conference "Turkey and the European Perspective" organised by the Unia & Polska Foundation (Warsaw) and the Centre for European Studies, Middle Eastern Technical University (Ankara) in Warsaw, November 8 and 9 2004. The paper also draws on interviews carried out in May 2004, as detailed in my earlier paper Hughes, Kirsty (2004), *Turkey and the European Union: just another enlargement?,* Friends of Europe Report, Brussels. I would like to thank very much all those who have contributed to this paper through interviews and comments on drafts, and their willingness to share their time, expertise and views with me. The author alone is responsible for all views expressed and any errors made.

to join the Union. The EU's formal recognition of Turkey as a candidate country in 1999, and its commitment at the end of 2002 to take a decision at the end of 2004 to start accession negotiations if Turkey met the so-called political Copenhagen criteria,[2] have been vital steps in giving the EU goal salience in Turkey's political reforms. The decision of the European Council in December 2004 to open accession negotiations with Turkey, in October 2005, marks the start of an important new phase in EU-Turkey relations.

The process of political and economic reform in Turkey has generated substantial domestic political debate, including many tensions and political complexities. Not all groups and actors across Turkish society support or trust all detailed or substantive aspects of the reforms, or those who are driving them, all the time – much mutual suspicion exists on goals, implementation and overall commitment. There is also ongoing opposition to the reforms from a number of sources. At the same time, there is strong support for the goal of EU membership – opinion polls regularly show 70% or more in favour of joining the Union. Nonetheless, there is also opposition to the EU goal from various parts of Turkish society.

On the EU side, there is recognition, as demonstrated firstly in the European Commission's key October 2004 report,[3] and secondly in the decision of the 17th December 2004 summit, of the rapid and extensive progress made by Turkey in its bid to open membership negotiations. While the governments of most EU member states have indicated their support for Turkish accession and the December decision to open negotiations (subject to certain conditions) was agreed unanimously among the 25 member states, Turkey's candidacy has been

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[2] The political Copenhagen criteria state that a prospective member must be: "a stable democracy, respecting human rights, the rule of law, and the protection of minorities".

[3] European Commission (2004), "Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession" 6th October SEC(2004) 1201.

strongly contested by a variety of politicians and political groups in the EU. Public opinion is also currently not in favour. A variety of arguments have been deployed to make the case for and against Turkish membership of the Union, with some arguing it will be an important positive and strategic development for the EU – with benefits ranging from foreign policy and security aspects, to democratic and cultural advantages, and others arguing it will impact negatively due to Turkey's size, relative poverty, location, culture and religion.

Turkey still has a long way to go to meet all the conditions for full membership of the EU, and the usually tough process of EU negotiations may be particularly difficult in this case, both due to objective conditions, such as Turkey's size and level of economic development, and due to the political dynamics on both sides – the successful but unfinished political reform process on the Turkish side, and the ongoing debate within the EU about Turkey's position in the future EU, a Union whose own future direction is both not entirely clear and also contested.

Faced with such a complex political picture, and with the prospect that Turkish membership of the EU will not take place before 2015 – assuming the process is successful – it is important to understand both the ongoing political development of Turkey, and the likely political impact of Turkey on the evolving European Union. This is the aim of this paper. It sets out to analyse the current and likely future political development of Turkey (section one), the likely political dynamics of negotiations (section two), and Turkey's likely impact on the EU of tomorrow (section three). The paper focuses principally on the political issues, and does not present a detailed economic impact analysis, but since economic and political trends and reforms do interact, broader political-economic interactions are also considered where appropriate in the analysis.

1 POLITICAL REFORM DYNAMICS IN TURKEY

1.1 Introduction – Democracy on the Move

Whether in Istanbul, Ankara or Diyarbakir, the energy and dynamism of political debate, argument, hopes and conflicts over Turkey's future and its accession to the EU is almost palpable. Probably more people in Turkey were aware of the date of the EU summit on December 17th than in any EU member state. From Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the AKP government, to Turkish and Kurdish women's groups, human rights and civil liberties NGOs, opposition politicians, senior officials and diplomats, business groups, journalists, academics and key parts of the military, a highly unusual, strong (though certainly not unanimous) consensus has built up in Turkey – in the last two years in particular – supporting an extensive process of domestic reforms, and supporting the goal of EU accession, and looking to that goal to underpin the domestic reform effort.

This reform process is far from finished and many tough debates, decisions and action to ensure implementation lie ahead. It is a tumultuous process of democratic development, with many, perhaps even all, of those in favour of reforms and the EU goal, questioning some aspects of the reform process – the need for, or risk of, particular changes, the underlying motivations and reliability of different players, the likelihood of real implementation – while at the same time, arguing about what to prioritise next, where the problems lie, who is responsible and what sort of modern, democratic society is the goal. Suspicions and lack of trust between different pro-reform segments of society often run very deep.

On top of these varied, questioning and energetic debates among the broadly pro-reform groups, there are also groups resisting reform whether publicly or from behind-the-scenes. Much of this opposition comes from parts of the nationalist left and right, and from significant parts of the bureaucracy and military and political establishment, who fear either genuine dangers for Turkey in the process of reform and/

or EU accession, or fear for their own positions of power, influence and rewards from the existing system.

Yet both the extensive reform achievements in a very short period of time, and the political energy and passion invested by different groups in this debate, give some reason for confidence that this dynamic process of democratic renewal and development will move successfully forward, not least with the crucial EU decision to open accession negotiations in 2005. But the successful completion of reform is far from guaranteed. Turkish society and its political structures and actors broadly defined have both got to absorb, internalise and implement the reforms made so far, and to debate, agree and implement many more.

This section first assesses the EU's impact on the Turkish reform process and then looks at the politics of reform in more detail. It analyses the political leadership provided by the Justice and Development party (AKP) in government and how the tensions and range of views and interests in Turkish society have been managed. It then assesses both progress in reform and the many areas where more remains to be done, not least in full implementation of new laws. The section then considers in more detail some of the main political debates and issues that will impact both on the continuation of the reform path and on the type of Turkish democracy that will emerge at the end of the process. In looking at these political debates it considers: the secularism-Islam debate, Kurdish rights and the conflict in the South East, human rights and minority rights, women's position in Turkish society, the future role of the military, and the way economic performance may impact on all these debates and on the reform process. The section concludes by setting out four scenarios of what sort of democracy and society Turkey may be in 10 years time.

1.2 EU Influence

The influence of the European Union in this political reform process has been considerable. The impact of the initial recognition of Turkey as a candidate country in 1999, the same year as the declaration of a ceasefire in the conflict in the South East by the PKK, encouraged some initial reform steps. This process was rapidly accelerated and brought to life by the unexpected victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) at the end of 2002, just before the EU commitment in December 2002 to take a firm decision on negotiations in December 2004. This positive conjunction of a major change in Turkish politics – with the almost complete rejection of the then Turkish political establishment parties, bringing to power a majority government, with only one opposition party in parliament – combined with the EU setting out clear conditions on which it would decide whether to open accession negotiations, allowed the intrinsic pressures for reform in Turkey to develop into a strong and sustained dynamic of change, albeit a contested one. Accession negotiations will certainly be tough but once they start they too should add a further positive impetus to reform.

As other candidate countries – and indeed member states – have found, pointing to external demands and conditions from the EU can frequently help unlock and promote domestic changes that while desirable in themselves, may nonetheless be too contested to be successful without the twin external pressure and goal provided by the EU. It is in part precisely the detailed nature of EU demands – whether in meeting specific political criteria or aligning with detailed EU laws, regulations or positions – combined with the rather intrusive process of monitoring of domestic developments that accepting candidate status brings, that gives the EU the considerable impact it has had both in Turkey and in other countries.

Yet at the same time in Turkey, the EU goal also plays a more 'macro' political role: the extent of support both in the general public and across different political and social groups in Turkey for the goal of EU accession means that the EU goal

helps to provide a strong glue promoting broad political consensus for reform, and helping to keep in check or hold the ring for the varied and often deep mutual suspicions that different political and social actors hold towards each other. This 'ring-holding' effect of the EU has been important in allowing the AKP government to push through sensitive reforms that would previously have been rejected by key elements of the so-called 'deep state', especially the military in their self-perceived role as the guardians of Turkish national integrity and secularism.

So the EU goal allows many different groups in Turkey to redefine and argue about how to build a reformed modern democracy while restraining their varied fears. For the military (not anyway a homogenous group) and for traditionalist Kemalists, together with other segments of the secular, establishment elites, the EU can both confirm their long-held goal of being part of the modern western group of countries while reassuring them (but only to some extent) that greater political freedom and recognition of human rights will not simply open the floodgates to a takeover or destruction by fundamentalist Islamists or separatist Kurds or other ethnic or minority groups.

A growing range of NGOs is beginning to flourish in Turkey, and for many civil society actors, the EU goal supports them in their attempts to build a genuine civic space and pluralist democracy, without facing charges that their actions and goals are undermining national security or the integrity of the state (or at least facing fewer such charges). Likewise, for the Kurds but also for many other ethnic or religious groups in Turkey, the EU offers a route to achieving greater political freedoms and human rights, including cultural rights and recognition, and to debate the development of a pluralist Turkey where multiple identities are accepted, without facing charges – political or legal – of separatism or aggression (again the EU lessens rather than removes the difficulties faced). For more conservative Islamic groups and political parties, notably the AK party, the EU goal increases the space

within which they participate in Turkish politics and facilitates their making demands for greater religious freedom and rights, without immediately running into total opposition (although strict secularism for now remains).

Business organisations have been of particular importance in the push towards the EU goal – in part motivated by the benefits of participation in the single market and by the contribution EU recognition can make to underpinning macroeconomic stability, but also because many businesses have recognised the need for a more flexible modern democracy, if economic development is to flourish (from entrepreneurialism to modernising education and training systems, increasing female participation in the workforce, and managing the ongoing agriculture to services transition). The fact that the EU can act as a political ring-holder as described here, is understood by major parts of the business community and underpins their pro-EU approach.

This positive impact of the EU on the political dynamics of reform in Turkey is neither simple nor comprehensive. It contributes to the management of fears, suspicions, doubts and disagreements among the variety of Turkish political, social, economic and military actors. It does not remove the fears or differences of view nor provide some magic solution to difficult and contested reform steps, but it contributes towards the easing of previously stationary blocks to reform.

So the EU has been a crucial catalyst but is only one part of a complex process. The tough but vibrant process of contested reform – a process which in itself starts to demonstrate and embed a new democratic dynamic – is driven, moulded and impeded by the interactions of Turkish political debate and political life. The eventual outcome of these political processes will depend on how the different goals, actions and fears of all the different groups involved are ultimately fought through and resolved. More voices in Turkey are increasingly recognising, too, that while the EU goal is important, nonetheless as a mature, functional and self-respecting democracy,

Turkey must own and demand these reforms, across the board, as changes wanted for their own sake, and not just to fulfil EU demands. Such a dynamic of externalisation and internalisation of ownership of reforms is one that has been seen in many previous candidate countries: over time, the more successful and well-rooted the reforms are, the less important the EU 'ring-holding' and incentive function will be – although for many countries this function of the EU has continued long after they have joined.[4]

The EU decision to start negotiations and the negotiation process itself will mean that the EU continues to be a significant influence on Turkish political developments and policy reforms. Meeting the demands of the *acquis* will have a major impact on Turkey, as in other countries. But the EU has also made clear its determination to ensure full completion and implementation of reforms necessary to fulfil comprehensively the political Copenhagen criteria over time. To this end, as the European Commission proposed in October 2004,[5] and the December 2004 EU summit agreed,[6] a link may be created between the speed and success of political reforms and the speed of negotiations, together with the possibility of an emergency brake to the whole process if major political problems erupt. Properly applied, such processes should be an effective positive but conditional approach. But a highly contested accession process – with foot-dragging and obstructionism on the EU side – would undermine much if not all of the positive influences on Turkish political reform that the EU has shown it can have.[7]

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[4] Some Brussels commentators suggest that Turkey already 'owns' its reforms much more strongly than fellow candidate country Romania.

[5] European Commission COM (2004), 656 final "Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's Progress towards accession", Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament.

[6] Council of the European Union (2004), "Brussels European Council 16/17 December 2004 Presidency Conclusions" 16238/04 Concl 4.

[7] The likely dynamics of negotiations are discussed further below.

1.3 Political Leadership and Managing Reform

The success of the AKP in the November 2002 elections was in many ways the culmination of, and reaction to, a variety of longer and shorter run trends in Turkish politics and society. The 1980s and 1990s were turbulent decades, with the limits and instabilities of Turkish democratic politics, and concomitant lack of human rights, only too clearly shown, from the military coup in 1980, to the so-called 'post-modern coup' of 1997. At the same time, the devastating conflict in the mainly Kurdish South East, lasting for 15 years or so until the PKK ceasefire in 1999,[8] the ongoing and periodically highly visible extent of corruption in Turkish political and economic life, and recurrent economic difficulties and crises, including most recently the major financial crisis of 2001, together with the social and political impact of the 1999 earthquake (and the inadequacy of the political and military response and the further corruption it demonstrated) all came together to underpin a widespread desire for change and rejection of the traditional political establishment – whether left, right, secularist or Islamist.

In this context – where the main bright spots were the PPK ceasefire and the EU recognition of Turkey's candidacy – the AKP established itself as a broad coalition, drawing on a core of the reform movement that had split with the more conservative Islamists around former premier Erbakan's Welfare Party (ousted in the 1997 'post-modern coup'), but bringing together in a conservative party a rather diverse group of politicians with a mixture of nationalist, conservative, religious and secular leanings, looking to a wide range of voters from conservative rural Turkey, to an emerging conservative middle class separate from the cosmopolitan urban elites, to small and business entrepreneurs, and to many of the urban poor. Erdogan himself has compared it to a traditional European centre-right Christian Democratic party (one name

[8] The PKK successor group *Kongra-Gel* declared an end to the ceasefire in May 2004.

the party considered as it was being formed was Democratic Conservative).

In very pragmatic style (that would be perhaps well understood by those in the UK who defined the 'New Labour' project), the party founders commissioned several opinion polls and identified a large group of around 46% of the Turkish electorate who were opposed to the then existing parties, and concerned with a number of core issues such as unemployment and corruption. Rather than target a very small percentage of non-conservative Islamist-leaning voters, the decision was taken to appeal to this broad group. The AKP won 34% of the vote in the 2002 general election – enough given the 10% hurdle for representation in the Turkish parliament to give it a parliamentary majority – and subsequently 43% in local elections, underlining both its broad appeal and its initial success in government. The one opposition party in parliament, the Republicans People's Party (CHP) has been reduced to a supporting role in the advance towards the EU.

The success of the AK party and government, both electorally and in driving reforms forward, has surprised many both inside and outside of Turkey. For many in Turkey, particularly in the establishment, Kemalist, and nationalist elites, the idea of a traditionalist conservative party with Islamic roots – and of a Prime Minister in Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who as mayor of Istanbul was seen to have deeply conservative to fundamentalist Islamic sympathies – being the leader of an unprecedented, radical democratising and modernising process, which has taken Turkey rapidly closer to the EU than any other party or government, is almost unimaginable even after two years of AKP government. While some in the secularist establishment have revised their views and reduced their suspicions of the AKP and government as its achievements mount, others remain deeply suspicious of potential 'hidden agendas'. But the AKP government has strong public support, and many western diplomats have also been impressed by its political skills and achievements, concurring with much of the

wider public that this is one of the best governments Turkey has seen.

Erdogan and the AKP government have taken advantage of and promoted what has succinctly been called a recasting of the modernisation and westernisation drive of the Kemalists as a drive for Europeanisation and democratisation.[9] Many of the more nationalist elites, with their emphasis on a homogenous, unitary state and national identity, and with recourse over the decades to authoritarian and military support to protect that version of modernisation and democracy, have been left on the back foot, as supposed opponents of Turkey's modernisation project – from Islamic traditionalists to Kurdish politicians and activists – have recast themselves and/or better explained themselves as the pluralist, modern democrats.[10] Adopting – to varying degrees – the language of global human rights and cosmopolitan democracy, multiculturalism and pluralism, a range of groups in Turkey, not only the government, have come together in support of a radical, even revolutionary process of reform (what foreign minister Abdullah Gul has called a silent revolution).

In the process, the traditional Kemalist, nationalist, strict secularist project has been shown up as neither fully modern nor fully democratic. While some nationalists and parts of the military oppose much of the reforms and the EU goal, the

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[9] Eralp, Atila (2004), *Turkey and the Enlargement Process of the European Union,* Middle East Technical University Ankara.

[10] For a more in-depth discussion of these complex and long running trends in Turkish politics and society see for example: Aydin, Senem and Keyman, E. Fuat (2004), *European integration and the transformation of Turkish democracy,* CEPS, EU-Turkey Working Paper No 2; Keyman, E. Fuat and Onis, Ziya (2003), "Helsinki, Copenhagen and beyond" in Ugur, M. and Canefe, N. (eds.), *Turkey and European Integration,* Routledge; Jung, Dietrich with Piccoli, Wolfango (2001), *Turkey at the Crossroads,* Zed Books; Rumford, Chris (2003), "Resisting Globalization?" *International Sociology* Vol 18; Rumford , Chris (2002), "Placing Democratization within the global frame: sociological approaches to universalism and democratic contestation in contemporary Turkey" in *The Sociological Review.*

current military leadership is cautiously supporting the EU goal and associated reforms, while more modern Kemalists and other secularists (who would reject a Kemalist label) also support the EU process and democratic reforms, while remaining suspicious of Erdogan's real agenda.

Some of those who remain suspicious question whether Erdogan and some of his colleagues are hiding their real intentions behind a pragmatic mask – some suggest traditional Islam allows precisely this *takkiye* or dissembling, although political dissembling and pragmatism is not unknown in the politics of most countries. But many disagree and suggest that the realities of power and the success of governing with a considerable popular mandate will ensure a moderate, pragmatic approach. Many in the AK party also argue that if some Iranian style imposition of *sharia* law was the hidden aim, moving towards the EU would hardly be a way to underpin such an aim. But other traditionalist, nationalist secularists express deep concern, interpreting attempts to ease access to university for students from *imam hatip* schools, or the criminalisation of adultery proposal (put forward and rapidly withdrawn under both domestic and EU pressure) as indicative not simply of deep conservatism but of an anti-Turkish fundamentalist agenda.

Given its broad coalition nature, some question how long the AKP will hold together, but success can provide a strong political glue. Some are also talking about a possible bid by Erdogan for the Turkish Presidency in the 2007 elections. Others are more concerned with the need for a stronger and more credible opposition to grow up to ensure a healthy lively democracy (and indeed some in Brussels suggest that demonstrating 'irreversibility' of Turkish reforms implies at some point it being seen that an opposition party moving into government will continue the direction of, and support for, reforms). The 10% voting support limit for representation in parliament provides a block to many parties, in particular – but not only – to Kurdish parties. Some suggest that Erdogan and the AK government could in a few years change this

voting limit, and that it is their very strength in parliament that could give them the confidence to do this, since such a shift would not automatically mean an end to their own dominant political position, while it would resolve some of the democratic concerns the 10% limit currently poses.

1.3.1 A Rapid Reform Process

Once in power, the Erdogan government embarked on an extraordinarily rapid, extensive and in many cases politically delicate set of political reforms. Building on constitutional and other reforms that had already taken place since 1999, they drew momentum from the election results and from the EU's promise of a decision at its 2004 summit on opening negotiations,

Overall, between 2001 and 2004 Turkey introduced two major constitutional reforms and 8 major legislative reform packages,[11] together with a major revision of the penal code which will come into force in April 2005. This extensive reform process has covered a wide range of areas and institutions. Major changes have been made to civil-military relations to bring them into line with international democratic standards. This includes important changes to the National Security Council, making it an advisory body with a civilian secretary-general, increased civilian control (including auditing control) over military and defence spending, and removal of military representatives from important civil bodies such as the High Education Board and the High Audio-Visual Board. The state security courts have also been abolished.

Major changes have been made in the broad area of human rights, from the abolition of the death penalty, to a new policy of zero-tolerance of torture, improved rules for detention of suspects (to an extent which, some lawyers say, at least on paper make them among the best in Europe), removal of many but not all restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly,

[11] Detailed in European Commission (2004), "Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession" 6th October SEC(2004) 1201.

and improvements to minority rights, including some new freedoms for broadcasting and language courses in languages other than Turkish, including Kurdish and other languages (albeit still under many restrictions). Major legislative improvements and changes have been made in women's rights and gender equality, in particular through the extensive revision of the penal code. Other changes have been made to the judicial system, including greater compliance with decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, and a number of international conventions have been ratified in the areas of both corruption and human rights.

Many of these reforms have involved the breaking of major taboos in Turkish society – from tackling the political role of the military, to recognising some Kurdish and other minority rights, through to the willingness demonstrated in 2003 and 2004 to move to backing a compromise solution to the Cyprus problem and support for the UN's Anan Plan (the referendum on which failed in April 2004, with the Turkish Cypriots voting to support the plan and the Greek Cypriots rejecting it). The political achievement in getting sufficient political and public support across different groups and sectors of society for such wide-ranging and rapid reforms is considerable, and the complexity of the task should not be underestimated.

1.3.2 Problems in Reform

The breadth, depth and success of the reform process, and the major political challenge in managing and leading this process should not be underestimated. Ensuring sufficient consensus to move forward, while both breaking long-standing taboos and impacting on the powers of various important interest groups in Turkey is a major political achievement. With such speed and breadth of reform, incomplete implementation may not be a surprise but it is a major problem. Many reforms remain incomplete for a variety of reasons. They include a mixture of deliberate obstructionism from low to high levels of the bureaucracy and the establishment – including in sections of the civil service, the judiciary, the military, police

and gendarmerie – and other problems, including the sheer time necessary to establish appropriate institutional structures, provide effective training and retraining, change organisation cultures and encourage a wider mentality change.

The government established a high level Reform Monitoring Group (chaired by foreign minister Gul) to monitor and tackle implementation problems, which has had some considerable impact. But the political challenge is wider than that of reform monitoring in various ways. Many political commentators and actors in Turkey consider that the Erdogan government has been having to tread a very fine line in promoting reform, in particular in not provoking an overreaction from the military, and in ensuring that changes that affect the military directly are discussed and agreed with them. Depoliticisation of the Turkish military is an ongoing process not a one-step change. Many point to the fact that the constitution, despite being a product of the 1980 military coup, has been amended not completely replaced as indicative of the relative power of the government to the military, and suggest replacement is necessary for full democratisation.

Nor is the military a homogenous group – its leadership is for now broadly supporting reforms and the EU goal, not least because of the public support for the goal and the democratic mandate Erdogan has, but at least some of the more junior ranks are said to be less supportive or opposed. Other political and bureaucratic actors opposed to reforms can also put many deliberate if hidden blocks in place. Some suggest those who are opposed to both the direction of reforms and to the goal of EU accession, are biding their time, waiting for a rebuff from the EU to weaken the pro-reform consensus and the government, and then to fight back more strongly. The continued existence of extensive problems of corruption in politics and economics adds to the problems caused by this opposition.[12]

[12] Transparency International's 2004 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Turkey in 77th place. Romania comes after this at rank 87, but all other EU member states and candidates lie above Turkey, including Poland at 67, Italy and Hungary at 44, France and Spain at 22, Germany at 15, the UK at 11, Denmark at 3 and Finland top at rank 1.

1.3.3 Commission Criticisms

In its regular reports on Turkey's progress towards meeting both political and economic criteria, the European Commission has assessed in detail both progress made and weaknesses and failings in the reform process. Its October 2004 report,[13] highlights both considerable progress but also many areas where much more remains to be done. It comes to the key conclusion that Turkey "sufficiently fulfils the political criteria" and so goes on to recommend "that accession negotiations be opened".[14] But political reforms, the Commission says, must be "further consolidated and broadened". It emphasises in particular the need for: "strengthening and full implementation of provisions related to the respect of fundamental freedoms and protection of human rights, including women's rights, trade union rights, minority rights and problems faced by non-Muslim religious communities. Civilian control over the military needs to be asserted, and law enforcement and judicial practice aligned with the spirit of the reforms".

The Commission considers that "corruption remains a very serious problem in almost all areas of the economy and public affairs". It recognises progress in eliminating torture but states that "numerous cases of ill-treatment including torture continue to occur and further efforts will be required to eradicate the practice". It also expresses considerable concern at ongoing limits on the freedom of expression including opening of criminal proceedings against some expressing non-violent opinion, and is concerned at aspects of the freedom of the press, including "the frequency of prosecutions against journalists". The Commission welcomes the establishment of a number of human rights bodies to monitor and guarantee

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[13] European Commission (2004), "Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession" 6th October SEC(2004) 1201.

[14] European Commission COM (2004), 656 final "Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's Progress towards accession", Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament.

rights but is concerned that their impact on the ground is limited and that human rights defenders are still subject to judicial harassment. It also welcomes the many legal changes to the rights of women but is concerned at the extent of violence towards women that exists, calling it "a serious problem".

The Commission also draws attention to problems of child labour, to significant constraints remaining in worker's rights such as the right to strike, to organise and to collective bargaining, and, while recognising the constitutional guarantee to freedom of religious belief, remains concerned at some problems faced by non-Muslim religions including ownership of property and training of clergy. While recognising progress in minority and cultural rights, it draws attention to the considerable restrictions that remain, especially in broadcasting and education, and emphasises the need to address the problems in the South East, notably the need to allow and support the return of internally displaced people to their villages.[15]

1.4 Further Reform and the Development of Democracy

Turkey is in the middle of a radical transition touching on almost all areas and aspects of political life. While in some ways, the extent of the reforms can be compared to the changes introduced into many of the central and eastern European countries after 1989, Turkey's reforms are occurring

[15] The European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee gave its response to the Commission report on 30 November 2004, supporting conditionally the recommendation to open negotiations – see European Parliament A6-0063/2004 "Report on the 2004 regular report and the recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession". For another comment on the reforms see Human Rights Watch, 4 October 2004: "Turkey: Progress on Human Rights Key to EU Bid" Press release and "Advisory Note to Journalists covering the Release of Regular Report on Turkey and Recommendations".

in a context of continuity rather than abrupt systemic change. In many ways this is to Turkey's advantage – democratic institutions are being reformed not introduced for the first time, and the market economy is being developed and modernised not introduced to replace a command economy.

Yet because Turkey is undergoing reform not revolution, the political, economic and social changes in some ways require more subtle and complex management, not least as some groups are seeing loss of power and privileges and threats to their established positions. Nor can all the changes be simply politically 'managed'. As already discussed, Turkish society is debating and contesting major systemic changes, and is beginning to address some difficult, contentious or taboos issues that in many cases have deep historical roots. Successful ongoing reform requires a mixture of effective shift in political and social power balances (not least from military to government), and a shift in mentalities – in different ways for different individuals and groups – together with the building of an ongoing consensus as to the broad outlines of the form of future Turkish democracy.

The continuing political debates in Turkey show the tensions and differences that remain over the future character of Turkish democracy, and the remaining taboos and controversies that have yet to be tackled. Central issues include: the debates around secularism and Islam in Turkey, Kurdish and minority rights and the resolution of the problems in the South East, full implementation of human rights – including women's rights, cultural rights and religious rights, the further development and genuine political acceptance of the role and existence of organised civil society, and the future role of the military. Many of these debates and issues are deeply interwoven. For example, there are multiple links between questions of women's rights and religious rights, the debate over the veil or headscarf, and the debate over secularism and Islam. Equally, solving the problems in the South East and Kurdish rights link to wider questions of minority rights and how and whether Turkey comes to define itself as a pluralist,

multicultural democracy or as a modernised but more unitary nationalistic Kemalist democracy.

The remainder of this section considers further some of these key issues. It also looks briefly at how economic trends may impact on these political debates and reforms, and then sketches out some scenarios of where Turkey's reforms may take it in the coming years.

1.4.1 Secularism and Islam in Turkey

The strict secularism adopted in Turkey has strong historical roots in the foundation of the republic in 1923 and the Ataturk drive for modernisation and westernisation, distinct from and in contrast to the Ottoman period. In today's Turkey, the reluctance expressed by many to allow a softer approach to secularism seems to rest on two related fears – of conservative Islam and of fundamentalist Islam. Thus, many express concern that allowing fuller expression of religious identity and less control by the state may encourage the spread of conservative Islamic views and behaviour which will lead to social pressure on other Turks to adopt many elements of such a conservative lifestyle, possibly reinforced by conservative, religiously-inspired social legislation.

The more general fear is that greater freedom, and such a development of conservative Islam, will allow full reign to political Islam to further its aims of establishing a full sharia law based state, similar to that in Iran or other fundamentalist countries. This also links to the view that political Islam is an externally-inspired threat, although most accept that Iran is no longer trying to export its Islamic revolution to Turkey. Despite these fears, many in Turkey will emphasise both that Turkish Islam and its historical roots is a moderate form of Islam and also that conservative to fundamentalist Muslims are probably not more than around 10-12% of the population, while the general public supports secularism.[16] As in many EU countries, Turkey is also facing the threat of fundamentalist-

[16] Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey (2004), *Turkey in Europe*

driven violence, including a number of bomb attacks in recent months and years.

While some try to present an image, especially in the EU context, of Turkey as a modern, secular democratic country where religion is strictly kept out of the public sphere – being an entirely individual matter and so demonstrating that the Ataturk goal has been fully achieved – the reality is much more complex. In the EU, the word secularism is often used to denote on the one hand a strict separation of state and religion, and, on the other hand, to denote a lessening of religious practice and strong belief. But in Turkey, with a population that is 99% Muslim (mostly Sunni Islam but with around 20% Alevis – among whom there is much debate as to whether Alevis are indeed a branch of Islam or a separate religion), secularism cannot be interpreted in either of these ways. While there is a wide range and diversity of intensity of belief and of actual practice, Turkey, compared to many other European countries, is a relatively religious country in terms of belief.[17] The state also plays a major role in controlling religion.

In terms of the state-religion divide, secularism is strictly enforced in public spaces, so that Islamic symbols or dress, notably the veil or headscarf is banned in schools, universities, parliament, and civil service (nor is restricted access to public life and work simply a female issue, since traditionalist Islamic men can also find access to the public space, in-

[17] For an illuminating discussion see Boland, Vincent (2004) "Turkey is becoming a re-religious society and trying to join a post-religious Europe" *Financial Times*, 5th October; see also Jung, Dietrich with Piccoli, Wolfango (2001), *Turkey at the Crossroads,* Zed Books.
In a recent survey on religious belief in Europe, only 20% of western Europeans and 14% of eastern Europeans said they attend a religious service regularly; 35% of western Europeans and 42% of eastern Europeans believe there is a personal God, while 36% western and 29% eastern believe there is 'some sort of spirit or life force'; and 55% of western and 34% of eastern Europeans think there are 'many true religions'. Gallup International Millennium survey quoted in The Guardian (2004) "Europe's theo-cons rally their forces", 3rd December.

cluding in the civil service, police and military is restricted). But at the same time as banning religious symbols in public spaces, the Turkish state strictly controls the practice and teaching of Islamic religion in Turkey, with the department for religious affairs – the Diyanet – controlling issues from religious education in schools, to building of mosques and training of Imams.[18] Control, rather than suppression or genuine separation, has been the mantra for many years. Indeed, as many authors have examined,[19] after the 1980 coup, the military in fact encouraged the development of moderate Islam, in what was called a Turkish-Islamic synthesis, including making religious education compulsory in schools, and the development of *imam hatip* schools, with the aim of encouraging moderate Islamic belief to form part of the unitary, nationalist Turkish homogenous identity, and help, in their view, to overcome some of the violent, divisive left- and right-wing politics and military reaction of the 1970s, and to counter Kurdish separatism.

The overall goal of building a unitary national identity to protect the integrity of the Turkish state led the military and Kemalist traditionalists over the years, in varying directions in their attempts at social engineering to achieve this goal. Thus, by 1997 the military engineered so-called 'post-modern coup' that removed Erbakan from power, since by then *imam hatip* schools and other such encouragement of religion were once again seen as threatening to unity. A similar about turn was also seen with respect to the Alevis: in the early 1980s (and before), as part of the attempt to build a common Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the development of a separate Alevi identity was strongly discouraged, with mosques built in Alevi villages

[18] US Department of State (2003), *Turkey: International Religious Freedom Report.*

[19] See, for example, Aydin, Senem and Keyman, E. Fuat (2004), *European integration and the transformation of Turkish democracy,* CEPS, EU-Turkey Working Paper No 2; Jung, Dietrich with Piccoli, Wolfango (2001), *Turkey at the Crossroads,* Zed Books; van Bruinessen, Martin (1996), "Kurds, Turks and the Alevi Revival in Turkey" *Middle East Reports* No 200.

and Sunni religious education made compulsory for their children. But by the early 1990s, this policy was reversed, as an Alevi identity became seen as preferable to a Kurdish identity (since many Alevis were also Kurdish) as the conflict in the South East raged on.[20] Meanwhile, given the conflict with the Kurds, the very fact of encouraging and defining a Turkish-Islamic synthesis alienated further the Kurds and ensured that using religion as a glue would certainly not work while Islam was brought into the ambit of unitary Turkish nationalism.

The secularism-Islam debate remains a powerful, divisive and contentious theme in Turkish politics. Some optimists consider that a more modern flexible secularism can be developed, seeing prospects for traditionalists and extremists on both sides to become more moderate. Others are much more wary, convinced that control of fundamentalism can only be guaranteed with the maintenance of the current strict Turkish practice of secularism/state-controlled religion. This long-running deep seated issue remains a central political issue but it is now strongly affected by the wider current of rapid democratic reform within Turkey, and by the context of the EU membership application, and by a yet wider global context and discourse, on the one hand, of human rights and cosmopolitan democracy, and on the other hand of the so-called war against terror, and the fears of fundamentalist-inspired terrorism.

The Headscarf

The *hijab* or headscarf has become the most potent symbol of this debate, which then inevitably spills over into other connected debates on human rights. Many secular human rights and women's NGOs, in asserting and calling for both women's rights and religious rights as part of the wider range of basic rights, do now argue that it is, and must be, a woman's

[20] Although in 1993 and 1995 there were serious incidents of violence against Alevi communities – van Bruinessen, Martin (1996), "Kurds, Turks and the Alevi Revival in Turkey", *Middle East Reports* No 200.

individual choice and right to dress as she likes, and that traditional (mostly male) conservative secularists and Islamists on both extremes should stop focusing their fight and disagreement over the control of what women wear. Indeed if conservative men on both sides would start arguing and practising genuine respect for gender equality, and tackling some of the very serious problems of abuse of women's rights in Turkey across the board, many fears and problems, not only those concerning Islam could start to be resolved.

However, there is no unanimity here – some secularist/ Kemalist women's NGOs have argued strongly for the ban on the headscarf to remain, and many people express fear at the possible increase in social pressure to adopt the headscarf, and other conservative pressures if a more liberal approach is adopted.[21] Certainly the emphasis of some in the AK party and other conservative Islamists on the headscarf while showing much less or no concern for other aspects of women's freedom or wider human rights demonstrates the wider need for fundamental change if this issue is to be resolved and depoliticised.

International human rights organisations have also waded into this debate. Human Rights Watch, (HRW), has called for women's individual rights to be respected, and for full access to higher education for all women irrespective of their independent decisions on head covering.[22] HRW also argue for a full consultation and debate with women throughout Turkey

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[21] For a range of views on the headscarf, see, for example, Belge, Murat (2002), "Turkey – normal at last?" Open Democracy; Kepel, Gilles (2004), *Jihad: the Trail of Political Islam,* I.B Tauris and White, Svend (2004), "Hijab hysteria: France and its Muslims", Open Democracy.

[22] Human Rights Watch (2004) "Turkey: Headscarf Ban Stifles Academic Freedom" 29th June and Human Rights Watch (2004) "Memorandum to the Turkish Government on HRW's Concerns with Regard to Academic Freedom in Higher Education, and Access to Higher Education for Women who Wear the Headscarf", 29th June. HRW also argue that the European Court of Human Rights judgment that Turkish universities can ban wearing of the headscarf is deeply suspect and expect it to be challenged on appeal.

to look for a way ahead that can assuage fears and promote rights on all sides, rather than seeing the decision as a zero-sum game in either direction. As many women's NGOs argue, full promotion and protection of women's rights across the board would be the best means to ensure women have a genuine choice. But this would need to be – and seen to be – firmly rooted in practice over time to convince many.

A number of commentators and activists do think that the time will soon come for a more liberal approach to the headscarf, so that the issue is depoliticised, (though many see it as too delicate for Erdogan to tackle soon precisely because of the suspicions already raised about his religious views). Overall, to continue banning the headscarf in universities and in parliament and in public offices, amounts to an extensive discrimination against women in the workplace rather than simply reflecting a particular form of secularism and so the status quo may be unlikely to hold.

Relation to EU Debates

Despite the recent debates and subsequent decision in France over banning the headscarf in schools, Turkish secularism is stricter than that seen in any EU country.[23] The European

[23] Interestingly, some aspects of what some call Turkey's 'identity crisis' are rather similar to some of the debates in France. France has put the emphasis on defining all its citizens as French, both in nationality and identity, and has aimed to reinforce that through its own emphasis on secularism, or more correctly laicité. France has faced problems in integrating and accepting its own minorities but resisted a more multicultural approach. Yet the failure of the simple, unitary approach to French identity to resolve the challenges of a multicultural, multi-ethnic society have contributed to a sense in France of a wider identity crisis. Like the strict secularism and nationalism found in some part of the Turkish elites, French elites have been disturbed in particular by what they see as conservative Islam and the headscarf has become a symbol of the debate in France as in Turkey. As one commentator suggests "it could be said that in key respects Turkey is too European in that it shares with France a rigid and (for human rights) lamentable concept of state secularism", Halliday, Fred (2004), "Turkey and the hypocrisies of Europe", Open Democracy, 16th December.

Commission has avoided taking a stand in this debate, and officials refer to the range of practice and interpretation of secularism, the varying role of the state in religion, and the varied nature of multiculturalism in different EU member states (some in the Commission it seems were relieved at the ECHR decision stating that headscarves could continue to be banned in universities, allowing them to stand back from commenting on this contentious issue).[24] It is not a condition of EU entry for Turkey to have resolved its debates over secularism and multiculturalism (not least when related debates are taking place in EU member states). Nonetheless, faced with adopting such parts of the *acquis* as the anti-discrimination in the workplace directive (which bans discrimination at work on the grounds of religion, ethnicity, age, sexual orientation and disability), Turkey may find that the EU accession process will add to pressure to change some of its strictest definitions of secularism. The European Parliament has also shown that, for now, a liberal approach to anti-discrimination is in the ascendant – with the resignation in November 2004 of the Italian Commissioner-designate, Rocco Buttiglione. The EU is a secular body, and attempts to include religious (particularly Christian) references in its new constitutional treaty were rejected. But it is a secular body that emphasises pluralism and anti-discrimination, and this combination will impact on Turkey as it develops its relations with the EU, possibly disturbing both strict secularists and conservative Islamists alike.

The secularism-Islam debate in Turkey is multi-layered – and the excessive focus on the headscarf does not help elucidation of, or progress in, the debate. As Turkey modernises and develops its democracy, many of these debates and conflicts are in effect about the development of pluralism and a more

[24] Some international human rights observers have expressed surprise and disquiet that while the European Commission placed great emphasis in its October 2004 report on the rights of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey, it ignored the issue of the rights of the wider Sunni Muslim community.

multicultural Turkey, concepts which for many are still fraught with difficulty, given the long assertion of the Kemalist goal of a unitary Turkish national identity, and with both political Islam and Kurdish separatism in particular, defined as serious – and for many externally-inspired – threats. Yet while the global western discourse of human rights and pluralism may suggest the development of a much more flexible approach in Turkey, the diversity of approaches in different EU countries also shows there is no single model.

Adding much more complexity to this debate, is the increasing debate in different EU countries about the integration of minorities and multiculturalism, a debate partly stoked by populist fears of immigration but also by the fall-out from 9/11, and the fear of fundamentalist-inspired *jihadic* terrorism (witness the current debates in the Netherlands fuelled by the murder of film-maker Theo Van Gogh). While on the one hand, many in Turkey often say that the EU in accepting Turkey as a member will show the EU to be a secular, multicultural body, on the other hand, Turkey is struggling with the extent to which it itself will become multicultural and how to deal with recognising and managing its own ethnic and religious diversity.

While the debates in Turkey and various EU countries differ not least because countries such as the Netherlands, UK, France or Germany are debating issues concerning their Muslim minorities, and these debates are frequently tinged with both xenophobia and Islamophobia, they are also in other ways quite similar debates – Turkey too is debating not only how and how far to be multicultural but also how to respond to conservative and fundamentalist Muslim groups within its society. Turkish debates and reforms are focused on putting more trust in the strength of democracy, in an EU context, and not in the military or authoritarianism to repel threats. The Kemalist message of strict secularism as the means to counter fundamentalism is being challenged in this contemporary debate, and does not seem to provide any helpful lesson for example to an EU country such as the UK, where its own

multicultural approach, while far from perfect aims to promote inclusion and limit alienation.[25] What is perhaps ironic in some of these debates, is that fear of Islamic fundamentalism and of fundamentalist-driven terrorism in Turkey is in some quarters greater than those fears in the EU. But both in Turkey and in various EU countries, there are ongoing and unresolved debates as to how to ensure that democracy both allows social diversity and rights, without being undermined by this diversity and intolerant currents within that diversity.

Moreover, with respect to issues of terrorism, it is clear that all European democracies are vulnerable to terrorism – whether strictly secular Turkey, secular France or more multicultural Britain. The challenge is to tackle the terrorism without compromising civil liberties and human rights and denying diversity, and in the case of religious-fundamentalist terror to tackle terrorism without stigmatising ordinary citizens who are Muslims. While Turkey as a modernising secular democracy with a population who by religion are mostly Muslim should be in a position to make a major contribution to these European debates, its ongoing debates about its own identity, and the long-running fears of many that greater religious

[25] It is also ironic that where German conservatives in Bavaria have banned teachers from wearing headscarves in school, more or less explicitly related to a wish to prioritise Christianity over other religions, Turkish secularism would approve the ban though not the motives. A nice example of different European – and US – views is given by John Hanford, the US ambassador at large for international religious freedom (quoted in King, Tim (2004), "Secularism in France", *Esharp*) who has said "In France, wearing a hijab is considered anti-French. In America it would be considered anti-American to ask someone to take it off." The US attitude is similar to that in the UK. Irshad Manji author of the controversial (among some Muslims) *The Trouble with Islam,* who has called for an Islamic reformation, has commented that she finds European discussion of Muslims and Islam obsessed with the headscarf, while Americans are obsessed with Islam and terror, International Herald Tribune (2004) "A Muslim braves Europe's secular zealots", 19th November.

freedom may encourage fundamentalism, mean it is in fact not yet making such a contribution.

One simple but important lesson perhaps from these overlapping currents is that living with, managing and accepting diversity, in modern rights-based democracies, requires ongoing debate to produce policies which both guarantee rights and ban discrimination and promote respect by all for each other's rights, at the same time as ensuring social cohesion and inclusion, not isolation, of different groups. But different fears – from fear that one's own rights and differences will not be respected to the fear of terrorism – make such policies much more difficult to reach agreement on.

Three different issues and policy agendas here also need more disentangling in these pan-European debates: diversity and inclusion in modern multi-ethnic, multicultural societies; guaranteeing rights in the face of intolerance or fundamentalism from some; and tackling terrorism from whatever sources. Turkey in its own political reform process is indeed having these debates but has not come to any broad consensus on them, and differences of view in these debates precisely underpin many of the tensions in the Turkish reform process.

1.4.2 Kurdish Rights and the Conflict in the South East

The other big fear of the Kemalist establishment and military has been the spectre of Kurdish separatism. The 15 year violent conflict in the South East left around 30,000 dead, many hundreds of thousands or more forcibly displaced from villages, the economy in the South East in a desperate state, and human rights largely absent. But the combined effect of the PKK ceasefire, after the capture of their leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, with the recognition in the same year of Turkey's EU candidacy (and so the demand for rights reforms), followed by a lifting of the state of emergency in 2002, and then the reforming AKP government of the last two years, has allowed important changes to begin and the taboo issue of Kurdish rights finally to start to be raised and tackled.

The Kurds – who number around 15-20 million in Turkey[26] – are particularly strong supporters of the EU goal, with opinion polls suggesting support levels around 78% compared to 74% across the population as a whole.[27] Expectations in much of the South East of Turkey are extremely high as to the impact of a positive decision to start EU accession negotiations. Many Kurds see the EU process as a way to establish full human rights including cultural rights and to tackle the dire economic situation in the South East, without being accused of separatism. The impact of the PKK ceasefire and the end of the state of emergency in 2002 were important. There are now great concerns at the end of the ceasefire in May 2004, and there is almost no support in the Kurdish population for a renewal of conflict. While many Kurdish commentators suggest that taboos have been broken and the new situation is the start of a breakthrough, many ordinary Kurds in the South East remain doubtful and suspicious of seeing real change, but welcome the relative normalisation – reflected in less violence on the streets and in ordinary people (whether in shops, planes or teahouses) actually being willing to talk to foreigners rather than too scared to talk.

Under strong pressure from the EU, new laws have been passed allowing some – highly restricted – scope for broadcasting in Kurdish, and in other minority languages such as Bosnian and Arabic, and for Kurdish and other language classes, though great resistance to this change and to its implementation was experienced. The restrictions on broadcasting and language classes mean that so far public television is broadcasting 30 minutes of Kurdish language programmes

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[26] These figures are according to European Commission (2004), "Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession" 6th October SEC(2004) 1201, though some suggest these figures are too high, with numbers actually speaking Kurdish possibly around 10 million. Kurdish people live all over Turkey, not only in the East and South East – many having migrated (forced or voluntary) from rural areas live in the peripheries of the larger cities.

[27] Yilmaz, Hakan (2004), *Euroskepticism in Turkey,* Bogaziçi University.

one morning every week, while Kurdish language courses are open only to those who have a basic school education certificate – so excluding not only children, but any less educated or illiterate adults which includes a large number of women in the South East. For many Kurds, the most important element of these reforms is simply the taboo-breaking recognition of the existence of the Kurdish people – as one commentator remarked in an interview for this report "even one minute of broadcasting would have had the same effect".[28] These changes then reflect the ending of a taboo and the start of a situation where greater rights can and should follow.

But the situation in the South East remains grim – the area still has a heavy military presence, and in towns like Hakkari and Van it is reported that while military vehicles withdrew from the town centre in the last 1-2 years, they are now returning again, while the military also periodically introduce checkpoints to control both individuals and vehicles. Reports of torture and ill-treatment continue, and many see the Erdogan government as still too weak and/or reluctant to challenge either the military or rogue regional police chiefs in order to insist that zero-tolerance to torture starts to be respected in the region. Without such respect for the new laws, police and gendarmerie behaviour and mentality will change little it is feared. Some lawyers report still having problems of access to clients in detention in contravention of the new regulations, and local human rights organisations experience considerable judicial harassment and police monitoring.

A number of Kurdish commentators consider that torture can and probably eventually will be stopped as the changes take root and especially as the government grows stronger but express greater concern looking forward at whether, and the extent to which, genuine cultural rights will be allowed. One local TV station was recently suspended for a month after

[28] Satellite TV in Kurdish is broadcast into Turkey from a Kurdish station in Belgium and listened to by many.

broadcasting a few sentences in Kurdish, and others report Kurdish cultural traditions such as wedding ceremonies under threat from authoritarian governors. Others report more positive, if minor developments – for example, in the past, children sometimes were given two first names – a Kurdish one to use at home, and a Turkish one to use in public life, while now Kurdish names are seen as more acceptable, though some still report problems (including with the use of letters that are in the Kurdish but not the Turkish alphabet). Kurdish can still not be used in schools, so many children especially in rural areas arrive at school speaking only Kurdish to be spoken to only in Turkish. Doctors who go out to villages often experience communication problems where villagers speak only Kurdish and the doctors only Turkish. Meanwhile, some parents are said to be reluctant to teach their children Kurdish, seeing it in the current situation as of little use to them in later lives. The reluctance with which the first few steps to cultural rights have been taken indicate it will not be an easy process to move towards general and free use of the Kurdish language in schools, universities, the media and wider political and social life.

Development of a modern Kurdish political culture is still difficult. The 10% share of votes limit on political representation means Kurdish parties cannot break through into parliament, and the Kurdish party Dehap is under threat of closure. More positively, with her release from prison earlier in 2004, former Kurdish MP Leyla Zana is aiming to establish a broader Kurdish political movement. But many doubt how much more progress can be made unless and until the conflict in the South East finally comes to an end. The ending of the ceasefire in June 2004 has not led to all out hostilities but there is renewed fighting in the region. While many in the region suggest that this is a defensive reaction by the PKK/Kongra-Gel to military activities, other observers argue that this is a deliberate tactic ('blackmail' in the words of one) by Ocalan, from his prison cell, to try to ensure that he and his movement are not excluded from the reform process and any

new political settlement.[29] Splits in the PKK do not make interpretation of developments any easier: Ocalan's younger brother Osman Ocalan, has established a rival – declaredly non-violent – organisation. Most agree that unlike at earlier stages in the conflict, there is no support for renewed violence among the public.

Some suggest that the conflict could be halted quickly by a general amnesty for those involved, with perhaps a time limit excluding those involved in violence from political participation. Such an amnesty is seen as crucial both to end the violence but also to allow Kurdish political parties and organisations to develop away from the shadow and pressure of the PKK. But others argue that after so many deaths and violence on both sides, it is difficult if not impossible for the government to agree to a ceasefire in the face of resistance from the military and the wider Turkish public. The EU has shown a reluctance to get involved in the question of the conflict itself, focusing instead on human rights and economic issues.

Many emphasise that an equally urgent problem in the South East, together with halting the violence, is to tackle the grave economic problems of the region. They argue that a major regional economic strategy is a vital and urgent route to stability. Unemployment in the largest city in the region, Diyarbakir, is said to be between 60-70% – and similar figures are found in other nearby cities. About a third of Diyarbakir's population – around 300,000 out of one million people – are internally displaced people, who moved out of their villages through forced migration during the conflict (overall estimates of numbers of displaced people vary from around 350,000 to 3 million). Returns to villages are proceeding slowly for a variety of reasons – some quote resistance to returns by the military, together with the continued existence

[29] Some also question why the military allow Ocalan to communicate his views with such apparent ease to his followers and to the media, given that access to him is strictly controlled.

of around 50,000 of the armed and notorious village guards (who should be rapidly disbanded), and say that villagers are asked to sign forms saying they left originally because of the PKK, though government officials deny this. The economic and social challenge and cost of returning to derelict villages and unfarmed land – often still mined – is very large. The European Commission has expressed its concern in its regular report at the slow progress in managing village returns.

Overall, the challenges in stabilising and developing the South East and in expanding political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Kurds remain considerable, despite the improvements of the last two years. These challenges also relate to a wider and controversial discussion now taking place in Turkey over the recognition and rights of minorities. Kurds themselves often say they do not want to be seen as a minority but as equal citizens from the republic of Turkey, yet some Kurdish human rights lawyers doubt whether Kurdish rights can be achieved and guaranteed without defining them in an internationally recognised way as a minority.

1.4.3 Human Rights and Minority Rights in Turkey

The issue of minority rights burst strongly into Turkish public debate in November 2004 with the publication of a report on minorities by the Human Rights Advisory Board, an advisory body to the Prime Minister. In a moment of high drama and controversy, at the press conference to launch the report, one of the members of the board, grabbed the notes from the head of the board and tore them to pieces. In the ensuing public and media debate, the government distanced itself firmly from the report (leaving, some critics said, the authors exposed to vilification and criticism) – while some from the nationalist right suggested its authors should be charged with treason.[30] Many academic observers and human rights commentators suggest the report is a good and serious one and that the

[30] See The Economist (2004), "Haunted by the Past", 13th November and Aljazeera.net (2004), "Rights Report sparks row in Turkey", 2nd November.

furore shows that these issues have been taboo for too long but at least now they are entering into wider, if not yet very rational, discussion. While observers suggest that so far the debate is creating more heat than light, more optimistic commentators suggest that the fact that the debate is beginning is a significant first step.

Turkey in fact encompasses extensive ethnic and religious diversity. The two largest minority groups are the Alevis (a religious minority) and Kurds (some of who are Alevis). Some suggest that up to 47 different ethnic groups can be identified in Turkey.[31] Officially, the only minorities recognised in Turkey were defined by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne to be three non-Muslim religious groups – orthodox Greeks, Jews and Armenians. Not only did this not recognise other religious minorities but it also ignored ethnic and linguistic definitions of minorities, which is not compatible with modern international human rights law on minorities. The report called for a broader definition of citizenship, so that citizens could be citizens 'of Turkey' (in Turkish *Turkiyeli* – of Turkey), rather than Turks[32]. While the furore around the report shows the strength of feeling among those concerned to defend a unitary homogenous approach to Turkish identity, and the fear of the so-called 'Sevres syndrome' (fear of the break-up of Turkey) reinforced for many by the Kurdish conflict, others argue, as does the report according to news reports, that if the original Lausanne Treaty had been respected, including its provisions allowing people to use their own language in media, teaching etc, then many minority rights problems would not have arisen, not least perhaps the whole Turkish-Kurdish conflict.

The minorities debate can be seen in the context of the wider effort to legislate for and implement a range of fundamental

[31] According to the European Commission other larger minority groups include one million Bosnians and three million Circassians, see European Commission (2004), "Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession" 6th October SEC(2004) 1201.

[32] The Economist (2004), "Haunted by the Past", 13th November.

rights in Turkey (as discussed above). The full implementation of these rights is taking time, due to deliberate resistance in many areas of the administration, judiciary, police and military, and due to the wider need for widespread understanding of rights and a change of mentality among the wider public – and indeed among politicians – together with establishment of effective and independent institutions to defend human rights. While a human rights commission does exist and a series of provincial and local human rights boards have been established, a number of human rights commentators believe stronger, more independent bodies are needed that have the trust of the public. At present, individuals making complaints of torture or ill-treatment are much more likely to go to local branches of various human rights NGOs than to the official boards.

Both Turkish and international human rights activists and commentators are also concerned that many of the problems to do with effective implementation of the zero-tolerance of torture policy, lie in the fact that many police and gendarmerie still operate with effective impunity, and that there is a lack of serious investigation, prosecution and punishment of cases of torture and ill-treatment.[33] They emphasise that this is not principally a question of education and training but of going beyond that to a genuine tackling of impunity, including establishment of effective independent bodies such as a police complaints commission. Regional differences are noted by some, with the situation in Ankara being said to be improving much more than in some other regions.

A further disturbing aspect of the human rights situation is the pressure that human rights defenders and organisations are still under. Many human rights workers report substantial levels of judicial harassment, with large numbers of legal cases brought against them and close police monitoring of

[33] Amnesty International (2004), "Turkey: Insufficient and inadequate – judicial remedies against torturers and killers", EUR 44/037/2004, 16th November.

their work.[34] This situation is not helped by a political environment that does not yet appear to be fully accepting of the democratic and political importance of a pluralist civil society space where NGOs operate. In the run up to the 17th December EU summit decision, human rights NGOs were criticised by politicians including Erdogan himself (including suggestions of connections to terrorist groups) for making public their criticisms of the current human rights situation, i.e. for doing their job. Erdogan and others do not seem to appreciate that their publicly expressed lack of tolerance for the activities of such NGOs undermines rather than strengthens their claims to meet the EU's political criteria fully (and also casts doubts on the credibility of some AKP members who argue for the ending of restrictions on wearing the veil as a human rights issue, while ignoring or questioning other key human rights issues or activists).

This relates to other problems of freedom of expression, not least in the university sector, a problem still emphasised by international human rights associations.[35] At the same time, the NGO sector has developed rapidly in recent years, and NGOs do report positive interaction with and consultation by government: embedding this into a more widely spread understanding and support for organised civil society is the challenge over time.

1.4.4 Women and Equality

Women's NGOs are a particularly strong element of Turkey's growing set of civil society organisations. Their grassroots and political activity across the country represent a vital dynamic in the political and social struggle to improve women's rights, and the genuine respect of those rights in Turkey. They are

[34] One human rights defender commented that when his organisation holds press conferences, they may have 15 people there and 50 police to observe.

[35] Human Rights Watch (2004), "Memorandum to the Turkish Government on HRW's Concerns with Regard to Academic Freedom in Higher Education, and Access to Higher Education for Women who Wear the Headscarf", 29th June.

also a clear example of popular and widespread support for political reform in Turkey and are a direct contradiction of those who suggest that change in Turkey only comes from the top down, and that the EU's impact is simply one more aspect of top down methods of changing Turkish politics. Political reforms, especially the recent changes to the penal code and to the constitution, and earlier changes in 2001 to the civil code, represent a big step forward in women's rights and gender equality – a major paradigm shift according to one commentator.

Women's NGOs have mostly strongly welcomed the EU goal and the impact of EU political demands, together with the future impact of adopting EU social legislation including gender equality laws. But they also emphasise their own long-running activities in pushing for legal, social and political change. One good example of this was seen in September 2004 when Erdogan made the badly-timed and controversial attempt to introduce changes to the penal code that would have criminalized adultery – this led to strong protests from the EU (only a very short time before the European Commission's vital October 6th report was due). But there were also strong domestic protests (as well as voices in support) with over one thousand women from all over Turkey demonstrating outside parliament with banners stating "Our bodies and our sexuality belong to us" – a protest that Erdogan apparently referred to as ill-mannered. While some saw in the adultery proposal the underlying fundamentalist nature of key AKP politicians, others suggested it was simply a conservative proposal more inept than deeply suspicious.

The situation of women in contemporary Turkey is rather diverse, with class, education, religion, ethnicity and urban/rural background all impacting on women's social, economic and political situation. While the overall women's employment rate is strikingly low (at 25% compared to an EU average of 55 %), female employment in many of the professions – from law to academia to medicine – is relatively high. But politics is a particular and major black spot, with women accounting

for only 4% of national MPs, and for a tiny proportion of mayors in local government (under 1% – 25 out of 3234 mayors). Nor, as the AK government follows the normal Turkish political tradition of introducing its members and supporters into senior and then less senior levels of the bureaucracy, is this seen to be a process favouring women in any way. The AK party's conservative and religious make-up is not one of its most positive characteristics given the need for a real political lead to be given to ensure women in Turkey have both fully respected human rights and full social and political participation. Nor, given the above figures on political representation, can previous governments claim any much greater achievements on women's rights.

Violence against women in Turkey is one of the most serious problems facing Turkey in its attempts to show it is tackling basic human rights.[36] So-called 'honour' crimes against women[37] are only one particularly striking part of a range of violent crimes and attacks that need to be tackled not only by legal changes but also by major attempts to change cultural attitudes. Revisions to the penal code have been welcomed greatly by women's groups, with almost all their demands for changes to the code being met, with crimes against women now fully and properly understood as crimes against women as individuals not as some wider crime against a family or community. But much remains to be done – Turkey currently has only 9 'safe houses' for women fleeing domestic violence, and women's groups report that police frequently simply send women back to their domestic environments when they come to the police for protection. Rural to urban migration has also added to pressures. The forced migrations from Kurdish villages to towns and cities are cited by some academics and women's groups as having lead to increased economic and

[36] See, for example, Amnesty International (2004), "Turkey: violence originating in the family", 2nd June.

[37] The large majority of which are said to occur in the East and South East within conservative tribal Kurdish society – Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey (2004), *Turkey in Europe*.

social dislocation pressures which have led to greater levels of violence.

Education is another area where women suffer discrimination in Turkey, often in rural areas where levels of school participation, and subsequently of literacy are much lower among girls and women than among boys and men (overall female illiteracy is estimated at 19% and much higher in some rural areas).[38] A number of national and internationally sponsored programmes, including from the World Bank, together with women's NGOs are starting to tackle these problems but they remain entrenched. As Turkey copes with a range of socio-economic trends – its growing, young population, its ongoing trend shift from agriculture to services and from rural to urban living – then it will need urgently and comprehensively to tackle both the overall modernisation of its education systems, and to ensure full and equal participation of girls and women in that system and subsequently in the labour market, and in political and social life.

In the area of gender equality, as with many of the other areas of political reform in Turkey, major progress has been made with radical changes to laws and rights. And as with other areas, much remains to be done in terms of full implementation and social and political acceptance and understanding of the changes. Women's NGOs and activists in Turkey are playing an important role both in driving through some of the necessary changes – through activism at political level and through intensive grassroots work on the ground. As such they also contribute to the dynamic and vibrant organised civil society that is taking off in Turkey – whether politicians like it or not. Indeed the challenge for politicians is not only to begin to accept fully the legitimate and democratic role of NGOs but also to improve their interactions and consultations with these bodies – something that certainly many women's NGOs consider still leaves considerable room for improvement.

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[38] European Commission (2004), "Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession" 6th October SEC(2004) 1201.

1.4.5 Future Role of the Military

As Turkey continues its political reform process and its debates about the form and nature of its future democratic society, the likely future role of the military is a recurring theme. Will the military stand back and allow the process of democratisation and Europeanisation to continue, together with the inevitable reduction in its previous powerful role in society, or will it become obstructionist? For now, many commentators are optimistic.

Major changes have been made to civil-military relations, and other elements of the democratic reforms, where progress has been made, are issues of high sensitivity to the powers and views of the military – from Cyprus to rights for the Kurds. But more remains to be done: some suggest the National Security Council should be abolished entirely, and many consider that Erdogan is still treading a tightrope in his relations with the military. Certainly, it seems that some of the blockages in forcing through genuine application of new laws in the human rights area are to do with relative government weakness. But the military has changed institutionally in some ways and is led for now by a modern and moderate chief of the general staff. The military has supported the EU membership goal – even if this support is not uniform either at higher levels or through the ranks (as in other parts of the Turkish establishment, ultra-nationalists and hardliners remain). The moderate army leadership see that there is strong support for the EU goal among the wider public, that overall the EU-driven reforms are taking modernisation forward, and also, crucially, that the EU framework can in future provide guarantees on the integrity of the Turkish state, against both political Islam and political extremism of other types.

Despite its support for the EU goal, the military still watch the political process extremely closely and periodically comment on political developments.[39] Apart from its concern to defend

[39] Including at monthly press briefings – see The Economist (2004), "Not Quite at Ease", 27th November.

the unitary Turkish state, and to ensure political reforms are not destabilising this aim, the military is, and will continue to, lose power as the reforms continue and as it moves towards a more democratic, professional army role. The military budget is also large, with 2004 reported to be the first time the education budget will exceed the military one. As Turkey moves towards the EU and resolves problems with its neighbours, in particular EU neighbours, then there may be a 'peace dividend' with a reduction in military spending, though this could be strongly resisted.[40]

While some elements of the military will no doubt continue to resist and obstruct reform where they can, many commentators are optimistic that overall, as long as the political reforms move forward with public support and the EU goal draws closer, the military will accept a fundamental shift in its role. Some point to the Turkish military's experience in peacekeeping in Afghanistan, the Balkans and elsewhere, as showing military leaders that they can still have a significant professional role to play. Eventual integration into the EU's common foreign policy and its security and defence policies – and the growing importance of joint EU action on border issues, international crime and terrorism –should all act to reassure the military both about its role and about the benefits of EU membership. However, if the EU process slows or becomes very contentious, the military may not continue to take a backseat. Some also worry that if the EU process were to breakdown completely, the nationalists would take over again, and that the military would at that point urge an isolated Turkey to go down the nuclear weapons route.

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[40] According to NATO data – www.nato.int – NATO (2004), *Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (1980 – 2003)* Table 3 "Defence Expenditures as % of gross domestic product" – Turkey has the highest expenditure on defence relative to GDP of any NATO country at 4.8% in 2003, with the Europe average at 2.0%, the overall NATO average at 2.7% and the next highest after Turkey being Greece at 4.2%. Resolution of outstanding border and other disputes between Turkey and Greece would open the way for a major peace dividend in both countries.

Overall, for now, the military is still a political player, and still very much understood in Turkey to be one. Reforms have been considerable, and tough – but as elsewhere in the reform process, they need to be completed, fully implemented, and require a wider mentality change, not only in the military but also in the wider public and elites, including among those who trust more in the military than in Turkish democracy to defend their rights.

1.4.6 Economic Influences on Political Reform

As discussed earlier, Turkish business and business associations have been important supporters of the move towards EU accession. Moreover, while meeting the Copenhagen political criteria was the key test set by the EU for its decision on negotiations in December 2004, economic issues are central both to the ability to conduct accession negotiations and to the momentum and context of political reforms.[41] Turkey has made remarkable economic progress since the financial crisis of 2001. Without this progress, it is hard to conceive either that the dynamic of political reform could have moved forward so successfully or that the EU would be ready to consider opening accession negotiations.

While current economic prospects are probably the best in many years, continuing economic stability and growth will be vital as the complex political reform dynamics continue to unfold. With astute political timing, Turkey agreed what is meant to be its final IMF programme – an exit programme – just days before the 17th December 2004 summit[42]. Some of the central issues in the discussion with the IMF were problems arising from Turkey's very economic success. With economic growth expected to be at least 10% in 2004, and

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[41] For a fuller discussion of economic issues in accession, see my earlier paper Hughes, Kirsty (2004) *Turkey and the European Union: just another enlargement?,* Friends of Europe, Brussels, and references therein.

[42] See Financial Times (2004), "Turkey agrees new $10bn standby deal with IMF", 14th December.

with investment, interest rates and the exchange rate all performing well, the macro success is leading to strains on the current account, with a possible deficit in 2004 of 5%. How to tackle this deficit and to maintain the overall positive macro performance, and move forward on micro reforms are all key issues. Inevitably, not least due to its economic success, the government would like, and is under some political pressure, to increase spending, develop social protection and to cut tax rates, while the IMF still urges caution on these issues. So these short to medium-run political-economic challenges have to be tackled successfully.

At the same time, not only will Turkey in the coming decade face all the challenges associated with adopting the EU's *acquis* (discussed further below), it also has to deal with longer-run trend shifts in its economy – many of which are potentially positive but still imply considerable structural and institutional change. Turkey has a young and for now growing population (though fertility rates are falling to European levels). This could be highly beneficial for the economy over the next 20 years as a bulge of young people come into the workforce (and potentially highly positive more widely as the predominantly young population supports and demands real political and social modernisation). Some Turkish economists hope that this demographic bulge could allow it a window of opportunity to emulate the Asian tigers, with rapid growth and rising competitiveness, and building on a strong entrepreneurial streak in Turkish society. Added to this trend, as the Turkish economy and society modernises, the ongoing rural to urban/agriculture to services trend will continue, and female participation in the workforce should increase dramatically.

These longer run trends are all potentially positive but pose considerable policy challenges. The Turkish education system is badly in need of modernisation across the board. Assuming this challenge can be met, then the large numbers of educated, skilled young people coming into the workforce will need to find adequate numbers of jobs, including women as well as men. The rural/urban shift is already straining the infra-

structure of the largest Turkish cities, and it is clear that modernisation of agriculture and trend shifts out of agriculture need to be accompanied by rapid regional development – both of infrastructure and of regional urban centres and employment opportunities. The informal economy remains very large, accounting for over half of employment according to the OECD which has underlined the problems this creates.[43] Changes in tax structure and a major improvement in tax administration are needed.

Both political reforms and economic performance are currently on the right track for managing these trends and turning them into a virtuous circle of growth and modernisation. EU support funds, which can impact strongly on training, infrastructure and regional development, are set to rise. The current political and economic changes in Turkey are already leading to a visible increase in foreign investors looking at investment prospects. A rapid and large take-off in foreign direct investment is possible, although more micro barriers – not least of which corruption (as problematic in the economic as the political sphere) – will need to be removed. The impact of moving closer to the EU on sustaining a positive dynamic and reducing economic and political risk was seen within two days of the December summit when the Turkish central bank announced a cut in interest rates and an overhaul of monetary policy.[44]

If Turkey sustains its current political and economic momentum then both shorter run economic issues and trend changes are susceptible not only to effective management but to creating a positive, dynamic prolonged period of structural change and growth across the country in the coming decades. But as this short overview demonstrates, there are many areas that could lead to stumbling blocks if not properly tackled – from

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[43] OECD (2004), *Economic Survey - Turkey 2004: Establishing an open and non-discriminatory business environment*

[44] Boland, V. (2004), "Turkey promises monetary shake-up", *Financial Times,* 20th October.

education to maintenance of macro stability, unemployment and corruption. Continued economic success will underpin and support the political and social transition Turkey is going through, but any major economic problems will equally act as potential drags on reform, making it more difficult.

1.5 Turkey's Democratic Future in 2015 – Four Scenarios

Turkey is in the middle of such extensive processes of political and economic change that it is difficult to look forward and predict what sort of society and political entity it will become in ten years time. How it changes will also be strongly affected by its ongoing interaction with the EU through the accession process – which is discussed in the following section. The impact Turkey will eventually have on the EU as a new member state will depend as much, or more, on the sort of society and democracy it becomes as on its more fixed characteristics, such as location, population size (not fixed but fairly predictable), ethnic composition, and religion. At the current time, the outlook is clearly positive, and that underpins the Commission's recommendation in October 2004 to open accession negotiations with Turkey.

By way of conclusion to this overview of Turkish political change and challenges in the reform process, it may be of value, looking forward, to outline some brief scenarios of where Turkey might be in ten years time. These scenarios are meant to be illustrative rather than precise predictions.

Scenario One:
Ahead of the Curve – A Model European Democracy
Turkey is a modern, vibrant, pluralist and multicultural democracy – a model to other EU member states and to other countries aspiring to democratic transformation and modernisation. It draws political, economic, social, and cultural strength and dynamism from its young and diverse population, with a new confidence in the strength that comes from its ethnic diversity and range of religious beliefs and practices – its citizens draw on multiple

identities and affiliations as part of an overall modern citizenship. Turkey no longer feels like an outsider in Europe or in the global community of modern democracies. It has resolved its own secular/religious tensions in a relaxed secular multiculturalism which gives it a real voice in European and wider debates and offers a real example to other EU countries and the rest of the world.

It has resolved the conflict in the South East and Kurds and other ethnic and religious groups have full social, political, economic and cultural rights. Big steps forward in women's rights are reflected in sharp rises in women's employment rates, dramatic increases in political participation and a sharp and sustained fall in violence against women. Zero-tolerance for torture has come to mean just that, with strong institutions backing it up. The military no longer play any political role and have not commented on political developments for many years – but the military is an active participant in European and UN peacekeeping missions.

Turkey is successful economically, with steady high growth, and a boom in foreign direct investment, while strong infrastructure and regional development underpin an ongoing rural/urban, agriculture/services transition. Social welfare systems have developed while entrepreneurialism is promoting a thriving business sector which is also benefiting from a reformed education system and well trained and motivated young people entering the workforce.

Scenario Two
– In the Mainstream – A Normal European Democracy
Turkey has become a modern European democracy respecting human rights including minority and cultural rights. Turkey is fairly dynamic politically, and more confident as a nation, drawing strength from its successful reforms and its young, growing population. The conflict in the South East has been resolved and Kurds and other

minorities have greater rights and start to feel like equal citizens of the republic.

But Turkey has not fully resolved all its internal political and social tensions. Arguments and divides continue between traditionalists and nationalists on the one side and those arguing still for more pluralism and multiculturalism. Secularism is more relaxed and Turkey is considerably more accepting of its own diversity and multiculturalism but, arguments continue about the role of religion and expression of religious identity. Women have full rights and equality on paper but this is not showing up fully in political or workplace participation, though the trend is in the right direction. Violence against women is still a problem but better institutions are in place to offer support and action. The military has withdrawn from political life and is engaging with EU and UN security policies. Cases of torture and ill-treatment are rare and reported cases are pursued strongly – there is no impunity for those responsible.

Economic development is reasonably successful but problems and tensions are arising from a growing young population with education reforms only partially successful, foreign direct investment growing but not very high, and unemployment threatening to rise. Rural/urban divides are still considerable and ongoing rural migration is causing strains in the larger cities and in economic and social policy. Both regional inequalities and problems in the modernisation of agriculture are causing debate over appropriate economic policies. Corruption has been tackled to a middling degree – it still causes problems in both economic and political domains.

The EU remains important as a ring holder for some of the political tensions that still exist and also helps to underpin confidence in the economic domain and to provide motivation for continuing reform.

Scenario Three – Lagging Behind – A Weak Democracy
Reforms have continued over the decade but many problems have been encountered and the process has been slow. Turkish democracy is rather weak. There is substantial corruption and problems of freedom of expression in the media, in universities and in political life. Religious rights are still contested and a rather strict secularism continues to be patchily enforced. Turkey continues to move towards the EU even so – implementation of reforms has moved forward, there are stronger civil liberties and organised civil society is fairly strong. The military has largely withdrawn from a political role but periodically makes political statements and there is an ongoing tussle within the military over where Turkey should be going.

Economic performance is middling, growth is reasonable but unemployment is rising, and political and social problems are arising out of the rural-urban divide and transition. Unstable and rather weak coalition governments are having difficulty in getting popular support to continue with reforms in the economic field, and little progress has been made in developing social protection systems. The resolution of the conflict in the South East has not been matched by adequate political and cultural rights for the Kurds – nor for other minority and ethnic groups – causing ongoing political tensions.

EU pressure and conditionality has impacted unevenly over time and is getting increasingly ineffective as a motivator for more reforms as the political and economic situation degenerates.

Scenario Four – Stagnant Turkey – Democracy in Retreat
The EU process first slows, then stalls and now looks irretrievably blocked from both sides. Democratic reforms have stalled and in some cases been reversed, with new controls on freedom of expression. Nationalists, religious conservatives and political extremists together with the

military have all been strengthened due to increased political instability, and growing social and political tensions. The secularism/Islam debate remains entirely unresolved and a source of major tension.

While most of the positive political reforms remain in place in the law books, there has been little implementation. Human rights abuses are taking place with increasing impunity. The conflict in the South East which had been resolved threatens to start again, aggravated by developments in neighbouring Iraq where civil war continues. Kurdish and other minority rights are minimal. Organised civil society is weak facing growing impediments to its operation and being criticised from all sides of the political fence. Reports of torture and ill-treatment are growing rapidly and international human rights organisations are issuing stronger and more urgent reports and warnings to the international community about Turkey's record.

Economic development is poor. Current account deficits and government debt together with excessive public spending lead to an exchange rate crisis in 2007. Subsequently, foreign direct investment more or less dries up, growth is low and unemployment rising. Many young people cannot find jobs and social tensions are rising. Corruption is endemic.

Caught between an EU no longer interested in dialogue and a highly unstable Middle East, the military is increasingly intervening in political life. Turkey is also facing international criticism and pressure due to suspicions that it is aiming to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities.

Which Scenario?

On current political and economic trends, and assuming a positive continuing engagement with the EU, scenarios one or two reflect the likely direction of future development. But

there is much work to be done and these two scenarios require effective political leadership and considerable consensus about the overall direction of reform – both these scenarios are 'success breeds success' scenarios. Scenario three is less likely at the current time but it could be seen as not entirely dissimilar to the situation of some of the weaker of the new member states and remaining candidate countries. Scenario four is the failure scenario, one that would result not only if the EU process were entirely blocked but also if Turkey failed then to continue forward in the direction of political and economic reform. It is a tribute to the strength and dynamism of current reforms that the trend for now is towards the first two scenarios.

2 THE POLITICS OF NEGOTIATIONS

2.1 Introduction

The EU summit on 17th December 2004 agreed unanimously to open accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. The run up to this decision was characterised by considerable public debate across Europe and there were detailed debates and argument among the governments of the EU 25 as the summit text was negotiated in the weeks before the final decision. Despite the various doubts expressed, the EU kept to its commitments made in 1999 and 2002.

As Turkey came closer to meeting the conditions for starting accession negotiations and as the December summit approached, the debates within the EU over Turkish accession grew stronger, and accession was more hotly contested. Much of this debate went back to first principles of whether Turkish membership was desirable in any circumstances, ignoring both the recognition of Turkey's candidacy by the European Council in 1999 and the initial association agreement in 1963. Some EU member states, or at least their governments, have strongly supported Turkey's membership bid as being clearly in the EU's own interests, others have many doubts. In some but not all EU countries the issue has been widely publicly debated, mostly with a substantially negative tone or slant.

In October 2004, the European Commission recommended opening negotiations, subject to a number of conditions, although this recommendation was strongly contested by a minority of commissioners. The European Parliament also expressed support for the starting of negotiations, passing a resolution two days before the summit – but again there was much debate among MEPs, within and across parties, and the Parliament's resolution includes a number of conditions and concerns.

The extent of the debate and doubts expressed within the EU both over Turkey's candidacy cast a considerable shadow, in the run up to the December 2004 Brussels summit, both over the achievements of Turkey in introducing rapid and radical

reform, and the EU's influence and role as a positive catalyst in those achievements. It has often been suggested that enlargement is the EU's most successful foreign policy tool: from the democratic and economic framework it provided to underpin systemic change in Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1980s, through to the recent 'big bang' 2004 enlargement bringing in eight central and eastern European countries and underpinning their transition achievements. The political and economic reforms in Turkey are part of this enlargement success story. The Turkish reforms are both desirable in their own right but are also strongly in the EU's interests – a stable, democratic and friendly Turkey, given its borders with the EU and its overall strategic location, is an unquestionable advantage. But the EU debate and opposition to Turkey's candidacy left the EU looking lukewarm in its approach to Turkish accession until the summit and failing to project its successful role in Turkish reform either internally or internationally. It is hard to imagine an individual country so signally failing to trumpet a notable foreign policy success.

With the achievement of a summit deal, one key question going forward is whether the EU will now resolve, or at least sideline, these debates and enter into a positive, dynamic negotiation process or whether the doubts and opposition will continue to hang over – and possibly undermine – the process. This will depend in part on whether it is possible to resolve the concerns expressed or whether, at the bottom of this debate, there are irreconcilable views about the Union's future and Turkey's impact on that. The summit decision is quite likely to represent an important new political phase where Turkey's candidacy and the negotiations become one accepted part of ongoing EU activity. But if key political players continue to debate and challenge the decision, and act obstructively where they can, and if these debates are not resolved, this could become the most contested enlargement the EU has seen.

This section starts by considering the range of views and arguments in the EU over the implications of Turkey's future

accession. It then considers the nature of the agreement at the December summit and whether the doubts of some member states resulted in any major biases or problems in the detail of the summit text. The section then assesses how the dynamics of the negotiation process may unfold, and whether the debates in the EU in the run-up to the negotiation decision mean that this will continue to be a highly contested accession throughout the negotiation process – or whether the fact of taking the decision and starting to negotiate will create facts on the ground which will change the political context.

The third and final section of the paper then looks further at the main political implications for the EU, given the analysis in section one of how Turkey's democratic transition is likely to proceed and given the analysis in section two of the dynamics of the negotiation process. It considers what sort of member state Turkey may prove to be and makes an assessment of the overall political and policy impact for the Union of Turkish accession.

2.2 EU Political Debates

The European Council took a unanimous decision at Helsinki in autumn 1999 to recognise Turkey as a candidate for EU accession. The leaders of the EU 15 then went on, in December 2002, to unanimously agree that if Turkey met the political Copenhagen criteria, the EU would open negotiations 'without delay'. Finally, in December 2004, the EU agreed to open accession negotiations with Turkey, subject to certain conditions discussed below. Despite these European Council decisions, a number of governments clearly harbour doubts about the desirability of Turkish accession, and, in a number of member states, opposition parties have been vocal in their disagreement, together with explicit or concealed opposition from various individual politicians, from former individual European commissioners to former presidents.

Member states showing the clearest positive support for Turkey, especially in the run up to the December 2004 de-

cision on opening negotiations, included, to varying degrees, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. The role of the European Commission, and in particular the outgoing enlargement commissioner Gunter Verheugen, was also particularly important in driving the process forward. Member states where either government and/or opposition and public are seen as having particular doubts include Austria, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the Republic of Cyprus.

With the exception of Cyprus, the new member states who joined in 2004 were seen as mostly not wanting to upset an important prior decision of the European Council, while also having some sympathy for the positive attraction of accession given their own recent experiences. Nonetheless, the right wing opposition in Poland, widely expected to win the elections in 2005, has more doubts, and other new member states including Slovakia and Hungary are considered by some to be less than fully enthusiastic.

Debates in France and in Germany have been particularly important, since opposition from either country would have made it impossible to move forward to negotiations – many doubters would have been happy to hide behind a French 'no'. Both Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and President Jacques Chirac played key roles before and at the summit – with Schroeder facing down criticism from the opposition Christian Democrats and Chirac facing major opposition in his own party, and both also facing negative public opinion on the issue.

2.2.1 Germany a Key Player

As with the 'big bang' enlargement to the eight central and east European member states (soon to be joined probably in 2007 by Bulgaria and Romania), the role and weight of Germany in supporting the enlargement process over Turkey has been particularly important. Both Chancellor Schroeder and foreign minister Joschka Fischer have clearly backed the process. Given Joschka Fischer's strongly integrationist views

on the EU – and his role in launching the strategic debate that led up to the drafting of the EU's constitutional treaty – his positive views have carried considerable weight. Fischer has argued that Turkish accession is in the EU's strategic interests, and will make a key contribution to the EU's ability to develop as a strategic power and to project stability in its neighbourhood, especially in the Middle East and Mediterranean, which he has argued is the most important region for the EU's future security and stability.[45] He has also argued that ratifying the EU constitution will be a vital step in ensuring that the enlarged EU can function effectively and develop as a strategic, geopolitical player.

Germany's position is in many ways similar to that of the UK which also stresses geopolitical and strategic advantages from Turkish EU membership. But as with the eastern enlargement, Germany's long and clear support for EU integration gives its support more weight with other countries and individuals. The UK's support, and in a similar vein that of Sweden, is seen as more suspect since both countries are seen as possibly or probably welcoming any impact enlargement may have in weakening EU integration and encouraging the EU to be a more intergovernmental body.[46]

But Turkish accession is a controversial issue in Germany, and the opposition CDU have been vocal in calling for Turkey to be offered some form of special or privileged partnership instead of full membership, and have also played an important role in pushing the European People's Party in the European Parliament in that direction too. Many in Germany are concerned that Turkish accession could weaken EU integration and undermine solidarity between member states. The CDU's

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[45] Joschka Fischer lecture, London School of Economics, 19th October 2004, see also his article Fischer, J. (2004), " Turkey's European Perspective: the German View" in *Turkish Policy Quarterly.*

[46] For a comparison of German and British positions on the eastward enlargement see Lippert, B, Grabbe, H. , Hughes, K. and Becker, P. (2001), *British and German Interests in EU Enlargement,* Chatham House.

arguments range from concern that at 25 or 27 the EU may not function well, even with the new constitutional treaty, and so more integration will become difficult, to concerns at the costs of further enlargement, and at the risk that if the EU's borders are not defined, the EU may expand further East and South and become simply a free trade zone.[47] While these are all general enlargement arguments, the CDU's bottom line in fact appears to be that Turkey is geographically not European (ignoring the accession of Cyprus, further East than a substantial part of Turkey's territory), since senior CDU spokesmen appear to accept that both Ukraine and Belarus are clearly European countries and so can have a full membership perspective.[48]

Some argue that there are in fact varied views within the CDU, with some uneasy at their party's opposition to Turkey when both German business and the US are seen to be in favour, and given that the CDU has traditionally had a pro-business and transatlanticist stance. It is not generally expected that a Christian Democrat victory in 2006 or at some later point would lead to a breaking off of negotiations – the EU's commitment would be respected. But CSU leader Edmund Stoiber has said that, if in government he would do what he could, with France, to block Turkey from full membership.[49] Even if his is not the overall government view, if the negotiations become difficult for whatever reasons, it is possible that a CDU/CSU government would be more likely to start pushing the alternative of a special partnership.

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[47] Hans-Joachim Falenski, foreign policy adviser, CDU/CSU Bundestag group, speech at the conference "Turkey and the European Perspective" organised by the Unia & Polska Foundation (Warsaw) and the Centre for European Studies, Middle Eastern Technical University (Ankara), Warsaw, November 8 and 9 2004.

[48] *ibid.*

[49] Financial Times (2004), "Turkey set to receive date for EU talks", 13th December.

2.2.2 France Divided

France's President Jacques Chirac has continued to support Turkish accession and to make the strategic case for it, despite the considerable political and public opposition in France not least from his own party, including from new UMP leader and presidential hopeful Nicolas Sarkozy, who has also argued for a special partnership instead of full membership.[50] France's position has been vital, since it has been seen as a country that could have shifted the decision in a negative direction given its political weight in the EU. Under domestic pressure, Chirac announced that a referendum would be held on Turkish accession once the negotiation process was successfully completed. This problematic decision means that doubts over the EU's commitment to Turkey's accession may remain to the end of the process but there is a precedent since France also held a referendum on the British, Danish and Irish accessions back in 1973. On the day of the summit decision, Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel announced that he too would call a referendum. Whether any other member states will follow suit remains to be seen.

French concerns are varied. France was a rather reluctant supporter of the Union's eastward enlargement seeing it not only as potentially weakening EU structures but also as reducing French political power and leadership in the EU. These concerns are clearly present again in discussion of Turkey's accession, not least since Turkey would be larger than France.

French debates also reflect a number of domestic issues. These include France's problems in integrating and accepting its own Muslim minority, the populist and xenophobic element in French politics reflected particularly in the electoral support for Jean-Marie Le Pen, related wider concerns and populist arguments about immigration, and wider debates about

[50] Financial Times (2004) "Sarkozy calls for new French success model", 29th November. Chirac has suggested under domestic pressure that a special partnership could be a fallback option, Financial Times (2004), "France urges EU 'fallback' on Turkey", 9th November.

identity, diversity and multiculturalism. Such concerns are also visible in other member states; not least those that like France already have Turkish immigrant communities, including Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands.[51]

Former French President Valerie Giscard d'Estaing has been particularly active in arguing against Turkish membership.[52] Like the CDU he puts much emphasis on geography but also admits the French concerns on Turkey's size. Where he is particularly disingenuous to the point of dishonesty is in firstly suggesting that the EU has fulfilled its commitments made in 1963 to Turkey by establishing a Customs Union in 1995 (arguing that in 1963 the EU was an economic not political body – an argument which British commentators are usually derided for by French and other commentators) and secondly in arguing that the EU is aiming to establish a 'European patriotism' and that the EU's constitutional convention aimed to define this in terms of Greco-Roman heritage, Europe's 'religious heritage' and 'the creative enthusiasm of the Renaissance, the philosophy of the Age of the Enlightenment and the contributions of rational and scientific thought. Turkey shares none of these'.

This struggle to find pseudo-intellectual and historical reasons for opposition to Turkey founders not only on their insulting nature but also on their inaccuracy, whether in suggesting no Turkish link to the Roman heritage or the comments on rational thought.[53] It is particularly ironic that there is at the

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[51] Germany has the largest number of Turkish immigrants at over 2 million, followed by about 200,000 in France, and smaller numbers in Austria, the Netherlands, UK, Belgium and Denmark, OECD.

[52] Financial Times (2004), "A better European bridge to Turkey", 25th November.

[53] For further responses to Giscard's arguments see: Staines, Anthony (2004) "Turkey in EU is start of fraternal links to Islam", letter, *Financial Times,* 29th November; Financial Times (2004) "A bit too late to go cold on Turkey : The EU has no choice but to embrace this Muslim democracy" editorial comment, 26th November; Wall, Stephen (2004), "If EU seeks peace and stability then Turkey is a prize", letter, *Financial Times* 26/11/04.

heart of Giscard's case a 'Christian Europe' argument, ironic not only because of French secularism but because of France's strong insistence, backed by Giscard as the convention chair, that the EU constitution should have no reference to God.[54] French opposition at bottom appears to rest on the interaction of a certain xenophobia with a French realpolitik dislike of a further loss in its political power in the EU caused by the accession of another large country (and a country that is the size of Germany – France has taken some time to get used to the idea since reunification that France is no longer equal in size to Germany).[55]

2.2.3 The EU Institutions

As well as divides within and across member states, the two other main EU institutions – Commission and Parliament – have also been divided over Turkey's membership bid. While the Commission made its positive recommendation on opening talks in October 2004, a minority of commissioners were opposed, and this explains some of the more negative language in the Commission's document not least the comments on the open-ended nature of the negotiation process. Concerns appear to be about how to absorb Turkey but also

[54] Giscard also argues that the draft constitution was not intended to accommodate a country the size of Turkey, one more tendentious argument given that Turkey will be the same size as Germany if it accedes in 2015.

[55] Because of its own failure to integrate effectively its own Muslim citizens, France looks to Turkey and sees two problematic characteristics – Muslim citizens and size – and does not see the similarity to itself – strong secularism and a lively and contested debate as to how to modernise its failing unitary national identity. Turkey as a member state might also take a rather 'French' view on a strong but not federal Europe.

have a marked xenophobic tinge.[56] Various divisions in the European Parliament also played out in the run up to the 17th December summit, with many in the European People's Party not in favour of Turkish membership, but more positive support from the Party of European Socialists (nonetheless somewhat divided not least because of French divisions in all party groups), the Liberals and the Greens. After many amendments and much debate, the European Parliament voted, two days before the summit, 407 in favour to 262 against (with 29 abstentions) to support opening accession negotiations. The informal eve of the summit meeting of government and opposition leaders from the EPP family together with EPP Commissioners and key MEPs after considerable debate also agreed backing for a deal at the summit.

2.2.4 EU Public Opinion

Doubts and political debate in some EU member states have also been reinforced by negative trends in public opinion. Eurobarometer data from 2002 suggest that in the old EU15 only four countries had a majority of public opinion in favour of Turkish accession (Ireland, Portugal, Spain, the UK).[57] Overall for the EU 15 public in 2002, 49% were opposed to Turkey's accession and 32% in favour.[58] Recent polls suggest opposition in France running at around 60% or higher, and at 50% (to 30% pro) in Denmark and two-thirds or more opposi-

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[56] See, for example, Financial Times (2004), "Fischler in attack on EU plans for Turkey", 9th September, and Financial Times (2004), "'Islamisation' warning cloud Turks' EU drive", 8th September. Former Dutch commissioner Frits Bolkestein notoriously warned that the 1683 Battle of Vienna would have been fought in vain if Turkey joins. This could be compared to the typical 'London taxi driver' argument that the existence of the EU means Germany has won through the Union what it couldn't win in World War II – both arguments failing to understand or accept the central existential role of the EU in overcoming past divisions.

[57] Eurobarometer (2002) Report No. 58.

[58] From the same poll, in the EU15 45% were opposed to both Romania's and Croatia's accession and 35% in favour of both; and 47%, 48% and 52% were opposed respectively to accession of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia and Albania.

tion in Austria. According to the Eurobarometer data, similar public opposition exists to most of the Balkan countries, including prospective members Bulgaria and Romania, suggesting the opposition to Turkey is perhaps not as country specific as some suggest.

A more recent Eurobarometer[59] asks whether member states support further enlargement but without specifying to which countries. Overall, 53% of the EU25 public support further enlargement but in a number of countries support is lower – in France it is 39% and in Germany 36%, the lowest being Austria at 28%.

Looking forward, one key issue is how these EU political dynamics and debates will spill over into the negotiation process. The Dutch presidency emphasised in autumn 2004 that it wanted to produce a 'sustainable' decision, but sustainability will depend not only on the compromises done at the summit but also on the subsequent negotiation process.

2.3 The 17th December 2004 Summit

The European Council on the 16th-17th December 2004 concluded that "Turkey sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria to open accession negotiations".[60] It asked the Commission to draft a framework for the negotiations with Turkey with the aim of starting negotiations on 3rd October 2005. The summit was something of a cliff-hanger with the draft text on Cyprus initially causing outrage on the Turkish side, and there were concerns and further negotiation too over the issue of permanent safeguards in some policy areas. But by the afternoon of Friday 17th a deal was done and hailed by both sides as historic. This agreement launches a new phase in

[59] Eurobarometer (2004), Report No. 62, first results.

[60] Council of the European Union (2004), "Brussels European Council 16/17 December 2004 Presidency Conclusions" 16238/04 Concl 4. This decision is subject to Turkey bringing into force 6 pieces of legislation highlighted by the Commission in its October 2004 report – these pieces of legislation have been adopted but are not yet in force.

EU-Turkey relations and one which will considerably change the political dynamics of the relationship, even though none expect the path ahead to be entirely smooth.

The summit text has two main sections relevant to Turkey – first the section (paragraphs 17-22) that is specifically directed at Turkey and secondly the section entitled 'framework for negotiations' which is meant to apply to Croatia and any other future candidates as well. Key points in the text include the following:

- The objective of negotiations is accession, but the outcome is open-ended as success cannot be guaranteed in advance. If a candidate eventually cannot meet the EU's accession criteria, efforts must be made to ensure it is 'fully anchored' in European structures;
- Political reforms and implementation, including the zero-tolerance for torture policy, will continue to be monitored closely by the Commission through an updated Accession Partnership;
- In the event of a serious and persistent breach of the EU's main political criteria (i.e. principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human and fundamental rights and the rule of law), suspension of negotiations can be recommended – either by the Commission or by one third of member states, and the decision on suspension taken by the Council by a qualified majority vote;
- Accession negotiations with candidates 'whose accession could have substantial financial consequences' cannot be concluded until the financial framework for 2014 and after is agreed together with any necessary financial reforms – which means 2013 (by when the 2014 financing must be agreed) will be the earliest possible date to conclude negotiations;
- Turkey is expected to extend the Ankara Agreement to all 25 member states before the start of accession negotiations;
- Turkey is expected to work towards resolution of any border disputes with member states and any unresolved disputes

should if necessary be brought to the International Court of Justice.

Overall, this is a clear and positive summit outcome and a good basis to move towards negotiation. Despite doubts of some member states, the summit made clear that accession is the goal. The language on the success of the outcome being 'open-ended' and any failure of negotiations to be followed by 'anchoring' candidates in European structures was necessary both for France and for some other member states. But, if somewhat grudging, this language, which was already contained in the Commission's October 2004 recommendation, is essentially factual – success cannot be guaranteed in advance. Moreover, contrary to the wishes of some opponents of Turkish accession, there is no mention of the issue of special or privileged partnerships.

While the Cyprus issue was the most contentious at the summit – and Cyprus has the opportunity to stalemate the negotiations chapter by chapter[61] – an equally or more problematic issue, as negotiations unfold, may prove to be the possibility the conclusions open for permanent safeguards and derogations in particular in the areas of free movement of people, structural funds and agriculture. This part of the summit conclusions goes considerably beyond the Commission's recommendation – though it was the Commission who first opened the Pandora's box of permanent safeguards in October 2004. Turkey did get an explanatory phrase included in this paragraph which states that permanent safeguards are "clauses which are permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures" which does dilute the issue somewhat. Nonetheless, the possibility (though there is no requirement) for the Commission to suggest such derogations both allows for member states to push for such clauses and opens up the

[61] Greek Cypriot leader Tassos Papadopoulos warned after the summit he had given up one big veto but still had 62 small ones (to open and close each chapter) Financial Times (2004), "Still a lot to do before joining EU, says Turkey's PM", 20th December.

possibility of more difficult and contested negotiations in these areas. Countries including the UK, Italy and Sweden argued against this part of the summit conclusions, not least as such derogations or safeguards could undermine the fundamental principles of the internal market and could open the way to second class membership in some areas if they were introduced. But the reference to such safeguards was necessary politically to get the agreement of the Netherlands and Austria among others.

2.3.1 Cyprus and Recognition

Prior to the summit, the Cyprus issue was clearly signalled both by the June 2004 European Council and by the Commission in July 2004 when it transmitted a draft protocol to Turkey on extending the Ankara Agreement which was also referenced again in its October recommendation. Despite this advance warning, Cyprus was the issue which almost broke the summit. On the Turkish side the view was propounded that the Dutch presidency was trying to bounce them into signing the protocol to extend the Ankara Agreement at the summit on the 17th December and to present that to the media as full recognition. In the event, the deal delayed the extension of the Ankara Agreement until after the summit but stated it must be done before negotiations start. This extension is not in general seen to constitute full international recognition, something Turkey is not ready to do without an overall settlement.[62]

A full recognition by Turkey of the Republic of Cyprus without an overall settlement of the division of Cyprus at the same time is not conceivable from the Turkish side since it would imply the division was a domestic not an international problem and so remove any future role of the UN in solving the problem. The question now is whether the conditions can be created politically to restart discussions on a compromise solution – probably with the Annan plan as its basis. The

[62] As one EU diplomat put it, the EU has agreements for example with Taiwan and the Palestinian Authority without recognising either.

blockage here in coming back to the negotiating table is for now on the Greek Cypriot side. The EU, and the UN, need to re-engage on this issue and to look for ways to restart negotiations. As well as positive moves, the other EU member states need to make it clear to the Greek Cypriot side that moving to a situation (through full recognition) where Cyprus can achieve its desired 'East German' solution to the division of the island – i.e. absorption of the northern part into the Republic of Cyprus and no changes in governance of the Republic of Cyprus itself[63] – is a non-starter. Crucially this would not be acceptable in northern Cyprus, where EU delays in fulfilling promises of opening up better links with the North since the 'yes' vote by Turkish Cypriots in April, have already begun to undermine the moderate democratic re-formers there.

It is clear that, until and unless there is a full settlement of the Cyprus issue, the ongoing dispute will interfere at many levels with the negotiation process. Greece meanwhile has been a positive supporter of opening negotiations, seeing it as in its political, security and economic interests. It would like to see an accepted settlement of the Cyprus problem and will remain one important player in the attempts to reach a solution.

2.4 The Accession Negotiations – Challenges Ahead

There is still work to be done in 2005 before the negotiations can start in October 2005 but the summit conclusions did not set any new conditions that had not previously been signalled. A negotiating mandate will have to be agreed before the negotiations can start but since Croatia should already have started negotiations in April, there will be a comparable mandate which may make agreement of the mandate for Turkey easier, assuming the issue of the Ankara Agreement has been resolved.

[63] Paid for though, as one Brussels diplomat comments, by the EU not by Cyprus.

The opening of accession negotiations with Turkey will represent a major new phase in the EU's relations with Turkey, and will represent a major achievement for Turkey as a whole and for the Erdogan government in particular. Accession negotiations will not be easy – taking on the *acquis* and fully meeting the EU's political criteria will be a major challenge, will need considerable time and adjustments in Turkey, and considerable diplomatic and political skills. This section first considers some of the political impact in Turkey of starting accession negotiations and managing the process. It then looks at the Commission's strategy for negotiations and likely EU politics around the process. It considers which areas Turkey may face particular problems in, and which areas will be most sensitive for the EU.

2.4.1 Accession Negotiations or Special Partnership – Different Negotiations

Despite the EU emphasis that negotiations are 'open-ended' – which is factually correct in that noone can guarantee that a negotiation process will conclude successfully – it is an *accession* negotiation and the summit conclusions make clear accession is the goal. Although some EU member states wanted to keep open the idea that negotiations may lead to some form of special partnership, they did not achieve this at the summit but the issue may come up again if negotiations falter. But Commission officials are clear that negotiations for membership are not, and cannot be, the same as negotiations for a special partnership. Accession negotiations are not in reality negotiations at all but rather a series of demands, conditions and assessments from the Commission to the candidate country (hence the problems most candidate countries face in dealing with the unequal power dynamics of such a process).

In contrast, negotiations for a special partnership would in fact be genuine negotiations about what both sides want the contents of the partnership to be. If accession negotiations at some point 'fail' (however that is defined or occurs) then a special partnership could be negotiated if both sides want it

but it could not simply pick up from where the accession negotiations stopped. This is the reality of the process even though politicians in some EU member states may see domestic advantage in blurring this issue. Turkey itself needs to be clear on this reality and to communicate that to the Turkish and EU publics. The summit conclusions will aid in this process.

2.4.2 Impact in Turkey

The decision to set a date to start accession negotiations was received overall very positively in Turkey. Inevitably perhaps, not least with the sensitive issue of Cyprus, there has been ongoing debate about what the summit conclusions mean and what sort of deal Turkey is being offered, and whether Erdogan gave away too much. Opponents of EU accession may continue to try to exploit these doubts – but the clarity of the summit conclusion, that there will be negotiations and they are for membership should be the main message that comes through. Moving to open negotiations is expected overall to be positive and to reinforce the power of all the reforming elements in Turkish society, in particular strengthening the Erdogan government relative to the military and to opponents in the bureaucracy. This should allow more rapid and deeper steps to complete and fully implement political reforms. At the same time, considerable political challenges lie ahead, not least now the unifying focal point of the December summit and negotiation decision is no longer there and a much longer phase lies ahead.

There will be many challenges for Turkey in managing the accession process. So far, as discussed in section one, there has been remarkable consensus across disparate groups in Turkey in supporting political reform. The challenge for the government is to ensure that consensus is maintained and that agreement, and appropriate compromises, on driving through reforms is sustained. Some in Turkey have unrealistically high expectations of how fast progress will be made following on from the summit, and these expectations and the reality of the process will have to be managed. Given the deep political

transition Turkey is going through, the management of these political challenges should not be underestimated.

If momentum slows or too many disagreements surface, then opponents of the process both in Turkey and in the EU, will be there ready to exploit the situation. Some in Turkey suggest that the government should announce not only a target date for actual accession but should also announce that it aims to participate in the 2014 European Parliament elections and so provide a focus and create a dynamic. This could stop opposition groups trying to push the implicit date back towards 2020 and so contribute to reducing momentum.

Turkey will need to establish a strong negotiating team which has the political power and backing to drive change through the government and bureaucracy.[64] It will also need a strong communication strategy, both within Turkey to manage what is bound to be a rather 'roller coaster' negotiation, and to promote better understanding and a much more positive outlook towards Turkey among the EU publics and politicians. Turkey should begin to see rapid progress in some areas that the Turkish public will mostly welcome – both further political reforms, and increased funding beginning to flow from the EU for regional and infrastructure projects (from €300 million in 2004 to around €500 million in 2006 and reaching perhaps around €1.4 billion by end 2013).[65] But the negotiations process, with the detailed demands and monitoring of the European Commission, themselves watched by member states, is bound at various times – as in many of the central and east European candidates, notably Poland – to upset or even outrage Turkish public and/or political opinion. Turkey has

[64] Turkey's administration is seen by some in Brussels to be more efficient and effective than those of the central and east European countries when they were candidates. Nonetheless, reforms and modernisation are needed including finding means to attract more high quality people into the bureaucracy.

[65] These funds are grants and so they are estimated to have an 8 to 10-fold multiplier effect on loans. A Commission study is already under way on necessary infrastructure investment.

shown its responsiveness to EU pressure in its extraordinary reform process so far, but it is a large and proud country and being on the receiving end of an unequal 'negotiation' process (more a process of 'hounding' to do things according to one Brussels official) will require considerable political skills to manage calmly. Nor will all the detailed changes to so many aspects of Turkish life, some of them costly, be seen as beneficial by all groups (as discussed further below).

2.4.3 Commission Negotiation Strategy

The Commission proposed in its October recommendation a 3-pillar approach to negotiations.[66] The first pillar aims to focus on continuing political reform in Turkey, using a revised Accession Partnership (to be updated in spring 2005) as its monitoring and benchmarking tool. The second pillar will be the actual negotiation process over the adoption of the *acquis* by Turkey, and the third pillar will be focused on promoting a cultural and political dialogue between Turkey and the EU, which will be vital if understanding is to increase and opposition to lessen. This 3 pillar approach is effectively endorsed by the December 2004 summit conclusions.

The negotiation framework will in many ways be tougher than in the previous 'big bang' enlargement, reflecting in part lessons learned. In particular, in the second pillar, Commission officials will put much more emphasis on ensuring that Turkey has actually implemented relevant parts of the *acquis*, rather than taking commitments and promises on trust. The latter softer approach used with the central and east European candidates is now seen with hindsight to have been a too weak and insufficiently controlling process, and one where commitments were not always followed through with action. At the same time, the intention is to link the first and second pillars, so that the pace of negotiations under pillar two will

[66] European Commission COM (2004) 656 final "Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's Progress towards accession", Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament.

depend in part on sufficient speed of political reform under pillar one. In addition, there will be a so-called emergency brake so that if the political situation were to deteriorate in Turkey with major concerns on its democratic situation, then the negotiations could be suspended. While this looks like a tough new criteria, similar conditions now exist for member states under the Nice treaty, whereby, any major derogation from basic democratic criteria could lead to suspension of EU membership. As in previous enlargements, negotiations will take place in the context of an intergovernmental conference where all member states are present and where agreement is by unanimity.

Commission officials take very seriously their role and powers in the negotiation process. While, on the one hand, their commitment and detailed work can form a vital part of the dynamic that drives the process forward and makes it a political reality on the ground, on the other hand, many previous candidates have found the tone of the 'negotiation' process, or more realistically of the sequence of demands from Commission officials, to be patronising, 'colonial', or even insulting. Commission officials have also tended in previous enlargements to show little sensitivity to how their demands (including the tone of the demands) is impacting on public opinion or political conditions in the applicant country – in fact, some officials even seem to consider it evidence for the thoroughness of their approach that governments in candidate countries have regularly fallen during the negotiation process.[67] This process will not be any easier for Turkey both because of the more stringent approach to ensuring implementation of the acquis and possibly also if some in the Commission bureaucracy continue to harbour doubts about the desirability of Turkish accession. Turkey will have to develop strategies to cope with this process. Member states too should

[67] Almost all the central and east European governments that started negotiations in the late 1990s fell shortly afterwards: Missiroli, A. and Posch, W. (2004), "Turkey and/in the EU: the security dimension", Conference report, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris.

make sure they are alert to how political developments are unfolding in Turkey and ensure where possible that the Commission is not adding unnecessarily to political tensions.

2.4.4 Issues in the Negotiations

Adopting the EU's *acquis* and ensuring its implementation is a major exercise.[68] Negotiations will principally focus on this process across different chapters of the acquis. In some cases, as in earlier enlargements, transition periods will be negotiated – sometimes to meet the needs of the applicant, sometimes to meet EU concerns. It has been suggested by some in Brussels that fewer transition arrangements will be agreed for Turkey since it will represent such a significant part of the EU – but though it may be about 14% of EU population on accession, it is unlikely to be more than 3% of EU GDP, and neither in population nor in GDP terms will it be bigger than the ten new member states in 2004 who agreed various transition periods. One recurring issue, given the conclusions of the December 2004 summit, will be whether permanent safeguards or derogations are introduced or not, which could imply, in some areas, second class membership. The Commission in its recommendation already indicated that certain chapters concerning budget and major expenditure-incurring policies will not be opened until the EU has agreed its 2014 on budget, which may not happen until 2013, and the December 2004 summit endorsed this. It has also said that Turkey must be fully meeting its commitments under the Customs Union before related chapters are opened.

From the Turkish side, major adjustments will be need in many areas. Turkey is not deemed by the Commission to meet fully the economic Copenhagen criteria of having a 'functioning market economy' so this will need to be an early priority. Adopting all the relevant *acquis* for the internal market from product specifications to regulatory regimes and health and

[68] The World Bank has just launched a detailed study to assess the full range of adjustments Turkey will have to make.

safety conditions will take considerable time and involve considerable costs. Environment is likely to be a difficult and costly area, as with the central and east European enlargement, and will probably involve a number of transition periods. Social legislation may pose challenges including developing aspects of the so-called social dialogue between trade unions and business.

Like other candidates, Turkey will not be expected to join the euro on accession but will be expected to be moving towards meeting the relevant economic criteria. This may be in its interests in ensuring a strong, stable macro-economic framework but like the current new member states, it will not want to move too rapidly to join the euro while its economy is still converging towards that of the EU.

The various elements that make up the acquis for the area of freedom, security and justice will pose many challenges for Turkey, not least given its extensive land and sea borders and existing problems of illegal migration, people trafficking and organised crime (these issues are discussed further below). As with the 2004 new member states, while Turkey will be expected to introduce stringent new border control mechanisms and visa criteria, there is likely to be a long period before Turkey could join the Schengen border free area – or it might even, as some suggest, end up like the UK choosing not to participate fully in Schengen and keeping internal EU border controls.[69]

Turkey's accession raises a number of questions concerning foreign policy which will be discussed further in the next section, but as well as aligning with EU foreign policy positions, Turkey will be expected to have good and/or normal relations with neighbours, in particular EU neighbours. As discussed above, this implies a resolution of the Cyprus problem, and a resolution of outstanding disputes with Greece

[69] Emerson, M. and Tocci, N. (2004), *Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign Policy,* CEPS, EU-Turkey Working Papers No1.

particularly in the Aegean. It will also imply some normalisation of relations with Armenia where relations are currently frozen and the border is not open, which raises a number difficult issues (also discussed further below). The Cyprus issue is one that until it is resolved is likely to bedevil negotiations since many detailed issues in individual negotiating chapters will be affected by the lack of a solution and of full recognition of Cyprus by Turkey. Greek Cypriots will be highly alert to every detail in the *acquis* where there is a link to the wider problem which will slow and complicate negotiations considerably.

Budgetary Issues, Agriculture and Structural Policies

Areas that will be of particularly high sensitivity to the EU include budgetary issues, and relatedly agricultural and regional policy, and the issue of free movement of labour. The potential cost of Turkish accession, due to its large size and relative poverty, is an issue that has raised concern and been used by opponents of Turkish membership. Various estimates have been done of the possible cost of Turkish accession, assuming unchanged agriculture, structural funds and overall budgetary policy. If Turkey joined the EU in 2015, overall gross budget costs for the first three years could be about €45 billion, i.e. rather similar to the initial cost for the central and East European enlargement of €40.8 billion (plus another estimated €13.6 billion for the first three years of Romania and Bulgaria's accession).[70] In its own estimates, the European Commission suggested that on unchanged policies the cost of Turkey's membership in 2025 (assuming by then it was fully eligible for all policies) could be between €16.5 billion and €27.9 billion net per annum.[71]

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[70] See my earlier paper Hughes, Kirsty (2004), *Turkey and the European Union: just another enlargement?,* Friends of Europe, Brussels. See also Quaisser, W. and Wood, S. (2004) *EU Member Turkey?,* forost Arbeitspapier Nr 25.

[71] European Commission (2004), "Issues arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective" Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2004), 1202.

The EU is currently locked in difficult arguments over its next budget for the period 2007 to 2013. This already raises questions of the allocation of both regional and agricultural funds and possible reform of the policies, to take account of enlargement to 25, and shortly to 27. The net contributors to the EU's budget are arguing for a reduction in its overall level. Others, including the European Commission, are arguing for a higher budget not least to ensure effective funding of policies and promotion of solidarity in the enlarged EU. Further debates will inevitably take place over the budget for the 2014 and later period, and over whether and what type of further reforms of regional and agricultural policy are necessary to accommodate Turkish entry (and that of other countries including some from the Western Balkans which may also be close to accession at that point).

Agriculture is expected to be one of the most difficult areas, both for the EU in terms of costs and necessary policy reform, and for Turkey in terms of structural adjustment and modernisation, with substantial impact on rural employment and rural development. At the same time, both Turkey and the EU need anyway to face up to major changes in their agriculture policies. Other EU and international political pressures may also demand further policy reform especially in agriculture. The challenge in negotiations will be to find suitable policy reforms and transition periods and to avoid the use of permanent derogations.

Assuming derogations are not used then, as with the central and east European enlargement, full access to EU expenditure policies is likely to be phased in over time. The EU has been decreasingly generous in subsequent enlargements – with Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal getting substantially more structural funding per head than the new member states in 2004, and with the budget deal for Bulgaria and Romania also giving them less per head overall than for the new 10 in 2004. With the 2004 enlargement, the amount of structural funds that the new member states could get was limited by introducing a new maximum limit of 4% of GDP. To cope with the

costs of Turkish accession, it is quite likely that some new lower limit and other ways of restricting funds will be proposed.

Overall, Turkey is likely to get a much lower budget allocation than the estimates described above of what it might get on unchanged policies – quite possibly closer to €10 billion than €20 billion. The key issue for negotiations will not simply be over the likely amounts and necessary reform of policies, but also, from the Turkish side, ensuring that eventually – after relevant transition periods – it is treated equally with other member states (just as this issue has concerned the current new member states) and avoids permanent derogations and safeguards.

Some have argued that the accession of a large, poor country like Turkey will strain the EU's solidarity and so lead to a 'thinning' of the EU, somehow reducing social and political interconnection. This is a curious argument: having enlarged to 25 countries, the Union – or its net contributors – are already showing themselves reluctant to agree even a small increase in the budget to help to ensure that the enlargement is a success and solidarity is indeed maintained. It can be anticipated that this lack of willingness to contribute more financially to underpin important political decisions may also be seen in the case of Turkey – indeed the summit conclusions already show this. But to suggest this is an argument against Turkish accession is rather like a rich individual explaining that the increase in the number of poor people is the cause of his deciding to give less to charity. If the EU's richer countries are not willing to pay more for EU economic and social convergence and solidarity that is indeed up to them – but that is their decision and not that of any of the less rich member states.

Free Movement of Labour

Negotiations over the free movement of labour look likely to be even more sensitive in the Turkish case than they were in that of the applicants from Central and Eastern Europe, where

variable transition periods of up to seven years were agreed. Politicians in the EU's member states are highly aware of the sensitivities of migration issues to their publics, with many member states having far right populist parties that have attracted varying degrees of support in recent years. European politicians have not in general shown themselves ready to make a positive political and economic case for immigration and to argue back against populist rhetoric.

Turkish demographics mean that by 2020, when the rest of Europe will be beginning to face considerable economic challenges due to ageing populations, Turkey will be the only country in Europe with a predominantly young population. In economic terms, the possibility of attracting some of these young, educated people to work in the rest of the EU is one of the advantages of Turkish accession. But for now, political fears are dominating. Even though preliminary estimates from various sources suggest that migration flows from Turkey could be similar to those anticipated over time from the new member states of central and eastern Europe over the coming decades, even greater concern is being shown over Turkey than over the 2004 enlargement.[72]

It is generally accepted in Turkey that long transition periods on free movement of labour will be demanded by the EU – nor does Turkey want to see a substantial brain drain of its most talented young people. But the suggestion by the Commission that permanent safeguards could be necessary on the free movement of labour, extended by the European Council

[72] Hughes, K. (2004), *Turkey and the European Union: just another enlargement?,* Friends of Europe, Brussels 2004, and references therein. Higher estimates are given by Quaisser, W. and Wood, S. (2004), *EU Member Turkey?,* forost Arbeitspapier Nr 25. A recent study suggest that even with free labour mobility from 2015, net migration from Turkey to the EU from 2004 to 2030 would only be between 1 and 2.1 million, but that it would be more, around 2.7 million if the accession process and so Turkish growth falter: Erzan, Refik., Kuzubas, Umut., Yildiz, Nilufer., (2004), *Growth And Immigration Scenarios: Turkey – EU,* Bogazici University, Istanbul.

at the December 2004 summit to free movement of people, and structural funds and agriculture, is an extraordinary departure. The so-called four freedoms (of movement of capital, goods, services and labour) are fundamental to the European Union and its internal market: it is unlikely to be acceptable either to Turkey or to a number of member states that such permanent safeguards could be introduced. Given the Commission's role in defending the four freedoms, it was both surprising and disappointing to see it suggest (and at such an early stage) that such a drastic measure could be necessary. In doing so the Commission opened the door to the even stronger formulation of the December summit. This was an unnecessary and inappropriate concession to populist political pressures – both from the Commission and from the European Council.

2.5 A Positive Dynamic or a Contested Enlargement?

It is clear that the detailed process of negotiating the adoption of the *acquis* will be tough. A more open question is what will happen to the political dynamics between Turkey and all the individual EU member states, once negotiations have actually started. As member states face up to the reality of a future Turkish accession, they are likely to start to give Turkey greater political priority as a strategic bilateral partner. So while individual member states will watch out for their own particular areas of concern in the detailed negotiations, they may also show much greater interest in political cooperation with Turkey. Such a dynamic should help Turkey substantially in showing some of the wider political benefits to the Turkish public while it is managing a difficult negotiation process. One issue for the EU will be to ensure that such political dynamics are not entirely uncoordinated. In the central and eastern European enlargement, different candidate countries were seen to some extent to have different particular 'friends' or sponsors on the EU side, leading to some natural division of labour. In the Turkey case, this may be less likely – not

least since Turkey is the same size as the eight central and east European countries put together but is only one country. The EU will not, for example, want to see 25 separate bilateral initiatives going ahead in the area of justice and home affairs.

But a more negative scenario is also possible. Along with the many problems that may arise while there is no resolution of the Cyprus issue, if some governments or oppositions remain either doubtful or become increasingly opposed to Turkish accession, then the negotiation process could get very difficult as a series of different delaying tactics are adopted by different players. If this happens to a substantial extent, and if at the same time opponents of the process in both the EU and Turkey interact or even coordinate, then this could become the most contested negotiation process the EU has seen. If this happens it will be vital not only for the Commission but also for key government leaders to give a strong political lead, communicating the advantages of Turkish accession and emphasising the commitments already made.

Overall, the December summit conclusions are relatively clear and positive, as discussed above, and should contribute to the development of a positive political dynamic. But the provision for possible use of permanent safeguards and derogations may lead to some very difficult moments in the negotiation process. EU leaders now need to build on their summit decision and to make clear, positive statements and actions reflecting their commitment to membership negotiations. They also need to make clear in and outside of Europe, the EU's effective use of soft power in its neighbourhood and underline its outward looking, secular and multicultural nature.

Whether, and the extent to which, the negotiations become highly contested will also depend on other events during the prolonged negotiation period. Ratification of the EU's new constitutional treaty will be one important issue. A failure to ratify the treaty would leave the EU in a major political crisis, and could lead to calls to suspend the accession negotiations. The EU also has to negotiate two budgets during the time in

which accession negotiations are expected to take place with Turkey – the 2007-2013 budget and the 2014 on budget. Such budget debates always show the EU at its worst and may be particularly difficult in an EU of 25 or 27. This too could impact on the negotiation process.

There will also be many elections and changes of government in EU member states over the period. While the expectation is that new governments will continue to support the process, it could change the political balance of support around the accession process, especially if the negotiations are hitting particular difficulties. Moreover, the EU is only just learning how to operate at 25 – if the enlarged EU hits political difficulties then this too could have a negative impact on the negotiation process. Wider issues such as how public and political attitudes and policy develop towards migration or towards diversity in their own countries or how EU and US policies develop on the so-called 'war on terror', or how the political situation in the Middle East develops could all have relevance to how political and wider public attitudes develop over time towards Turkey. France and Austria have said they will hold referenda on Turkish accession – time will tell if these commitments are translated into action but, if they are, these will represent one more hurdle, and risk challenging the ability of the Union to make clear long run international policy commitments.

Many of these issues are interrelated in the broadest sense in that a confident, politically effective EU with dynamic strategic leadership and clear goals will manage all these processes and any crises much better than a weak and divided Union. An EU that can operate efficiently and strategically with 27 member states is also likely to be an EU that can manage an efficient and strategic enlargement process towards Turkey. An EU that is weak and divided in general, may stumble when faced with the political management of the Turkish accession process.

Overall, how the politics of the negotiation process will unfold

depends on three broad areas: the detailed negotiation process, the political climate and political management of the process in Turkey, and the political climate and political management of the process in the EU – including in the Commission, Council, Parliament and in individual member states. Previous enlargements suggest a positive dynamic could start to unfold once negotiations begin, but the difficult political debates up to the December 2004 summit also suggest that there is a risk of this becoming the EU's most contested enlargement process.

3 THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF TURKISH ACCESSION ON THE EUROPEAN UNION

3.1 Introduction

The overall impact of Turkey on the EU if it joins as a member state in around 2015 depends on three main sets of factors:

- Firstly, it depends on certain relatively fixed or slow-changing characteristics of Turkey – its size, geographical location, and history.
- Secondly, it depends on what sort of country Turkey will have become in the next ten years – politically, economically, socially and culturally. As discussed in section one, Turkey is changing rapidly. This will affect not only what it will look like in ten years time but also what sort of member state it may be, in terms of political behaviour, strategic views and policy stances. The dynamics of the negotiation process will also affect what sort of member state Turkey may be.
- Thirdly, it depends on what sort of Union the EU will have become and in what direction it is moving in ten years time.

This section first considers the question of Turkey's size and looks briefly at some of the economic issues. It then analyses the foreign policy and internal security implications for the EU of Turkish accession, given its size, location, and foreign policy outlook. It then considers the impact of Turkey's accession on the EU's institutions. Drawing together the analysis so far, it then makes an assessment of what sort of member state Turkey will be, and on that basis considers how Turkey may impact on the EU's policies and overall political direction and strategy. It concludes with a set of key areas to watch over the negotiation period that are likely to indicate how successfully and in what direction the accession process is developing.

3.2 Size – A Normal EU Member State or too Big to Absorb?

Turkey, with a population of around 70 million, is larger in population terms than all the EU member states except Germany (currently 82 million). Its large size has raised a number of concerns about its possible impact on the Union both politically and economically.

Turkey's population is also still growing and so it is predicted that by 2015, a possible accession date, it could be almost the same size as Germany, and by 2025 it could be larger, at almost 89 million. But this similarity in size to Germany suggests that the EU is not being asked to face a new challenge. With Germany, the EU already operates with a country of 82 million people and has also agreed both appropriate weights in its different institutions and decision-making procedures (the institutional issues will be discussed further below). The EU from its original group of six member states, encompassing then both Germany and Luxembourg, has always managed, through successive enlargements, the political and sovereignty dynamics of having both large and small member states.

This is not to say that size is irrelevant to Turkey's impact. Turkey as a large, and eventually the largest, country in the Union will have a different and much more significant impact than the accession of a small country such as Slovenia or Malta, just as the accession of countries such as the UK or Spain also impacted differently on the EU due in part to their size. But since Turkey's current and future size is similar to Germany, then it is difficult to argue that there is something special about Turkey's size *per se* that should be an obstacle to membership.

Table 1 sets out population estimates for the EU and Turkey from 2003 to 2025. If the EU had 28 countries today (including Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania), Turkey would be 12.8% of the total population while Germany would be 14.8%. In the actual EU of 25 today, Germany accounts for 18.1% of the total population. Even by 2025, when Turkey

Table 1: Total Population: Various EU member states and candidates, and total EU 25, EU 27 and EU 28; UN estimates 2003, 2015, 2025

(thousands)	2003	2015	2025
Austria	8116	8058	7979
Belgium	10318	10470	10516
Czech Republic	10236	10076	9806
France	60144	62841	64165
Germany	82476	82497	81959
Greece	10976	10944	10707
Hungary	9877	9324	8865
Italy	57423	55507	52939
Netherlands	16149	16791	17123
Poland	38587	38173	37337
Portugal	10062	10030	9834
Romania	22334	21649	20806
Spain	41060	41167	40369
Sweden	8876	8983	9055
UK	59251	61275	63287
Turkey	**71325**	**82150**	**88995**
Total EU 25	**454187**	**456876**	**454422**
Total EU27	**484418**	**485692**	**481837**
Total EU28 (incl Turkey)	**555743**	**567842**	**570832**
Turkey as % of EU 28	**12.8%**	**14.4%**	**15.5%**
Germany as % of EU 28	**14.8%**	**14.5%**	**14.3%**
Germany as % of EU25	**18.1%**	–	–
Germany as % of EU27	–	**16.9%**	**17.0%**

Source: UN World Population Division: World Population Prospects: the 2002 Revision

would be the largest member state, it will only account for 15.5% of the EU28 population, i.e. less than Germany today – and if the EU were to stay at 27 countries (including Bulgaria and Romania) then by 2025 Germany would account for 17.0% of the total population. So in both population and proportionate terms, it is clear that Turkey does not pose different or new challenges due to its population size.[73]

Nonetheless, as a large – and relatively poor – country, its accession inevitably raises many more questions for the Union than the accession of any one small country. However, it should also be noted that the 2004 enlargement added 75 million to the EU's population and ten new member states, and that probably in 2007, with Bulgaria and Romania's anticipated accession, the 12 new member states will have added over 100 million to the Union's population. Both the 2004/2007 enlargements and the Turkish enlargement will impact substantially on the Union, but in some ways, including in institutional terms, adding one large country, rather than 12 small and medium-sized countries, poses fewer absorption problems.

3.3 Economic Issues[74]

Turkey's relatively small economic size – currently about 1.9% of EU GDP (roughly the size of Poland) – means that its overall economic impact on key indicators such as EU competitiveness, eurozone growth or interest rates, trade levels, or inflation will be rather small. Even with high and sustained

[73] Even looking a long way ahead to 2050 when Turkey's population is predicted by the UN to stabilise at 97.7 million, Turkey would account for 17.7% of the EU28 population (though the EU is likely to have many more members by then, reducing Turkey's share further) which is still less than Germany's share today.

[74] For a longer discussion of the economic impact of Turkey see European Commission (2004), "Issues arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective" Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2004) 1202, and Hughes, Kirsty (2004), *Turkey and the European Union: just another enlargement?,* Friends of Europe, Brussels.

growth, Turkey is unlikely to be more than 3% of EU GDP in 2015. Its economic share in the internal market or in trade will mean that it will be difficult for Turkey to have the level of authority and political weight in economic policy discussions that Germany or France, Italy or the UK might have. So though Turkey will be the largest member state in population terms, to some considerable extent the political and policy impact of that will be reduced by its small economy.

However, if Turkey continues to succeed in economic stabilisation, reform and growth, then its market will be attractive to EU and businesses both as a source of growing demand and as a location for foreign direct investment (rather similarly to the new member states from central and eastern Europe). But Turkey's size and relative poverty do mean that the costs of its accession in terms of the EU budget are likely to be high, as discussed in the previous section, and require policy reforms on both sides. Its GDP per head in purchasing power parity terms is barely that of Romania or Bulgaria, though at current exchange rates it is substantially higher – and the very large size of the Turkish informal economy also suggests that Turkey is probably already rather wealthier than these two countries per head of population. Turkey also suffers though from major regional inequalities and sharp income inequality across its population. It will remain eligible for many years to come for structural funds, and agricultural policy reforms will be needed if the costs of a highly agricultural country like Turkey joining the EU are to be managed.

Migration, as discussed above, should be one of the economic gains of Turkish accession but for now the political, populist fears that migration currently arouses in many EU member states mean that long transition periods are likely to be imposed on free movement of labour (though the issue of permanent safeguards will be hotly contested since it would both undermine the 'four freedoms' and relegate Turkey to permanent second class member status). It is quite possible that once Turkey has joined, the political atmosphere may have changed for the better, not least as the economic pressures of

demographic aging in the EU begin to be felt and so understood more clearly.

3.4 Foreign and Security Policy – Strategic Asset or Strategic Risk?

Turkey's geographical location makes it a crossroads between a number of strategically important but often unstable countries and regions. It borders the Black Sea, the southern Caucasus – Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – Iran, Iraq and Syria, the Mediterranean and Aegean, and Greece and Bulgaria.[75] For the EU, whether Turkey is in or outside of the Union, it is strongly in the EU's wider foreign policy and security interests, that Turkey is stable and friendly and helping to project peace and stability across its various borders, rather than one more problematic, unstable or unfriendly country in the neighbourhood.

Turkey's location and neighbours have been taken by both EU supporters of its accession and opponents of its accession as highly significant issues in the debate over whether the Union should enlarge to include Turkey. The supporters of Turkey's accession argue that it is in the Union's geopolitical interests to ensure a stable, democratic and friendly Turkey through enlargement. Moreover, they argue that it will add to the Union's ability to act as a strategic and geopolitical player both in the wider region and globally. Opponents argue that expanding the Union's borders to such neighbours as Iran, Iraq and Syria will drag the EU into areas and disputes it could otherwise more easily stay out of. They also dispute the beneficial effects of a Turkish accession on the Union's foreign policy weight in the world. Faced with such dangerous and porous borders they argue, the Union should define its external borders to exclude Turkey.

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[75] Turkey has an external land border of 2477 km, a Black Sea border of 1762km, and Aegean and Mediterranean border of 4768km – European Commission (2004), "Issues arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective" Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2004) 1202.

As discussed in section one, it is hard to deny that the Union's role as a catalyst in Turkey's radical reform process is a major foreign policy success for the Union in its region – a remarkable example of how soft power projection can work. Turkey's reforms have been driven and managed internally, but once the EU offer of candidate status was made, it was up to Turkey to take and exploit that offer in its own reforms. There could be little stronger contrast than that between Turkey's own reform choices interacting with the EU's soft power tools and the damaging outcome of the US's hard power intervention in neighbouring Iraq (with of course the support of the UK and various other EU member states). So far, the hard power intervention in Iraq has promoted instability, violence and terrorism in Iraq, with destabilising knock-on effects into the wider region.

The Turkish reform process is impacting on its foreign policy outlook as well as on its internal democracy and stability. Turkey traditionally, not least given its extensive, sometimes threatening and often unstable neighbourhood, has had a rather defensive and nationalistic foreign policy posture. The Turkish reforms, interacting with the EU dynamic, have already led to a substantial political rapprochement with Greece, and substantial taboo-breaking changes in its stance on Cyprus. The further Turkey continues down its path of political and economic reform to becoming a modern and confident democracy, then the more its foreign policy stance is likely to change as well.

But as discussed in section one, the political transition in Turkey is far from complete – what sort of player it will be internationally will depend strongly on how Turkish politics and society continue to evolve. A Turkey that is confident in its own cultural and ethnic diversity, that has established full, functional human and minority rights, that has resolved its secularism-Islam debates, that has resolved the conflict in the South East, and that has completed the transformation of civil-military relations, will be a very different country with very different concerns than a Turkey that is still grappling with

these issues to a greater or lesser extent. So domestic and foreign policy are both strongly interconnected; since the direction of transition for now is clear but its final destination is less so, then Turkey's foreign policy stance in ten years time has to be predicted in the context of predictions of the outcome of domestic reform.

EU membership has a double importance here – first in underpinning the ongoing domestic transition, and second, as with the 2004 new member states, in providing the implicit security that comes with being part of the EU club.[76] Rejection by the Union at any stage could weaken Turkey's reform process, strengthen the Turkish military's political role, and would definitely change Turkey's foreign and security policy calculus of its position in the region (including raising the question of considering whether to acquire nuclear capabilities). A rejected Turkey would also be likely to prove a much less cooperative partner on issues concerning border security, illegal migration, and international crime. Finally, EU rejection of Turkey, given its commitments in 1999 and 2002 (and the earlier history of the relationship) would substantially damage the Union's own international credibility.

Given these arguments, the more open questions concern the likely positive and negative impact of Turkey on the Union's foreign and security policy. These depend on firstly, how Turkey's own foreign policy concerns and attitudes will impact on its behaviour as a member state and on the Union's overall foreign, internal and external security policies, and secondly, how and whether Turkish accession will strengthen or weaken the EU's geopolitical role, including the impact of extending the Union's borders to the Middle East. This will depend strongly too on how the EU's foreign and security policies develop anyway in the next decade, prior to any Turkish accession.

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[76] This was a common feature of the central and eastern European enlargement with politicians in all applicants underlining the perceived importance of the EU as much as NATO to their security.

3.4.1 Turkey's Foreign Policy and EU Accession

The political transition process in Turkey and the establishment of the goal of EU accession as the key priority of Turkey's foreign policy have combined to change Turkey's traditional foreign policy stance in many ways. It has been suggested that traditional Turkish foreign policy was based on three main principles: conservative nationalism, strict secularism, and the strategic alliance with the US.[77] The analysis of Turkish political and social change in section one has shown how Turkey's democratisation process has weakened the grip of conservative nationalists and begun to lead to moves towards a more multicultural society which may in due course lead to a more flexible secularism. Turkey's relations with the US are also changing.

It has also been suggested[78] that the political reform process in Turkey, in the EU context, has offered Turkey the chance to move from being what Onis has called a "coercive" regional power to a "benign" regional power. Certainly, Turkey is not and does not show an interest in being a global foreign policy player: its foreign policy interests and concerns lie in its region. Clearly, many of the EU's principal security and foreign policy concerns lie too in this neighbourhood.

The US-led war against Iraq in 2003 not only damaged relations with many European allies but also resulted in a significant shift in Turkish-American relations consequent upon the Turkish parliament's failure to agree the US request for troops to be stationed in and transit through Turkey. While many in Turkey's foreign policy establishment were initially highly concerned at the impact of the parliament's decision on this important strategic relationship, with the benefit of hindsight many considered that Turkey had managed to keep out of a damaging war, and had managed to somewhat distance

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[77] Everts, S. (2004), *An Asset not a Model: Turkey, the EU and the wider Middle East,* Centre for European Reform.

[78] Onis, Z. (2003), *Turkey and the Middle East after September 11: the Importance of the EU Dimension,* Koç University Istanbul.

itself from the US but without critical damage to the relationship (although some disagree), and so to position itself more closely to the EU (even despite the EU's own splits over Iraq). Turkish public opinion is more negative towards America than EU public opinion, and while the Turkish public is in general more willing to contemplate the use of military force internationally than the EU public, it is less so than the US – moving some suggest in a more European 'Kantian' rather than 'Hobbesian' direction.[79] Turkish commentators in general look with concern at the US-EU splits that have opened up in the wake of the Iraq war, and Turkey would always want to see a strong and positive transatlantic relationship.

Turkey has aligned itself with many of the EU's common foreign and security policy positions, and it has developed a considerable dialogue with the EU since the mid-90s on the EU's security and defence policy, including resolving, through the Berlin plus agreement, the question of how non-EU European NATO members would participate in European security and defence operations. Turkey has participated in international peacekeeping in the Balkans and elsewhere, including in Afghanistan. All this means that Turkey is not an unknown quantity for the EU and suggests that its integration into CFSP and ESDP structures could be relatively straightforward.[80] Turkey also has considerable military assets with its large army counting in personnel terms for 27% of NATO's European forces – although, as discussed above, successful further progress in Turkey's overall political reforms in the coming years would suggest some considerable peace dividend may be likely so implying a reduction in the size of its armed forces.

But the EU and Turkey do not necessarily share identical views on the regions which Turkey borders. The European

[79] German Marshall Fund of the United States (2004), *Transatlantic Trends 2004* and Everts, S. (2004), *An Asset not a Model: Turkey, the EU and the wider Middle East,* Centre for European Reform

[80] European Commission (2004), "Issues arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective" Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2004) 1202

Commission in its October 2004 issues paper also drew attention to the fact that while Turkey generally aligned itself with EU CFSP positions, its record has not been as good as that of other acceding and associated countries with differences of view tending to arise in some areas of Middle East policy and human rights.

Energy Security and Water

As well as the importance to the EU of stability in Turkey – both of value in itself, and in projecting stability in a highly unstable region, a stable Turkey in the EU also offers other security advantages. Turkey is an energy and transport hub. It both borders a number of key energy rich regions and countries, including the Gulf, the Caspian Basin, and Russia and acts as an energy corridor from those regions to the EU – including the vital Bosphorus route, the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline from Azerbaijan via Georgia, and the Tabriz-Erzurum gas pipeline from Iran. Turkey by itself can clearly not guarantee the EU's oil and gas supplies but it can certainly contribute positively and significantly. However, just as Turkey has switched most of its oil supplies from the Middle East to Russia, the International Energy Agency has warned that the EU's increasing dependence on Russia for gas is threatening its energy security[81] – sources of supply as well as transit routes will be vital issues for future EU-Turkey discussion as Turkey gets closer to accession.

Turkey also has control over water resources that are important for a number of its neighbours – poor relations with Syria in the past have had much to do with water disputes. While some suggest it will be beneficial for the EU to become involved in this strategic and sensitive issue,[82] water resources are perhaps more realistically an example of an area

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[81] Financial Times (2004), "Europe too dependent on Russian gas, says IAE", 3rd December

[82] Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey (2004), *Turkey in Europe.*

where the EU will become more involved than it would need to if Turkey did not join the Union.

Cooperating on Soft Security Threats?

Turkey's location also means that it is a transit route – and source – for illegal immigration to the EU, for asylum seekers, and for people trafficking and other major problems of international crime including drug smuggling. Turkey has also been the target for terrorist bomb attacks and some Islamist terror groups operate from Turkey. The EU accession process means that the Union can expect, and is already seeing, positive and growing cooperation from Turkey on all these issues.

For Turkey to take on all the EU acquis in the area of freedom, security and justice will be a lengthy, difficult, sensitive and costly process.[83] The EU makes very strong demands on candidates over border management, visa regimes, civil and criminal judicial cooperation, and management of asylum-seekers (Turkey is also the source for a number of people seeking asylum in the EU. This should fall considerably as political reforms are fully implemented and will clearly need to be resolved before any accession). The Union – as has been seen with the 2004 new member states – is also not prepared to move quickly to remove internal borders until all aspects relevant to meeting the conditions for participation in Schengen are entirely fulfilled.

The EU's advantages in Turkey participating in these processes are clear. Turkey too will benefit from greater control of international crime, cooperation on prevention of terrorism, and of illegal immigration. But border and visa issues impact directly also on Turkey's foreign policy and its relations with

[83] Apap, J., Carrera, S., Kirisci, K. (2004), *Turkey in the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice,* Centre for European Policy Studies, EU-Turkey Working Paper No 3.

many of its neighbours – with many of whom it either has visa free travel agreements or very simple 'visa on arrival' provisions.[84] The EU is currently pressing Turkey to sign readmission agreements with the EU and with third countries – another sensitive issue. Turkey and Greece have signed a joint readmission agreement but have hit problems in its implementation. Nor is Turkey a full signatory to the Geneva Convention on asylum, only accepting asylum claims from Europe – this too will have to be changed. While the Union is normally very strict on these issues of borders and visas, which caused a number of problems for the then candidate countries in central and eastern Europe, it has been suggested that the EU should be ready to look at ways to allow a certain flexibility, as it has for some other EU member states, in order not to damage political and economic relations with neighbouring countries[85] and also as it puts increasing emphasis on developing a constructive neighbourhood policy, and not one based on a 'fortress Europe' approach to its region.

Cyprus and Greece

The EU in general expects candidate countries to have good or at least normalised relations with neighbouring countries, in particular with existing EU member states. As discussed above, this means that Turkish accession does imply a settlement of the Cyprus problem, and further development of relations with Greece leading to a settlement of disputes over borders in the Aegean. Turkish-Greek relations have been increasingly positive in recent years and so resolution of outstanding problems, though sensitive on both sides, should be achievable and would contribute considerably to greater stability in the eastern Mediterranean.

[84] *ibid.*
[85] *ibid.*

Movement on the Cyprus problem will be trickier not least following the failure to get agreement on the Annan Plan in April 2004 following a 'no' from the Greek Cypriot side. Although Turkey has moved substantially on the question of Cyprus, this movement came principally after the election of the AKP government at the end of 2002. This meant there was only a short window of opportunity to try to combine this movement on the Turkish side with EU leverage over the Republic of Cyprus in advance of signing of the accession treaty. There are a number of reasons why it proved impossible to take advantage of that window of opportunity, not least among which was the international debate and disagreement in the run-up to the Iraq war in March 2003. The EU, following on from its December 2004 summit and given the sensitivity of the issue at the summit, now needs to show leadership on this question, in cooperation with the UN, in an attempt to get a solution acceptable to both sides as rapidly as possible.

Armenia

Relations between Turkey and Armenia, currently frozen and with a closed border, will need to be improved prior to accession. This is an extremely difficult issue in Turkish politics and some say it is the next taboo area that needs to be frankly debated in Turkey. Turkey's revised penal code in fact contains an article which makes it a criminal offence to suggest that the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Armenians in 1915 were genocide[86] (seen by some in Brussels as giving strong and unnecessary ammunition to those opposed to Turkish accession). But many commentators do suggest the time is approaching when the historical events of 1915 can be discussed, and also suggest that an international expert panel could be convened on the issue. The Commission has stated "its [Turkey's] relations with Armenia will need to be improved, with better Turkish protection of its Armenian minority, and a resolution of the issue of the historicity of the

[86] The Economist (2004), "Haunted by the Past", 13th November.

Armenian genocide in 1915".[87] Turkish-Armenian relations are also complicated both by the fact that Armenia still lays claim to some Turkish territory,[88] and by the importance to Turkey of its relations with Azerbaijan, since Azerbaijan and Armenia are still in dispute over the Nagorno Karabakh enclave. The Nagorno Karabakh dispute is a considerable blockage for Turkey in the process of opening the border with Armenia. The Commission urges Turkey to try to assist in easing tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia, something Turkey is not yet in a position to do very easily.

Relations with the Middle East

The Middle East is a major international political and security preoccupation for the European Union but it is not a region where the EU has managed to exert substantial foreign policy influence. Some hope that the inclusion of Turkey as a member state and the extension of the Union's borders to the Middle East will impact positively on the region and on the EU's ability to influence the region's development. They suggest Turkey could be a bridge to the Middle East or at least an interpreter but many, not least in Turkey, do not wish to exaggerate the role Turkey could play. Historical legacies and tensions, not least from the Ottoman Empire underpin some suspicions of Turkey, and its secular democracy is, for many rulers in the region, the opposite of any model they may want to follow. Turkey's relations with its Middle East neighbours have improved relative to a few years ago but they are mixed. Turkey will not simply become a 'bridge' to help and

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[87] European Commission (2004), "Issues arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective" Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2004) 1202. French foreign secretary Michel Barnier has said France will ask Turkey to acknowledge the mass killings of Armenians in 1915 and after, even though it is not a condition of EU entry, see "Turkey 'must admit Armenia dead' ", 13th December 2004 BBC web site – www.bbc.co.uk

[88] Ireland and the UK both joined the EU, and had full diplomatic relations, while the Irish constitution still laid claim to northern Ireland, so such disputes do not preclude establishment of functional diplomatic relations, nor do they necessarily need to be fully resolved prior to accession.

strengthen the EU's policy effectiveness in the region – its impact will be more complex than that.

In terms of its immediate neighbours, Iran, Iraq and Syria, there have been recent improvements. Tensions in Turkey's relations with Iran have reduced in recent years and cultural and business links are developing. Turkey, like the EU, is concerned at any possible acquisition of nuclear capability by Iran but is also concerned at the damage that an excessively strong reaction could cause – not least by the US, especially if it was a military reaction. Turkey has also improved relations with Syria consequent on resolution of problems over water resources and previous Syrian backing for the PKK.

Turkey has also inevitably been strongly affected by the conflict in Iraq and deeply concerned by the ongoing instability in the country. Developments in northern Iraq particularly concern Turkey, and any further deterioration in the security situation in Iraq or any threat of a break-up of the country would impact directly on Turkey's domestic politics and its progress in domestic reform. If Turkey at any point decided to intervene militarily, on a unilateral basis, in northern Iraq this would undoubtedly lead to a suspension of any negotiations with the EU.

But at the same time, the steps forward in Turkey in beginning to recognise minority rights including Kurdish rights and the prospects for an end to the conflict in South East Turkey open up the possibility of Turkish reforms having a positive impact throughout the region. If, as discussed in section one, Turkey can build on its taboo-breaking but small steps taken so far on Kurdish rights, and move to a situation of full human and minority rights, the impact could be considerable. Given the existence of Kurdish populations in Iran, Iraq and Syria, a full resolution of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict in Turkey and full implementation of human and minority rights, could both act as a positive demonstration effect to its neighbours and reduce the international tensions and risks in the Middle East that have arisen from the situation of the Kurds in all four

countries. Such a positive outcome would show how EU pressure on a candidate country to reform can lead to beneficial effects not only in the candidate country itself but also can impact positively on the surrounding region, and so contribute to wider foreign policy goals.

Turkey has had strong bilateral relations with Israel for many years, strongly encouraged by the Turkish military. At the same time, the Turkish public's sympathies largely lie with the Palestinians. The strong political and military relations between Turkey and Israel have not helped its relations with Arab countries in the region nor put it in a position to contribute very effectively to efforts to mediate on the Israel-Palestine conflict. However, the coming to power of the AKP government has been received positively by a number of countries in the region. Turkey also currently chairs the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, a position which it is seen to have used constructively.[89] Erdogan himself has not made any visits to Israel, and has at certain points been highly critical of the Sharon government – nonetheless official ties remain strong between the two countries. The combination of these various trends in Turkey – the AKP government, the slight weakening in Turkey-American relations, Turkey's EU bid and related domestic reforms, the start of improvements in Turkey's South East – together with growing business and economic ties between Turkey and many Middle Eastern countries mean that Turkey may be moving to a position where its overall stance in the region and its relations with different countries are more positive and constructive overall than in the recent past. But this should not be exaggerated – Turkey is not in a position to be a regional power, and nor would it be accepted as such in the region.

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[89] Emerson, M. and Tocci, N. (2004), *Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign Policy,* CEPS, EU-Turkey Working Papers No1.

Russia and Central Asia

Turkey's relations with Russia, though often somewhat tense in the past, have improved, and Russia is Turkey's second-largest trading partner after Germany. Turkey has been concerned by Russian policy towards the Caucasus and the two countries also have potentially overlapping and competing interests in Central Asia. But Turkey's attempts in the 1990s to develop strong political and diplomatic links with the group of Turkic Central Asian republics was not successful, with the Central Asian republics suspicious of Turkish intentions and not interested in any suggestion of strong Turkish leadership in the region. Consequently, Turkey has focused instead, and more successfully, on developing softer and lower key cultural and economic links. This has also helped to reduce Russian concerns about what role or interests Turkey may have in the region.

While Turkey's knowledge of, and cultural and social connections to, Central Asia could be of some assistance to the EU in the future, this is an area of multiple overlapping strategic interests concerning notably Russia, the US and China. The EU with its nascent common foreign policy is unlikely to have the ability to play any significant role in the region for many years to come.

Russia may look with some suspicion on the whole process of Turkey's EU membership bid.[90] Turkey is, of course, already a member of NATO. In the case of the central and eastern European new EU member states, it was their accession to NATO that caused Russia to express most doubts and opposition not their accession to the EU. Nonetheless, some in Russia have looked with concern at the EU's expansion eastwards – and recent events in Ukraine have shown that any further eastwards enlargement would be highly controversial in Russia.

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[90] *ibid.*

Turkey is not as sensitive geopolitically for Russia as Ukraine, but combined with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, Turkish membership of the EU would mean a significant new presence of the European Union in the Black Sea region – and through the vital Bosphorus strait. Moreover, if Turkey does succeed in joining the Union this will be taken as a precedent by many for arguing that Ukraine too should be given, if it wants, a clear membership perspective – together eventually with Belarus and Moldova. Some of the specific elements of Turkish accession, including the needs to impose full visa requirements on many countries including Russia, are also likely to be taken negatively. How significant these Russian concerns become will depend in many ways much more on how future EU-Russian relations develop than on the specifics of Turkey-Russian relations.

3.4.2 The EU's Future Foreign Policy

What role Turkey may play in the EU's future foreign, security and defence policies will depend inevitably on how those policies do develop in the coming decade. The EU's common foreign and security policy remains at a relatively early stage of development and while many common positions are taken, reaching agreement on the most important, sensitive and strategic issues is difficult, as the Iraq war only too clearly demonstrated. The EU's draft constitutional treaty proposes various steps forward, including the establishment of both a 'double hatted' EU foreign minister – responsible to the Council of Ministers, and also acting as a vice president of the European Commission – and a semi-permanent President of the European Council who will also have a foreign policy role. The draft treaty also proposes a number of steps forward in defence cooperation. The EU in 2004 has also made progress in developing its so-called rapid reaction forces to be used in various peacekeeping roles.

Turkey will want to play an active and positive role in the EU foreign and defence policies, seeing these as key EU policy areas where it has something to contribute and can be taken seriously. As with many of the existing member states, it will

be reluctant to move away from an intergovernmental approach in this area (although Turkey's representatives at the convention drawing up the EU constitution did support extension of qualified majority voting in foreign policy).

The EU is also still in the process of constructing its overall security strategy, and debating soft and hard security goals, and tools, including the broader issue of 'human security' which aims to link traditional security and foreign policy discussions to broader development issues. While the EU in many ways appears to be developing a rather different overall approach to that of the US – as shown with its frequent preference for a 'soft power' approach and its emphasis on multilateralism, given concrete form in its support for the Kyoto Treaty and the International Criminal Court. But there are contradictions here – the EU, pushed especially by France, is debating lifting its arms embargo on China, despite its human rights record, while the US is arguing strongly against this. Turkey has not yet signed the Kyoto Treaty. Nor has its shown a global interest in development policy, not so surprising given its location and own economic challenges. So Turkey will be supportive of the EU's emphasis on multilateralism but it may take a rather traditional or narrow approach to foreign policy and security priorities.

Given that foreign and defence policy decisions are taken unanimously in the EU, with every country having a veto, then adding one more large country to this decision-making procedure will not make reaching agreement any easier. At the moment, conventional wisdom suggests that if France, Germany and the UK agree, the EU can act effectively in foreign policy – but apart from the difficulties in getting such agreement, the other EU member states are not ready to delegate common foreign policy to a *directoire* of these 3 large countries. Turkish accession may both complicate further the difficult dynamics of agreement among the large EU countries, and add to the tensions that can build up with trying to have effective strategic leadership in EU foreign policy while also agreeing at 25 (or 27 or 28). But the com-

plex dynamics of EU foreign policy will continue whether Turkey joins or not – if the political will did develop to take serious steps forward, or agreement was reached for an 'enhanced cooperation' on foreign policy which would give an *avant garde* group a leadership role, then Turkey like some other member states would have to decide if it was ready to integrate more closely or stay in an outer tier. Turkey may add both potential and complexity to the EU's foreign policies but it will not be the determining factor in how, and how successfully, they develop in the coming decade and after – unless strong consensus has developed at 27 and Turkey joins with substantially different foreign policy views.

While Turkey and the EU have similar broad interests and goals in many areas, notably in the Middle East, there is certainly the potential for disagreement on specific issues, whether on water resources, the political situation in northern Iraq, or border management. Turkey will also have to adapt to the EU taking much more interest in issues such as water, that it is used to dealing with on a bilateral basis. Nonetheless, with the continuation of the positive trends described above in Turkey's Middle East relations, combined with greater stability and democracy in Turkey itself, then Turkish accession overall should contribute positively to the EU's foreign policy and security goals in its neighbourhood.

Geopolitical Gains?

It has also been suggested that Turkish membership can bring wider geopolitical benefits in showing to the wider world that the EU is not a defensive 'Christian club'.[91] Given the tone of some of the debates in the EU over Turkish accession, it is clear that a confident and positive acceptance of future Turkish membership would reflect the Union's own confident acceptance that it is and will continue to be a secular organisation where religion is not, and will never be, a criterion for membership. Given the Union's own Muslim population,

[91] Posch, W. (2004), *Talking Turkey,* Institute for Security Studies, Bulletin no 12.

estimated at around 12-15 million, Turkish accession will also underline what is already the case, that the EU is a multi-ethnic, multicultural group of countries. However, given that the EU is a secular body, then any such positive benefits should be seen as additional or 'externalities' and certainly not as reasons for membership. Since Turkey itself is a secular state, and does not wish to be seen or pushed forward as a model of a Muslim democracy, expectations should not be exaggerated of any impact of Turkish accession on the EU's relations with Islamic countries, either in its region or more globally. However, there may be an asymmetry here in that a rejection of Turkey will have a stronger negative impact than the positive impact of a 'yes'.

Moreover, in terms of more specific fears of Islamist, fundamentalist terrorism, there is little reason to expect that Turkish accession *per se* will lead to a major shift either in the EU's or in the wider international community's ability to deal with this challenge. What Turkey can do is contribute firstly, to a broader European discussion of managing multiculturalism and diversity (as discussed in section one) and secondly, to a wider international discussion aimed at understanding and remedying the reasons why many Muslim countries and individuals (together with many other developing countries) feel western countries are hostile or threatening to them. More broadly still, Turkish culture combines elements of East and West, and together with its location and historical experience, Turkey – not least as it becomes more confident in its own democratic transition – could become an important promoter of dialogue and greater understanding.

3.5 Impact on the EU Institutions[92]

As with previous enlargements, the EU institutions will have to be adjusted to take account of the accession of a new

[92] This discussion of institutions draws on the analysis in my earlier paper Hughes, Kirsty (2004), *Turkey and the European Union: just another enlargement?,* Friends of Europe, Brussels.

member state. Adding one country to an EU of 27 (or 28 if Croatia has joined before Turkey, possibly more if other countries from the western Balkans also join at the same time or before Turkey) looks at first glance as if it should be much easier than adding ten as in 2004. But EU institutional arrangements concern the distribution of political power and influence in the EU and so are highly sensitive, and individual countries often guard their positions with great determination. Furthermore, in expanding from its original 6 member states to 25 in 2004, the Union has put increasing strain both on its efficiency and in the perceived accountability and degree of democracy in its institutions.

The summit to agree the Nice Treaty which established voting weights for the EU of 25 was rancorous in the extreme with France, in particular, determined to maintain its voting parity with Germany. The December 2003 summit which was meant to agree the draft constitutional treaty (under the Italian Presidency) collapsed in acrimony, as Polish and Spanish concerns over the new voting system and their weight in it, collided with French and German determination to see the new 'double-majority' voting system in place. So adding a new large country, as big as the EU's largest member state Germany, and soon to be the largest, will inevitably raise political concerns, interests and debates over the appropriate institutional adjustments.

Having said this, the fact that, if Turkey joins in 2015, as discussed above, it will be the same size as Germany means that there is a pre-existing situation indicating the relative power and institutional position that Turkey might have. Some suggest that Giscard d'Estaing in the chair of the EU's constitutional convention pushed the new double-majority system (which favours the larger member states, especially Germany, though it also – much less frequently commented on – gives more weight to the very smallest countries) in part to make it difficult or impossible to include Turkey in this new system, and he himself has suggested that the new arrangements were not "designed to accommodate a power the size of

Turkey".[93] But this is disingenuous, since if the new arrangements can accommodate Germany, then they can equally well accommodate Turkey.

Table 2 sets out the population-share voting weights different countries would have in an EU of 25, 27 and 28.[94] It shows that while today Germany has 18.1% of the population share of votes in an EU of 25, France 13.2% and the UK 13.0%, looking to 2015, in an EU of 28 including Turkey, then Germany would have 14.5% of the population vote, Turkey 14.4%, France and the UK almost 11.0%. On an individual country basis, there is nothing in the inclusion of Turkey in this voting system that dramatically shifts the relative power of different countries – indeed with the reduction in Germany's voting weight, the system could be said to be more evenly balanced.

As a large member state, Turkey will add to the relative weight in EU decision-making of the larger countries, an issue that was highly sensitive in the discussions around the constitutional treaty. But the impact is not very large. Table two also shows the relative share of population of the largest 4 member states in an EU of 25, 27 and 28, and the share of the 'big 4' + Turkey in an EU of 28. In the EU of 25, the big 4 account for almost 57% of the population share, and almost 54% in an EU of 27. Turkey's accession would mean the largest 5 countries would account for 60% of the population share. This is only 3 percentage points different from the joint population vote of the big 4 in today's EU25. Nor, of course, do the largest countries often or easily agree – and agreement

[93] Financial Times (2004), "A better European bridge to Turkey", 25th November.

[94] It should be remembered that it is a *double*-majority voting system, so each member state also gets one vote of equal weight as a sovereign member state in the second part of the double-majority system – this part of the system favours the smaller countries, and the constitution specifies that to agree a proposal at least 15 countries or 55% of the number of countries must agree, together with 65% of the population but with a minimum of 4 countries needed to block a proposal.

at five on any particular one of the myriad of EU directives or policies will be even harder than at four. So there is little here to suggest that Turkish accession will either strongly shift the balance of voting power in the Council of Ministers or that it will strongly increase the chances or likelihood of the larger countries agreeing and aiming to impose a position, in opposition to all the medium-sized and smaller member states.

Table 2: Voting Weights by Population share – EU25, EU27, EU28

	Share in EU25 2004	Share in EU27 2015	Share in EU28 2015
Germany	18.1	16.9	14.5
France	13.2	12.9	11.0
Italy	12.6	11.4	9.7
UK	13.0	12.6	10.7
Spain	9.0	8.4	7.2
Poland	8.4	7.8	6.7
Sweden	1.9	1.8	1.6
Turkey	–	–	14.4
'Big 4'	56.9	53.8	45.9
'Big 4 +Turkey'	–	–	60.3
Total EU28	**100**	**100**	**100**

Source: UN World Population Division: World Population Prospects - the 2002 Revision and own calculations

The other main institutional impact of Turkish accession will be on the European Parliament where Turkey will join Germany as the country with the largest number of seats. The draft EU constitution has set a limit of 750 seats for the future size of the European Parliament with a minimum per country of six and a maximum of 96 – so in essence the limits to which a large country can have a large share of Parliament's seats have already been set. This is explored further in Table 3 which looks at the seats in the European Parliament today and in 2015 (assuming an EU of 28, with Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey). If these three countries were given seats that are commensurate with those of member states of similar size

today they would between then have 154 seats (respectively 17, 33 and 99) but to keep to the 750 upper limit, and the maximum of 96 seats, adjustments would have to be made.

Table 3 sets out the situation with a proportionate adjustment of seats. Germany and Turkey would both get 84 seats, with Germany's share of seats falling from 13.5% to 11.2%. As with the Council of Ministers, the impact of Turkey's accession is in fact to reduce the size of the largest country's share (i.e. Germany). So again this is not a situation of unbalanced dominance by one or two larger countries. MEPs also join European party groups and in general should vote according to party and political positions not member state views. This does not always happen and there are concerns that the 2004 new member states MEPs may be rather 'national' in approach but the EP is still adjusting to this enlargement and there is a learning curve for new MEPs, one that Turkey too would go through.

Table 3: Seats in European Parliament 2004 & 2015

	EU25 – 2004		EU28 - 2015	
	Nos	%	Nos	%
Germany	99	13.5	84	11.2
France	78	10.6	66	8.8
UK	78	10.6	66	8.8
Italy	78	10.6	66	8.8
Spain	54	7.3	45	6.0
Netherlands	27	3.6	22	3.0
Sweden	19	2.5	16	2.1
Turkey	–	–	84	11.2
Total	732	100.0	750	100.0

Source: European Parliament and own calculations, assuming accession of Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey

In the case of the European Commission, for now each member state has a commissioner though with the new constitutional treaty the EU will eventually shift to having a Commission that is made up of two thirds of the number of member states, with strictly equal rotation across member states, irrespective of size. So here Turkish accession will have very little impact – Turkey like other countries will have one commissioner in two out of every three Commissions. While some have been concerned that with the 2004 enlargement, the Commission may become more 'intergovernmental', the deal in the constitutional treaty holds out the prospect of a strong Commission taking its pan-European responsibilities seriously.

3.6 What Sort of Member State Will Turkey Be?

No definite answer can be given to the question of what sort of member state Turkey will be since it is not expected to join the Union before around 2015. In many ways in the EU of 25, the ten new member states of 2004 are only just demonstrating, and learning themselves what sort of member states they will be. The EU itself is changing and will continue to change over the next ten years; and, as discussed in section one, Turkey is going through a rapid period of political, social and economic change. Section one concluded that Turkey was on the way to becoming a modern, pluralist, multicultural democracy – but it also set out four different scenarios of how Turkey could develop depending on the ongoing success, or otherwise, of its reforms. Nonetheless, it can be useful to further our understanding of Turkey's impact on the EU to take a rather speculative and illustrative look at what sort of member state it may be.[95]

[95] An exercise carried out in 1999 for some of the then candidate countries: Hughes, K., Grabbe, H., Smith, E. (1999), *Attitudes of the central and East European Countries to Integration,* University of Birmingham, Discussion Papers in German Studies.

3.6.1 Public Opinion

Public opinion in Turkey can give some indication of the likely strategic attitudes of Turkey as a member state to the role and future direction of the Union, although as with other candidate countries, public opinion is likely to evolve as the accession process proceeds and as the public acquires greater knowledge about the EU.

According to a recent survey, public support for Turkish membership of the EU currently runs at 75% in Turkey with 17% against.[96] The public sees both economic and political benefits coming from accession. Asked to identify the most important benefit of becoming a member of the EU, 39% of respondents identified economic benefits, 13% freedom of movement in the EU, 12% deepening and strengthening of democracy, 12% a stronger role for Turkey in the international arena, 8% decrease in corruption, and 9% equal and just treatment of citizens by the state.[97] A large number, 58%, say they will feel safer in the European Union.[98] These replies suggest that the Turkish public understands the EU to be both a political and an economic body, and important to Turkey for both reasons. This suggests a public outlook that is perhaps more similar to the views and experience of countries like Greece, Spain and Portugal, and to many of the 2004 new member states, than to that of countries like Denmark, Sweden or the UK.

Only 20% of the Turkish public feel they are well-informed about the enlargement process while 76% do not.[99] However, when asked for their views on specific EU policy areas or issues, positive responses generally outweigh negative ones, though with considerable numbers of 'don't knows'. There is also some volatility over time, reflecting perhaps both the impact of external events as well as the influence of a general

[96] Yilmaz, Hakan (2004), *Euroskepticism in Turkey,* Bogaziçi University.
[97] *ibid.*
[98] Eurobarometer (2004), *Public opinion in the acceding and candidate countries,* 2004.1.
[99] Eurobarometer (2004), *Public opinion in the European Union,* Spring

lack of knowledge on the EU. Thus, in 2003 55% supported the euro although this had dropped to 44% (with 29% against) by 2004; 61% supported the EU's common foreign and security policy in 2003 but this fell to 47% by 2004; and 63% supported a European security and defence policy in 2003 again falling to 46% in 2004.[100] On the question of the European constitution, 41 percent say they support it to 18% against, and 53% support the idea of a European Foreign Minister with 12% against.

Despite this generally positive attitude to the EU and to its policies, the Turkish public clearly harbour some doubts which to a substantial extent reflect the fact that they do not yet believe that the EU will treat Turkey as a welcome candidate for membership. Asked if the EU would accept Turkey as a member or not if it satisfies all the necessary conditions, 50% said it would not while 40% said the EU would accept Turkey. Asked if they would be disturbed to see the EU flag hanging next to the Turkish flag or the EU anthem being played alongside the Turkish national anthem, almost two-thirds of respondents said they would find this at least a little disturbing.[101] So it is clear that the Turkish public is still learning about the Union and its attitudes towards the EU will develop over time. Overall, the current picture is of a generally positive attitude.

3.6.2 Future Policy Positions?

Turkish commentators are not surprisingly reluctant to predict Turkey's likely future political positions in the EU. Some in the EU, meanwhile, are concerned that Turkey could be rather like the UK, i.e. an intergovernmental player, not interested in – or opposed to – further political integration, and with a strong emphasis on national identity and sovereignty. In fact, the outlook is more complex than this. Turkey is not about to adopt a Belgian-like stance in favour of a federal Europe. But

[100] Eurobarometer (2004), *Public opinion in the acceding and candidate countries,* 2004.1.
[101] Yilmaz, Hakan, (2004), *op.cit.*

it does understand and is ready to see Europe develop further as a political actor. Moreover, Turkish commentators believe that Turkey as a member state will be fully committed to its participation in the EU (unlike the UK with its continuous rerunning of the debate about whether membership is a good thing or not). They consider that Turkey will be a positive and active player, drawing energy both from the dynamic of its political reforms and newly modernised democracy, and from its large young population, who some say will bring enthusiasm, determination and an outward-looking attitude.

Turkey will certainly be alert to its national interests and to its national sovereignty, and it may like many other member states have a vocal eurosceptic minority, but in its overall attitude to the EU it may look more like Spain or France than the UK or Poland. This will depend on the success of its political transition: the more it becomes the model European democracy ('scenario one' in section one), the more likely it is to be a confident positive European player; if it tends towards a weak democracy ('scenario three' in section one), then it may be a more awkward player in European integration. But it is clear that Turkey is not interested in the EU becoming simply a free trade zone, not least because it could simply have stayed with the Customs Union agreement with the EU and not made such deep seated efforts to meet the EU's membership requirements.

If the Union does develop in the direction of more flexible integration, with a number of countries participating in 'enhanced co-operations', then Turkey is likely to want to be in some but not all such *avant gardes*. As discussed above, Turkey may make its most positive and active contributions in the areas of foreign policy and internal and external security policy, while in the areas of economic and social policies it will be more likely to take a back seat given its relatively small economy and its ongoing challenges of economic development. This is not to say it will take no positions in these policy areas.

Its overall economic policy attitude may tend towards the liberal end of the spectrum after so many years of IMF tutelage but interventionist tendencies also remain in Turkey (and indeed the privatisation process has tended to stall). Turkish economists consider that Turkish business is rather entrepreneurial and will not be supportive of extensive regulation, so it will find itself in agreement with many other member states' business communities. On social policy, Turkey may be generally in favour of positive social welfare policies (depending in part on which government is in power) but like many of the 2004 new member states it will be cautious of policies that impose any great costs. Turkey will certainly welcome transfers from the EU's structural funds and Common Agricultural Policy, again as the new member states have done. But there is already widespread recognition in Turkey that agricultural policy will need to be reformed to contain both its overall costs and the costs of Turkish accession, and that regional funds are unlikely to be as generous as in previous years and previous enlargements.

Table 4 summarises these observations on the characteristics that Turkey may display as a future EU member state. Many of these characteristics will change in the years ahead, so again it must be emphasised this represents an approximate snapshot of the current situation and no more than that. But it suggests that Turkey will not look unfamiliar as a member state nor will it be at one or other extreme end of the policy or overall strategic outlook spectrum.

Table 4: What Sort of Member State Will Turkey Be?

	Likely View or Policy Stance
Public Support for EU	High
Support for EU as a political body	Medium/high
Intergovernmental or federal	Fairly intergovernmental
Quality of democratic life	Weak/medium – improving rapidly
Quality of administration	Medium/weak - improving
Corruption	High
Economic Policy	Tending to liberal, with some interventionist tendencies
Free trade or Protectionist	Middling position
Social Policy	Medium support
Environmental Policy	Weak support
Importance of budgetary transfers	High transfers
Support for CFSP	High overall but intergovernmental
Support for the area of freedom, security and justice	Medium/high

3.7 Impact on the EU's Future Political Direction

Many of the opponents of Turkish accession to the EU have suggested that Turkish membership would block further political integration in the EU and impede the development of a stronger European political, social and cultural identity. As discussed above, the argument that there is something specific connected to either Turkey's size or its political outlook that would give it a defining role and impact on the Union's future is false. Turkey can be absorbed into the EU's institutional and decision-making structures without their seizing up, and Turkey understands and supports the EU as a political as well as an economic body, so its default stance would not be one of opposition to further political integration let alone a desire for the EU to become simply a free trade zone.

Turkey is a large country, and by 2025 would be somewhat larger than Germany. But Germany alone, though an important

member state, does not and cannot determine either the Union's overall strategic direction or the outcome of more specific micro policy initiatives. By the time it joins, Turkey would probably be the 29th member state (assuming Croatia joins before it) and indeed a number of the other western Balkans countries may join at around the same time. Even being as large as Germany on accession, Turkey will still only be one among almost 30 or more member states and so will not play the decisive or determining role in the Union's future any more than any other single country will.

The EU is currently grappling with many debates over its future strategic and political direction. The big political challenge in 2005 and 2006 is on the one hand to ratify the constitutional treaty and on the other hand to show that the EU can function effectively across its different policy areas having enlarged to 25 countries. The Union, if it succeeds in ratifying the constitutional treaty, will then have to show it can use the provisions of that treaty to give new political dynamism, democracy and vitality to its activities. It will be a particular challenge over the coming decade for the Union to show it can play a larger, constructive and progressive role in the world.

If the Union succeeds in the key challenges facing it in the decade ahead, then Turkey will join a politically stronger, dynamic and confident EU. If the EU fails to do this adequately, then Turkey may join a Union that is looking rather weak and inchoate politically. It is the Union's own political behaviour in the coming decade that will determine its future political direction, not the accession of Turkey. It is certainly possible that if the EU finds it difficult to move forward at 25 or 27, then there will be considerable political debate, and perhaps agreements to move ahead in smaller numbers using the enhanced cooperation provisions of the treaty. The EU has already moved ahead without all its members both on the euro and the Schengen area, although neither of these was in fact done in the context of an enhanced cooperation. But most of the new member states are not keen

to be left behind – they want to join the euro and the Schengen area, and will mostly want to participate in rather than stay outside of any other areas of enhanced cooperation. So the real challenge for the EU is to show that it can manage its complex multilateral processes successfully at 25 or more.

It is also an unfounded caricature to suggest that Turkish accession will determine whether the EU heads in the direction of a federal state or a mere free trade zone. The constitutional treaty strengthens the EU in many dimensions but at the same time it preserves its rather unique nature as a hybrid institution combining elements of the intergovernmental and the federal. There is not sufficient public or political support to move towards creating a European superstate as an equivalent to the US, but nor is there support for abandoning all the many political elements of the EU's construction. At the time of writing, the only one of the EU 25 who looks like failing to ratify the constitutional treaty is the UK – if it were the only one, then it is possible that Britain would have to resolve its long ambivalence about its EU membership by leaving the Union. While the UK has certainly been keen, especially in the debates over the constitutional treaty, to emphasise the intergovernmental nature of the Union, even it has not argued for turning the EU clock back to make it essentially an economic body. As discussed above, Turkey does not look likely at present, if and when it joins, to demonstrate the unresolved ambivalence of the UK – it may in many ways look much more like a typical Mediterranean member of the Union.

As for the broader question of European identity, there is no agreement or single view across the EU today as to what constitutes a European identity. There is no single or entirely common root determining what it means to be European – countries in the region share overlapping but not identical histories, cultures and modern societies through which they find commonalities. It is also clear from opinion polls that EU citizens tend to be happy to describe themselves as having multiple identities – part local, part national, part European –

in proportions and extents which vary substantially across different member states. The constitutional treaty describes the EU's motto as 'unity in diversity' – and the EU is indeed diverse across its many nationalities, ethnic groups, and cultures. This tendency of EU citizens to recognise that they have multiple identities reflects well the multi-level governance structure that is today's European Union.

As discussed at length in section one, Turkey's national identity is being debated energetically as part of its overall debates on democratic transition. Turkey, just like other EU countries, is talking about how to define itself and operate as a multicultural, multi-ethnic society. The accession of Turkey to the Union will in part demonstrate that the EU is confident in its multiculturalism, in its diversity, and in its quite unique multi-level governance structures. A rejection of Turkey, particularly on cultural or identity grounds, would suggest an EU that is defensive and tending towards a 'fortress Europe' mentality. So the real choice for the EU is between being confident or being defensive in its current politics and structures – it is not a choice between two rather false polar opposites of being a federal state or a free trade zone.

An EU that rejects Turkey is likely to be a defensive and insecure body that does not have the confidence to be geopolitical; it may be a Union that tries to build a federal state through a small core of its existing membership so denying the reality of its own historic enlargement in 2004. But a Union that confidently and successfully brings Turkey into its organisation is likely to be modern, pluralist, confident and outward-looking with a determination to develop a successful 'soft power' geopolitical role.

3.8 Key Areas to Monitor as Negotiations and Political Reforms proceed – A Checklist

As this report has shown, the process of accession negotiations with Turkey will be complex and multi-layered, given the extent of political and economic change that will be necessary

in Turkey and given the politics within the Union around the process. There are many indicators and areas that will reflect whether and how fast progress is being made – or otherwise – and how the political dynamics are unfolding, including whether a positive momentum develops or whether the process becomes increasingly difficult. As a summary of some of these dynamics, a checklist is given below of some of the key areas to monitor:

- Ongoing political reform in Turkey: the success of democratic reforms – their implementation, acceptance and practice; the completion and full implementation of fundamental rights reforms, including zero-tolerance of torture; Kurdish and other minority rights; freedom of expression; the situation of women in Turkey (including levels of violence, illiteracy and women's representation in politics); the ending of conflict in the South East; further development and acceptance of organised civil society; the professionalisation of the military and end of its political role.
- Turkish politics: effectiveness of government and opposition; maintenance of wide consensus around reforms and the accession process; public support for the political process; levels of corruption.
- Economic progress: continued macro-economic stability and growth, and micro-reforms; levels of foreign direct investment; levels of skills and training; higher female employment rates, income inequality and regional inequalities; negotiations over structural funds including transition periods and whether or not permanent safeguards are proposed.
- Agriculture: management in Turkey of rural-urban migration and the agriculture/services transition, including development of regional urban poles and infrastructure; modernisation of agriculture to meet requirements of a (reformed) Common Agricultural Policy; decisions over transition periods and over whether or not permanent safeguards are proposed.

- Migration pressures: employment and unemployment; reform of education and levels of education and skill; EU political and economic debates about migration as the EU population ages; decisions over transition periods for free movement of labour and over whether or not permanent safeguards are proposed.
- EU Budget: what sort of deal for 2007-2013, especially what funding goes to the central and east European member states, and what deal is done on agriculture and structural funds. What sort of deal is done for 2014-2020.
- Public opinion in EU and Turkey: what is happening to public opinion, does Turkish support remain strong. Which EU countries' publics have most doubts. Impact of negotiations and adjusting to the acquis on Turkish public opinion.
- EU political debates over Turkish accession: which countries, governments or opposition parties or individual politicians are supporting and explaining positively the process of Turkish accession and which opposing and/or pushing for derogations during negotiations. Impact of government or leadership changes in different countries, especially in France, Germany, and Cyprus. Is there a French and/or an Austrian referendum on Turkish accession.
- Turkish political debate on the EU: does opposition grow (and how much) and remain obstructionist. What sort of wider debates develop in Turkey on what the EU is and should become as a political organisation. What sort of member state does Turkey look like being.
- EU constitutional treaty: is it ratified. What role if any does the question of Turkish accession play in any referenda campaigns.
- Turkish and EU foreign policy: how do both develop. What happens in the Middle East, including in Iraq and Iran. As Turkish reforms progress is there a peace dividend (i.e. lower military spending). What progress in relations and disputes with Armenia, Greece and Cyprus. Is the Ankara Agreement extended to all 25 EU member states and consequences of this.

- Dynamics of negotiations: positive but tough or various EU players stalling and creating problems (whether individual member states, officials in the Commission, new governments coming in). Are permanent safeguards and derogations proposed, suggesting a second class membership. How do bilateral political relations develop between Turkey and each of the 25 member states – more political dialogue and support for joint projects.

3.9 Conclusion

This paper has analysed the political implications and political dynamics of Turkey's accession to the European Union. It has assessed the trends, tensions and overall dynamics of the radical political and economic transition process that Turkey is currently going through. This positive, progressive reform process is work in progress, it is not yet complete, but it is heading in the right direction. The EU has acted as a positive catalyst in this reform process and as such has demonstrated the remarkable effectiveness its enlargement policies – 'soft power' foreign policy – can have. It is a considerable but too frequently unrecognised success story for the EU as well as for Turkey. A stable, democratic, friendly Turkey is a major advantage for the Union.

Following on from the historic decision of the EU's December 2004 summit, accession negotiations should start in October 2005. The process of accession negotiations will inevitably be tough. Turkey will face many adaptations and costs. But it also stands to gain many benefits, and a positive committed negotiation process on both sides will help to underpin and drive forward the completion of Turkey's already extensive political reforms. Once negotiations have started, the 'facts on the ground' that will be created may lead to a positive, committed dynamic, as has happened with earlier enlargements. There is a risk however that this negotiation process could become the most contested enlargement the EU has ever seen. It is vital for the EU's political leaders and the Union institutions to commit themselves to the process in genuine

good faith and to explain the impact and benefits to the wider European public. Turkey too has an important role to play in this.

Turkey will be almost as large as Germany if it joins the EU in 2015 and so will clearly have a much greater political and economic impact than the accession of a much smaller member state. The analysis in this paper has demonstrated that Turkey can be successfully absorbed into the Union's structures and politics and that the EU stands to gain overall in the areas of foreign policy and internal and external security from Turkey's accession, even though this will add new challenges as well in these areas. It is too early to give a precise answer as to what sort of member state Turkey will be, but a preliminary analysis suggests it will be a positive and committed player, recognising the political as well as economic goals of the EU while also remaining conscious of its own national interests. As such it may resemble more France or Spain than the UK.

Turkey will join an EU that is heading to a membership of 30 or more member states. Despite being a large country, it will not and cannot alone be the determining factor in the EU's future political direction any more than any one individual large member state in today's Union can. The EU will demonstrate in the next decade how successfully it can operate and move forward at 25 or 27. A positive, confident EU building a dynamic new internal and international politics on the basis of ratification of its constitutional treaty should be ready to welcome Turkey, by 2015, to contribute to the EU's political future.

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