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Christer Gerdes and Eskil Wadensjö

Immigration to Sweden from the New EU Member States

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Preface

When the EU expanded in 2004 and 2007 to include a total of ten new members from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), there were fears that the much lower income levels in the CEE countries would create problems in the incumbent EU countries. Several member states therefore introduced transitional arrangements so as to reduce the probability of low-wage competition and an increase in social transfers to CEE immigrants. Today, echoes of this debate can be heard in several member states, where there are fears of 'benefit tourism', i.e., that immigrants from the CEE member states will take advantage of the incumbent countries' welfare systems.

The authors of this report, Christer Gerdes and Eskil Wadensjö, have studied the situation in the labour market in Sweden of those who have arrived from the CEE member states. In following up a similar SIEPS report from 2008, they have added another four years of observations and therefore are able to study the effects of the latest financial and economic crisis. Moreover, they present detailed data regarding income transfers to immigrants from the CEE member states and conclude that 'benefit tourism' has not been a problem in Sweden.

By publishing this report, SIEPS hopes to add to the knowledge of the implications of free movement from the CEE member states. This is particularly important in view of the on-going debate on the lifting of the remaining restrictions for the free movement of Bulgarian and Romanian citizens at the turn of the year.

Anna Stellinger
Director

SIEPS carries out multidisciplinary research in current European affairs. As an independent governmental agency, we connect academic analysis and policy-making at Swedish and European levels.

About the authors

Christer Gerdes is a Doctor of Economics at the Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI), Stockholm University and a researcher at SULCIS (Stockholm Linnaeus Centre for Integration Studies). His PhD thesis, 'Studying the Interplay of Immigration and Welfare States' (2008), deals with immigration to Denmark and Germany and examines whether it has had consequences for the welfare states of the two countries. In other studies he has treated various aspects of immigration to Denmark, Germany and Sweden. Since 2011 he has worked as a researcher at the research unit of the Swedish Employment Office (Arbetsförmedlingen).

Eskil Wadensjö is a Professor of Economics at SOFI and director of SULCIS. He was dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Stockholm University between 1996 and 2005. His main research interests are the economics of international migration, labour market policy and social security. His current research topics are the economic effects of immigration, temporary employment agencies, the youth labour market and economic aspects of pension reform. He has published many books and articles on various subjects. His recent books on immigration include 'Immigration and the Public Sector in Denmark' (with Helena Orrje) Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2002, 'The Common Nordic Labour Market at 50' (with Peder J. Pedersen and Marianne Røed), Nordic Council, Copenhagen, 2008 and 'Labour Migration – What's In It For Us?' (with Aleksandra Wójcicka and Martin Ruhs), Fores, Stockholm, 2012. He was President of the European Association of Labour Economists (EALE) 1993–99 and Chairman of the Swedish Economic Association 1992–93. He has also been a member of several governmental committees.

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Executive summary

Sweden is a member of a progressively more comprehensive joint international labour market. As early as 1954, the common Nordic labour market was formed, and Sweden became a member of the EU/EEA's common labour market in 1994 and the EU in 1995. The EU has since undergone three stages of expansion, in 2004, 2007 and 2013. The biggest enlargement took place on 1 May 2004, with ten new EU member states, eight Central and Eastern European countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and two in the Mediterranean area (Cyprus and Malta). It was possible for Sweden and the other old member states to introduce transitional rules in terms of opportunities to immigrate from the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe. Concerns were raised about social tourism in the political debate – that some would move here not to work but to gain income transfers in Sweden. However, it was decided after an intense discussion not to impose any transitional rules. Only two other countries chose not to do so, Ireland and the UK (although the two countries imposed some minor restrictions). From 1 January 2007, the EU was enlarged by two other new members, Bulgaria and Romania. These two countries have lower income levels than all the other old and new EU member states. Even this time, Sweden decided to abstain from introducing any transitional rules. On 1 July 2013, the EU gained its twenty-eighth member state, Croatia.

In this study, we examine what has happened with immigration from the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007; it is too early to evaluate the impact of Croatia becoming a member of the EU. We look at the size of the migration flows, the educational level of new migrants who have come to Sweden, what has happened to them in the Swedish labour market as well as some discussions about how migration may have influenced the Swedish economy.

Immigration from the new member states increased after both 2004 and 2007. Many migrants came from Poland after 2004 and Romania after 2007. There is considerably less immigration from other countries. However, there is more from the Baltic countries, Hungary and Bulgaria than from the other new member states. That the largest numbers are primarily from Poland and secondly from Romania can be explained by the facts that they are the two largest countries in terms of population size and that Poland is a neighbouring country across the Baltic Sea. Earlier migration can have an impact via a network effect. Even before 2004, many who were born in Poland lived in

Sweden. Compared with the migration before the EU enlargement, the proportion of males increased.

There are some problems with the statistics. In the population statistics, only those who declare their intention to stay for at least one year in Sweden are included and therefore taken into account in our study. Among those who have arrived, many return: we can see this in the emigration statistics. However, emigration is underestimated. Many people do not report to the tax authorities when they move out of the country. Gradually, corrections are made (which may take several years) but emigration becomes misclassified in terms of which year the exodus occurs. The most problematic consequence resulting from this delay in the updating of the public records is that the number of foreign-born individuals is overestimated.

When the number of foreign-born individuals is overestimated, the employment rate will be underestimated. This means that we do not have any reliable statistics on the employment rates of those who come from these new member countries. For those for whom we do not have notification that they are employed, we do not know whether they are out of work but still in Sweden or whether they have left the country. However, for those for whom we have an indication that they are employed, we have information that allows us to examine their labour market situation.

When it comes to education, we can see that those who come are relatively well educated compared with those born in Sweden. Above all, they usually have at least secondary education. This partly reflects the fact that mainly young people come from these countries. Younger cohorts are on average better educated. Many also have a university education. There are, as in other areas, differences between those who come from different EU countries.

Those arriving as labour migrants are often concentrated in particular sectors and occupations. This also applies to those coming from the new member countries to other EU countries, such as Ireland, the UK and Denmark. When we look at the breakdown by broadly defined sectors in Sweden, we do not find particularly big differences. The distribution is approximately the same as for those born in Sweden. There may be differences on a more detailed level.

When we compare the number of hours worked between those from the new EU countries and those born in Sweden, we find practically no differences. For both those who have moved here and those born in Sweden, women work on average slightly fewer hours per month than men.

Regarding the average earnings between those born in the new member states and those born in Sweden, we obtain the same result: no significant differences. Those who come from these countries are on average not a group that is characterized by a low labour income. When we make that kind of average calculation, we do not take account of the differences in each individual's educational background; as mentioned earlier, the group of migrants from the new EU member countries is often well educated. When we estimate wage equations and take into account differences in age and education, we also find some differences in pay. Those coming from the new member states have lower wages than those born in Sweden. The difference is not very large, about 6 per cent. This may be due to the fact that many of the migrants do not have jobs for which they are trained: they are what is commonly referred to as "over-educated". The explanations for that may be a lack of knowledge of the Swedish language or that they have education that is not in demand in the Swedish labour market, but also discrimination. It is important to examine continually how wages evolve with increasing time in Sweden.

The number of persons who have come to Sweden from the new member states is small compared with both the overall size of the Swedish labour market and the total immigration to Sweden. Therefore, we do not expect any major effects on the labour market in terms of employment and wages in Sweden. International research also suggests that the effects on employment and wages for those already in the country (those born in the country or those who have previously immigrated) are low or non-existent. It is most likely that such a study will find effects in occupations to which relatively many migrants arrive and from which few leave for other professions, such as medical doctors and construction workers.

As mentioned, a political debate demonstrated concern that many of the immigrants from the new EU member countries would end up in welfare dependency and that there would be "social tourists". We have investigated this claim for those who are of working age and not received any such indications. It is not more common for those who are from these countries to receive different types of income transfers, nor are the amounts received higher than those for people born in Sweden. This result would be even stronger if we included those aged 65 years and older, the age at which the majority has retired and receives a pension. Those born in Sweden are overrepresented in this age category and therefore more often receive a pension. They also differ in terms of entitlement rights whereby as a rule one has to have a record of having lived in Sweden for 40 years to receive a full guarantee pension.

1 Introduction: Sweden and labour migration[1]

The European Union expanded in three steps in 2004, 2007 and 2013 to include a total of 13 additional countries, mainly in Central and Eastern Europe. In this report, we deal with the first two enlargements. The main topic is the situation in the labour market in Sweden for those who have arrived from the new member states, but we also deal to some extent with the effects on the Swedish labour market and public sector. We use register data mainly from 2010, the latest year available. This study follows up our previous studies in this area; see Gerdes and Wadensjö (2008, 2009). The main difference is that we here have the possibility to add another four years of observations and thereby are able to follow the situation after the start of the economic crisis that hit Europe after the financial turmoil in 2008. As "social tourism" has been politically much discussed in Sweden and in some other countries, we present detailed data regarding income transfers.

We will only deal with the Swedish experiences in this report. For information on the experiences of other EU countries see, for example, Barrett and Duffy (2008), Barrett and McCarthy (2007), Barrett et al. (2012), Doyle et al. (2006), Drinkwater et al. (2006), Wadensjö et al. (2012) and various chapters in Kahanec and Zimmermann (forthcoming).

This study takes a rather general approach with its focus on the broader impact of the migration to Sweden from the new EU member countries. This means at the same time that we do not consider in detail all the relevant aspects connected to this area. In the paper, from time to time, we touch on related issues in passing, e.g. by referring to relevant studies.

In the next section, we will give a short overview of the Swedish labour migration history. That chapter is followed by a detailed review of the migration pattern from the new EU member countries to Sweden since the start of the century, i.e. the focus of our study. In chapters 4 and 5, we describe the labour market situation for this group and discuss the implications for public sector finances. Chapter 6 looks at the extent to which migrants from these countries receive transfers, while chapters 7 and 8 concern more general aspects of labour migration to Sweden and discuss the degree to which the financial crisis has influenced migration patterns to Sweden. Chapter 9 concludes.

[1] We thank two anonymous referees as well as Jonas Eriksson, SIEPS, for providing a number of suggestions that helped to improve the chapter significantly. We remain responsible for any mistakes still present.

2 Labour migration to Sweden

Sweden's immigration policy has changed drastically on several occasions over time.[2] The immigration policy was very liberal from the 1860s until the First World War, with no requirements regarding passports, visas or work permits. The policy changed in 1914 after the start of the First World War, and the controls gradually became more stringent during the war, a work permit being compulsory and difficult to attain for those who wanted to move to Sweden for work. While the immigration regulation remained after the war, the requirements for those coming from other Nordic countries were made slightly less stringent.

The policy changed once again during the Second World War; this time in a less restrictive direction. Many refugees arrived in Sweden from neighbouring countries and the work permit requirement was abolished for citizens of the other Nordic countries on 1 October 1943. Following the end of the war, the Swedish economy experienced a period of very fast growth, with excess demand for labour. Employers and the governmental labour market administration started to recruit workers from outside Sweden. The Nordic labour market developed, and the Common Nordic Labour Market was established in 1954. The period from the 1940s until the early 1970s was characterized by large-scale labour immigration to Sweden from the other Nordic countries, particularly Finland, as well as from Southern Europe and Turkey. This period of easy access to the Swedish labour market ended in the late 1960s with the gradual introduction of stricter work permit legislation and implementation. While the Common Nordic Labour Market remained, the wage differentials between the Nordic countries declined and Sweden became less attractive as a country of destination for those seeking jobs in a neighbouring country.[3]

A period of mainly refugee- and family-related migration followed, from the 1970s onwards, and while this migration continues at present, labour migration has also become gradually more important again since the mid-1990s. The first of several institutional changes involved Sweden becoming a member of the EEA in 1994 and the EU in 1995, leading to increased migration from other EU countries to Sweden. The second step was the enlargement

[2] See Boguslaw (2012) for a detailed presentation of the development of the Swedish immigration policy and Wadensjö (2012) for a report on some of the important changes in the twentieth century.

[3] See Pedersen et al. (2008) for a study of the first 50 years of the Common Nordic Labour Market.

of the EU in 2004. Sweden was the only country that did not introduce any transitional rules when the EU gained new member states from 1 May 2004 (Ireland and the United Kingdom introduced only minor ones).[4] Some people worried about the effects of the EU labour market enlargement on public finances. The concept of "social tourism" was launched in the debate regarding the 2004 enlargement, before the decision was taken by the Swedish Parliament not to introduce any transitional rules. The overall experience after the first enlargement on 1 May 2004 was that there was no indication of "social tourism".[5] These results probably contributed to a more positive attitude towards labour migration in Sweden. The same decision, namely no transitional rules, was taken when Bulgaria and Romania became members of the EU on 1 January 2007 and when Croatia became a member on 1 July 2013.

In some countries there have been many worries regarding migration from Bulgaria and Romania, especially regarding what will happen after the period of transitional rules (see, for example, Goodhart (2013) regarding the United Kingdom). These worries may be unfounded. A recent study regarding Germany shows that migrants from Bulgaria and Romania are less often unemployed than other migrants and receive income transfers less often (see Brücker et al., 2013). For a survey of the experiences of the Member States, see DG Employment (2013).

The fourth step to a more open labour market in Sweden followed a governmental report, when a new policy regarding labour immigration from countries outside the EEA was decided on by the *Riksdag* in November 2008. Labour immigration from countries outside the EES was deregulated from 15 December 2008, and the only requirement for a work permit was a job offer with a wage either according to a collective agreement or on the same level as collective agreements in the industry. Unions are asked to provide their view about the working conditions, including the wage bid, before the Swedish Migration Authority decides whether to grant a work permit, but the unions cannot block the Authority's decision. While a considerable expansion of labour immigration from outside the EU was expected, the recession that started in the autumn of 2008 probably led to a smaller immigration flow than would otherwise have occurred. Nonetheless, more than 10,000 work

[4] See Doyle et al. (2006) for the political process leading to the decision of no transitional rules.

[5] See, for example, the quote from the Swedish minister of migration, Tobias Billström, reported in the newspaper Expressen: http://www.expressen.se/nyheter/eu-mote-om-social-turism-i-dag/. In addition, one of our earlier studies showed that the "social tourists" did not arrive, and few of the new immigrants received income transfers (see Gerdes and Wadensjö, 2009).

permits were granted per year during 2009–2012, while 16,543 work permits were granted in 2012.[6] Two types of work permits dominate: highly skilled workers (IT specialists, engineers, technicians, etc.), many of them from India and China, and unskilled workers, mainly from different Asian countries typically for seasonal work in agriculture. We will return to the economic crisis and its effects on migration later in this study.

[6] There is a strong political unity across party lines within the Swedish Parliament in support of labour migration. See Berg and Spehar (2013) for a discussion on the possible mechanism behind the Swedish "exceptionalism" regarding labour migration.

3 The development of labour migration from the new EU member countries after 2004

The development of immigration from the twelve new member states is shown in table 1 on pages 14-15,[7] highlighting that migration from most of the EU10 countries increased from 2004 onwards. The exceptions are the two Mediterranean countries of Cyprus and Malta, with very low emigration to Sweden both before and after 1 May 2004. To facilitate the comparison over time, we also present figures based on these numbers. Note that the scales differ for the different countries. The immigration from the EU10 to Sweden is dominated by migration from Poland, while the Baltic States and Hungary are the other most important countries of origin. Many had already migrated from Estonia, Hungary and Poland to Sweden prior to 2004, most of whom had arrived as refugees. The earlier migrants may have contributed to new arrivals of migrants from those countries, either new immigrants following those of similar ethnic and cultural heritage or family relatives.

Box 1 Abbreviations of different groups of EU countries

EU10 = the countries that became members of the European Union on 1 May 2004 (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia).

EU2 = the countries that became members of the European Union on 1 January 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania).

EU12 = EU10 + EU2

EU14 = the 14 countries that besides Sweden were members of the European Union before 1 May 2004 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom).

[7] It is possible to present information on the migration flows according to country of birth, country of citizenship or country of arrival and departure. The tables presented here are based on country of birth. The differences between the different legal statuses are small. One example follows: the number of immigrants born in Poland was 4500 in 2011 and the number of immigrants with Polish citizenship was 4403 in the same year. The corresponding numbers for emigration were 1530 for Polish-born people and 1395 for Polish citizens.

Table 1 Immigration to Sweden of people born in the new EU countries 2000–2012

		Year												
		2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Cyprus	Men	9	4	10	11	13	9	25	23	31	14	13	24	23
	Women	1	3	10	7	10	5	11	21	18	9	13	14	24
Czech Republic	Men	34	38	58	50	47	55	85	109	166	101	83	101	100
	Women	45	47	47	46	52	55	83	98	112	89	80	93	111
Estonia	Men	80	78	101	76	151	147	173	179	179	285	286	249	311
	Women	194	204	218	215	246	247	246	262	219	279	226	279	275
Hungary	Men	73	87	111	75	97	125	255	423	567	470	435	390	428
	Women	96	108	134	118	149	167	232	361	432	417	345	328	398
Latvia	Men	47	59	53	48	61	93	149	128	164	423	386	377	335
	Women	118	100	114	114	136	139	210	198	221	475	373	410	353
Lithuania	Men	47	71	74	63	177	332	419	470	452	643	747	705	740
	Women	89	136	170	154	250	327	430	403	411	515	600	621	593

Malta	Men	3	4	5	3	2	2	7	5	7	8	8	10	8
	Women	0	3	3	2	4	4	4	2	2	11	7	6	5
Poland	Men	287	369	468	445	1155	1799	3464	4273	3881	2808	2548	2435	2380
	Women	471	561	727	698	1397	1726	2978	3344	3210	2453	1969	2065	2125
Slovakia	Men	24	25	36	16	37	34	49	90	107	107	138	91	63
	Women	34	24	35	30	69	58	88	74	94	114	99	62	70
Slovenia	Men	10	7	4	10	10	15	21	23	39	31	22	37	27
	Women	8	20	10	10	14	15	24	30	21	18	18	25	32
Bulgaria	Men	65	67	69	77	56	52	60	662	546	394	339	301	359
	Women	75	74	102	104	83	62	77	409	323	306	252	254	299
Romania	Men	126	129	150	142	126	154	172	1511	1441	1004	963	1096	932
	Women	217	213	262	241	209	261	250	1121	1154	872	817	874	825

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Figure 1 Immigration to Sweden of people born in the new EU countries 2000-2012



Figure 1 Immigration to Sweden of people born in the new EU countries 2000-2012



The crisis that started in 2008 was followed by a decline in immigration from Poland, but the immigration from the Baltic States increased. The unemployment increased much more in those countries than in Sweden, and there were still job vacancies in Sweden, particularly in the Stockholm area.

Even though the migration from the EU10 countries increased from 2004 onwards, the migration from those countries to Ireland and the UK, the other two countries that in practice had no transitional rules, was much larger. The reasons for this might be that those emigrating from EU10 countries were fluent in English to some degree, as well as the higher demand for labour in those countries, especially in low-wage sectors such as cleaning, hotels and restaurants. The unions in Sweden have successfully implemented a high minimum wage according to agreements leading to the elimination of low-wage jobs.[8] It should be mentioned that migration also increased from those countries to those with transitional rules, such as Denmark and Germany, as well as to Norway, which is a member of the EEA (although not of the EU).

Immigration from Bulgaria and Romania increased between 2006 and 2007 following their entry to the EU, although the increase was not very large in absolute terms. Migration declined in 2008 and 2009 and continued at a lower level than in 2007 in 2010–2012. The drop in migration between 2007 and 2008 is most likely to be a result of the 2008 economic crisis, yet it may be partly a result of a number of immigrants who had already been in Sweden for some time choosing to register as living there in 2007, when they were able to receive a permit to stay and work due to the EU enlargement.

The corresponding figures for emigration from Sweden are presented in table 2 on pages 20-21. Emigration is on a much smaller scale than immigration, although it has increased over time, mainly as a result of a larger immigrant population.[9] Many do not deregister when they leave Sweden as a result of ignorance of how to deregister or in order to avoid unnecessary complications when registering anew if they have the intention to return later. This means that emigration is underestimated (and/or the registration of emigration is delayed) and the immigrant population is thus overestimated.

It is also important to acknowledge when studying the statistics that a person should only be registered as an immigrant if the intention is to stay for at least one year. This means that those arriving as seasonal workers or for shorter

[8] There is no minimum wage legislation in Sweden.

[9] For a study of the return migration experiences of EU10 migrants in several countries, see Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2012).

work periods are not included in the population statistics. People come to Sweden for shorter stays for various reasons: for instance, persons who stay in Sweden for a period of less than six months only have to pay income tax at a low rate in Sweden. Rather, they have to pay income taxes in their home country, which in most cases means a lower combined tax rate. This clearly provides an incentive for temporary migrants to have work spells in Sweden of less than six months (less than one hundred and eighty days).

A rather common phenomenon is the employment of so-called posted workers, who work in Sweden yet are employed by an employer in another country, often one of the new EU member countries.[10] This is more common in some other countries, such as Norway.

The immigration numbers being larger than the emigration numbers leads to an increased immigrant population. As shown in table 3 on pages 24-25, many immigrants from the new EU member states already lived in Sweden prior to the EU enlargement in 2004, mainly due to earlier refugee flows from Estonia (in the 1940s), Hungary (in the 1950s) and Poland (in the 1960s and 1980s). Many refugees also arrived from Czechoslovakia in the 1960s, although, given that it has not been possible to divide those immigrants between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, they are not included in the table.[11] There is a similar problem regarding those who arrived from Slovenia when it was part of Yugoslavia and from the Baltic states when they were parts of the Soviet Union. They are also excluded from the tables.

Those who were born in Poland represent the largest group of foreign-born people from an EU12 country. Poland is the only EU12 country among the top-ten countries of origin in Sweden (Poland is number three after Finland and Iraq). The second-highest number of persons from EU12 countries who arrived in Sweden comes from Romania, with the numbers of Romanians in Sweden stable up to 2007, before gradually increasing after Romania became an EU member in 2007.

[10] See OECD (2011).

[11] Some of those who arrived from Czechoslovakia have been reclassified by the authority in charge of the population register as born in the Czech Republic or Slovakia but most are still classified as being born in Czechoslovakia. Among the people living in Sweden at the end of 2012, 1314 were born in Slovakia, 1466 in the Czech Republic and 5692 in Czechoslovakia, according to the official statistics.

Table 2 Emigration from Sweden of people born in the new EU countries 2000–2012

		Year												
		2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Cyprus	Men	19	12	12	14	10	12	11	15	6	10	6	12	9
	Women	6	2	3	8	5	6	7	8	2	2	7	4	6
Czech Republic	Men	7	8	15	18	31	29	27	33	41	20	22	75	64
	Women	8	14	17	17	23	26	24	32	29	23	29	31	48
Estonia	Men	23	31	27	36	50	54	49	56	73	49	95	87	131
	Women	27	34	45	39	58	70	76	95	64	52	82	102	115
Hungary	Men	89	55	74	66	84	88	93	114	128	115	181	216	204
	Women	66	67	74	81	81	79	84	100	97	84	151	167	133
Latvia	Men	10	27	20	21	19	22	29	46	47	46	65	61	99
	Women	10	18	16	24	23	22	33	63	55	27	79	64	93
Lithuania	Men	8	30	12	19	26	20	41	63	91	72	102	119	215
	Women	7	13	3	28	29	16	49	58	60	49	70	96	130

Malta	Men	0	1	1	4	1	1	4	3	2	2	8	6	3
	Women	2	3	2	0	0	2	7	1	2	2	2	5	2
Poland	Men	100	117	103	131	159	182	245	454	637	731	842	946	1019
	Women	143	143	148	200	192	252	322	385	472	482	589	584	670
Slovakia	Men	1	7	4	5	9	8	14	12	32	33	45	56	42
	Women	0	8	5	6	10	12	17	26	30	34	37	48	34
Slovenia	Men	2	2	2	6	3	4	8	4	8	7	10	19	17
	Women	3	4	2	1	3	7	7	9	7	13	9	6	12
Bulgaria	Men	19	20	19	32	23	18	32	47	96	100	100	135	164
	Women	19	18	12	34	24	16	28	48	64	53	70	89	79
Romania	Men	42	41	53	51	65	59	87	146	225	354	290	388	359
	Women	44	55	66	69	61	59	89	96	160	251	208	247	245

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Figure 2 Emigration from Sweden of people born in the new EU countries 2000-2012



Figure 2 Emigration from Sweden of people born in the new EU countries 2000-2012



Table 3 Immigrants who were born in one of the new EU countries living in Sweden at the end of 2000–2012

		Year												
		2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Cyprus	Men	285	276	274	269	270	267	278	285	309	311	316	326	339
	Women	168	169	175	174	179	177	181	193	209	216	222	232	249
Czech Republic	Men	110	141	184	217	234	260	317	393	517	578	623	647	687
	Women	211	243	275	305	335	362	419	487	570	621	651	714	779
Estonia	Men	4417	4310	4240	4130	4065	4014	3979	3938	3904	4012	4062	4082	4152
	Women	5836	5842	5839	5834	5855	5856	5841	5862	5859	5930	5948	6250	5993
Hungary	Men	7192	7126	7052	6947	6833	6757	6798	6979	7303	7545	7656	7705	7800
	Women	6935	6901	6882	6847	6839	6843	6913	7078	7321	7574	7683	7736	7878
Latvia	Men	930	928	930	933	951	991	1085	1146	1235	1588	1890	2181	2400
	Women	1375	1421	1491	1549	1630	1724	1869	1976	2109	2528	2796	3123	3375
Lithuania	Men	319	356	417	456	600	912	1290	1696	2058	2626	3268	3849	4374
	Women	466	583	753	878	1094	1403	1782	2129	3479	2946	3467	3987	4441

Malta	Men	46	49	53	52	53	54	57	59	64	70	70	74	79
	Women	41	41	42	44	48	50	47	47	47	56	60	61	64
Poland	Men	13814	13951	14170	14354	15227	16698	19788	23472	26588	28532	30094	31449	32672
	Women	26309	26555	26949	27254	28245	29505	31955	34708	37234	38986	40159	41416	42651
Slovakia	Men	84	101	132	143	171	197	233	310	384	458	551	587	604
	Women	159	175	206	231	292	339	411	457	520	600	662	675	710
Slovenia	Men	368	383	386	393	405	421	438	456	486	505	517	533	540
	Women	315	343	357	372	387	400	419	439	452	457	466	486	506
Bulgaria	Men	1674	1718	1756	1794	1817	1838	1860	2466	2915	3209	3447	3597	3776
	Women	1834	1887	1968	2031	2084	2124	2161	2515	2771	3022	3205	3365	3581
Romania	Men	5359	5418	5486	5532	5556	5607	5655	6979	8171	8776	9415	10104	10639
	Women	6417	6536	6686	6811	6980	7141	7255	8235	9181	9756	10326	10912	11440

Source: Statistics Sweden.

Figure 3 Immigrants born in one of the new EU countries living in Sweden 2000-2012



Figure 3 Immigrants born in one of the new EU countries living in Sweden 2000-2012



The decline in the first years after the enlargement and subsequent slow growth of the number of people born in Estonia in spite of the rather large emigration from this country to Sweden is due to the refugees who arrived in Sweden at the end of the Second World War now being old, and therefore the mortality rate is high.

Most of the migrants coming from the EU12 countries are in their twenties, with many arriving just after completing secondary or tertiary education.[12] This means that the new employed migrants from those countries on average have a rather high level of education, higher than that of the natives. The migrants from the Baltic States have, for example, a higher level of education than most other groups in the Swedish labour market. See table 4 on the next page for details. Note that information on education is missing for a larger share of immigrants than for natives.

Only a few natives and immigrants have a very low education, i.e. primary school less than nine years. Nine (or ten) years of education as the highest level is more common among natives than immigrants. On the other hand, immigrants more commonly have higher education. That many from EU12 countries are highly educated compared to those in the immigration country does not mean that they have higher education then the population in the home country. See Anniste et al. (2012) for information on Estonia.

Education information is, as mentioned, missing for a larger share of immigrants than for natives, particularly with respect to those who have only been in Sweden for a short time. It takes some time for Statistics Sweden to gain information on education from immigrants. Statistics Sweden sends out a schedule to all new immigrants asking questions regarding their education once during the first year of their stay in Sweden, but not all answer and return the schedule. Information on education received by various authorities, such as the Labour Market Administration, is sent to Statistics Sweden, and thus the missing information share is gradually reduced; however, there remains a problem with the data availability on education, especially regarding those who have recently arrived in Sweden.

[12] The average age of all those born in EU12 countries living in Sweden aged 16–64 is almost the same, 39.8 years, as that of those who were born in Sweden in the same age span, 39.9 years. Those born in countries without an earlier migration history to Sweden, such as Latvia and Lithuania, are much younger on average.

Table 4 Distribution of people born in one of the new member states and Sweden according to education in 2010; percentage; only those employed included

	Education							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	9	All
Cyprus	2	6	40	6	35	3	9	100
Czech Republic	1	2	21	5	45	6	17	100
Estonia	1	5	30	7	45	3	10	100
Hungary	2	4	43	6	38	3	4	100
Latvia	1	5	25	6	46	3	15	100
Lithuania	1	5	24	5	41	3	20	100
Malta	8	10	42	8	28	2	2	100
Poland	2	4	42	5	34	2	10	100
Slovakia	2	2	26	3	46	10	11	100
Slovenia	5	8	48	7	26	1	3	100
Bulgaria	4	4	37	4	40	3	8	100
Romania	2	5	39	6	41	3	5	100
EU12	2	4	40	5	37	2	9	100
Sweden	2	9	51	7	31	1	1	100

Notes: Educational classification: 1. primary school for less than 9 years, 2. primary school for 9(10) years, 3. secondary school, 4. higher education for less than two years, 5. higher education for two years or more, 6. post-graduate education, 9. missing information.There are immigrants who have arrived from the areas of the present states Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia who are registered as immigrants from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. It has not been possible to separate those from others registered as immigrants from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

Source: SIEPS database.

4 The labour market situation of labour migrants from the new EU member countries

The data on employment rates for immigrants is somewhat misleading given that many of those who have emigrated from Sweden are still registered as living there, as can be identified by the fact that many of those who are not employed and do not receive a labour income also do not receive any form of transfer income.[13] Accordingly, using register data on employment leads to an underestimation of the employment rate.[14] Here we only provide information on the labour market situation of those who are employed.[15] We include both those who arrived before the enlargement and those who arrived after the enlargement from enlargement countries in the estimations.

The working hours are more or less the same for natives and those born in EU12 countries: 140.2 hours per month for natives and 138.1 for those born in EU12 countries. The variations in working hours between those coming from different countries of origin are rather small (see table 5 for details). While there are some problems in the statistics regarding the number of hours worked full time, such problems should be more or less the same for all groups.[16] Men work more hours on average than women, although this difference is not very large, indicating that even if part-time work is more common among women than men, women are most often working long part-time. The hours worked are 146.1 hours for native men per month and 145.1 for EU12-born men, as well as 135.7 hours for native-born women and 134.8 hours for EU12-born women.

[13] For those born in Sweden, the share without both income and income transfers is about 6 per cent, but for those from EU12 countries in most cases it is more than 20 per cent. Some may live in Sweden and work in non-registered employment, but the number of persons for which information on both employment and income transfers is missing is too large for this to be the main explanation.

[14] For statistics on employment rates in previous years see Gerdes and Wadensjö (2008)

[15] Çelikaksoy (2013) makes a comparison with migrants from Turkey and the Middle East. Compared with those groups, the migrants from the EU10 and EU2 have significantly higher employment rates.

[16] The problem regards the fact that there are no exact records on the working hours for those who are employed in the public sector; in their case, there is only a number for stipulated work time. We recode this information to working hours by multiplying the stipulated work time by a factor of 165.

Table 5 Working hours among those born in one of the new member states and in Sweden aged 16-64 in 2010

	Men	Women	All
Cyprus	149.1	142.0	145.9
Czech Republic	142.1	135.2	138.1
Estonia	140.6	133.4	134.7
Hungary	147.6	138.3	142.0
Latvia	140.4	130.3	132.5
Lithuania	141.7	125.8	130.1
Malta	140.0	131.4	135.3
Poland	146.1	135.2	138.3
Slovakia	148.5	133.0	137.9
Slovenia	146.5	137.0	141.0
Bulgaria	140.0	135.1	136.8
Romania	143.3	134.4	137.6
EU12	145.1	134.8	138.1
Sweden	146.1	135.7	140.2

Notes. Only those employed are included. There are immigrants who have arrived from the areas of the present states Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia who are registered as immigrants from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. It has not been possible to separate those from others registered as immigrants from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

Source: SIEPS database.

Table 6 on the next page shows that the monthly wages for full-time work are more or less the same for immigrants and natives. As previously mentioned, those born in EU12 countries are more educated than those born in Sweden.

Estimations of Mincer wage equations (with age, gender, country of birth and education as explanatory variables) show that immigrants have slightly lower wages than natives, albeit with rather small differences compared with the situation in some other destination countries in Europe (see table 7 on page 34).[17] For all the EU12 countries taken together, the wage was 5.7 per cent lower for men and 6.3 per cent lower for women in 2010 for those who had arrived in 2000–2010, when controlling for age and education. If dummies are included for each country, we find that the estimates differ between countries (see table 8 on page 35). For men, the largest negative effects are found for Romania and Bulgaria (10.5 and 11.5 per cent, respectively), and in the case of women, for Lithuania (11.0 per cent). These wage differences may be due to over-education or low seniority in the workplace, although it is not possible to observe this latter aspect in the available data.

Andersson and Hammarstedt (2012) study the wages and occupational standing of migrants from the EU10 countries (the countries that became members in 2004) compared with migrants from other countries and natives in 2007. They find that the wages of EU10 migrants, controlling for characteristics such as education, age, region and civil status, are lower than those of natives and migrants from the old EU countries. A quantile regression shows that this is a result of a difference in the lower part of the income distribution. This result is interpreted as over-education being common among the EU10 migrants. The EU10 migrants have a relatively low occupational standing given their education.

It is perhaps surprising that immigrants from the EU12 countries have more or less the same distribution across industries as natives (see table 9 on page 36). The main exception is a small immigrant overrepresentation in construction and the health sector, as well as an underrepresentation in public administration. Comparing immigrants from different EU12 countries, we find that those born in Lithuania and Poland are overrepresented in construction, while those born in Lithuania are also greatly overrepresented in agriculture (working in the southern part of Sweden). Naturally, there may also be differences within sectors, which are not possible to detect at this level of aggregation.

[17] See Wadensjö et al. (2012) and different chapters in Kahanec and Zimmermann (eds.) (2009).

Table 6 Monthly wages (for those working less than full time the wage is recalculated to the full-time wage) among those born in one of the new member states and Sweden aged 16-64 in 2010; in thousands SEK

	Men	Women	All
Cyprus	35.3	28.9	32.4
Czech Republic	33.9	28.9	30.9
Estonia	33.8	25.5	26.9
Hungary	33.9	28.5	30.6
Latvia	32.9	25.8	27.3
Lithuania	32.0	24.7	26.7
Malta	31.7	25.2	28.2
Poland	31.3	26.0	27.5
Slovakia	36.7	30.1	32.2
Slovenia	27.9	25.2	26.3
Bulgaria	28.8	26.4	27.2
Romania	29.8	26.6	27.7
EU12	31.4	26.4	27.9
Sweden	31.9	25.9	28.4

Notes: Only those employed are included. There are immigrants who have arrived from the areas of the present states Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia who are registered as immigrants from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. It has not been possible to separate those from others registered as immigrants from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

Source: SIEPS database.

Table 7 Wage equation estimations among those born in one of the new member states and Sweden aged 16-64. Log monthly wage in 2010 as the dependent variable

	All	Men	Women
Woman	-0.169***		
	(0.000392)		
Age	0.0335***	0.0424***	0.0267***
	(0.000107)	(0.000190)	(0.000121)
Age square	-0.000318***	-0.000403***	-0.000252***
	(1.26e-6)	(2.27e-6)	(1.40e-6)
Primary school 9(10) years	0.0618***	0.0670***	0.0562***
	(0.00131)	(0.00201)	(0.00150)
Secondary school	0.129***	0.150***	0.104***
	(0.00121)	(0.00190)	(0.00136)
Higher education less than 2 years	0.286***	0.325***	0.231***
	(0.00147)	(0.00221)	(0.00177)
Higher education 2 years or more	0.334***	0.378***	0.295***
	(0.00125)	(0.00198)	(0.00139)
Post-graduate education	0.606***	0.612***	0.601***
	(0.00226)	(0.00318)	(0.00311)
EU12 immigrated 2000–10	-0.0597***	-0.0566***	-0.0634***
	(0.00370)	(0.00720)	(0.00422)
EU12 immigrated 1995–99	-0.0744***	-0.0793***	-0.0682***
	(0.00519)	(0.0129)	(0.00555)
EU12 immigrated 1990–94	-0.0729***	-0.0808***	-0.0651***
	(0.00368)	(0.00846)	(0.00395)
EU12immigrated 1985–89	-0.0576***	-0.0938***	-0.0356***
	(0.00373)	(0.00709)	(0.00429)
EU12 immigrated 1980–84	-0.0346***	-0.0652***	-0.0153***
	(0.00471)	(0.00880)	(0.00551)
EU12immigrated 1975–79	-0.0271***	-0.0632***	-0.00958
	(0.00590)	(0.0138)	(0.00640)
EU12 immigrated 1970–74	0.0064	-0.0317**	0.0267***
	(0.00768)	(0.0155)	(0.00859)
EU12 immigrated before 1970	0.0182*	-0.0056	0.0350***
	(0.0102)	(0.0170)	(0.0124)
Constant	9.284***	9.043***	9.311***
	(0.00229)	(0.00386)	(0.00262)
Observations	2,082,105	893,718	1,188,387
R-squared	0.288	0.248	0.251

Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1

Note: People born in Sweden constitute the reference group.

Table 8 Wage equation estimates among those born in one of the new member states and Sweden aged 16-64 with the log monthly wage for full-time work in 2010 as the dependent variable

	All	Men	Women
Woman	-0.169***		
	(0.000392)		
Age	0.0335***	0.0424***	0.0266***
	(0.000107)	(0.000190)	(0.000121)
Age square	-0.000317***	-0.000403***	-0.000252***
	($1.26e^{-6}$)	($2.27e^{-6}$)	($1.40e^{-6}$)
Primary school 9(10) years	0.0620***	0.0669***	0.0566***
	(0.00131)	(0.00201)	(0.00151)
Secondary school	0.129***	0.150***	0.105***
	(0.00121)	(0.00190)	(0.00136)
Higher education less than 2 years	0.286***	0.325***	0.231***
	(0.00147)	(0.00221)	(0.00177)
Higher education 2 years or more	0.334***	0.378***	0.295***
	(0.00125)	(0.00198)	(0.00139)
Post-graduate education	0.606***	0.612***	0.601***
	(0.00226)	(0.00318)	(0.00311)
Cyprus	0.0313	0.0070	0.0502
	(0.0226)	(0.0326)	(0.0308)
Czech Republic	0.0229	-0.0103	0.0436*
	(0.0218)	(0.0394)	(0.0252)
Estonia	-0.0711***	-0.0463*	-0.0734***
	(0.00901)	(0.0273)	(0.00917)
Hungary	-0.0042	-0.0241***	0.0095
	(0.00542)	(0.00914)	(0.00666)
Latvia	-0.0574***	-0.0299	-0.0634***
	(0.0121)	(0.0314)	(0.0126)
Lithuania	-0.1000***	-0.0738***	-0.109***
	(0.00986)	(0.0251)	(0.0100)
Malta	-0.0183	-0.0008	-0.0416
	(0.0598)	(0.113)	(0.0494)
Poland	-0.0542***	-0.0617***	-0.0481***
	(0.00232)	(0.00514)	(0.00253)
Slovakia	0.0257	0.0288	0.0200
	(0.0255)	(0.0498)	(0.0296)
Slovenia	-0.0701***	-0.0941***	-0.0522**
	(0.0181)	(0.0261)	(0.0244)
Bulgaria	-0.0833***	-0.115***	-0.0639***
	(0.00764)	(0.0131)	(0.00934)
Romania	-0.0619***	-0.105***	-0.0374***
	(0.00403)	(0.00721)	(0.00477)
Constant	9.285***	9.043***	9.311***
	(0.00229)	(0.00386)	(0.00262)
Observations	2,082,105	893,718	1,188,387
R-squared	0.288	0.248	0.251

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1

Note: People born in Sweden constitute the reference group.

Table 9 Distribution of people aged 16-64 born in one of the new member states and Sweden according to industry in 2010; percentage

	Industry											
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	All
Cyprus	1	0	8	0	3	14	13	15	30	11	6	100
Czech Republic	2	4	14	0	5	12	18	11	19	12	3	100
Estonia	1	2	8	0	9	17	19	10	19	11	3	100
Hungary	1	0	13	1	6	17	17	12	22	8	4	100
Latvia	2	6	8	0	11	14	21	8	15	12	3	100
Lithuania	1	13	9	0	18	12	17	6	12	9	2	100
Malta	0	0	20	0	2	13	18	13	10	23	0	100
Poland	1	2	12	0	14	14	18	8	19	8	3	100
Slovakia	1	2	14	0	5	12	13	14	27	10	2	100
Slovenia	1	0	20	0	5	19	19	8	16	7	4	100
Bulgaria	1	1	11	0	6	16	17	11	17	16	3	100
Romania	1	1	18	0	6	15	18	10	20	8	3	100
EU12	1	3	13	0	11	15	18	9	19	9	3	100
Sweden	1	2	14	1	7	19	16	11	16	7	6	100

Notes: Industry classification: 0: not classified, 1: agriculture, forestry, fishing, 2: manufacturing, mining, 3: public utilities, 4: construction, 5: trade, communication, 6: financial services, business services, 7: education, 8: health care, 9: personal and cultural services, 10: public administration.

Only those employed are included. There are immigrants who have arrived from the areas of the present states Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia who are registered as immigrants from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. It has not been possible to separate those from others registered as immigrants from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

Source: SIEPS database.

5 The effects on the labour market and the public sector in Sweden[18]

The flow of migrants from the EU12 to Sweden is small compared with the total Swedish labour market, as well as the total immigration to Sweden. If anything, the effects on wages and unemployment are thus small for the labour market as a whole. Moreover, meta-studies on the labour market effects of immigration have also shown small or no effects.[19] The increase in labour supply, which should lead to lower wages, is counteracted by immigrants and natives being complements in the production process, or alternatively by migration-induced capital formation or capital imports. Immigration may lead to an upgrading and higher wages for the native workers.[20] The negative wage effects are most likely to be found in the parts of the labour market in which many migrants are arriving, with those working there being "locked into" such labour markets.

There has been renewed interest in the labour market consequences of immigration in recent years, with added focus on placing empirical estimates in the context of labour demand theory and substitutability of types of labour (Borjas, 2003; Borjas et al., 2008; Card, 2001, 2009; Manacorda et al., 2012; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012). A review of the cited studies reveals considerable disagreement concerning the magnitudes of key substitution elasticities and, therefore, the overall economic impact of immigration.[21] Such disagreement calls for empirical studies of the immigration wage effect that build on transparent and convincing identification strategies.

Health is one sector to which many foreign-born individuals are coming (not only immigrants from EU12 countries). Of those gaining a license to be a medical doctor in Sweden in recent years, more than half received their degree outside Sweden. While some of them are Swedish-born individuals who have studied abroad and returned after completing their exams, others are foreign-born individuals who became employed in Sweden. One of the larg-

[18] See Wadensjö et al. (2012) for a discussion of the economic effects of EU12 immigration. For recent general surveys of the effects of immigration, see Okkerse (2008) and Pekkala Kerr and Kerr (2011). For a survey of the Swedish experience, see Olli Segendorf and Teljosuo (2011).

[19] See Longhi et al. (2005, 2006, 2008). Malchow-Møller et al. (2009) find some negative wage effects for especially low-skilled workers in Denmark of migration from Eastern Europe.

[20] See D'Amuri and Peri (2012) and Cattaneo et al. (2013).

[21] A study by Orrenius and Zavodny (2008) of the effects of minimum wage increases finds no effects on employment for immigrants or natives.

er groups of new doctors completed their exams in Poland. If the inflow of medical doctors had not taken place, the wages for doctors would have been higher.[22] Moreover, another likely effect would have been a political decision leading to the faster expansion of the number enrolled in medicine studies. Medical doctors have the highest wages of all the occupational groups in Sweden; thus, immigration is hardly leading to people leaving this occupation for others. Furthermore, there is no unemployment among medical doctors in Sweden.

Many migrants also work as nurse aids and in old-age care. It is difficult to recruit native Swedes to such jobs in the sparsely populated northern part of Sweden, while young people, and especially women, are continuing to higher education and leaving for the cities at the same time as the population is ageing in such areas. The solution has been the recruitment of migrant women into care jobs, who alternatively become self-employed and offer their services to the municipalities.[23]

Migrants from EU12 countries are also overrepresented in construction, with the same discussion being valid here as for medical doctors. However, the inflow is smaller in this case compared with the size of the specific labour market, while the outflow to other occupations is larger and there is some unemployment among construction workers, albeit not very large (around 4 per cent in September 2012). The low level of unemployment in this sector can be partly explained by a relatively new tax deduction scheme (called ROT) when hiring people to repair and renovate privately owned dwellings. This has prompted a large expansion in the demand for people able to undertake such work, including those from Poland and the Baltic states. There have been some conflicts between unions and employers using posted workers from EU12 countries in this area.[24]

Resources are redistributed by the public sector through people paying taxes and receiving income transfers and public consumption. The income redistribution is mainly transferred from those of an active age to those who are young or old, from those of an active age who are employed to those of an active age who are out of work, and from those with high labour incomes to those with low labour incomes. The migrants from EU12 countries are of

[22] Per Lundborg, SULCIS, Stockholm University is undertaking a research project on this topic. His preliminary results indicate wage effects.

[23] See Hedberg and Pettersson (2012).

[24] There is no study of the wage effect of immigration for the construction sector in Sweden, but it is not unlikely that there is a negative wage effect, as is found in Norway. See Bratsberg and Raaum (2012).

active age, are employed (or for the recently arrived at least to a low extent receiving income transfers when out of work; see the next section) and do not have low incomes on average when employed. Accordingly, this means that the redistribution is from the labour migrants to the rest of the population.[25]

[25] See Gerdes et al. for a recent study on the effects for the public sector in Denmark.

6 Income transfers

Prior to the enlargement in 2004, there were political worries that the immigrants from EU12 countries would be greatly overrepresented in the income transfer programmes; however, this has not been the case. The new migrants are underrepresented in those programmes, which should not be considered surprising given that there is a waiting period in several of the programmes prior to a person becoming eligible for compensation. Gradually, with an extended stay in Sweden, the new immigrants become eligible for different social transfers. Tables 10–12 on pages 41-43 show information regarding income transfers to both new and old immigrants who were born in these countries.

In table 10, the percentage shares of those aged 16–64 with different forms of income transfers are shown.[26] The last column shows those with at least one of the different forms of income transfers. As income transfers vary with age as well as gender, we have controlled for those characteristics in the estimates shown by running the following OLS regression model:

$$y=a+\beta_1[\text{country of origin}]+\beta_2 Age+\beta_3 Age^2+\beta_4 Female,$$

where β_1 is the respective coefficient value for the migrant group of interest. In tables 10, 11 and 12, the mean value for the reference group (Swedish-born) is added to the [country of origin] coefficient β_1; y is the outcome indicated at the top of each column.[27]

The differences are generally small and move in different directions when comparing immigrants and natives. As the immigrant population is overestimated (some of them have left Sweden without being deregistered), the percentages for the immigrant populations are underestimated. The general impression is, however, that the differences are small and that the social tourists did not arrive. Note that these numbers include those who arrived both before and after the expansion of the European Union.

Not only the percentage share receiving income transfers but also the amounts are of interest. The amounts received per person of those who have received an income transfer are shown in table 11 on page 42. The amounts are of about the same size for the different groups (natives and immigrants) for

[26] Due to the age restriction, we have not included old-age pensions.

[27] Every time a regression is run only the migrant group of interest and the Swedish reference group are included.

Table 10 Percentage aged 16–64 with different forms of income transfers in 2010.

	Social assistance	Labour market programmes	Unemployment insurance	Disability pensions	Sickness benefits	Parental allowance	All
Cyprus	4.3 (0.385)	6.8 (0.145)	3.4 (0.007)	13.9 (0.000)	5.7 (0.028)	12.9 (0.000)	38.4 (0.913)
Czech R.	4.2 (0.279)	4.0 (0.050)	3.2 (0.000)	4.8 (0.000)	4.1 (0.000)	6.5 (0.000)	22.1 (0.000)
Estonia	4.0 (0.176)	5.0 (0.667)	4.7 (0.006)	4.1 (0.000)	4.9 (0.000)	10.3 (0.000)	26.6 (0.000)
Hungary	6.2 (0.000)	7.3 (0.000)	6.0 (0.204)	10.9 (0.000)	6.2 (0.000)	10.6 (0.000)	38.3 (0.439)
Latvia	4.0 (0.226)	5.2 (0.929)	4.1 (0.000)	3.9 (0.000)	3.4 (0.000)	5.3 (0.000)	21.3 (0.000)
Lithuania	2.1 (0.000)	4.2 (0.001)	4.6 (0.000)	3.9 (0.000)	3.5 (0.000)	5.4 (0.000)	20.1 (0.000)
Malta	2.9 (0.681)	4.7 (0.803)	5.2 (0.825)	5.1 (0.299)	5.9 (0.357)	15.9 (0.499)	34.6 (0.343)
Poland	5.1 (0.000)	6.2 (0.000)	5.9 (0.019)	9.2 (0.000)	6.7 (0.000)	10.8 (0.000)	35.2 (0.000)
Slovakia	12.9 (0.000)	5.0 (0.817)	3.4 (0.000)	5.0 (0.000)	3.5 (0.000)	7.9 (0.000)	29.9 (0.000)
Slovenia	5.3 (0.040)	6.4 (0.180)	6.6 (0.306)	11.7 (0.000)	5.8 (0.016)	13.0 (0.000)	40.6 (0.320)
Bulgaria	5.4 (0.000)	7.6 (0.000)	5.9 (0.374)	7.8 (0.141)	4.4 (0.000)	5.6 (0.000)	29.1 (0.000)
Romania	5.4 (0.000)	7.6 (0.000)	6.9 (0.000)	7.9 (0.003)	5.7 (0.000)	8.3 (0.000)	32.9 (0.000)
EU10	5.0 (0.000)	6.0 (0.000)	5.6 (0.634)	8.5 (0.000)	6.1 (0.000)	10.1 (0.000)	33.5 (0.000)
EU2	5.4 (0.000)	7.6 (0.000)	6.6 (0.000)	7.8 (0.001)	5.4 (0.000)	7.6 (0.000)	31.9 (0.000)
EU12	5.1 (0.000)	6.4 (0.000)	5.8 (0.020)	8.4 (0.000)	6.0 (0.000)	9.6 (0.000)	33.1 (0.000)
EU14	4.8 (0.000)	5.3 (0.001)	5.5 (0.013)	10.2 (0.000)	6.6 (0.000)	12.8 (0.000)	36.7 (0.000)
Sweden	*3.5*	*5.2*	*5.6*	*7.3*	*8.0*	*18.1*	*38.7*

Note: Values adjusted by OLS-regression estimations, in which separate models are run for each country/region together with the reference group of those born in Sweden. The value of the coefficient for the country/region dummy is added to the average values for the group of Swedish-born individuals, which results in the values shown in the table. The p-values shown indicate the significance level of the country coefficient estimates. *The values in italic for the group born in Sweden are mean-values*.

Table 11 Amount of different forms of income transfers in 2010 among those aged 16–64 who receive payment from the programme in thousand kronor

	Social assistance	Labour market programmes	Unemployment insurance	Disability pensions	Sickness benefits	Parental allowance	All
Cyprus	42.4 (0.079)	45.9 (0.966)	62.7 (0.155)	122.8 (0.091)	34.1 (0.856)	32.2 (0.553)	72.6 (0.001)
Czech R.	27.2 (0.546)	24.0 (0.000)	58.0 (0.166)	96.2 (0.132)	35.5 (0.682)	32.1 (0.362)	57.0 (0.988)
Estonia	27.2 (0.166)	36.1 (0.000)	44.9 (0.255)	91.6 (0.000)	33.3 (0.829)	29.9 (0.639)	54.8 (0.103)
Hungary	32.0 (0.000)	41.8 (0.019)	52.8 (0.007)	119.0 (0.000)	36.4 (0.036)	30.1 (0.458)	66.9 (0.000)
Latvia	21.1 (0.195)	26.6 (0.000)	50.5 (0.431)	90.6 (0.012)	33.6 (0.836)	27.3 (0.373)	50.9 (0.000)
Lithuania	22.5 (0.434)	27.6 (0.000)	42.4 (0.020)	99.0 (0.401)	29.9 (0.286)	28.2 (0.511)	50.9 (0.000)
Malta	56.1 (0.214)	31.9 (0.284)	62.3 (0.253)	106.2 (0.638)	47.4 (0.452)	40.5 (0.383)	61.3 (0.618)
Poland	30.2 (0.000)	42.4 (0.000)	50.6 (0.000)	112.4 (0.945)	33.1 (0.547)	27.0 (0.000)	61.4 (0.000)
Slovakia	28.3 (0.043)	27.1 (0.000)	48.3 (0.939)	96.3 (0.075)	35.5 (0.720)	25.7 (0.180)	53.2 (0.076)
Slovenia	25.2 (0.875)	49.8 (0.614)	56.6 (0.136)	115.3 (0.592)	37.1 (0.544)	25.6 (0.338)	64.8 (0.016)
Bulgaria	22.3 (0.233)	35.8 (0.000)	48.7 (0.697)	111.7 (0.789)	37.1 (0.132)	28.6 (0.745)	61.5 (0.000)
Romania	25.0 (0.454)	40.9 (0.000)	52.8 (0.000)	121.6 (0.000)	34.6 (0.175)	28.8 (0.616)	64.6 (0.000)
EU10	29.6 (0.000)	40.4 (0.000)	50.3 (0.000)	113.4 (0.104)	33.5 (0.155)	27.7 (0.000)	61.1 (0.000)
EU2	24.3 (0.983)	39.6 (0.000)	51.8 (0.000)	119.3 (0.000)	35.1 (0.057)	28.7 (0.552)	63.9 (0.000)
EU12	28.4 (0.000)	40.2 (0.000)	50.7 (0.000)	114.4 (0.000)	33.8 (0.037)	27.9 (0.000)	61.6 (0.000)
EU14	27.2 (0.000)	41.8 (0.000)	48.2 (0.277)	118.3 (0.000)	34.7 (0.000)	32.6 (0.000)	64.2 (0.000)
Sweden	*24.3*	*46.3*	*47.8*	*112.4*	*32.7*	*29.2*	*57.0*

Note: Values adjusted by OLS-regression estimations, in which separate models are run for each country/region together with the reference group of those born in Sweden. The value of the coefficient for the country/region dummy is added to the average values for the group of Swedish-born individuals, which results in the values shown in the table. The p-values shown indicate the significance level of the country-coefficient estimates. *The values in italic for the group born in Sweden are mean values*.

Table 12 Amount of different forms of income transfers in 2010 of all who are aged 16–64 in thousand kronor

	Social assistance	Labour market programmes	Unemployment insurance	Disability pensions	Sickness benefits	Parental allowance	All
Cyprus	1.8 (0.086)	3.7 (0.139)	2.1 (0.372)	18.3 (0.000)	2.0 (0.266)	3.6 (0.011)	31.6 (0.000)
Czech R.	1.2 (0.282)	1.0 (0.000)	2.1 (0.220)	5.8 (0.000)	1.6 (0.002)	2.9 (0.000)	14.6 (0.000)
Estonia	1.2 (0.022)	2.1 (0.204)	2.3 (0.046)	4.9 (0.000)	1.7 (0.000)	3.8 (0.000)	16.0 (0.000)
Hungary	2.0 (0.000)	3.6 (0.000)	3.3 (0.002)	13.9 (0.000)	2.4 (0.106)	3.5 (0.000)	28.6 (0.000)
Latvia	0.9 (0.966)	1.6 (0.000)	2.2 (0.042)	4.9 (0.000)	1.3 (0.000)	1.7 (0.000)	12.7 (0.000)
Lithuania	0.5 (0.000)	1.4 (0.000)	2.1 (0.000)	5.1 (0.000)	1.2 (0.000)	2.0 (0.000)	12.3 (0.000)
Malta	1.6 (0.517)	1.8 (0.561)	3.4 (0.654)	5.1 (0.167)	2.9 (0.857)	6.6 (0.607)	21.4 (0.882)
Poland	1.6 (0.000)	3.0 (0.000)	3.1 (0.000)	10.7 (0.000)	2.3 (0.000)	3.3 (0.000)	23.9 (0.000)
Slovakia	3.7 (0.000)	1.5 (0.000)	1.8 (0.019)	5.8 (0.000)	1.4 (0.000)	2.5 (0.000)	16.6 (0.000)
Slovenia	1.4 (0.193)	3.2 (0.230)	3.7 (0.140)	14.3 (0.000)	2.2 (0.496)	4.0 (0.060)	28.8 (0.001)
Bulgaria	1.3 (0.000)	3.3 (0.000)	3.1 (0.097)	9.1 (0.014)	1.7 (0.000)	1.9 (0.000)	20.4 (0.002)
Romania	1.4 (0.000)	3.6 (0.000)	3.8 (0.000)	10.0 (0.000)	2.0 (0.000)	2.7 (0.000)	23.4 (0.000)
EU10	1.5 (0.000)	2.8 (0.000)	2.9 (0.000)	10.1 (0.000)	2.1 (0.000)	3.2 (0.000)	22.7 (0.000)
EU2	1.4 (0.000)	3.5 (0.000)	3.6 (0.000)	9.8 (0.000)	2.0 (0.000)	2.5 (0.000)	22.7 (0.056)
EU12	1.5 (0.000)	3.0 (0.000)	3.1 (0.000)	10.0 (0.000)	2.1 (0.000)	3.0 (0.000)	22.7 (0.000)
EU14	1.3 (0.000)	2.5 (0.001)	2.8 (0.003)	12.7 (0.000)	2.3 (0.000)	4.1 (0.000)	25.8 (0.000)
Sweden	*0.9*	*2.4*	*2.7*	*8.2*	*2.6*	*5.3*	*22.1*

Note: Values adjusted by OLS-regression estimations, in which separate models are run for each country/region together with the reference group of those born in Sweden. The value of the coefficient for the country/region dummy is added to the average values for the group of Swedish-born individuals, which results in the values shown in the table. The shown p-values indicate the significance level of the country coefficient estimates. *The values in italic for the group born in Sweden are mean values*.

the various income transfer programmes. Additionally, here we control for age and gender. As these numbers only relate to those who have received an income transfer, there are no problems caused by unregistered outmigration.

The average total amount per capita (all persons are included irrespective of whether they received an income transfer or not) depends both on the percentage who receive a transfer and on the amounts received by those who obtain a transfer. In table 12 on the previous page, those average total amounts for all individuals aged 16–64 are shown. As the results are based on table 10 and table 11, we control for differences in age and gender between the different groups. As expected from the results in the other two tables, the total amounts are small and similar for the different groups.

In Appendix 2, we show the corresponding results in tables A1–A3 including only those who arrived from the new EU countries in May 2004 or later. In those three appendix tables, we compare immigrants from EU12 countries with those who were born in Sweden and re-entered in May 2004 or later. According to the results in those tables, it is even clearer that the new migrants are not overrepresented in the public transfer programmes. Finally, in tables A4–6, we show the results for the various groups aged 16–64 not controlling for age and gender.

7 The effects of the crisis on migration

The severe economic crisis that started in 2008 only lasted for a short period in Sweden. The GDP decline was 0.6 per cent in 2008 and 5.0 per cent in 2009, when the export industry lost many of its customers and laid off workers or let them work on a short-term basis, particularly in the western part of the country. However, the economy swiftly recovered and the GDP increased by 6.6 per cent in 2010 and 3.7 per cent in 2011, but only by 0.7 per cent in 2012. Employment has increased during recent years, although the unemployment rate remains higher than before the crisis started in 2008.

Labour immigration declined somewhat in 2008, but has subsequently increased slightly. Moreover, other forms of immigration, such as refugee immigration and that of family members of those already living in Sweden, have increased even more. In fact, Sweden is the European country that accepts the most refugees relative to its population size.[28]

Immigration from EU12 countries is around the same as before the crisis, but labour immigration from countries outside the EU has increased. The number of non-EU nationals gaining a work permit was 16,543 in 2012, compared with 14,722 in 2011 and 13,612 in 2010. The main countries gaining work permits in 2012 were Thailand (5,784, mainly seasonal workers), India (2,725, IT specialists) and China (888, both skilled and unskilled), followed by Turkey, Iran, Ukraine, Syria, Pakistan, the United States and Iraq. The current crisis in Syria has prompted an increase in both its labour migrants and its refugees.

The economic crisis in the EU is especially severe in some countries, such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland. Some of these countries were major destination countries before the crisis. Spain and Ireland, in the 1990s and the first years of this century, turned from being emigration countries to become immigration countries, but they are now countries of emigration again. This means that those who earlier would have moved to those countries may now instead look for jobs in the north of Europe, such as in Sweden. In addition, people born in those countries, especially young people, may emigrate to avoid unemployment in their home countries. More people may come from Greece and Italy to Sweden, but the increase is still quite small; Germany is the major destination country. An increased inflow from Southern Europe to Sweden is a possible outcome of the crisis, however. This may

[28] See OECD (2011).

lead to a competition for job vacancies between those coming from Central and Eastern Europe and those coming from Southern Europe.

Croatia has been a member of the European Union since 1 July 2013. The unemployment is high in Croatia. Only Greece and Spain had a higher unemployment rate than Croatia among the EU member states in 2012, according to Eurostat. We may expect that many will try to find employment in another EU member state. The population of Croatia is, however, small and the majority of migrants will most likely migrate to Austria and Germany. We cannot expect a large inflow of migrants from Croatia to Sweden.

8 Some experiences of the post-enlargement migration

Sweden is experiencing a period of economic growth at present, even though it is slow due to a decline in demand from other European countries. As long as the Swedish economy is growing, there is likely to be increased labour migration from the new EU member states and other countries to Sweden. Politically (in Parliament as well as public opinion), there is strong support for a labour market open to labour immigrants.

However, some problems related to labour migration have been the focus of political debate, having already led to some policy changes, and indeed may lead to further changes of the immigration policy. We will mention some of these problems here.

The working conditions of (summer) seasonal workers from countries outside the EU/EEA have been much discussed during the last three years.[29] Many did not receive pay for their work due to bankruptcies or received only very low pay. This has led to the regulation for companies from outside the EU/EEA hiring seasonal workers to be registered in Sweden and to leave a bank guarantee for their wages. This prompted an expansion of companies of the same type, but rather with employees and employers from EU/EEA countries, and with the same problems as a result.

The conditions of those employed by temporary work agencies in other EU countries, especially Poland, yet working in Sweden, have also been debated.

There have been some examples of companies that have two different wage agreements with the foreign workers they employ: one to show to the Migration Authority to gain the work permit and a lower one that states the actual pay.

Proposals have been put forward to maintain the present rules yet strengthen the control of the rules actually being followed. The Minister of Immigration stated in Parliament in February 2013 that he will put forward a proposal to the Parliament to provide the Migration Authority with more resources and a mandate to control the agreements for workers coming from outside the EU/EES. The proposal was published later in 2013, see Ds 2013:57.

[29] See Woolfson et al. (2012) for more about this debate.

Sweden is part of the larger European labour market. This means that the rules and changes of rules for the European labour market may also influence the migration to Sweden. One example is a common policy regarding refugees; another is a common policy regarding skill migration.

9 Conclusions

The enlargement of the European Union led to increased immigration from the new member states to the old member states, including Sweden. The new immigration was relatively small both compared with the total migration to Sweden and compared with the migration flows from those countries to some other EU countries. Other forms of immigration, such as refugee immigration and immigration of family members, have been more important for Sweden. The migration from the new member countries is especially small when compared with the two countries that in 2004 together with Sweden introduced no or only minor restrictions for those who wanted to migrate for work, Ireland and the United Kingdom. The migration to Sweden has been rather stable in the years following the crisis in 2008. The most likely explanation is that the recession in Sweden only lasted for about one year, i.e. 2009, and that it was concentrated on some parts of the manufacturing industry in which relatively few migrant workers from the new EU member countries were employed. If the present EMU crisis spreads to Sweden, the situation may become different.

There are some problems with the statistics when studying the situation for those who have arrived in Sweden from these countries. Firstly, only those who declare that they intend to stay for at least one year are registered as living in Sweden. This means that migrants who only work for short periods in Sweden, for example seasonal workers, are not included in the statistics of the population residing in Sweden. Secondly, there are problems with the statistics on emigration. Many leave without notifying the tax authority (the authority in charge of the population register), meaning that the emigration is underestimated and the population is overestimated. An overestimated population means that the employment rate becomes underestimated. This results in the inability to show reliable estimates of the employment rate of those coming from the new EU member states. It is, however, possible to use the register information on those who are employed, who are obviously in the country.

The educational level is slightly higher for the migrants from the new EU member states than for natives, which could be explained by more migrants being younger than in the population as a whole. Note that information on education is missing for almost 10 per cent of the migrants. The working hours (hours worked per month) are similar for immigrants and natives. The monthly wage is also more or less the same for migrants and natives. However, when taking into account that migrants on average are more educated

than natives, they have lower wages than natives. The difference is about 6 per cent for those who arrived in 2000–2010.

The distribution among sectors is remarkably similar for EU12 migrants and natives. There are some differences if we look at the information for each country separately, but if we look at all the countries taken together the differences compared with native-born Swedes are quite small.

Before the EU expanded in 2004, there was a discussion in Sweden and even more so in some other countries on whether the new immigrants would become greatly overrepresented in the income transfer programmes. We have studied whether this is case but have found that it is not so in Sweden. The "social tourists" have not arrived.

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Appendix 1
Data on migration flows – some problems

Knowledge about migration and its effects demands statistical information of a high quality. However, there are some problems in this respect, as detailed below.

- There is underreporting (or late reporting) of the emigration of immigrants, which leads to the migrant population being overestimated and the employment rates underestimated. The most common likely explanation for the underreporting of emigration is a lack of information on how to do it or simply forgetting to do it. However, there may also be other explanations.

- Another problem is that only those staying for at least one year (or intending to stay for one year) are obliged to be registered in the register of the Swedish population and thereby included in the statistics. Those who stay for at least three months are registered by the tax authority and are given a special "coordination number". When sent to Statistics Sweden, this information is not combined with information on the country of origin or citizenship.

- Some foreign workers arrive as tourists and stay in Sweden for less than three months and thus are not included in any of the registers.

- Another group for which we lack information is those who work in Sweden on a temporary basis for companies based in another EU country.

Appendix 2

Table A1 Per cent aged 16–64 with different forms of income transfers in 2010 for those who arrived from May 2004: raw mean values. i.e. no correction for background characteristics

	Social assis-tance	Labour market prog-rammes	Unem-ploy-ment in-sur-ance	Disa-bility pen-sions	Sick-ness benefits	Parental allow-ances	All
Cyprus	2.6	2.6	0.6	1.9	1.3	7.8	15.6
Czech R.	3.8	3.8	2.1	0.1	2.8	9.2	17.9
Estonia	3.9	4.3	2.9	0.1	2.9	11.9	20.5
Hungary	4.1	5.9	4.1	0.7	3.0	9.0	21.7
Latvia	3.9	4.8	2.8	0.1	2.0	8.7	18.1
Lithuania	2.2	4.4	4.3	0.0	2.2	10.6	19.6
Malta	4.1	0.0	2.0	0.0	2.0	18.4	26.5
Poland	3.4	4.1	4.8	0.2	4.4	14.7	25.9
Slovakia	11.7	5.1	2.8	0.5	1.6	11.4	26.6
Slovenia	5.6	8.6	5.2	0.0	5.2	15.9	32.3
Bulgaria	4.4	6.4	4.1	0.2	1.8	6.6	18.7
Romania	5.5	6.5	4.6	0.2	2.1	8.3	21.5
EU10	3.6	4.4	4.4	0.2	3.7	13.2	24.0
EU2	5.2	6.5	4.5	0.2	2.0	7.8	20.7
EU12	3.9	4.8	4.4	0.2	3.4	12.1	23.3
EU14	3.3	3.2	3.3	1.2	2.4	9.8	19.1
Sweden[*]	*7.0*	*4.3*	*4.8*	*1.7*	*4.1*	*15.8*	*31.0*

[*] The values in italic for the group born in Sweden are mean values for those who have a registered date of (re-)entering Sweden after May 2004.

Table A2 **Amount of different forms of income transfers in 2010 among those aged 16–64 for those who arrived from May 2004 and who receive payment from the program (in thousand kronor): raw mean values, i.e. no correction for background characteristics**

	Social assistance	Labour market programmes	Unemployment insurance	Disability pensions	Sickness benefits	Parental allowances	All
Cyprus	28.4	7.6	120.4	99.4	14.2	47.9	48.5
Czech R.	35.2	21.7	37.8	70.9	17.6	44.4	42.6
Estonia	24.6	21.8	33.0	34.2	25.6	36.6	38.9
Hungary	27.2	21.4	44.4	106.6	29.9	38.1	42.6
Latvia	18.7	19.8	43.3	62.9	32.4	37.3	37.8
Lithuania	20.8	21.0	39.7	44.5	19.8	31.8	35.3
Malta	86.0	0.0	115.3	0.0	3.7	61.3	64.8
Poland	25.1	27.8	44.2	81.7	29.2	31.8	39.8
Slovakia	27.0	19.1	39.9	90.8	48.2	39.9	41.5
Slovenia	27.3	27.0	34.4	0.0	18.8	37.8	39.1
Bulgaria	20.7	20.4	39.1	122.7	23.1	37.7	37.3
Romania	26.6	22.1	39.3	131.2	24.7	35.4	38.9
EU10	25.0	25.2	43.2	85.9	28.4	33.0	39.6
EU2	25.2	21.7	39.3	128.4	24.3	35.9	38.5
EU12	25.0	24.3	42.4	92.3	27.9	33.4	39.4
EU14	28.9	25.9	41.6	96.3	31.7	40.1	46.9
Sweden[*]	*28.5*	*28.1*	*39.0*	*106.1*	*30.4*	*41.2*	*47.4*

[*] The values in italic for the group born in Sweden are mean values for those who have a registered date of (re-)entering Sweden after May 2004.

Table A3 Amount of different forms of income transfers in 2010 of all who are aged 16–64 and who arrived from May 2004 (in thousand kronor): raw mean values, i.e. no correction for background characteristics

	Social assistance	Labour market programmes	Unemployment insurance	Disability pensions	Sickness benefits	Parental allowances	All
Cyprus	0.7	0.2	0.8	1.9	0.2	3.7	7.6
Czech R.	1.4	0.8	0.8	0.1	0.5	4.1	7.6
Estonia	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.0	0.7	4.4	8.0
Hungary	1.1	1.3	1.8	0.7	0.9	3.4	9.2
Latvia	0.7	0.9	1.2	0.1	0.7	3.3	6.9
Lithuania	0.5	0.9	1.7	0.0	0.4	3.4	6.9
Malta	3.5	0.0	2.4	0.0	0.1	11.3	17.2
Poland	0.9	1.1	2.1	0.2	1.3	4.7	10.3
Slovakia	3.2	1.0	1.1	0.5	0.7	4.5	11.0
Slovenia	1.5	2.3	1.8	0.0	1.0	6.0	12.6
Bulgaria	0.9	1.3	1.6	0.3	0.4	2.5	7.0
Romania	1.5	1.4	1.8	0.2	0.5	2.9	8.4
EU10	0.9	1.1	1.9	0.2	1.1	4.3	9.5
EU2	1.3	1.4	1.8	0.2	0.5	2.8	8.0
EU12	1.0	1.2	1.9	0.2	1.0	4.0	9.2
EU14	0.9	0.8	1.4	1.1	0.8	3.9	9.0
Sweden[*]	*2.0*	*1.2*	*1.9*	*1.8*	*1.2*	*6.5*	*14.7*

[*] The values in italic for the group born in Sweden are mean values for those who have a registered date of (re-)entering Sweden after May 2004.

Table A4 **Per cent aged 16–64 with different forms of income transfers in 2010: raw mean values, i.e. no correction for background characteristics**

	Social assis-tance	Labour market prog-rammes	Unem-ploy-ment in-sur-ance	Disa-bility pen-sions	Sick-ness benefits	Parental allow-ances	All
Cyprus	4.0	6.6	3.4	15.1	5.7	10.6	37.6
Czech R.	4.6	4.3	3.8	1.6	4.1	15.4	27.3
Estonia	4.4	5.4	5.1	1.6	5.2	17.5	30.8
Hungary	5.7	6.8	6.2	13.0	7.4	10.0	39.9
Latvia	4.6	5.8	4.4	0.8	3.2	11.9	24.3
Lithuania	2.6	4.8	5.0	0.3	3.0	13.2	23.6
Malta	2.7	4.5	5.4	5.4	6.3	17.1	36.0
Poland	4.9	6.0	6.3	9.4	7.6	13.9	38.4
Slovakia	13.3	5.4	3.9	2.0	3.5	15.7	34.1
Slovenia	5.1	6.3	6.8	12.1	6.3	14.2	42.2
Bulgaria	5.5	7.7	6.4	6.1	4.4	10.7	32.2
Romania	5.4	7.6	7.3	6.8	6.1	13.2	36.4
EU10	4.9	5.9	6.0	8.3	6.8	13.5	36.5
EU2	5.5	7.7	7.1	6.6	5.7	12.6	35.3
EU12	5.0	6.3	6.2	8.0	6.6	13.3	36.2
EU14	4.1	4.7	5.8	12.9	7.9	11.6	38.4
Sweden	3.5	5.2	5.6	7.3	8.0	18.1	38.7

Table A5 Amount of different forms of income transfers in 2010 among those aged 16–64 who receive payment from the program (in thousand kronor): raw mean values, i.e. no correction for background characteristics

	Social assistance	Labour market programmes	Unemployment insurance	Disability pensions	Sickness benefits	Parental allowances	All
Cyprus	44.7	58.0	66.6	132.8	36.6	24.2	86.6
Czech R.	28.2	22.6	57.5	92.4	33.4	37.2	48.0
Estonia	28.1	37.3	42.6	84.0	30.6	37.3	48.2
Hungary	34.3	54.1	57.3	126.7	38.3	31.2	79.2
Latvia	21.1	25.4	45.6	75.0	30.9	36.1	42.6
Lithuania	22.9	26.3	39.4	87.8	26.9	35.3	40.5
Malta	58.1	41.8	66.0	100.9	48.5	39.9	62.0
Poland	31.9	51.3	51.9	114.4	33.3	30.9	66.3
Slovakia	28.4	24.8	45.2	81.3	32.5	33.0	43.6
Slovenia	26.3	51.9	56.4	121.8	38.4	30.1	70.7
Bulgaria	24.3	41.9	49.7	113.2	36.7	32.0	61.4
Romania	26.7	46.7	53.2	124.5	34.4	31.6	64.9
EU10	31.2	48.2	51.4	116.3	33.7	31.9	65.1
EU2	26.1	45.5	52.4	121.9	34.8	31.7	64.1
EU12	30.0	47.5	51.6	117.2	33.9	31.9	64.9
EU14	30.2	57.5	54.9	125.3	36.9	29.1	77.1
Sweden	24.3	46.3	47.8	112.4	32.7	29.2	57.0

Table A6 Amount of different forms of income transfers in 2010 of all who are aged 16–64 (in thousand kronor): raw mean values, i.e. no correction for background characteristics

	Social assistance	Labour market programmes	Unemployment insurance	Disability pensions	Sickness benefits	Parental allowances	All
Cyprus	1.8	3.8	2.3	20.0	2.1	2.6	32.6
Czech R.	1.3	1.0	2.2	1.5	1.4	5.7	13.1
Estonia	1.2	2.0	2.2	1.3	1.6	6.5	14.9
Hungary	1.9	3.7	3.5	16.5	2.8	3.1	31.6
Latvia	1.0	1.5	2.0	0.6	1.0	4.3	10.3
Lithuania	0.6	1.3	2.0	0.2	0.8	4.7	9.6
Malta	1.6	1.9	3.6	5.5	3.1	6.8	22.4
Poland	1.6	3.1	3.2	10.7	2.5	4.3	25.4
Slovakia	3.8	1.3	1.7	1.6	1.1	5.2	14.8
Slovenia	1.3	3.2	3.9	14.7	2.4	4.3	29.8
Bulgaria	1.3	3.2	3.2	7.0	1.6	3.4	19.8
Romania	1.4	3.6	3.9	8.5	2.1	4.2	23.6
EU10	1.5	2.9	3.1	9.7	2.3	4.3	23.7
EU2	1.4	3.5	3.7	8.1	2.0	4.0	22.7
EU12	1.5	3.0	3.2	9.3	2.2	4.2	23.5
EU14	1.2	2.7	3.2	16.2	2.9	3.4	29.6
Sweden	0.9	2.4	2.7	8.2	2.6	5.3	22.1

Sammanfattning på svenska

Sverige är medlem av en stegvis alltmer omfattande gemensam internationell arbetsmarknad. Redan år 1954 bildades den gemensamma nordiska arbetsmarknaden, 1994 blev Sverige medlem av EU/EEA:s gemensamma arbetsmarknad och 1995 medlem i EU. EU har sedan dess utvidgats i tre steg: 2004, 2007 och 2013. Den största utvidgningen skedde den 1 maj 2004, då EU fick tio nya medlemsstater: åtta i Central- och Östeuropa (Estland, Lettland, Litauen, Polen, Slovakien, Slovenien, Tjeckien och Ungern) samt två i medelhavsområdet (Cypern och Malta). I samband med utvidgningen hade Sverige likt övriga gamla medlemsstater rätt att införa övergångsregler när det gällde möjligheterna att invandra från de nya medlemsländerna i Central- och Östeuropa och i den politiska debatten uttrycktes farhågor för ”social turism” – att människor skulle flytta till Sverige i första hand för att få bidrag. Efter en intensiv debatt beslutades dock att Sverige inte skulle införa övergångsregler. Endast två av de övriga EU-länderna – Irland och Storbritannien – följde samma linje (även om man införde vissa mindre restriktioner). Den 1 januari 2007 fick EU ytterligare två nya medlemsstater: Bulgarien och Rumänien. I båda dessa länder var inkomstnivåerna lägre än i något av de länder som då var EU-medlemmar, men även denna gång valde Sverige att inte införa övergångsregler. Den 1 juli 2013 blev Kroatien EU:s 28:e medlemsland.

I den här undersökningen undersöker vi omfattningen av invandringen från de länder som blev medlemmar i EU 2004 och 2007 och hur det har gått för dem i Sverige. Det är ännu för tidigt att utvärdera betydelsen av att Kroatien har blivit EU-medlem. Vi studerar omfattningen, vilken utbildning de personer har som har kommit till Sverige och hur det går för dem på den svenska arbetsmarknaden. Till en del behandlar vi också frågan om hur migrationen kan ha påverkat den svenska ekonomin.

Invandringen till Sverige från de nya medlemsländerna ökade efter såväl 2004 som 2007. Efter utvidgningen 2004 var det framför allt från Polen människor kom, efter utvidgningen 2007 var det främst från Rumänien. Från övriga länder har invandringen varit betydligt mindre. Den är dock större från de baltiska länderna samt från Ungern och Bulgarien än från övriga nya medlemsländer. Att invandringen från Polen och Rumänien har varit den mest omfattande kan förklaras av att de länderna är de befolkningsmässigt största. För Polens del handlar det också om att det är ett grannland vid Östersjön, vilket för övrigt också gäller de baltiska länderna. Även tidigare invandring kan ha betydelse. Redan före 2004 var många polskfödda bosatta i Sverige. Jämfört med invandringen före utvidgningen av EU är andelen män större bland dem som därefter har kommit till Sverige.

När det gäller statistiken över invandringen finns det ett par saker man bör hålla i minnet. Endast personer som förklarar att de tänker stanna minst ett år i Sverige ingår i befolkningsstatistiken och därmed också i vår undersökning. Bland dem som har kommit till Sverige är det många som återvänder, vilket också syns i statistiken. Många glömmer dock att meddela skattemyndigheten när de lämnar landet, vilket innebär att utvandringen blir underskattad. Uppgifterna kommer visserligen in efter hand (ofta tar det flera år), men utvandringen blir felklassificerad när det gäller vilket år den avser. Det allvarligaste problemet är dock att antalet utrikesfödda blir överskattat, ett bekymmer inte minst för forskningen.

När antalet utrikesfödda överskattas, innebär det att sysselsättningsandelen blir underskattad. Vi har alltså ingen tillförlitlig statistik för andelen sysselsatta bland dem som kommer från de nya medlemsländerna. När det gäller personer för vilka vi saknar uppgift om anställning vet vi således inte huruvida de är kvar i Sverige och utan arbete eller om de har lämnat landet. För personer där uppgift om sysselsättning är tillgänglig har vi dock den information som behövs för att undersöka hur de klarar sig på arbetsmarknaden.

När det gäller utbildning kan vi se att de som kommer till Sverige är relativt välutbildade jämfört med dem som är födda här. De har i regel minst gymnasieutbildning, vilket delvis återspeglar att det främst handlar om unga människor. Yngre är i genomsnitt bättre utbildade än äldre och många har utbildning på universitetsnivå. Som på många andra områden är skillnaderna dock betydande beroende på vilka länder personerna kommer från.

Den invandrade arbetskraften är ofta koncentrerad till vissa sektorer och yrken. Det gäller också arbetskraftsinvandrare från de nya medlemsländerna i EU-länder som Irland, Storbritannien och Danmark. När vi studerar fördelningen per sektor i Sverige upptäcker vi dock inte särskilt stora skillnader. Fördelningen är ungefär densamma som för personer födda i Sverige. Det hindrar inte att man vid en mer detaljerad uppdelning än den vi har gjort skulle kunna finna skillnader. Huvudintrycket är dock att de som kommer från de nya medlemsländerna inte är koncentrerade till vissa sektorer.

När vi jämför antalet arbetade timmar mellan personer från de nya EU-länderna och personer som är födda i Sverige finner vi i princip inga skillnader. I båda grupperna arbetar kvinnor i genomsnitt något färre arbetstimmar per månad än vad män gör.

När det gäller den genomsnittliga arbetsinkomsten får vi samma resultat: det finns inga markanta skillnader mellan dem som kommer från de nya

medlemsländerna och dem som är födda i Sverige. De som kommer från de nya EU-länderna är inte en grupp som kännetecknas av låga arbetsinkomster. Den här typen av genomsnittsberäkningar tar dock inte hänsyn till vilken utbildning de enskilda individerna har och som tidigare nämndes handlar det ofta om välutbildade personer. När vi skattar löneekvationer – och tar hänsyn till ålder och utbildning – upptäcker vi också vissa löneskillnader. De som kommer från de nya medlemsländerna har lägre löner än de som är födda i Sverige, men skillnaden är inte särskilt stor, endast cirka sex procent. Att det ändå finns en skillnad kan bero på att många av dem som kommer hit inte arbetar med sådant som de är utbildade för; de är vad som brukar betecknas som ”överutbildade”. Förklaringen kan vara bristande kunskaper i svenska språket, att de har annan utbildning än den som efterfrågas på den svenska arbetsmarknaden men också diskriminering. Det är därför viktigt att fortlöpande undersöka hur lönerna för den invandrade arbetskraften utvecklas i Sverige.

Antalet personer som har kommit från de nya EU-länderna är litet jämfört med såväl den samlade arbetsmarknaden i Sverige som den totala invandringen till Sverige. Vi kan därför inte vänta oss några stora effekter på den svenska arbetsmarknaden vad gäller sysselsättning och löner. Internationell forskning pekar också på att effekterna på sysselsättning och löner för dem som redan finns i landet (de som är födda i landet eller som har invandrat tidigare) blir små eller obefintliga. Där vi mest sannolikt skulle kunna upptäcka effekter är i yrkesgrupper där det finns relativt många invandrare och där få lämnar för andra yrken, som exempelvis läkare och byggnadsarbetare.

Som tidigare nämnts fanns i samband med utvidgningen 2004 en politisk oro för att många människor som sökte sig till Sverige från de nya medlemsländerna skulle hamna i bidragsberoende och att det skulle komma ”sociala turister”. Vi har granskat frågan när det gäller personer i yrkesaktiv ålder och har inte fått några indikationer på att så blev fallet. Att mottaga någon form av inkomstöverföring är lika vanligt bland personer födda i Sverige som bland personer från de nya EU-länderna. Det finns heller inga skillnader när det gäller nivån på de belopp som betalas ut till den enskilde. Bilden skulle bli ännu tydligare om vi inkluderade personer som är 65 år och äldre, den ålder då en majoritet har lämnat arbetslivet. I den åldersgruppen är personer födda i Sverige överrepresenterade och merparten i den åldersgruppen uppbär pension. För att få full garantipension krävs att en person har varit bosatt i Sverige i minst 40 år.

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