

Turkey
Sweden and the
European Union
Experiences and
Expectations

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FOREWORD

On a beautiful, sunny day at the beginning of October 2005, a number of Turkish and Swedish academics, diplomats and journalists gathered in the leafy garden of the Swedish Consulate-General in Istanbul to participate in a round-table discussion on “Turkey, Sweden and the EU. Expectations and Experiences”. The event was organized by the Consulate-General of Sweden in co-operation with the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, SIEPS.

The seminar was held only a few days after the historic decision taken by the European Union to start membership negotiations with Turkey, and the atmosphere in the garden was rather excited. After more than forty years of discussion and disputes within the European Union, the question was no longer if Turkey should be let into the negotiating room, but how these talks should be conducted and what the results might be.

An inspiring and intense day of discussions followed. At dusk we all felt that we had gained new and important insights into the historical and political conditions for the negotiations between the EU and Turkey and, thus, into the future development of the European Union.

Even if a small, fairly new Member State such as Sweden may not have a lot in common with a big, prospective Member State such as Turkey, the seminar showed that a European discussion is possible, fruitful – and absorbing. We have therefore decided to publish the contributions to the conference, in the hope that something of the inspiring mood that developed around the table that day may be shared by a broader public.

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THE TURK AS A THREAT AND EUROPE'S "OTHER"

Ingmar Karlsson

For most Europeans the words Turk and Turkey have negative associations. A fear of Turks was impressed on western minds during the long period when the Turks governed a large part of Europe and seemed to threaten the existence of Christianity. The comment made in the autumn of 2004 by the then EU Commissioner, Bolkenstein, in the discussion about whether or not Turkey should be given a negotiation date shows the persistence of this threat scenario. In case of a yes, he warned, the victory over the Turks outside the gates of Vienna in 1683 would have been in vain. Instead, we would see the Turks rioting inside the gates of Brussels.

The fall of Constantinople in 1453 aroused a fear of Turks that was later augmented and was symbolised by names of battlefields and of conquered and besieged cities such as Mohács, Peterwardein, Vienna and Belgrade.

The Archbishop of Prague, for example, ordered that the city's church bells should toll at nine o'clock every Friday to remind people of the Turks' painful victory over the Christians. After the Turks had been driven away from Vienna in 1683, the bells were instead tolled as a mark of thanksgiving that the danger from the Turks was over and, in this way, the threat was kept permanently alive in people's consciousness.

As early as in the mid-1400s special "missa contra turcas" were celebrated, with the message that victory over the Turks was only possible with the help of God. A Christian community was therefore necessary to withstand the cruelty of the Turks: "There are no crueller and more audacious villains under the heavens than the Turks who spare no age or sex and mercilessly cut down young and old alike and pluck unripe fruit from the wombs of mothers" claimed Bishop Fabri of Vienna (1536–41). Through preachings about the Turks, bad conditions in the European societies were also attacked which were said to favour the evil Turks. This applied in particular to alcohol abuse. To quote Bishop Fabri again:

"How can a person who, due to drunkenness cannot stand on his feet, fight the sober Turk."

In the 16th century about 2 500 publications about Turks, over a thousand of which were in German, were spread around Europe and in these too the image of the bloodthirsty Turk was imprinted. In the period 1480 to 1610, twice as many books were published about the Turkish threat as about the discovery of the continent of America. Claims were spread that the Turks were the descendants of the son, Ismael, whom Abraham had with his Egyptian slave Hagar. In the first book of Moses 16:12 it says: "He will be a wild donkey of a man; his hand will be against everyone and everyone's hand against him. And he will live to the east of all his brothers."

Just about all the vices in the world were associated with the Turks. In Italy phrases such as "bestemmia come un Turco" (he swears like a Turk) and "puzza come un Turco" (he stinks like a Turk) were used. The French called rude behaviour, cruelty and greed "turquerie" and when the Spanish wanted to make disparaging remarks about a person, he/she was called "turco". The English expression "to talk turkey to somebody" means to give a frank opinion to the opposite party.

The German repertory ranged from "Türkenhund" (Turkish dog) to "Türkenknecht" (Turkish farm-hand), "Kümmeltürke" (caraway Turk) and "er qualmt wie ein Türke"

(he smokes like a Turk). Both the pipe and tobacco came from the Turks. In the Austrian countryside you can still hear today how children are called in from play: “Es ist schon dunkel. Türken kommen. Türken kommen” (It’s already dark, The Turks are coming. The Turks are coming).

Luther’s closest associate, Philip Melanchton, claimed that the Turks were red Jews. Jews because they circumcised their sons and had taken over other Jewish manners and customs. Red because they were bloodhounds that murdered and warred. According to other theologians the word Turk came from “torquere”, torture, and according to another popular theory the Turks were identical with the Scythians who were considered a particularly cruel race. Military power and cruelty were recurring attributes in all these claims about the origin of the Turks.

In Luther’s view, the Turks’ invasion was God’s punishment of Christianity because it had allowed the corruption of both the Holy See and the Church. In 1518 when he defended his 95 theses, Luther claimed that God had sent the Turks to punish the Christians in the same way as he had sent war, plagues and earthquakes. The reply of Pope Leo X was the famous papal bull in which he threatened Luther with excommunication and attempted to portray Luther as a troublemaker who advocated capitulation to the Turks.

However, in time Luther developed his own grounds for war against the Turks. The Christians could make war against the Turks but must first do penance and reform their lives and their church. Since the Turks were God’s punishment, the Christians must first eradicate the grounds for this punishment. When that had been done, they could start a war of defence which would then be justified: “This struggle must begin with penance and we must change our lives or we will fight in vain.”

In Sweden too, the Turks were designated the arch-enemy of Christianity. This was the case, for example, in a book entitled *Luna Turcica eller Turkeske måne, anwissjandes lika som uti en spegel det mahometiske vanskelige regementet, fördeltes uti fyra kvarter eller böcker* (Turkish moon showing as in a mirror the dangerous Mohammedan rule, divided into four quarters or books) which was published in 1694 and was written by the parish priest of Jönköping, Erland Dryselius. In the sermons the country’s clergy preached about the Turks’ general cruelty and bloodthirstiness and of how they systematically burned and plundered the areas they conquered. In a Swedish school book published in 1795 Islam was described as “the false religion that had been fabricated by the great deceiver Muhammed, to which the Turks to this day universally confess”.

Stories of the dog-Turk also contributed to this negative image. The dog-Turk was claimed to be a man-eating being, half animal half human with a dog’s head and tail. Karl XII had got into its debt during his stay in Bender in the Ottoman empire and to settle his debt he had to pay a certain amount of human flesh every year. This debt was said to have been taken over by the freemasons who were also considered a threat to the church.

After the defeat of the Turks outside Vienna in 1683, the image of the dog-Turk began to change. He was no longer as dangerous but changed into a ridiculous figure. In carnival processions and masquerades from Bohemia to the Tyrol from Vienna to the Rhineland, the dog-Turk appeared alongside witches, clowns and other popular comic

figures. The Turks were generally ridiculed and the noble European character emphasised. This did not change the image of the brutal Turk but fear of this barbarian lessened and a feeling of superiority emerged that has lasted to the present day.

When the Turkish threat appeared to be over, a veritable Turkish fashion broke out in Europe's theatres and operas. The contents of play were drawn from fantasy and historical half-truths, and the picture of the Turk was often ambivalent and served to cement the image of both the dangerous and the ridiculous Turk. In the plays of Racine and Molière you could see a funny figure with a turban and fat belly and it was good form to say a few words in Turkish too. In Mozart's *Abduction from the Seraglio*, Osmin expresses his views on how Christians should be treated:

“Erst geköpft, dann gehangen, dann gespiesst von heissen Stangen, dann verbrannt, dann gebunden, dann getaucht, zuletzt geschunden:”. (First beheaded, then hanged, then impaled on red-hot spikes, then burned, then bound and drowned, finally flayed).”

In the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire began to establish permanent diplomatic missions in London, Paris, Vienna and Berlin. As a result of these contacts all things Turkish became exotic, not least the dress fashion, “turquoise”. Sultans and pashas were often portrayed as noble and enlightened people in contrast to European rulers. At the Prussian and Saxon courts, feasts, processions and weddings were held *à la Turc* and Turkish manners became a way for the upper classes to distance themselves from common people. Turkish kiosks were erected in Swedish manorial parks too and Gustav III built a Turkish pavilion at the Haga Park.

In the 18th century, Ignatius Mouradgea, a translator (dragoman) of Armenian origin at the Swedish Embassy in Istanbul, contributed to spreading knowledge and a positive image of Turkey in Europe through his encyclopaedic volume entitled *Tableau Général de l'Empire Ottoman*. He was later knighted by Gustav III acquiring the name d'Ohsson and was for a time head of the Embassy in Istanbul.

Turkish Janissary music inspired among others Mozart and Schubert to compose music *à la turca*. And with the age of enlightenment and Romanticism there was increased interest in the exotic and greater tolerance of and curiosity about other religions and cultures, which was reflected in the image of the Turk who now came to be regarded in many quarters as the “noble savage”.

Voltaire, however, did not hide his hatred of the Turks whom he characterised as “tyrants of the women and enemies of arts”. These “barbarian usurpers” must be chased out of Europe. He accused them of having destroyed our ancient heritage from “the Orient's Christian realm” and wrote:

“I wish fervently that the Turkish barbarians be chased away immediately out of the country of Xenophon, Socrates, Plato, Sophocles and Euripides. If we wanted, it could be done soon but seven crusades of superstition have been undertaken and a crusade of honour will never take place. We know almost no city built by them; they let decay the most beautiful establishments of Antiquity, they reign over ruins.”

There are countless similar quotations from publications by other 18th century writers. The Turks were perceived as usurpers of the classical heritage that Europe's identity was said to be built on while they themselves were not considered to have a culture worth the name.

The image of Turkish women was also negative. They were described as uneducated, blindly submissive to the will of their parents and husbands. They had to hide their faces and were forced into arranged marriages, subjected to domestic violence and had no control over their own fate whatsoever.

However, there is one exception in Lady Mary Wortley Montagu's *Letters from Turkey*. In 1716 she accompanied her husband after his appointment as British Ambassador in Istanbul.

She describes how Turkish women expressed their pity at the corset she was wearing when she visited the baths. It must be a male invention: "They thought I had been locked into this machine and was not capable of opening it myself, something which they attributed to my husband."

Never before had she met such beautiful, gifted and satisfied women as there. It was a completely wrong idea that Turkish women lived their days in imprisonment. Turkish women were undoubtedly Europe's most liberated. The veil was not a means of suppressing women. Quite the reverse. They could move freely on the streets without needing to fear harassment thanks to the veil and even evade their husbands' control. Turkish women could move freely and go wherever they wanted on the street. If they were bored in their harem they could meet their women friends at the baths.

Her conclusion was that Turkish men and women were not at all as described in the travel books she had read. The Turks were no more cruel than other people. According to Lady Montagu, the Hungarian prince at Győr treated his subjects far worse than the Turkish Sultan after conquering these areas. The Turks were a cultivated people who attached great importance to literature and architecture. They were far in advance of Europe in medicine too. Smallpox which sorely plagued the English had been eradicated in Turkey through vaccination.

In the 1840s Czar Alexander of Russia talked of Turkey as the sick man of Europe, an expression that stuck in public consciousness and gave the impression that the Ottoman Empire had always suffered under the reign of hopeless, cruel, dissolute and incompetent sultans. A negative image of the Turks and the Ottoman Empire now evolved in Europe, an image that was largely based on prejudice, contempt and fear. In a geography book (*Elements of Geography*) published in London in 1833 the following, for example, may be read:

"The Turks are generally tall, strong and robust. They are an idle, cruel and ignorant people. They like to smoke."

Another geography book (*Géographie Universelle*) published in Paris in 1860 gives this picture:

"The indolent Turk does not know about the excitement of our societies, he rests softly on the pillows of his sofa, smokes tobacco from Syria, warms up with Mocha coffee, watches dancing slaves; some grains of opium transport him to heavens accompanied by immortal beauties."

The image of the brutal Turks was further impressed by the fight for independence waged by the Christian peoples in the Balkans during the 19th century and which gave rise to the so-called "Eastern question". Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian nationalists attacked Muslim villages in the hope that this would trigger counter-measures on such a

scale and of such brutality that the western powers would be induced to intervene on the side of the Christians. Lord Byron's death in Greece in fever in 1823 shortly after he had joined the Greek forces set off a wave of anti-Turkish feeling all over Europe. In spite of the fact that outrages were committed on both sides – the Greeks started their war of independence in 1821 by massacring thousands of Turkish men, women and children at Morea – western public opinion only reacted to Muslim outrages. The Muslims on the Balkans were regarded by their neighbours as *turci* and hence as traitors who had chosen to throw in their lot with the conquerors. Ethnic cleansing of predominantly Muslim areas was carried out by the Serbs as early as the first decades of the 19th century when the Turks were pushed back. On old copperplate from Belgrade, you can see countless minarets. The mosques were levelled to the ground when the Turkish troops left the country.

When, in 1876, Ottoman troops put down a Bulgarian revolt with great brutality and massacred 15 000 men, women and children, the event was used in British domestic politics. William Gladstone wrote a lampoon directed against his rival Benjamin Disraeli – *The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East* – 200 000 copies of which were sold in two months and cemented the image of the brutal Turk.

The Turks were portrayed as a foreign body that must be driven out of Europe. The American writer, William Milligan Sloane, wrote, for example, after a journey through the European parts of the Ottoman Empire in 1908:

“From Asia they came, to Asia they return with little regret and being a totally unhistoric people it is doubtful whether centuries of European abode would in their future tradition be much more than a tale of Scheherazade. In order to understand and do justice to the Turk we need a fourth dimension. He is our antipode.”

The rhetoric increased during the first world war. The British prime minister Lloyd George instructed those responsible for British war propaganda on the aim and direction of anti-Turkish propaganda: “The Turks' inability to govern, their misrule and above all massacres of the hardworking population must be emphasised. I hardly need to point out that this should be done gradually and the articles spread over a long period so that our purpose is not too obvious. Sir Mark Sykes' article in the Times is exactly what we want to see.”

In this article, which was later spread throughout the United States, expressions such as merciless tyrant, unprincipled bully, unadulterated barbarians, a degenerate race that has littered the earth with ruins, were used. Sykes even fabricated quotations by different members of the Ottoman government. One of the most sensational claims was that it was the Turks who had invaded and destroyed Baghdad, a conscious attempt to interfuse the history of the Turks and the Mongols.

The British propaganda ministry also published a *Blue Book*, a lampoon against the Turks, chiefly inspired by Greeks and Armenians, which expressed an open and unconstrained hatred of the Turks in racist terms.

Even the young historian Arnold J Toynbee was involved in the campaign and wrote a book entitled *The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks* in which he claimed that throughout their history the Turks had “lamed and beguiled more gifted nations”. After the 1912-1913 Balkans wars the Turks had wiped out all Greeks, Albanians and Slavs that were left on their territory. The Turks were simply uncivilised: “They have nothing other than a military tradition of violence and cunning.”

Not just the English were engaged in this propaganda war. Henry Morgenthau who was the American Ambassador in Istanbul 1913-1916 wrote for example:

“Such graces of civilisation as the Turk has acquired in five centuries have practically all been taken from the subject peoples whom he so greatly despises. His religion comes from the Arabs; his language has acquired a certain literary value by borrowing certain Arabic and Persian elements and his writing is Arabic. Constantinople’s finest architectural monument, the mosque of St Sophia was originally a Christian church and all so-called Turkish architecture is derived from the Byzantine. The mechanism of business and trade has always rested in the hands of the subject peoples, Greeks, Jews, Armenians and Arabs. The Turks have learned little of European art and science, they have established very few educational institutions and illiteracy is the prevailing rule.”

Another American writer and former Ambassador in Berlin, James Gerard, proposed that the Turks should be treated in the same way as America’s Indians and placed in reserves and the French historian, André Mandelstam, added that throughout history the Turks had not “done anything to justify their existence from a civilisatory point of view. They are a fruitless people. Their historical role was to destroy and destruction needs no soul.”

In spite of the change of direction that took place after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and, following Kemal Atatürk’s secular revolution, the expressed will to integrate Turkey into the western world, the image of the Turks in Europe remained negative. Not least the fact that the new republic inherited the blame for the fate of the Armenian population during and after the First World War was a contributory factor and continues to be so.

Membership of the Council of Europe and NATO after the Second World War did not lead to any fundamental change in the image of the Turk, which acquired a further dimension when in the early 1950s the Turks began to emigrate to Europe, primarily to Germany, which at that time was in great need of labour. Simple farmers left Anatolia in the hope of returning when they had earned sufficient money. They could not speak the languages of their new home countries and never integrated. They lived in the same areas and were not open to their surroundings. They were unaware of the negative image the Turks already had to deal with in Europe and they did not know enough about their own culture and history to be able to defend themselves against prejudice. Gradually a new image of the Turk emerged – pleasant, rather boring, not afraid to undertake work but a person at whom you turned up your nose. The word Turk now had the same pejorative meaning in Europe as it had had among the elite of the Ottoman Empire.

Prejudices were reinforced elsewhere too. The film *Midnight Express*, which was a box-office success all over the world after its première in 1978, has contributed perhaps more than anything else to the negative image of the Turks and Turkey.

The film is about a young American who has been given a long prison sentence after being arrested for possession of hash. All the Turks in the film are portrayed as bloodthirsty and sadistic torturers with homosexual inclinations, unshaven and swarthy with unkempt moustaches. However, if you look at the cast it shows that none of the actors were Turkish and many of the most obnoxious roles were played by Greek and Armenian actors. Istanbul is also changed beyond recognition. All the buildings are

dilapidated, washing hangs over dark and ominous alleys full of people of menacing appearance and on the pavements idle men with dull eyes sit smoking their hookahs. This European metropolis has been changed into a third world city characterised by violence, disorder and chaos. All through the film, the imprisoned Billy Hayes and his family talk of the Turks as “pigs”.

A reviewer in *Le Monde* wrote that the action arouses such feelings of hatred in the audience that when they leave the cinema they wish that such a nation did not exist. There is simply no justification for it.

Oliver Stones received an Oscar in 1979 for his film script. When, during a visit to Turkey in December 2004 immediately after Turkey had been given the go ahead for EU membership negotiations, he admitted he had overdramatised what Billy Hayes had told him in interviews which were the basis for the film, this received much publicity and was regarded as a kind of belated national redress.

However, the prejudices still lie deep which may be illustrated, for example, by the definitions of the word Turk in some of our most frequently used dictionaries:

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary: One who is cruel or tyrannical

Concise Oxford Dictionary: Ferocious, wild or unmanageable person

Random House Dictionary: A cruel, brutal or domineering man

In Norstedts English-Swedish Dictionary you can read; Turk, bråkstake, vilddjur; a regular young Turk, en riktig bråkstake; turn Turk, bli vild, börja gorma

The states that have risen out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire each have their own national liberation legend and their own national historiography and even today there is a tendency to blame all shortcomings and wrongs in present-day society on the earlier Ottoman rulers rather than on the 45 years of communism. In Hungary and the Balkans, the image of the Turk as an oppressor has become part of these countries' folklore. “500 years under the Turkish yoke” is still to this day the explanation for practically all problems from shortages of food, to explaining why the lift does not work and why corruption is so widespread with an equivalent version in Bulgarian, Serbian, Romanian and Greek.

The negative image has also been self-inflicted through the economic and political crises and recurring military coups. You have to have lived in Turkey for some time to realise how deeply rooted is the so-called Sèvres complex. The 1920 Peace Treaty of Sèvres would have reduced the Turkish Republic to the areas around Ankara on the Anatolian Plateau and part of the Black Sea coast. With his war of liberation Kemal Atatürk tore this up and by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 the Republic of Turkey was established. However, many Turks still have a deeply rooted conviction that underlying the world's interest in human rights and the situation of minorities in Turkey there is a hidden agenda characterised by Sèvres, which has led to an often aggressive and contra-productive attitude of self-defence which in its turn has been reinforced by continuous Greek, Armenian and Kurdish anti-Turkish propaganda.

This mentality which is reflected in the phrase “Türkün Türkten baska dostu yoktur” (The Turk is the Turk's only friend) is now in process of changing. Dramatically improved Greek-Turkish relations are an example of this. Turkey's popularity as a tourist country and the hospitality, openness and friendliness with which all visitors are

received has also contributed to a gradual dismantling of the negative image of the Turk which was impressed on Europe for centuries. As a result, more and more elderly Europeans are now settling in the coastal areas of Turkey as they find the environment there friendlier and more attractive than on the increasingly crowded Costa del Sol or in Algarve.

More and more Europeans will realise that Istanbul is not a Cairo which happens to partly lie on the continent of Europe but an international metropolis comparable with New York, ("the coolest city in Europe, to quote a cover story in Newsweek from August 2005) that not just Ankara and Izmir are modern cities with millions of inhabitants but also towns in central Anatolia such as Kayseri and Malatya compare favourably as regards their European characteristics with the major cities of the new member states. Above all it will emerge that the Turkey that exists today in European ghettos such as Kreuzberg in Berlin belongs to the past and has not taken part in the development which the Republic of Turkey is undergoing today.

The comment by former EU commissioner Bolkenstein quoted at the beginning of this paper shows however that we have not reached that point yet. In many cartoons concerning Turkey's European ambition you still see Turkey depicted as a backward peasant society in sharp contrast to a modern Europe. References are still often made to Turkey as "the sick man of Europe " and as a monolithic reactionary Islamic society unable to recover without Europe's helping hand. The Turkish characters are often distorted and described as fat, bearded, cunning creatures in oriental costumes and fezes, in spite of the fact that the fez was forbidden by Atatürk 80 years ago and that the French secular state has been a model for the Turkish society ever since.

The EU membership negotiations will result in increasing and ever broader areas of contact and as a result of this process prejudices on both sides will decline. Europeans will return from Turkey with the same experience as a French traveller in 1652:

"There are many in Christendom who believe that the Turks are great devils, barbarians and people without faith but those who have known them and talked to them have a quite different opinion. It is certain that the Turks are good people who follow very well the commandment given to us by nature, only to do to others what we would have done to us."

MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT SECULARISM, ISLAM, AND ISLAMISM IN TURKEY

Şahin Alpay

Let me begin by expressing my deep felt satisfaction with the outcome of the meeting of the EU Council in Luxembourg. If a consensus on the start of accession negotiations with Turkey had not been achieved in literally the last minute, we certainly would be in no mood to talk about Turkey, Sweden and the EU today. I do not know if I will live long enough to see the conclusion of negotiations. If I do, I am not sure if I will vote “Yes” in the referendum on EU membership which I expect to be held in Turkey when the time comes. The only thing I am sure about is that the process of accession will continue to greatly assist Turkey in consolidating its democracy and modernizing its economy. I am also very happy to note that the Luxembourg decision of October 3 decision has shown that those who see the EU as a union based on universal values of human rights, rule of law, democracy and respect for cultural diversity prevail among European decision makers, and that the vision of EU as a “Christian club” is rejected.

This morning I would like to briefly address certain misconceptions about Turkish secularism, Turkish Islam, and the Islamist movement in Turkey shared by some people not only in Europe and the West in general, but unfortunately also here in Turkey. The misconceptions I refer to are mainly the following:

- Secularism in Turkey is protected by the state bureaucracy and especially the military. EU reforms which curb the political role of the military may strengthen Islamist forces, and bring about the demise of the secular regime in Turkey.
- The Turkish people are becoming increasingly religious, and if this religious resurgence is not effectively controlled and suppressed, Islamists would be able to mobilize the great majority of the Turkish people to establish a rule based on Sharia, i.e. Islamic law.
- The ruling Justice and Development Party has a hidden Islamist agenda. As soon as it consolidates its power, it is likely to overthrow secularism and democracy in Turkey and establish an Iran – like regime in its place.

Secularism in Turkey

Let me begin with the first misconception. Secularism in Turkey is not dependent on protection by the bureaucracy or the military. It is firmly rooted in Ottoman – Turkish history. The Ottoman state was not a theocracy run by the clergy, but had a de facto secular administration. Religious authority was strictly subject to political authority. Secular laws passed by the Ottoman rulers always carried greater weight than religious law. The ulema’s, i.e. religious scholars’ primary function was to provide religious legitimacy to the Sultans. The Ottoman “Millet system” provided substantial autonomy to various religious communities that made up the Empire. Legal secularization began with the Tanzimat reforms of the early 19th century, and by the end of that century religious law was implemented only in private affairs, in the regulation of marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc. The Republican regime that was founded in 1923 took a further step and secularized even private law.

Kemalists, the founders of the Republic of Turkey, like the Young Turks before them (who ruled during period of the Ottoman Empire) largely shared a materialistic, positivistic, scientific philosophy under the influence of European thinkers. They

regarded Islam as a reactionary force that was partly responsible for the decline of the Empire, and they were convinced that if Turkey was to progress religious thinking had to be replaced by scientific thinking. Kemalists went further than the Young Turks in suppressing Islam. The Republic established a system by which religious affairs were put under strict state control through the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Turkey today has legal secularism, but state and religion are not separated. The state has no official religion, but the Sunni Hanefi version of Islam represented by the Directorate is promoted by the state. The Directorate controls all mosques, pays the salaries of all religious personnel with tax money. The Ministry of Education has monopoly over religious education, and operates prayer leader and preacher schools. There are compulsory religion courses in schools which focus on the teachings and practice of the officially sanctioned form of Islam. Wearing of the Muslim headscarf is banned in all schools, universities and government offices.

Today the debate in Turkey is not at all between those who want to protect the secular regime, and those who want to dismantle it. The debate is between those who want the current authoritarian type of secularism (inspired by “laicism” of the French Revolution), and those who ask for greater religious freedom. This debate is going on since the introduction of multi – party politics in 1950, and coming to power of non – religious parties with a more tolerant attitude towards Islam. It may be said that ever since two opposing understandings of secularism confront each other in Turkey. The authoritarian, Kemalist notion of state (or “positive”) secularism which assigns the state the function of secularizing society, and for this purpose controlling religion and restricting religious freedoms is challenged by those who share may be called a liberal understanding of (“negative”) secularism which demands separation of state and religion and equal treatment of all beliefs by the state. The Islamist movement in Turkey has in fact never opposed state sponsorship of Sunni Islam, but demanded lifting of restrictions on religious freedoms primarily of the Sunni majority. A scholar of Turkish politics, Elisabeth Özdalga, has commented that in Turkey “secularism is in need of secularisation”. A new balance between religion and state, and formal recognition of religious plurality constitutes an important aspect of the liberalization of Turkish democracy.

Turkish Islam

Lifting restrictions on religious freedoms in Turkey is not likely to lead to the radicalisation of Islam. Like Christianity, Islam has many different interpretations, and Turkish Islam is particularly pluralistic. In Turkey, there are three main forms of Islam: Official Islam sanctioned by the state and represented by the Directorate of Religious Affairs is a kind of Islam which emphasizes respect for family and traditional values. Volk Islam, i.e. Islam of religious brotherhoods and communities is based on the Sufi, mystic tradition that has played an important role in the conversion of Turks to Islam in the 8th and 9th centuries. A plurality of Sufi brotherhoods and communities still has a large following and influence in Turkey despite the fact that they have been outlawed since 1925. Various branches of the Nakshibandi brotherhood and “Nurcu” groups (which consist of followers of Said Nursi’s teachings) have during the 1990s produced market, democracy, science and EU friendly interpretations of Islam. They have founded networks of schools, media, hospitals, solidarity foundations, industrial and financial enterprises that play an important role in the economic, social and cultural life of the country. The kind of Islam they preach shatters all cliches about Islam not being

favorable to or compatible with capitalism and democracy. These religious groups have encouraged the rise of the so-called “Islamic Calvinists” of Anatolia, a middle class which combines religious values with entrepreneurial skills. If the Sufi brotherhoods are the cultural driving force behind the rising Anatolian bourgeoisie, that bourgeoisie may be said to be the driving social force behind the rise of the ruling Justice and Development Party led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The third main form of Islam in Turkey is the heterodox Islam of Alevi, who constitute about a fifth of the population of Turkey. Their kind of Islam combines elements of Shia Islam and pre-Islamic beliefs of Turks. It can in general be said that partly explained by its heterogeneity and pluralism, mainstream Turkish Islam forms a generally moderate, tolerant and liberal type of Islam. There is no doubt that modernist interpretations of Islam prevail in Turkey. Fundamentalists are largely marginal, and predominantly non – violent. The notoriously violent fundamentalist group Hizbullah is suspected of being promoted by the state authorities during the 1990s in the fight against the Kurdish separatist uprising.

That a moderate and tolerant kind of Islam prevails in Turkey is supported by various research findings, and particularly by the comprehensive survey conducted in 2000 by two distinguished political scientists of Bogazici University. The findings indicate that 85% of Turkish Muslims believe that someone who does not pray can still be regarded a Muslim. 66 % does not regard consumption of alcohol as a disqualification from being a Muslim. 85% say a woman who does not wear headscarf can still be a Muslim. 89% believe that there are good people even among faithful of other religions. Only 10 – 15 % are in favor of introducing religious law, and that only in private affairs. (See: Ali Carkoglu – Binnaz Toprak, *Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset / Religion, Society and Politics in Turkey*, TESEV Publication, 2000.) Turks in general have traditionally favored moderate parties in all elections held since introduction of multi – party politics in 1950, and the more religious have favored center – right parties.

During the last decades there seems to be a general rise in the number of women who wear the headscarf. But this does not mean that fundamentalism is on the rise in Turkey. Most of those women who wear and defend it, seek recognition of the suppressed Islamic identity through an appeal to human rights. Wearing of the headscarf does not signify fundamentalism. On the contrary, it is a vehicle for modernization for women who come from conservative families and want to participate in the social, economic and political life of the country. It is important to note that during the last decades headscarved have been the most politically active women in Turkey. (An excellent book on the headscarf controversy in Turkey is Yesim Arat’s *Rethinking Islam and Liberal Democracy: Islamist Women in Turkish Politics*, State University of New York Press, 2005.)

Political Islam in Turkey

Political Islam or Islamism in Turkey has from the outset been pragmatic, moderate and constitutionalist as explained in Erik Jan Zürcher and his colleagues excellent report to the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy entitled “The European Union, Turkey and Islam” (Amsterdam University Press, 2004). This is due to several factors: Like the Young Turks and Kemalists, Turkish Islamists were influenced by European ideas. Turkey was never a colony, so Islamism never became an ideological vehicle for nationalist resistance to the West. Turkey never experienced large scale socio

– economic deprivation as elsewhere in the Muslim world, and since 1950s dissatisfaction could be expressed through politics. The rapidly growing middle class shares religious beliefs but is also raised in a secular regime. Turkish Islam's pluralism and traditional pro – state orientation also explains for its pragmatic and flexible character. Sufi brotherhoods and communities, as discussed above, have contributed to the development of a market, democracy, and secularism friendly kind of Islam.

The Islamist movement was not allowed to participate in democratic politics before the end of the 1960s. Parties founded by the movement called the National Vision movement under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan were closed down one after the other either by the Constitutional Court or military tribunals for violating the principles of secularism. Islamism remained a marginal movement until mid – 1990s when in the parliamentary elections of 1995, Welfare Party became the leading party with close to 22 % of the vote. The growth in the 1990s of the electoral power of the National Vision movement, traditionally supported by a core of conservative religious voters, was closely related with the growing influence of the Anatolian bourgeoisie. The movement also had the support of large segments of the urban poor and non – nationalist Kurds. Ironically, the politics of using Islamization against communism and separatism pursued by the military regime which ruled the country between 1980–83 also helped Welfare Party's success.

The Welfare Party's discourse was ambivalent on the issue of equal human rights for all. There was also a dose of anti – Semitism in Mr Erbakan's discourse. The movement advocated state – led industrialization, and was against the support provided by the state elites to the Istanbul bourgeoisie. It stood for an anti – Western, anti – EU and pro – Islamic unity platform until mid – 1990s. But it never contested the democratic regime, and always worked within the constitutional system. It never challenged state secularism, but demanded greater religious freedom, and a greater role for religion in public life. When the Welfare Party was banned in 1998 by the Constitutional Court, Erbakan did not challenge the decision in the streets of Ankara, but at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Following the banning of even the Virtue Party that had replaced Welfare Party, the Islamist movement split. Supporters of Erbakan (who was banned from politics for 5 years) gathered in the Felicity Party while the followers of former Istanbul mayor, Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdogan founded the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in August 2001. The AKP which declared itself to be a Conservative Democratic party fully committed to secularism and democracy adopted a highly liberal political and economic platform with full support for Turkey's EU membership. That platform and the protest vote against the corrupt and incompetent politicians of mainstream parties helped AKP win a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections of November 2002.

In conclusion, it can be said that a reasonably well functioning democracy in Turkey which has opened the doors to participation in the political process to the Islamist movement has led to a gradual liberal transformation of that movement. The AKP in power has achieved political and economic reforms that have paved the way for the start of accession negotiations with the EU. By shedding the ambivalent position on human rights of the National Vision movement, and by declaring its unequivocal commitment to democracy and secularism, AKP has surely helped strengthen the secular regime in Turkey.

THE SWEDISH DEBATE ON TURKEY'S PROSPECT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP*

Fredrik Langdal

Introduction

The ideas of offering Turkey a privileged partnership with the European Union, rather than membership, as has been voiced by the German Chancellor or subjecting a membership bid to a national referendum, as proposed by the French president or promising to permanently seal off a national labour market from the Turks as promised by the Austrian Chancellor, would all sound very alien in the Swedish debate on Turkey's membership ambitions. By contrast, in the Swedish debate a future Turkish membership is embraced in principle by all parties represented in parliament, albeit with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Moreover, the debate is muted and low-key and essentially confined to political elites.

This highly empirical paper will deal with the Swedish debate on the issue of Turkish membership to the European Union with a focus on the parliamentary arena during the parliamentary session 2004/05 and the first two months of the 2005/06 session (starting in September). The paper will draw heavily on a previous endeavour where the Swedish debate between 1999 and 2004 on this topic was researched.¹ That study included, apart from parliamentary records, also the debate in the mass media. This paper will make comparisons between those findings, primarily the 2003/04 parliamentary session and the more recent developments which will allow for identification of changes in the debate over time and hopefully some inferences regarding the causes for such change.

Albeit empirical, some analytical dimensions should prove helpful for systematisation and comparison. It seems obvious that a debate regarding expansion of any organisation will contain references to inclusion and exclusion, i.e., the openness of the organisation. If a candidate should be included or excluded seems to be one of the fundamental questions for any non-static organisation. Another dimension which is likely to be relevant is if the argument in favour or against enlargement is focused on the effect on a given constituent part of the organisation, the organisation as such, or on the candidate applying for membership. These two dimensions will be addressed in the concluding section of the paper.

In the table below some basic examples of possible configurations are given for hypothetical national debates and examples of what such national debates may focus upon. It should be noted that any given national debate may contain several of these configurations simultaneously as actors may hold different preferences.

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¹ Langdal, F. (2005), "Die Schwedische Debatte über einen EU-Beitritt der Türkei: Im Kern eine Frage der Konditionalität" in Giannakopoulos, A. and Maras, K. (eds.), *Die Türkei-Debatte in Europa. Ein Vergleich*, VS-Verlag

Table 1: Examples of possible configurations of organisational enlargement debates

Openness		
Impact	Inclusion	Exclusion
Member State	Domestic benefits	Domestic costs
Acceding State	Benevolent export of values	Anti-imperialism
Organisation	Organisational or material benefits	Threats to organisational coherence

The paper is structured in the following way, first we shall survey why different actors think that Turkey should join the EU, second we will look at which objections to commencing accession negotiations and which obstacles to membership that have been raised by the parliamentarians and try to analyse what they have in common. The paper will compare these findings with the debate during the 2003/04 session and identify key areas which are *not* discussed in the Swedish context. Finally we will try to draw some conclusions regarding the future direction of the debate.

Arguments in favour of Turkish membership

All Swedish parties represented in parliament are positive in principle to Turkish EU membership. However, much of the debate has previously revolved around whether Turkey fulfils the criteria for membership and related deficiencies, something which had hitherto overshadowed the more positive arguments of the debate.

The most obvious, and frequently heard argument can be labelled *constitutional* or *rule based*, i.e., a general argument for enlargement of the EU to all countries that wish to become members and which fulfils the criteria for membership.² In this context, Turkish membership is in principle debated in the same breath as for example those for the Ukraine, the Balkans in general and Croatia in particular. The essence of the argument is the importance of not changing the rules of the game, something which is repeatedly emphasised.³ This in turn reflects a virtual unanimous view that international cooperation should be rule-based, be it in the form of the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation or the EU. The Swedish government, with unanimous parliamentary backing, has acted according to this approach and was the member state that held out until it was the lone defender of the position that there should be no wording along the lines of permanent safeguards. As it were, the Government had to arrange a consultation over the phone with members of the Committee on European Affairs on the eve of the European Council meeting in December 2004 to consult with the committee if it could give up its resistance to permanent safeguards. The deal the MP's were presented with was, put starkly; either Sweden accepted a clause on permanent safeguards or that the summit would fail to give Turkey a date for starting negotiations. The Swedish position became that if Turkey could accept permanent safeguards, so could Sweden. However, it is obvious that the Swedish politicians were unhappy with

² See for example Swedish Riksdag, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2004/05:UU10, Wigström, C., Swedish Riksdag, Committee on European Affairs, 2004/05:15, §1:16, Persson, G., Swedish Riksdag, *Declaration of Government*, 2005/06:2, §2:3 NB. All parliamentary references in the following are to the Swedish Parliament.

³ See for example Freivalds, L., Plenary debate, 2004/05:143, §7:1 and Forslund, K. G., Plenary debate, 2004/05:118, §5:4

the outcome since it was deemed to be a very important issue *in principle* to meddle with the concept of full membership.⁴

A second related line of reasoning concerns the positive impact an EU membership would have on Turkey, the Turkish population at large and specific segments of the Turkish population.⁵ The essence of the argument is that by fulfilling the criteria laid down for candidacy, initiating membership negotiations and for membership respectively, the Turkish state is successively reforming in a way that is deemed desirable, e.g., through fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria and implementing the *aquis*. This is stressed both in general terms and in relation to specific objectives that actors are advocating. The positive effects of the membership process have been raised in relation to human rights⁶, the situation of women⁷, and minority rights.⁸ However, these are exactly the areas that are still of most concern to Swedish politicians, as we will see below, and the image projected is not all bright. In the words of the Prime Minister the

EU enlargements have taught us that it is an incredible dynamic that the process sets off, and the prospect of membership in the Union releases political forces in the national parliaments, previously unthinkable, positive ones, constructive ones. The enlargement creates its own momentum. ...⁹

A third line of reasoning which is frequently raised is that Turkey as a member of the European Union would act as a bridge between East and West, to ease cultural understanding and dialogue.¹⁰ Much less common in this line of reasoning is explicitly mentioning that this bridge shall be used for spreading Western values, but one can find examples of this as well.¹¹ Again in the words of the Prime Minister from a session ahead of the December European Council meeting in 2004

... [the statement that] Turkey is a bridge between a Christian Europe and a Middle East suffused by Islam. It could be so and it can be so ... How we handle the process with Turkey will be decisive if there is to be such a link. Since the link then will be to the neighbourhood that is *the* conflict area of the world and which thus will be our neighbours, it would, in my view, be unbelievably unwise politically to create a conflict with the country that could be the bridge into the region, which if the conflicts escalates, threatens to destroy us all.¹²

As far as parliamentary debates go, the arguments used by the MP's and Government Ministers are generally abstract and may even at times be rather empty declarations. Related to the last three lines of reasoning we also find the position that the alternative, i.e., rejecting Turkey as a member, is worse.¹³

Some politicians argue along the same lines but phrase it rather as it is the fact that Turkey has a Muslim population, *per se*, which is important. The argument that is used is that by welcoming Turkey as a member of the Union, the alleged Christian hegemony

⁴ Committee on European Affairs, 2004/05:18, §2

⁵ Persson, G., Plenary debate, 2004/05:55, §1:1, *ibid.* §1:11, *ibid.* §1:51

⁶ Palm, V., Plenary debate, 2004/05:143, §7:74

⁷ Olofsson, M., Plenary debate, 2004/05: 140, §1:35

⁸ Hägglund, G., Plenary debate, 2004/05:115, §2:11

⁹ Persson, G., Committee on European Affairs, 2004/05:15, §1:10

¹⁰ Lejonborg, L., Plenary debate, 2004/05:115, §2: 17, Hamilton, C. B., Plenary debate, 2004/04:55, §1:4, *ibid.* Sherifay, M. O. §1:8, Hökmark, A. G., *ibid.* §1:58, Larsson, H., Committee on European Affairs, 2004/05:15 §1:4

¹¹ Gustavsson, H., Committee on European Affairs, 2004/05:15, §1:6

¹² Persson, G., Committee on European Affairs, 2004/05:15, §1:10

¹³ Reinfeldt, F., Plenary debate, 2004/05:140, §1:1 and Hägglund, G., Plenary debate, 2004/05:55, §1:10

in the European Union will be broken and they are thereby emphasising the transformative and symbolic power of including Turkey in the Union.¹⁴ It should be noted that *transformative* here relates primarily to the effect Turkey will have on the EU as such. In the same vein there are several Swedish politicians who argue that Turkey's relative poverty should be seen as an asset to the Union and that the inclusion of Turkey would signal that the EU is not a club only for rich countries. The argument is based on diversity but, as will be shown below, diversity is only considered a good as long as it is not in contradiction with the fundamental characteristics of democracy, human rights, rule of law and market economy and the *aquis*. Some representatives of those parties negative of *Swedish* EU-membership sees a Turkish membership as a way of radically transforming the union away from supranational ambitions towards a more intergovernmental and "voluntary" form of international co-operation, with less detailed and rigid regulations.¹⁵

Fifth, occasionally security aspects are explicitly mentioned, but that these types of arguments are far from central to the Swedish debate. Moreover, when mentioned it seem to refer to Turkey as a stabilising factor in relation to the south east of Europe rather than in relation to the Middle East.¹⁶ Likewise, issues like trade and growth do not feature prominently in the debate, though they are at times referred to.¹⁷ This is not to say that Swedish politicians are indifferent to the long-term economic benefits that a Turkish membership will yield, rather it is probably deemed as one of the premises of the whole process.

When reviewing these different arguments why Turkey should be welcomed as a member in the Union it is interesting to note that some of the country specific characteristics which are frequently held against Turkey are by some Swedish politicians, primarily EU-sceptical ones, described as assets, e.g., that Turkey is relatively poor, with a predominantly Muslim population and its geographical position. Moreover, arguments of Swedish self-interest are virtually absent; rather it is stressed that it is primarily in the Turkish interest and in the interest of the Union that Turkey joins.

To conclude, there is a broad elite consensus on the desirability of a Turkish membership when the conditions laid down are fulfilled. This consensus is very much appreciated by the Government since it allows it to argue the case within the EU with full parliamentary support. This fact is repeatedly stated, both by the Government and by the opposition, as an asset to be used as leverage vis-à-vis more sceptical Member States, especially ahead of key meetings regarding Turkey's prospects.

Changing arguments?

Comparing the arguments above with the ones used during the preceding parliamentary session, i.e., 2003/04, the most important difference is the increased emphasis on the reasons why Turkey should join. In the previous period these reasons were infrequently spelled out as the focus of the debate lay elsewhere (see below). However, the arguments that were used have not changed radically; the benefits for the Turkish

¹⁴ *ibid.* Lundström, S., §1:40

¹⁵ Wetterstrand, M., Plenary debate, 2004/05:115, §2:21 see also *ibid.* §2:85-86 and Lennmarker, G., Committee on European Affairs, 2004/05:15, §1:15 for a counterargument.

¹⁶ Reinfeldt, F., Plenary debate, 2004/04:55, §1:2

¹⁷ *ibid.*

population and the benefits to the Union of including a country with a Muslim population, which can serve as a role model for the region. However, we find one argument that has decreased in importance and that is the security argument referring to a Turkish membership as a way for the Union to play a constructive role in the Middle East and to secure the borders towards the rest of the region. Why Swedish politicians have all but stopped using these arguments is of course difficult to say with any certainty but perhaps the bleak and complex situation in, *inter alia*, Iraq and the Palestinian territories, have tempered the inclination for simplified argumentation regarding the problems of the region and the role Turkey could play in solving them.

Obstacles to Turkish membership

[w]hat is decisive for the decision to initiate membership negotiations with Turkey is entirely what the situation is like, if one has implemented the reforms necessary, that is to say if the criteria for initiating membership negotiations are fulfilled.¹⁸

Even though the more positive argumentation regarding Turkey has gained ground in Sweden over the last two years, there are still a number of concerns that are commonly raised by Swedish parliamentarians and ministers. The concerns and objections raised almost all relate directly to the fulfilment of the criteria for membership, but there are is at least one which is less concerned with conditionality and more with acknowledging the past. The sections below do not account for the debate on the Cyprus question, but the consensus view is unsurprisingly that the issue needs to be resolved. To scholars of the process of the Turkish candidacy, there will be few surprises in the following sections, but they may nonetheless be interesting since the changes in the debate are non-negligible.

Conditionality

The essence of the Swedish debate has been, and remains, the issue of conditionality. As was hinted above, the focus on openness of the Union to new members as long as they fulfil the criteria, is the relevant starting point in understanding the Swedish debate. So how is Turkey faring in the eyes of the Swedish parliamentarians?

Human rights

The debate on the human rights situation is, and has been, central as there is a zero-tolerance consensus to breaches of human rights. However, some parties are pushing the issue more, while others are putting the emphasis on the direction of the Turkish reforms. The human rights issues span over a number of different areas, from minority rights and torture to freedom of speech and organisation. If the arguments described in the section above tend to be abstract, the opinions regarding human rights abuses are vivid and concrete, often citing real-life examples.

Starting with the issue of torture, the Green and the Left parties, issued a joint motion 2004/05 calling for a stop of systematic torture as a precondition for beginning negotiations – which is formally non-controversial.¹⁹ The signatories of the motion did however make a different assessment of the situation in Turkey than the European

¹⁸ Freivalds, L., Committee on European Affairs, 2003/04:36, §1:18

¹⁹ Lundström, S. *et. al.*, Motion 2004/05:U272

Commission, the judgement of the latter forming the basis for the assessments of the other Swedish parties. To give a few more examples of issues that has been raised in the Swedish parliament regarding torture; five members of Dehap were tortured to death in 2005,²⁰ that the number of cases of reported torture increased during 2004,²¹ and that no fundamental change has taken place regarding torture due to lacking implementation.²² The latter is however not the majority view. On the contrary, the shift in Swedish perceptions of Turkey is based on the Turkish reforms, not least in the area of torture where there is a zero tolerance policy for membership. Thus it should be stressed that while the general view is that the Turkish state still has to implement further reforms, the overall impression one gets from the debate is that the use of torture is decreasing.²³

Women's rights are also high on the Swedish agenda as it is considered an integral part of human rights. The patriarchal character of Turkish society is seen, to varying extent, as problematic by Swedish politicians. This is true in relation to particular issues such as Swedish asylum policy vis-à-vis Turkey²⁴ (which admittedly is not connected to membership negotiations as such) as well as specific Turkish legislation regarding rapists and the proposed law on infidelity²⁵ (which was later withdrawn) and more general calls for the importance of stressing women's rights during the membership negotiations.²⁶

Freedom of speech is another topic which is quite often raised in the context of Turkey, both as a general right and with specific examples.

Increased freedom of speech and pluralism are necessary parts of the Turkish EU-process ...²⁷

and

The demand must be: Sweep away those paragraphs which enables imprisonment of persons exercising their right to freedom of speech and dares to hold a line that is not in accordance with the official [regarding a conference on a genocide of Armenians]²⁸

are fairly typical quotes from the Swedish parliamentary debate on the issue. Other specific examples that have been subjected to parliamentary debate in this field concerns the fate of Orhan Pamuk²⁹ and Medeni Ayhan,³⁰ both in relation to statements regarding the genocide of Armenians. The bottom line of these discussions on the freedom of speech in Turkey is that this right (and all other human rights) will have to be fully implemented before Turkey can become a member of the Union.

²⁰ Lundström, S., Interpellation 2004/05:579 and Åström, A., Plenary debate, 2004/05:129, §4:6

²¹ Lundström, S., Plenary debate, 2004/05:55, §1:44

²² Åström, A., *et. al.*, Motion 2005/06:U312 see also Bager, E., Plenary debate, 2005/06:19, §5:3

²³ Freivalds, L., Parliamentary debate, 2004/05:579, §4:5 and Freivalds, L., Committee on European Affairs, 2004/05:3, §1:10

²⁴ Acketoft, T., Written question, 2004/05:484 and Ekström, A.M., Written question, 2004/05:148

²⁵ Lundström, S. *et. al.*, Parliamentary motion 2004/05:U272

²⁶ Fridolin, G., Committee on European Affairs, 2004/05:15, §1:21 and Åström, A., Plenary debate, 2004/05:55, §1:12

²⁷ Freivalds, Laila, Plenary debate, 2005/06:19, §5:1

²⁸ Lundgren, K., Plenary debate, 2005/06:19, §5:2 see also Lundgren, K., Interpellation 2005/06:32

²⁹ Landgren, P., Parliamentary motion 2005/06:U329

³⁰ Enochson, A., Written question 2004/05:1845

Minority Rights

Despite the prominence of the different issues discussed above, there is probably nothing more central than the issue of minority rights. However, it is not, as one might believe, primarily the Kurdish situation that figures most prominently, although the Kurdish cause has support or at least sympathy from all parties, but rather the situation of Assyrians, Syrians and Chaldeans. Common for the concerns regarding all minorities is the call for recognition of these minorities as such and thus for the associated minority rights such recognition would entail.³¹ The cause of the Christian minorities is argued most intensively by a number of Christian Democrats but parliamentarians from several different parties are engaged in raising the issue, in particular as it ties in with the question of the massacre of Armenians, which according to some politicians should be acknowledged as a genocide and that such a recognition should precede Turkey becoming a member.³² Examples of concrete issues that have been raised concerning Assyrians, Armenians etc. relate to the cultural heritage of these groups,³³ the right to freely exercise their religion³⁴ and the handing back of confiscated property.³⁵ The concerns of the Kurds are also frequently referred to but there are less parliamentary motions and written questions relating specifically to the Kurds. Nonetheless one can find examples where parliamentarians call for the full recognition of the Kurds as an official minority protected and recognised by the Turkish constitution and that Kurdish should be made a second official language of Turkey.³⁶

To sum up the debate on the pros and cons of a Turkish membership to the European Union, as the issue has been discussed in Sweden over the last 15 months, the following prime ministerial statement from 29 September 2005 seems to capture the essence, if not the nuances, of the debate;

Mrs Speaker! I am a supporter of Turkish membership in the EU. I think it would be good for Europe. ... Turkey shall however not have a membership in the EU if Turkey does not fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria, i.e., basic democratic freedom and democratic rights and protection of human rights, which is fundamental to be counted among the circle of democracies. ... No other demands than those which are demanded by other countries should be placed on Turkey.³⁷

Changing Arguments?

When comparing the argumentation above with the argumentation during the 2003/04 parliamentary session, one finds that the presumption of the debate has remained that Turkey is a desirable member of the EU if, and when, it fulfils the criteria for membership. Moreover, there is little discussion of other topics than the political criteria, i.e., economic and administrative criteria are more or less completely absent from the debate. However, one also finds that the debate regarding the obstacles to Turkish membership has transformed in several ways. First of all, the amount and

³¹ See for example Kerimo, Y., Plenary debate, 2004/05:55, §1:74, Ruwaida, Y., Committee on European Affairs, 2004/05:13, §1:24, Landgren, P., Motion 2005/06:U327 and Lundgren, K., Interpellation 2005/06:32

³² Lundgren, K., Plenary debate, 2005/06:19, §5:5

³³ Lundberg, I and Kerimo, Y., Motion 2004/05:U220 and Lundström, S., 2004/05:U269

³⁴ Lundgren, K., Motion, 2004/05:U248

³⁵ Lundström, S., Motion, 2004/05:U272

³⁶ *ibid.*

³⁷ Persson, G., Plenary debate, 2005/06:9, §1:35

intensity of criticism of Turkish shortcomings in relation to the Copenhagen criteria has decreased and a larger share of the debate concerns the desirability of having Turkey as a member. Second, as indicated above, the situation of the Kurds is less prominent in the debate which should be construed as an acknowledgement of the reforms that has been passed and implemented. However, in the place of the Kurds, the situation of other minority groups is increasingly being highlighted. Thirdly, references to the deficiencies of Turkish democracy and the role of the military are less frequent but the importance of freedom of speech and rule of law remain integral to the Swedish debate. Finally, the tendency to express doubt about the sincerity and durability of the Turkish reform process has decreased after the decision to open negotiations. To summarise, one could say that as Turkish reforms are progressing and are being implemented according to the Copenhagen criteria, the less material objections Swedish politicians find to debate in relation to the Copenhagen criteria specifically.

Before moving on to a brief analysis it is informative to identify the issues that are not really contested, above all the question of religion. As was shown above, if religion is mentioned at all, it is considered an asset rather than a liability that Turkey has a predominantly Muslim population, as long as the state remains secular. Looking back at the discussions during the drafting of the new Constitutional Treaty some members were advocating the insertion of a reference to Christianity. This suggestion was ill received in Sweden, not because of Turkey's candidature but normatively. First, an inclusion of a reference to Christianity would be at odds with state-society relations. Even though the separation of state and Church in Sweden took place only in the year 2000, Swedish society is secular. Secondly, an inclusion of the reference would be at odds with what the EU is perceived, by Swedish politicians, to be and what it should develop into. The fact that, insofar religion is considered a factor, it is primarily in the sense that increased diversity is desirable. A second issue which is often raised in discussions on Turkey, albeit not in Sweden, is the relative poverty of the country. Arguments, such as cost and budgetary effects are virtually not used in the context of Turkey even though it is frequent in the Swedish debate relating to most other issues concerning the EU; rather, as on the topic of religion, the relative poverty of the country is seen as an asset which will increase the diversity of the Union, an argument used primarily by 'progressive' Eurosceptic parties. Other 'non-issues' issues are for example identity, size, migration, borders and the large share of agriculture in the economy. One is tempted to ask if the shrunken space of contested issues will remain and this is a question which will be addressed below.

Analysis

How are we to understand and analyse this mass of empirical information? The first observation is that accession is seen as a one-way process. It is repeatedly emphasised that Turkish adaptation to the conditions laid down by the EU is at the heart of the process, as in any accession process. Rarely is there any acknowledgement of that the European Union could or should have anything to learn from Turkey or Turkish experiences. The approach where positions are taken based on rules and international law is in fact well closely aligned with how Sweden tends to approach international politics. This rule-based based approach has at least two important effects. First, it creates an either-or situation where the conditions laid down are either fulfilled or they

are not and there is little scope for compromise. The second consequence of this approach is that once the conditions are met the Swedish government, should lend full support to the Turkish efforts during the negotiations.³⁸

This approach does however raise the important question of who should judge if conditions are met or not and in this particular case it seems that the Swedish government has delegated these decisions to the Commission, i.e., the views of the Commission will be essential in maintaining Swedish support during the negotiations. However, if the Commission's and the Government's assessments start differing systematically one can assume that the Government will reclaim its sovereign right during the negotiation process which ultimately is an intergovernmental process.

The second observation concern the lack of references to what the inclusion of Turkey would entail for the development of the European Union. We have seen above that the unique characteristics of Turkey as prospective member is seen by most as an asset, but how? To analyse intentions and more or less hidden agendas does of course border on the inappropriate for political scientists, but one could at least hypothesise on one effect that would be welcomed by most of the Swedish political elites. It is well-known that most Swedish politicians view European integration as a fundamentally intergovernmental process; a process which should be pragmatic in character and where *status quo* is preferable to grand schemes of federalism.³⁹ Seen in this light, the Swedish support for enlargement in general is rational, even though one should not deny that there are also normative reasons for this support. The rationality is obvious in the case of the Eurosceptics but also for Social Democrats and Conservatives despite their different conceptions of the Union. These relatively 'thin' conceptions could in fact be served well by enlargement in general and perhaps with Turkey in particular as deepening of the integration project and moves towards majoritarianism or federalism will be considerably more difficult to attain, even though the decision-making process will need to be reformed at some stage to avoid the Union becoming deadlocked.

Finally, the systematic absence of references to a Turkish impact on European identity is interesting and can be explained by the fact that the Swedes are among the most Eurosceptic citizens of the Union. Looking at Eurobarometer data on identity one finds that Swedes are close to the European average, with 48 percent having only a national identity, 45 percent having a Swedish and European identity and only a couple of percent having solely a European identity or a European and Swedish identity.⁴⁰ Thus, the argument that Turkey joining the Union would somehow pose a threat to European identity is not a concern for the Swedes. Swedish politicians are also behaving accordingly through stressing the intergovernmental character of the Union, aiming to limit the supranational decision-making to a necessary minimum⁴¹ and not using exclusionary arguments based on European identity.⁴²

³⁸ Langdal (2005) *op. cit.*

³⁹ See for example Joint Committee on Constitutional and Foreign Affairs, 2001/02:KUU2, p. 14

⁴⁰ Eurobarometer 62, Autumn, 2004

⁴¹ Tallberg, J. (2001), "Inledning – Sveriges ordförandeskap i EU 2001" in Tallberg, J. (ed.), *När Europa kom till Sverige*, p 28f, Stockholm: SNS Förlag

⁴² Langdal, F. (2005), *op. cit.*

Looking ahead

Even if the negotiations prove successful, actual membership for Turkey is likely to come at a point where many of today's top politicians have retired, which may of course affect focus, intensity and preferences. While there is more or less an elite consensus, Swedish citizens are thus far not active in the debate on Turkish membership, a debate which is currently low key and mainly taking place behind the doors to the parliament. Looking at the latest available Eurobarometer data we find that 50 percent of the Swedes are in favor of a Turkish membership, a comparably high figure, but at the same time Turkey is the country with least support out of a list of 12 prospective members.⁴³ The group of citizens which does not favour a Turkish accession represents a pool of voters currently without political representation on this issue and may thus be a tempting target group to mobilize.

To give one recent example of politicization; the Swedish political elites were long amongst the staunchest, defenders of the 2004 enlargement, using some of the arguments we have seen above. Nonetheless, a few months before the enlargement, an intensive debate broke out regarding migration and potential misuse of the Swedish welfare state, with the effect that the Government proposed transitional safeguards. Even though the proposed safeguards were defeated in parliament the intensity and the rapid shift in policy positions – even on such a matter of principle as full and equal membership – shows that even the most principled stance can fall prey to short term considerations. If this experience is anything to go by, the Swedish debate is likely to change character as the actual enlargement approaches, just as we have seen that the focus has shifted somewhat during the last two years. It is therefore not unlikely that the current focus on the internal Turkish situation will give way to a focus on the effects that Turkish accession may have on the EU and on Sweden. Economic and budgetary effects, the impact of migration, the geopolitical situation in the region and even cultural and religious dimensions may yet become politicized within Sweden. If a populist party were to seriously contest seats in parliament or if one of the established parties were to approach the four percent threshold, the temptation of playing the Turkish card may prove irresistible. But as for now, this is just a hypothetical scenario and should be treated as such.

Conclusions

Returning to the sketch of proposed analytical dimensions introduced at the beginning, it is possible to pinpoint the Swedish debate, not least given the rather consensual view that so far characterise this debate. In terms of inclusion-exclusion, it is obvious that all Swedish political parties argue in terms of inclusion according to the rules laid down. We can also identify if the debate is centred on the consequences for a given member state, the Union, or on the effects on the candidate country and here we can just as easily conclude that the arguments primarily concern the positive effects the membership will have on Turkey. The domestic Turkish dynamics created by the accession process has been central to the debate. The arguments that refer to the impact Turkey will have on the EU are less frequent and less developed this far, let alone the effect the accession will have on Sweden. Even though the focus and content of

⁴³ In fact ending up behind Albania. See *Eurobarometer 63*, Country report Sweden, July 2005

the debate have changed between 2003 and 2005, the framing of the debate within the two dimensions has remained the same.

Even though it is a generalisation to lump all Swedish political parties represented in parliament into one group one can say that Sweden falls into the category of benevolent export of values which can be seen as a form of Europeanisation, even though it is seldom described as such. Clearly there are differences between the political parties, with the Conservatives being the most supportive and the Greens, the Left and the Christian Democrats as somewhat more critical, but as the careful reader of footnotes has noted already: quite few of the 349 MP's which take an active interest in the issue. It remains to be seen if this exclusivity will remain and if the focus will shift towards potential costs; costs which may be tempting to politicise as the actual enlargement draws near or if it is possible to maintain the current elite consensus focusing on potential benefits.

TWO PILLARS OF NATIONALIST EUROSKEPTICISM IN TURKEY: The Tanzimat and Sèvres Syndromes

Hakan Yılmaz

Introduction

In this brief paper we are going to define and focus on two discursive patterns of elite-level Euroskepticism in Turkey, namely the Tanzimat and Sèvres syndromes, which, we believe, constitute the core of the Turkish nationalist discourse on Europe. We will argue that while the “deep policy” imperative of the Tanzimat syndrome is a delegitimation of collective and individual rights, that of the Sèvres syndrome is isolationism in the area of foreign policy and “westernization without the west” in the domestic arena. These two syndromes, we will argue, may help us understand the strategic shift of the nationalist conservatism away from Europe and the generally disapproving attitude of the nationalist conservative political parties and intellectuals to Turkey’s integration with the European Union.

The Strategic Move of Nationalist Conservatism away from Europe: The Tanzimat and Sèvres Syndromes

The Tanzimat syndrome and the Sèvres syndrome represent two premises of the genealogical narrative of modern Turkish nationalism. It was on these two premises that modern Turkish nationalism has constructed its historical narrative of the decline and collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the Turkish Republic, covering roughly the one hundred year-period between the early 19th century and the first quarter of the 20th century. The syndromes have essentially been consolidated by Kemalism, the founding ideology of the Turkish Republic founded in 1923, and they have been popularized in the larger society by the Kemalist-controlled school system, press, and literature. However, the roots of the syndromes go back to much earlier than Kemalism, to the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid (r. 1876–1909) and the Young Turks (r. 1909–1918), embodying an ideological continuity between the late Ottoman and early Republican state elites.

As Western powers played a determining role in both the collapse of the Empire and the founding of the Republic, both syndromes offer a specific interpretation of the nature of relations between the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, on the one hand, and European great powers, on the other, highlighting the turning points, major actors and their intentions. Although both syndromes give an account of the actions and intentions of the West towards Turkey, each encapsulates a different moment of Turkish-Western history and emphasizes a different facet of the West. Among the two, the Sèvres syndrome is more central, focuses upon Turkey’s foreign relations, and offers a general account of the Western strategy towards Turkey and of what Turkey should do in order to put off direct foreign intervention and subversion. The Tanzimat syndrome, on the other hand, focuses upon domestic politics and identifies the West’s likely collaborators within Turkey itself. These potential collaborators of the West have typically been identified as the Christian minorities (Armenians and Greeks); Muslim but non-Turkish communities (Arabs and Kurds); Muslim and Turkish but over-Westernized segments of the society.

The syndromes are rooted in the fact that the Turks, beginning with the Seljuks in the 11th century, but particularly with the Ottomans since the 14th century onwards,

conquered and settled in the lands, Anatolia and then Rumelia, which had originally belonged to the Christian peoples. Anatolia had been a territory of the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) empire, and long after the Seljuk Turks had captured it piece by piece and made it their new home, they continued to call it as the “Land of the Romans” (*Diyar-i Rum*). Once the Ottoman Turks replaced their Seljuk predecessors as the new masters of Asia Minor, they changed the direction of their conquest and settlement towards Constantinople and the Balkan possessions of the Byzantine Empire. The Balkans became the Ottomans’ “Land of the Romans”, who called the area as *Rumeli*, a name that is still a common parlance today. The Turkish-Islamic conquest of the Christian territories, the Turkish nationalists believe, prepared the ground for a European-Christian revanchism and restorationism, which started with and is epitomized by the Crusades of the middle ages. The Europeans, in the Turkish nationalist narrative, never gave up their historical mission of driving the Turks away from the historic lands of the Christians and back to the steppes of Central Asia. Hence, in the Turkish nationalist narrative, the Crusades of the middle ages, the capitulations (trading privileges) that the Ottoman Empire granted to certain European states beginning with the 16th century, colonization of some Ottoman territories in the 19th century, the occupation and the final division of the core Ottoman lands by the Allied powers after the First World War, and the American and European political, economic, military and cultural hegemony over Turkey in the period following the Second World War, all are incarnations of the eternal European “crusade” against the Turks.

The Tanzimat and Sèvres syndromes are syndromes, in the sense that they refer to a certain mode of perception, and a resulting code of operation, which are rooted in a traumatic past experience with the West, and which are not revised afterwards, no matter how the real relationship with the West has changed over the years. On the one hand, it is not rational to stick to a past memory of a relationship, and the corresponding reflexive reaction to it, even though the nature of that relationship has significantly changed over time. On the other hand, though, it is not uncommon for states and similar organized collectivities, like big corporations for instance, to develop syndrome-like perceptual and operational patterns and transmit it from one generation to another as the time-honored wisdom of the past. This seemingly irrational behavior may have to do with the overwhelmingly high transaction costs of adapting one’s mentality and behavior to the changing conditions, particularly for the big organizations like states. Because of the sheer size of a state-like organization, it takes so much time and work for the acquisition, processing and possessing of information that there occurs an almost natural resistance within the organization to revising that information and adapting organizational behavior in line with the changing conditions. Particularly when the information in question has to do with the survival of the organization in a world populated by rival organizations, then the organization in question may over-value that information and develop an even stronger resistance to its revision. As such, the syndromes refer to the “deep memory” and the associated “deep policy” of the Turkish nationalist elites regarding the West and its domestic allies. In what follows, we will explore, in more detail, these deep memories and deep policies.

In this connection, a few words about “memory” are in order. Memory is not always what we “remember” as autonomous subjects, but what we are “reminded of” by those in positions of authority, using the ideology-producing and ideology-disseminating institutions (schools, museums, textbooks, the media, cinema, literature, and so on) at

their disposal. In that sense, memory is an essential part of every individual's subjectivity, but is not always subjectively (i.e., autonomously) produced and transmitted from one individual to another. A certain configuration of memory is, therefore, always produced by and reflective of a certain configuration of the balance of political forces and the hegemonic situation as they exist at a certain moment in a given society.

The "Deep Historical Memory" behind the Tanzimat Syndrome

The term *Tanzimat*, which means arranging things in a new and better order, refers to a series of modernizing reforms in the Ottoman Empire, which were set in motion in 1839 by the promulgation of the Imperial Decree of Gulhane. The Gulhane Decree was later supplemented in 1856 by the declaration of another major statement, called the Reform Decree (*Islahat Fermani*). The backbone of the Tanzimat reforms was to provide the Ottoman subjects with modern citizenship rights and to create a state based on the rule of law. These basic citizenship rights included equality before law, irrespective of one's social status and religion; supremacy of law over the acts and decisions of the political authority; security of life, property and honor of all citizens; regulation of taxation and putting an end to the arbitrary confiscations of property. The Reform Decree of 1856 brought special new rights and privileges to the Christian subjects of the Empire, including freedom of prayer; the right to establish their own educational institutions; the right to enter into the military service; and equal taxation.

One particular expectation of the Palace from launching this reform program was to regain the allegiance of the Empire's Christian subjects (mostly Greeks and Armenians) and thereby to contain their separatist tendencies. Another expectation was to stop the Great Powers of Europe from interfering in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, the European states, particularly Britain and Russia, had long been active in mobilizing the Christians against the Ottoman state, and they were putting demands on the Palace to grant the Christians with economic, political and cultural liberties and advantages. By engaging itself in the Tanzimat reforms, the Ottoman center was hoping to satisfy some of the demands of the European Great Powers and thereby to put an end to their provocation and support of the Ottoman Christians towards separatism.

This is not the place to judge the value, wisdom or success of the Tanzimat reforms. However, even a cursory look at Ottoman history after the initiation of the Tanzimat reforms in 1839 reveals a constant process of imperial collapse, which was brought about by the successful independence movements of the Christian and non-Turkish peoples supported by this or that European power. As a result, between 1839 and 1908, the Empire lost its entire east-central European lands. The Balkan and North African territories were gone between 1908–1918, during the Balkan Wars, the Italian invasion of Ottoman North Africa, and the First World War. Finally, during the Allied occupation of the Empire between 1918–1922, the defunct Treaty of Sèvres detached large chunks of Anatolia from the Empire, which had been already reduced to a symbolic entity.

One reason for the reverse effect of the Tanzimat's society-empowering reforms was that they remained suspended in the air as the Ottoman imperial center could not develop a new institutional model of center-periphery relations and it could not define a new imperial ideology which might have contained community demands under the roof of a revitalized empire. Under these circumstances, granting modern national,

religious, and legal rights to the peripheral communities, in accordance with Russian and Western European demands, resulted in nothing but the destruction of the traditional center-periphery relations and the rapid weakening of the Center's hold over the periphery. In many cases, the imperial center had to engage in state-strengthening reforms just to be able to contain the divisive consequences of the previously undertaken society-empowering reforms.

This historical record taught the Ottoman statesmen and the Republican founding fathers two lessons. One was that giving rights and freedoms to a people would not make them more loyal to the state; on the contrary, this would even supply them with more opportunities to organize a stronger assault on the state. The second lesson was that the real intention behind the European demands of respect for human rights was to divide the Turkish nation and weaken the Turkish state. The combination of these two lessons, which are so deeply engraved in the historical memory of the Turkish state and society, and which makes up the main axis of the mentality of contemporary Turkish conservatism and isolationism, we call the Tanzimat Syndrome.

Perhaps the best exemplification of the Tanzimat Syndrome can be found in the words of Sultan Abdulhamid (r. 1876-1909), who had eliminated the Young Ottomans to consolidate his powers and who lost his throne to the Young Turks. In his political memoirs, Sultan Abdulhamid writes:

"The reform demands of the great powers never end. They know nothing about our country, yet they still play the role of the all-knowing counselor. ... Though they disagree among themselves as to what our problems are and how we are going to deal with those problems, there are two points which they all agree on: First, to create the impression in our public opinion that all reforms are done because of their recommendations and pressures, and thereby to put us down in the eyes of our own nation; and second, to enhance the position of the Christians in our country, and to make them come forward with even more excessive demands from us. This reform thing is a dirty trick. They should take off their hands from our business. The reforms they are recommending cannot possibly be taken seriously and implemented without doing serious harm to the interests of our nation. If we proceed in our own way I am sure that we will develop more slowly but more smoothly." (Sultan Abdulhamid 1984: 110-111).

Another illustration of the Tanzimat Syndrome comes from Recep Peker, a prominent bureaucrat, prime minister, and ideologist of the Turkish one-party regime from the 1920s through the 1940s. In his *Lectures on the Revolution*, which he offered at the Ankara University in the 1930s, Peker sharply criticized the Ottoman constitutional regime as an unwarranted imitation of the Western model. He argued that the Ottomans had borrowed the Western conception of freedom, which was not suitable to the local conditions and traditions. According to Peker, Islamic reactionaries and Christian separatists exploited freedom to achieve their ominous goals:

"...The destructive elements found many supportive opportunities in the atmosphere of constitutional monarchy. In this air of freedom, and in the name of freedom, a fool named Derviş Vahdeti began publishing a newspaper called *Volkan* and founded a party called The Mohammadan Union (*İttihad-i Muhammedi*). ... Such a newspaper would have done great damage even today, if we had allowed its publication. Back then, however, the Empire was tolerating such newspapers in the name of freedom, and when legal measures were being taken to stop such unwanted developments, a chorus was starting to shout that freedoms were being violated. Again using this freedom, a deputy of Greek origin could say "My exterior is Ottoman, but my interior is Greek" in the Assembly of Deputies, and the Ottoman Assembly showed no reaction to this in the name of freedom." (Peker 1984: 33).

The “Deep Policy” Imperatives of the Tanzimat Syndrome: Delegitimization of Rights and Freedoms

The “deep policy” imperatives of the Tanzimat syndrome can be formulated as follows:

First: Declare as illegitimate all demands for minority rights, particularly those that are put forward by ethnic and religious groups.

Second: Declare as illegitimate all demands for group rights, including those that are put forward by social classes and regional communities.

Third: Declare as illegitimate all demands for rights, including basic human rights.

The best policy alternative, implied by the Tanzimat Syndrome, has been to deny the very existence of the ethnic and religious minorities, and to try to assimilate them into the mainstream national culture by all means at the disposal of the state. However, if the state had to recognize the existence of a minority, and if assimilation policies did not bring about the total transformation of a group, then it would become essential to resist, as much as possible, their demands for recognition and cultural rights. It was believed that it was the Western powers who would galvanize the minorities to come forward with more and more demands for rights and freedoms. Hence, granting any rights to the minorities would make them less, rather than more, loyal to the state. More rights and freedoms would simply give birth to more and stronger secessionist movements among the minorities, and the Western powers would not hesitate to give them their ideological, political and sometimes military support. In the end, the minorities would end up founding their own independent state, which would be nothing more than a puppet state under the protection of one or more Western powers.

A more general, and certainly more significant, policy prescription of the Tanzimat syndrome is a delegitimization of the very idea of rights, including individual rights, as it was believed that rights would endow the individuals with a larger space of action, and individuals would use that larger action space to engage in anti-state activities. Therefore, the state had to resist granting even the basic rights to the individuals, in order not to weaken the authority of the state over the society. The state, perceiving the world through the lenses of the Tanzimat syndrome, perceived a zero-sum game between state and society, between state authority and societal rights, the latter being either collective or individual rights. Hence, the state perceived itself as a Leviathan and demanded absolute submission from social groups and individuals. Rights simply did not fit into this Hobbesian picture, and all kinds of rights were perceived as challenges, big or small, to the authority, and more than that, to the very existence of the state.

Indicators of the Tanzimat Syndrome in the Turkish Public Opinion: Public Attitudes towards Basic Rights and Freedoms⁴⁴

One way of measuring how deep the beliefs and attitudes that are characterized under the Tanzimat syndrome have sunk into the political culture of the Turkish public is to observe the public's attitudes towards individual and collective rights and freedoms. The data in TABLE 1 and TABLE 2 are chosen to illustrate those attitudes. The first remark to be made regarding the data in these tables is that almost everybody expressed an opinion on the issue of rights and freedoms, and those who chose not to give an answer remained around 1% for TABLE 1 and 4% for TABLE 2. In TABLE 1,

⁴⁴ The data that are used in this section are drawn from TESEV-Bogazici 2002.

Table 1: Indicators of the Tanzimat Syndrome in the Turkish Public Opinion Public Attitudes towards Basic Rights and Freedoms

	SHOULD NEVER BE RESTRICTED	CAN BE RESTRICTED in certain times and circumstances	NA/NO	Total
Equality before Law	91	7	1	100
Freedom of Religion	90	8	1	100
Freedom of Communication	85	13	2	100
Freedom from Torture	83	16	1	100
Freedom of Expression	74	25	1	100
Right to Use One's Mother Tongue	74	25	1	100

the respondents are offered a number of basic rights and asked if they think a given right must always exist, regardless of the context and conditions, or if they think the right in question can be restricted under certain circumstances. It should be noted that, at this stage, the circumstances under which a given right can be restricted are not specified. It turned out that the public were most sensitive for two rights, namely, “equality before law” and “freedom of conscience and religion”: 90% of the people said that those two rights must not be restricted under any circumstances. Then came two other rights, “freedom of communication” and “freedom from torture and ill-treatment”. For these rights, the sensitivity dropped slightly, by 5 percentage points, and around 85% of the people interviewed said that these two rights must be beheld at all times. The last two rights, about which the respondents turned out to be least sensitive, were “freedom of expression” and “the right to use one’s mother tongue”. Hence, only about 75% of the people were of the opinion that no restrictions should be imposed on these two rights.

If we leave aside the first two rights, “equality before law” and “freedom of conscience and religion”, about which there is almost unanimous agreement that they should in no way be restricted, the picture is not so bright when it comes to the remaining four rights. Hence, 13% of the people believe that, when conditions call for it, individuals can be prevented from communicating freely. Yet another 16% think that, if necessary, a person can be tortured. The picture becomes even darker when the respondents expressed their opinions regarding freedom of expression and freedom to use one’s mother tongue. Hence, on both occasions, a very sizeable minority, close to 25%, opined that there may be occasions in which the authorities can prevent a person from saying what he wants to say and, even more gravely, that the state can prohibit a person from using his own language.

The cultural penetration of the Tanzimat Syndrome is more visible in TABLE 2. Here, the respondents are again offered a series of rights and asked whether they would agree that the authorities restrict these rights when national interest, public safety, or social order is at risk. In other words, unlike in the previous set of questions, now the type of restrictions is made clear and specified. The results are admittedly much gloomier compared to the ones in TABLE 1. Hence, on all counts, close to 50% of the respondents said that the state can suppress basic rights and freedoms when such highly esteemed community norms and values as national interest, public safety, and social order are at serious risk.

Table 2: Indicators of the Tanzimat Syndrome in the Turkish Public Opinion Public Attitudes towards Basic Rights and Freedoms — Expressed Conditionally (When National Interest, Public Safety, Social Order Is at Stake)

	Tend to AGREE	Tend NOT TO AGREE	NA/NO	Total
We SHOULD NOT tolerate those opinions that are opposed to the opinions of the majority	56	39	4	100
When the newspapers publish news and articles that are opposed to the interests of the nation, they SHOULD BE closed down	51	47	3	100
When the interests of the nation are under serious threat, human rights CAN BE restricted	50	46	4	100

Taken together, these two tables give us important clues of the extent to which nationalist conservatism's perception of rights as illegitimate have been adopted by the general public. First of all, sizeable minorities in the Turkish public do not think that basic rights and freedoms are an inalienable and inseparable attributes and that they are embedded in the very definition of being a human being. Secondly, and echoing the Hobbesian spirit of the Tanzimat syndrome, the Turkish public seems to be ready to trade freedom and rights for order and security.

The “Deep Historical Memory” behind the Sèvres Syndrome

The Mondros Armistice of October 30, 1918 marked the final defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the World War I. By that time, the CUP cabinet had already resigned on October 8 and the triumvirate of Enver, Cemal and Talat Pashas were about to flee the country (they would do so on November 7). The Mondros treaty provided for a total and unconditional surrender of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman navy and armies, including the armies still operating in the eastern front, were to be demobilized, and all communication and transportation facilities and food and coal supplies were to pass to the control of the Allied powers. The Straits were to be opened to the passage of the Allied warships. The treaty included special provisions for the Armenian population of the empire, such as the releasing of all Armenians held in the Ottoman prisons whatever their crimes were. The Allies reserved for themselves the right to occupy any strategic area of the empire, and particularly the six Armenian-populated eastern provinces, in case of disorder (Kili 1982: 5 8; Lewis 1968: 239 242; Shaw and Shaw 1977: 327 328).

With the exception of Mosul in Iraq, which would be occupied by the British soon after the Mondros Armistice, the Arab-populated Iraqi, Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian provinces of the Ottoman Empire had already fallen to the British or French forces right before the conclusion of the Mondros Armistice. Kirkuk had fallen in May 1918; and Nablus, Haifa, Acre, Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Alexandretta, and Beirut had been occupied in September-October 1918. Thus, by the time the Mondros treaty was concluded, the territory of the Ottoman Empire had already been reduced to Anatolia (including eastern Thrace and Istanbul).

The Turks made up the majority in western and central regions of Anatolia, with sizeable Greek minorities living in Istanbul and the Aegean. Eastern Anatolia was home to the Armenians remaining after the expulsion of 1915, the Kurds, and the

Turks. Calculations based on the 1914 census show that, out of the 11 million people living in Anatolia (excluding eastern Thrace and Istanbul), 85% were Muslims (Turks and Kurds), 9% were Greeks, 5% were Armenians, and 0.8% were Jewish and other non-Muslims. In eastern Thrace, the total population was approximately 630,000, of which 57% were Muslims, 35% were Greeks, 3% were Armenians, and 4% were Jewish and other non-Muslims. Finally, the population of Istanbul was divided between the Muslims (60%), the Greeks (25%), the Armenians, Jews, and other non-Muslims (15%) (Kili 1982: 72).

In the year that followed the Mondros Treaty, Istanbul and parts of Anatolia, and particularly those regions with sizeable Armenian and Greek minorities, also came under the occupation of the Allied powers and the Allied-supported armed forces of Greece. On November 13, 1918, the Allied warships anchored in the port of Istanbul, though the official occupation of the city did not yet begin. In December 1918 the French occupied the southeastern Anatolian province of Adana (Cilicia). At about the same time, the British forces entered Antep, Birecik, Maras and Urfa in southeast, Batum and Kars in northeast, and Samsun in the Black Sea coast of Anatolia. On March 16, 1919 Istanbul was officially taken under Allied occupation. Beginning from March 28, 1919 the Italian forces landed on the western Mediterranean city of Antalya and its environs. Finally, on May 15, 1915, accompanied by the Allied warships, the Greek forces began occupying the city of Izmir and the Aegean region.

The new situation created by the occupations was formalized in the Treaty of Sèvres, signed by the Ottoman Empire and the Entente powers on August 10, 1920. According to the Sèvres Treaty, the Arabian Peninsula and Mesopotamia (Iraq) was ceded to Great Britain; Syria and the southeastern Anatolian provinces of Antep, Mardin, and Urfa was taken by France; eastern Thrace, and Izmir and its environs were surrendered to Greece; and western Anatolia except Izmir was designated as the economic dominion of Italy. The Sèvres Treaty also stipulated that an independent Armenian state under American mandate would be created in northeastern Anatolia, and an autonomous Kurdistan would be established in southeastern Anatolia. According to the terms of the treaty, all the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire who had been previously expatriated would be allowed to return to their homelands and their initial wealth and property would be returned to them. Istanbul was left as the Ottoman capital and the seat of the sultan, but the Straits was taken under the control of an international commission. The Ottoman government was denied the right to have armed forces other than a gendarmerie for internal security purposes. The Ottoman finances were to be regulated by a permanent Allied commission and part of the Ottoman revenues was to be reserved for payments of reparations to the Allies (Kili 1982: 84-86; Shaw and Shaw 1977: 356).

The circumstances created by the treaties of Mondros and Sèvres, and especially the prospect of the foundation of Armenian and Greek states in Anatolia, led many Turks in the occupation zones to found Defense of Rights Committees and to start an armed resistance movement. Thus, in the course of November-December 1918 three such committees were formed: Committee for the Defense of the Ottoman Rights (*Mudafaa-i Hukuk-u Osmaniye Cemiyeti*) in Izmir, Committee for the Defense of Thrace (*Trakya Pasaeli Cemiyeti*) in Thrace, and Committee for the Defense of Rights of Eastern Provinces (*Vilayat-i Sarkiyye Mudafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti*) in Istanbul. The Defense of Rights Committees were accompanied by urban and rural guerilla wars

against the occupation forces. The Kemalists entered the stage after these initial organizations and forms of nationalist resistance had already taken root. What Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the Kemalist revolutionaries did was, first, to organize the various Defense of Rights Committees into a centralized resistance organization called the Committee for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumeli. Another contribution of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the Kemalists to the nationalist cause was to replace the irregular guerilla forces by a regular army called the National Forces (Kuvva-i Milliye). In 1922 the national resistance movement ended in victory, and many of the territorial losses of the Sèvres Treaty were reversed under the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. The Lausanne Treaty also implied the Western recognition of the Kemalist state as the new political authority of Turkey, replacing the defunct government of the Ottoman sultan.

The “Deep Policy” Imperatives of the Sèvres Syndrome: Isolationism and Westernization without the West

The following formulae are the “deep policy” imperatives of the Sèvres syndrome:

First: Isolationism: Do not enter into economic, political or cultural pacts and alliances with the Western world. Never trust the Western states and always watch your back.

Second: Westernization without the West: Westernize/Modernize the state, the military, the economy and the society without getting engaged in economic, political or cultural pacts and alliances with the Western world.

The basic assumption underlying the Sèvres syndrome was that the Europeans perceive the Turks as the illegitimate invaders and occupiers of the European-Christian lands and as the oppressors of the European-Christian peoples. Therefore, the syndrome went on, the Europeans have always tried to sweep the Turks away from the ancestral European-Christian territories and to restore those lands back to their rightful owners, the Armenians and the Greeks in the past and now the Kurds. This historic “missionary struggle” of Europe had started with the Crusades in the middle ages and culminated in the Sèvres Treaty of 1920 ending the First World War, under the terms of which Turkey was carved up between Western powers and the Christian minorities collaborating with them. Scrape every European and you will find a Crusader behind it! The Sèvres Treaty, and with it the Crusader mission of driving the Turks away from Anatolia, became defunct as a result of the Turkish national resistance. However, Europeans, and the Christian minorities inside Turkey, have never given up the Crusader’s mission. Even today, the European Union’s seemingly innocent demands for individual and minority rights are nothing but concealed attempts to revive the terms of the Sèvres Treaty, and they simply want to get by peaceful means what they could not achieve by the force of arms eight decades ago.

Indicators of the Sèvres Syndrome in the Turkish Public Opinion: Public Attitudes towards Europe and the West⁴⁵

The data from the public opinion survey, which was conducted in November 2003 as part of our Euroskepticism project, offer ample evidence on the way to measure the impact of the Sèvres syndrome on the political beliefs and attitudes of the Turkish public. Part of this evidence is shown in TABLE 3 below:

⁴⁵ The data that are used in this section are drawn from OSIAF-Bogazici 2003.

Table 3: Indicators of the Sèvres Syndrome in the Turkish Public Opinion: Public Beliefs on the Crusades, Capitulations and the Sèvres Treaty

	We Would Have Been Better Following National Ways Rather Than Westernization	Europeans Have Been Trying to Divide Turkey in the Past and Now	Crusader's Spirit Shapes European Policies Towards Turkey	EU-Related Reforms Are Like the Capitulations of the Ottoman Times	EU-Related Reforms Are Like the Terms of the Sèvres Treaty of the WWI
Tend to AGREE	63	54	46	41	36
Tend NOT TO AGREE	26	33	27	27	27
NA/NO	11	13	28	32	37
Total	100	100	100	100	100

The basic assumption of the Sèvres syndrome was that the Europeans perceive the Turks as the illegitimate invaders and occupiers of the European-Christian lands and as the oppressors of the European-Christian peoples. Therefore, the syndrome went on, the Europeans have always tried to sweep the Turks away from the ancestral European-Christian territories and to restore those lands back to their rightful owners, the Armenians and the Greeks in the past and now the Kurds. According to the data presented in TABLE 3, this assumption is well received by the Turkish public. Hence, a net majority of the public, 54%, think that European states are now trying to divide and rule Turkey, just as in the past they tried to divide and rule the Ottoman Empire.

Moreover, a close look at the data in TABLE 3 show that a sizeable plurality of the Turkish public, approximately 40%, is of the opinion that Europeans, today, continue to be motivated by the “Crusader’s spirit” in their dealings with Turkey, that they relentlessly try to regain the capitulations of the middle ages and to degrade Turkey to an economic colony, and that they still pursue to resuscitate the Sèvres Treaty of 1920. It is to be noted that those who do not share these ideas remained only at 27%, as opposed to the 40% approval rate, and that one third of the respondents expressed no opinion on the issue of the Crusades, capitulations and Sèvres. Finally, based on the data in TABLE 3, we will try to find some evidence for one of the “deep policy” imperatives of the Sèvres syndrome, namely, “westernization without the west”. “Westernization without the west” would imply an inward-looking model of development without following the economic, political or cultural models of the West. As we can follow in TABLE 3, this policy imperative has gained wide recognition in the Turkish public opinion. In fact, a clear majority of the people interviewed, 63%, said that Turkey would have been better off today if she had followed her own, rather than Europe’s, values and traditions. Only about 25% of the respondents opposed that idea, while 11% chose not to express any opinion regarding that issue.

Concluding Remarks: The Syndromes and the Europeanization of Turkey

An unrelenting source of resistance to Turkey’s ideological and institutional Europeanization consists of the individuals and institutions whose political identities have been shaped by the Tanzimat and Sèvres syndromes. Therefore, Europeanization of Turkey means, first and foremost, an ideological and institutional re-equilibration in the area of national identity and foreign policy. This re-equilibration implies a gradual disarticulation of the Tanzimat and Sèvres Syndromes and their replacement by a

commitment to human rights in the domestic arena and to integrationism in the international arena.

The Tanzimat and Sèvres Syndromes, taken together, have defined a Hobbesian *modus operandi* for the Turkish state: Providing security in exchange for freedom. The two syndromes have been the founding ideological pillars of the modern Turkish state since the late 19th century (from the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid onwards). The modern Turkish state has (so far) been a Hobbesian state. Europeanization of Turkey, on the other hand, signifies a not-so-easy transition from a “Hobbesian” to a “Kantian” state. The founding principle of a Kantian state, as opposed to a Hobbesian one, is to put freedom before security and morality before politics. This principle is best captured by the following words of Immanuel Kant taken from his 1795 essay entitled “On the Opposition between Morality and Politics with Respect to Perpetual Peace”, which appeared in his book *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*: “If there is no freedom and no morality based on freedom, and everything which occurs or can occur happens by the mere mechanism of nature, certainly politics (which is the art of using this mechanism for ruling men) is the whole of practical wisdom, and the concept of right is an empty thought.”

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ENSURING THE EU'S VISIBILITY FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE PRE-ACCESSION PHASE

Cengiz Aktar

One of the *conditio sine qua non* for the successful outcome of Turkey's European Union membership preparations is the visibility of the EU in Turkey. So far that has not been the case and, quite to the contrary, the Union was literally invisible, at best an abstraction. For the man in the street it is even a "threat" to sovereignty and the integrity of the country as long as the requirements for membership are ill-featured by a certain media. In fact the European Union is either invisible or, when visible, it appears with a rather negative image. Thus a "concrete" European Union is necessary in order to counter these euro-sceptic tendencies. Visibility is also necessary in order to ensure the success of the pre-accession phase and the smooth functioning of the preparatory endeavours. Turkish civil society and the Turkish administration need to prove to the public at large that the European Union is not just words but means concrete achievements for the benefit of its citizens.

Limited financial resources

So far, since the beginning of the relationship between Turkey and today's European Union, in a period of forty years starting with the entry into force of the Ankara Agreement in 1964 some 3.2 billion EUR have been put at the disposal of Turkey, out of which only 620 million were grants.

Regarding the financial resources, the Commission declared from the beginning that it would dissociate Turkey, together with Cyprus and Malta, from the 10 Central and Eastern European countries, especially as regards to the main financial instruments, i.e. PHARE, ISPA⁴⁶ and SAPARD⁴⁷. Although conceived as a starter, the yearly grant allocation of EUR 177 million for the year 2000 had a negative symbolic effect in a country where billion-dollar figures are used everyday in relation to various financial transactions and where the trade deficit with the European Union amounts since 1996 to approximately 9 billion EUR per year. Euro-skeptics have seized this opportunity to point their fingers at double standards, comparing the grant allocation of EUR 177 million to the yearly total allocations of similar candidate countries such as Poland and Rumania. The result of the first grant allocation was one more of deception than of encouragement. In the following years amounts similar to 2000 allocation were granted to Turkey: EUR 177 million for 2001, EUR 126 million for 2002, EUR 144 million for 2003. As of 2004 and onward the Commission proposed and obtained a three-year package of EUR 1,05 billion covering the period 2004-2006.

Needless to say, such amounts are highly insufficient to help the sluggish EU preparations to speed up and take off. Consolidated tables attached in annex show the projects which were financed thanks to these grants. The tables show vast disparities among the projects and a lack of guiding principles and focus, certainly due to Turkey still having been in the waiting room for negotiations.

⁴⁶ ISPA stands for pre-accession instrument for structural policies. Worth EUR 1,04 billion a year from 2000 to 2006, it is directed towards aligning the infrastructure standards in transport and environment for candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The DG Regional Policy manages it.

⁴⁷ SAPARD stands for special accession programme for agriculture and rural development. It amounted to EUR 520 million a year from 2000 and is managed by the DG Agriculture.

Indeed, one can argue that Turkey was not negotiating until 3 October 2005, and more financial resources are to come in the next phase starting in 2007. Indeed, the Commission proposed a new package of EUR 8 billion for the period 2007–2013, which constitutes a substantial increase compared to past and present years. Still, compared to the amounts received by Central and Eastern European Countries under PHARE, SAPARD and ISPA during their negotiations phase, the package foreseen for Turkey is approximatively equivalent to a third of the yearly amount granted to those countries, given that their total population as well as their landmass are almost exactly the same as Turkey's population and area.

It is well known that the pre-accession phase for candidates foresees burden-sharing mechanisms between European Union institutions and International Financial Institutions.⁴⁸ Such resources often are better tailored than grants. However, the pre-accession period requires joint efforts by the government of the candidate country and the EU institutions to kick-start this crucial phase when EU mechanisms are supposed to penetrate the society.

Another type of assistance foreseen within the framework of existing Commission grants are the so-called **twinning** projects. Twinning is the principal mechanism for the delivery of institution building projects identified in the Accession Partnership. Twinning brings together administrations in candidate countries with their counterparts in Member States to work in clearly defined projects that involve the transposition, implementation and enforcement of a specific part of the *acquis communautaire* or the *EU legal order*. Twinning projects with Turkey have been very limited in scope and number. A chart attached as an annex shows the present state of affairs. Out of 1030 twinning projects implemented between Member States and the candidate countries during the period 1998–2004, only 39 were in Turkey. And in 2005, Romania for instance had 35 twinning projects under implementation whereas Turkey had only 10.

Bilateral resources are also available from national aid institutions of Member States for the benefit of candidate countries, but so far only the Netherlands and Sweden were active in these bilateral fundings. The latter was also involved in informing and capacity building together with the EU through a variety of imaginative initiatives.

Limited human resources and limited physical presence

Human resources to be devoted to Turkey-European Union relations have been increased rather slowly to reflect the candidature decision of December 1999, be it in Brussels or Ankara. The Commission only recently reached 110 staff members in Ankara, is soon to become 123, yet earlier was at the level of a skeleton staff for many years.

The Commission sponsors 12 information offices in 12 cities within the Chambers of Commerce. The Commission also funds an Information Center in Istanbul with limited coverage and resources. Compared to human resources mobilised for the pre-accession

⁴⁸ Capital intensive big projects and programmes in candidate countries require international financial co-operation. The 1998 Memorandum of Understanding, revised in 2000, between the Commission and the International Financial Institutions (IFI) address this need. PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD were the main financial instruments which co-ordinate and co-finance projects with IFIs. They will be replaced during the present enlargement by a single instrument called Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA).

phase of former candidate countries of Central Europe, staff and physical presence in Turkey look scarce. *There is an urgent need for the EU to consider opening sub-offices with certain executive powers like in the United Nations operations in order to be able to adequately cope with the size of Turkey.*

Preparing Turkey for EU membership will require imagination, patience and devotion on behalf of Member States, the EU institutions and the candidate country itself.

SWEDEN'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EU: Experiences and Lessons Learned

Jörgen Hettne

As a lawyer and a legal advisor to the Swedish government during the Swedish accession negotiations with the European union, I will focus on the legal side of this process. As regards the more political side of these negotiations, I refer to Ambassador Asp who will speak after me.

A description of the structure of the accession negotiations is a good platform for further discussion. There are at least three phases in the negotiation process. First the *preparation phase*. This is the phase that Turkey has now completed. Thereafter we have the *negotiation phase*. This is expected to be a very long and troublesome process in the case of Turkey and differ therefore strongly from the Swedish experience. Last we have the *drafting phase*, which of course in principle is a purely legal exercise. The different phases will now be explain a bit further and I will comment on the experiences and lessons that was learned from this process.

The preparation phase

Turkey and Sweden have in common that they both have profound experience in working with the European union and the EU law. Sweden had negotiated the EEA agreement (the European Economic Area) before joining the European Union. This Treaty contains a very large part of the *acquis communautaire* (the European Union legislation), so the necessary adaptations to community law had already been adopted to a large extent before the accession negotiation started. This pre-accession experience was of course important from a legal, psychological and political point of view. Due to the EEA agreement Sweden did know very well what the union expected. Turkey has also a very advanced cooperation with the European Union. It has a custom union with the Union and due to that agreement it has gained profound experience of negotiations and contacts with the EU and its institutions. Turkey has therefore a pre-accession experience comparable to that Sweden had before joining the European Union.

The negotiation phase

It has been pointed out to day that Turkey will not unilaterally adapt to anything and therefore, its accession negotiations with the European Union will take a very long time. If you consider how long time Sweden needed to negotiate with the Union you realize that Sweden is rather an expert on unilateral adaptations. There were of course difficulties during the negotiations, but it was a fast procedure. The negotiations started on 1 January 1993 and ended in April 1994. Sweden became a member on 1 January 1995. However, Sweden is not alone in adapting unilaterally to Community Law during the accession negotiations. This is actually how things work. You are not really negotiating, you join a club, not a Christian club, but still a club. The club members are not expecting that you will try to change the rules of the club before joining it. So in practice there are no real negotiations between equal parties. You join a club and the accession negotiations focuses on what specific problems you as a new club member may have to join the club immediately. Thus, as a new member, you are not expected to ask for permanent derogations, but may negotiate some additional time to adapt to the

existing rules (*acquis communautaire*). This approach can be described as “Take it or leave it”. That is how the accession negotiations have worked so far.

One experience Sweden gained from the negotiations is that the candidate country negotiates much more with the EU institutions than with the Member States. This can be quite surprising as the negotiations concern a treaty which amends the fundamental treaties of the union and is therefore a product of the existing Member States and the new Member State. The Commission in particular has a very important role in the negotiation process. An explanation can be that the Commission has a special responsibility for the development of the community legislation. It makes proposals for all new legislation or amending legislation. An accession means that the existing Community legislation on different levels needs to be changed. The Commission has the necessary experts to fulfill this task and it should therefore not be a surprise that the Commission is heavily involved in the negotiations at the expert level.

Three different levels

The negotiations can be structured into three different levels. On the top we have the *political level*. On this level negotiations take place between the foreign ministers from the existing Member States and the new Member State. The foreign minister who presides the Council in the European Union is the chairman and spokesman for the union at these occasions. Under the top level is the *chief negotiating level*. On this level the negotiations take place between the chief negotiator of the candidate country and the ambassadors in Coreper (The permanent representations of the Member states in Brussels). Spokesman for the union is the chairman in Coreper, who is coming from the same Member State as the one who presides the Council. Last but not least, we have the *expert level*. As the negotiation is mostly about technical adaptations to the existing community legislation, a large part of the negotiations takes actually place at this level. I would say 90 % at least. During these meetings experts from the candidate country are discussing with experts from the Commission. Problematic questions are identified and transferred to the chief negotiation level and finally to the political level, if no mutually acceptable solutions are found. The most important question are of course dealt with on the political level, but most of the questions are solved at the expert level.

The process

As already mentioned, the accession process with the union is highly technical and especially in the beginning the opposite party is mainly the Commission. There will be technical meetings with the Commission about every single subject covered by Community Law. The object of these meetings is to check every piece of the EU legislation and discuss them in order to identify possible problems. Non-problematic legislation is put a side. Problems that are identified will be discussed on different levels and will hopefully be solved on the chief negotiation level or the political level. A solution to a problem is often that a transitional period or a temporary safeguard clause are drafted in order to be inserted in the Accession Act later on.

The drafting phase

The Accession Act is composed by three parts; *The Accession Treaty*, *annexes* and finally *protocols*. The Accession Treaty contains general and principle provisions and

the annexes technical adaptations and transitional periods to the Community legislation. Protocols are used for more specific issues and special arrangements. During the drafting phase all solutions agreed during the negotiation phase must be put into legal terms. There is of course a risk that the need for negotiations reappear if the lawyers cannot agree on the actual terms of a specific solution.

Annexed to the Accession Act is also a *Final Act*, who usually contains a number of declarations with statements from the candidate country and one or more Member States.

Hierarchy of norms

The Accession Act is primary law, as it constitutes a part of the EU Treaties. The annexes and protocols have the same status. They constitute a integrated part of the Accession Act. However, the Final Act is not binding law. It is only a source of interpretation. The interpretation value of the declarations annexed to the Final Act depends on their content and on how many countries which are supporting them. Joint declarations from both the candidate country and the Member States therefore have a higher interpretation value than unilateral declarations from the candidate country. It is moreover of interest if there exists any opposite declarations, so called counter declarations, as they can heavily reduce the interpretation value of a unilateral declaration.

Concluding observations

Permanent exceptions is in principle impossible to get during the negotiations with the Union. However, Sweden managed to get one. In Sweden, oral tobacco called “snus” is used all over the country. This product was not used in the existing Member States when Sweden joined the union. Moreover, according to Community law it was not allowed to market any new form of tobacco product on the Common market. Therefore, Sweden needed a derogation from Community law, otherwise snus would be forbidden also on the Swedish market, which would have made it impossible for Sweden to join the union. The agreement reach states that the marketing of snus is still lawful in Sweden, but that Sweden must guarantee that snus are not exported to the other Member States.

Another observation is that it is very difficult to extend a transitional period. When the period expires, it is extremely difficult to renegotiate it. The countries negotiation position is even more weak at this occasion than it was as a candidate country. This has been obvious to Sweden when it has tried to renegotiate its restrictions regarding import of alcohol beverages. As these kind of products are heavily taxed in Sweden, the private import of them threatens the retail monopoly on alcoholic beverages. Sweden kept its own import restrictions during a transitional period of 5 years, but when it expired, Sweden wanted a prolongation. That proved to be very difficult. Today, Sweden does not have its own restrictions on private import of alcohol and the retail monopoly is facing strong competition from this kind of importations.

TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO THE EU FROM A SWEDISH PERSPECTIVE: What Will EU Membership Entail for Turkey?

Christer Asp

Will Turkey need to give up national sovereignty? Yes, an acceding country will have to pool its national sovereignty with that of the other Member States in a number of areas.

Can Turkey negotiate concessions in one area in order to obtain advantages in another? No, this is not possible. The point of departure is the common rules and regulations of the EU, the *acquis communautaire*, which will have to be emulated in its entirety. Only derogations in terms of transitional periods will be accepted. The candidate country will accede to a legal entity, based on common norms, values and rules with regard to democracy, the rule of law and human rights.

Is Turkey really such a unique case in accession terms as the debate often portrays it to be? I do not think so. Each accession is unique and poses unique problems that will have to be negotiated and overcome during the accession case. A closer look at all the accessions up until now will show that all candidate countries have had to cope with problems of different magnitudes, sometimes with the potential to derail the negotiations.

Was the decision on 3 October to start accession negotiations with Turkey a historic one? Yes, in many respects it was. It marked the end of 40 years of Turkish endeavours and it constitutes a political commitment on behalf of EU to take Turkey on board, provided Turkey fulfils all the commitments of membership. It also marks recognition of Turkey's fulfilment of the so called Copenhagen criteria as a starting point for the accession process. By and large, this decision may well turn out to be the single most important decision during the accession process.

The events on 3 October in Luxemburg leading up to the final decision to start negotiations were truly dramatic. But it should also be remembered that important things are often conceived with pain. This is certainly the case with EU decisions. A child was born on that night in Luxemburg. It is now up to the EU Member States and To Turkey to jointly rear that child into a fully grown accession treaty.

Sweden has strongly supported Turkey's EU-bid, and will continue to do so. Whatever criticism Sweden has ventilated vis-à-vis Turkey, it should be seen in that perspective. Indeed, Swedish parliamentary support for Turkish accession is unique – every political party in Parliament and every individual parliamentarian stands behind the Government in this regard.

Speaking of criticism, in particular in the area of human rights, it should be well understood that there is wide spread regard for Turkey's endeavours to re-adjust its rules and regulations in order meet with the values, norms and standards of the EU. Having said that, it is equally important to see to that new rules are implemented as it is to decide on reforms. To this end, Sweden will continue to put forward constructive criticism whenever deemed necessary and appropriate.

As was mentioned at the outset, Turkey should not be portrayed as a unique accession case. Of, course, Turkish accession will pose a number of challenges to the EU and a number of problems of a varying nature will have to be overcome. But this is not unique in an accession process. Each and everyone of the previous acceding countries

have had to cope with problems of different natures. In the case of Sweden formidable problems had to be negotiated in terms of regional aid issues, the environmental legislation, alcohol policy and last but not least snuff, a kind of oral tobacco that Swedes have used for centuries and which the EU wanted to forbid. That single issue could have put a permanent end to Sweden's entry into the EU had not a derogation been found. None of these issues made the headlines of the international media in the same way as for instance the Cyprus issue does.

However, the point I wish to make is that each of us have had problems to cope with in the accession process that could have derailed the EU-aspirations. With persistence and political will they should, and will be overcome. To this end, it is worth while noting that no country that has embarked on an accession negotiations has failed to reach the goal of an accession treaty. Only in one case a country has decided not to ratify such a treaty, namely Norway which refused membership in two separate referenda.

Negotiations will take time for Turkey and will be completed at the earliest about 10 years after the start on 3 October. The next financial perspective of the EU will have to be decided and implemented before the EU will be able to take Turkey on board. Of course, it is also important for Turkey to know what the financial implications are before becoming a full member.

In the case of Sweden the negotiations took 5-6 years, despite the fact that our national rules and regulations by and large were already compatible with those of the EU. The accession proper took only a little more than a year. But it should be recalled that Sweden along with most of the other EFTA countries at the time started out by negotiating a special relationship encompassing most political areas only excluding the agricultural and fisheries policies, the European Economic Area (EEA).

The EEA, which was a special relationship but not a full membership suited both parties, including Sweden. At the end of the 1980s the EU was engaged in consolidating the internal market and was not particularly eager to take on board new members. In fact, it was often felt on the Swedish side that my country was not really welcome in the EU. At the same time a special relationship suited Sweden's security policy at the time as full membership as not considered to be compatible with our policy of neutrality, as it was defined some 20 years ago. Hence, a special relationship was offered and accepted as a forerunner to Sweden's application of full membership a few years later. In addition, a number of political areas that are central to day to the EU did not really form part of our negotiations. They include EFSP, ESDP, the single currency and what is called the third pillar, i. e. justice and home affairs.

Negotiations proper can be described as a roller coaster. They are slow at the outset, starting normally with the screening of easier political chapters. Eventually they pick up speed as more and more chapters become ready for actual negotiations. Nerve wrecking negotiations on individual issues are sometimes followed by slower and less dramatic events while some of the politically most difficult issues are gathered in a basket to form part of the breath taking last marathon negotiation before a deal can be closed. Sweden along with Norway, Austria and Finland negotiated during that last session for more than 80 hours consecutively before a final deal could be sealed.

The notion of "negotiations" deserve a few words. Indeed, it is doubtful if an accession could be termed as a negotiation in the traditional sense. An accession deals with

a countries wish to adapt to a legal framework based on common norms and values. It goes without saying that the legal framework that underpins such a co-operation cannot be negotiated. Neither can a pick and chose approach apply. The acceding country will have to adapt its national rules and regulations to that of the community of member states. the rules of the community shall be applicable in any court of law within the Union in order to safeguard a uniform rule of law. The only derogation that is accepted is transitional periods. But in the end, the acceding country will have to take on board the so called aquis in its entirety. It would be more appropriate to speak about an adjustment process tan a negotiation.

And who does the acceding country negotiate with? Well, formally with the 25 Member States of the Union, but in practice the daily negotiations are between the acceding country and the European Commission, which in turn will put the acceding country's case before the Member States. And the Commission will similarly put the Member States positions to the acceding country. Only on rare occasions will the acceding country meet with Council of member states. However, during most of the proceeding the Commission will serve as a filter between the negotiating parties and most of the time the negotiations can be described as a process at intermediate civil service level.

Thus, the Commission plays an important role during the entire process in terms of its responsibility as interpreter and guardian of the treaty. And as negotiations proceeded with the EU, we learnt at the Swedish side that the Commission was actually our best friend, trying to find constructive solutions to our problems. We learnt that it was worth our while to listen carefully to the experts in the Commission as we were often at odds with individual Member States on different issues.

To sum up, although Sweden and Turkey are different countries posing different challenges with regard to accession, there are a number of similarities between our accessions to the EU, as there are similarities between all acceding countries procedures. The individual accession case is of course unique, but the mechanics of negotiations do not differ from one case to the other. And there are lessons to be learnt from previous negotiations. It is important that Turkey draws from countries that have been through an accession. To this end Sweden will stand by to facilitate Turkey's accession in any way it can. A political commitment has been made on behalf of the 25 Member States of the EU. That is a firm commitment that should bring to bear on both parties. The ball is now very much on the Turkish side, as has been the case with the candidates of all previous accessions.

MY VIEW FROM BRUSSELS

Rolf Gustavsson

I will offer you “my view from Brussels”. I’m not representing anyone else than myself, not even my newspaper. So I will give you some short remarks. To the last intervention I would only add to the timetable the ratification process in the member states, which may take a rather long period of time, with at least one referendum in France.

Now, if we start from last Sunday and Monday with the events in Luxemburg, I think there are some lessons to be learnt. The Swedish ambassador to the European Union, Mr. Sven-Olof Petersson, said: “We needed almost 24 hours to convince the Austrians not to ask for the introduction of new elements into the text which were already there. And then they needed a number of hours to convince the Turkish government not to ask for amendments of things in the text which were not there”. That diplomatic process was not very well handled from the British presidency. I was astonished to what extent the Austrians were stubborn, obviously linking the Turkish question to the Croatian question. Then we can only speculate about what happened to Carla del Ponte, when she suddenly changed her mind and opened the door for Croatia by her statement about “the full cooperation” of the Croatian government in the case of general Ante Gotovina.

The basic lesson from Luxemburg was the confirmation that the main problem in the European Union is not connected with the newcomers but with the old members of the EU. In other words, what is often described and perceived as the Turkish or the Eastern problem, is in fact above all a question to ourselves. A question about the way the European Union decisions are taken. With the aspirations of Turkey a lot of difficult political questions emerge, which so far have not been properly addressed. They have often been on the agenda but the real discussions have permanently been swept under the carpet.

From the Maastricht treaty and onwards, European integration moved from “low politics” to “high politics” but the European Union way of working remained basically that of a technocratic, a-political process. The method has been to focus decisions on criteria and target dates. You oblige yourself to fulfill the criteria and follow the timetable. This was the case for economic and monetary union and this was the case for the enlargement process. This method is technically efficient and powerful. Step by step member states face obligations to deliver more or less on time. The downside of this method is that you don’t face the serious political discussion about the substance and you don’t involve the public opinion until the decision is already a fait accompli. When you avoid the public political discussion you also miss the opportunity to explain to the citizens the reasons behind the decisions. In the worst case you create the impression of a conspiracy and the result is a crisis of confidence. The present crisis in connection with the ratification of the constitutional treaty should be analyzed in this perspective, as a kind of a back lash reaction to the absence of any serious effort to explain to the citizens why the enlargement, thus the European unity, is a good thing. In the old member states of the EU the political leaders rather present this great achievement as a problem.

As you know the European Union and its institutions are in deep crisis and there is no quick fix at hand. In my view we are in a situation of political coma. Not only in the

institutions in Brussels, but also in most of the member states. We have now what is called a time for reflection, “Denkpause”. It is very much “pause”, but I have seen very little reflection so far.

When will this “Denkpause” end? My guess is will continue until after the French presidential election and then we are close to 2008. Maybe the “restart” will not come until you get a new political set up, around 2008/2009. If I try to describe the general mood as if I were a car dealer I would say that we wait for the new models. The outgoing models among the heads of states and governments are leaving. Germany, France, Italy, Poland maybe Sweden, UK, Austria. Will the new models be better, not only in design but also in performance? Or will they just be more of the same? This is an open question and it will be decisive. You can imagine all kinds of scenarios with Merkel, Sarkozy and so on.

The old EU was driven by the Franco-German engine. But today it is dead. I remember a time when at the eve of every European summit meeting came a letter from Bonn and Paris to the heads of states and governments on the crucial issues on the agenda. I have not seen such a letter for years. And there is no impulses coming from the Franco-German engine. They are still able to block but they are not able to perform. In alliance to the Franco-Germans, you had always the Benelux countries supporting. But Benelux today is a dead entity, especially after the Dutch referendum. You can look around for the new forces emerging. But what do you see? Of course everybody says Tony Blair. Yes, he makes remarkable speeches, but he has got very few allies. Occasionally some in Eastern Central Europe, occasionally one in Sweden, Göran Persson. But apart from that?

So where will the new initiatives come from? The usual, classical answer is of course the European Commission. Where is the European Commission today? I would say that in relation to enlargement, in relation to this process with Turkey they have performed very well and I am full of respect to Ollie Rehn, the commissioner in charge. But it seems to me that the European Commission today in general is rather weak and very sensitive for criticism from the member states, especially from the more powerful capitals. Basically, among the heads of states and governments, the real masters of the EU, very few do really respect the views from the Commission, unfortunately. And they pay even less attention to European parliament, despite all of their activities.

So I see a vacuum where you would need force. Some still dream of “Kern-Europa” - hardcore Europe, but it is a weak core or may be there is no core at all, “Kernfreies Europa”. It is at least not a reality for the moment.

So what should you do then? With a constitution in crisis, with a budget in crisis, with a Lisbon process in crisis and with a crisis of confidence in some important member states where both the public opinion and the political leaders are victims of what is called “the enlargement fatigue”. In my view, we should concentrate on what the European Union does best, using its integration instruments to contribute to the geopolitical stability of Europe by keeping the door open for new member states.

The egoistic reason could be put in a very simple way. The perspective of EU membership is a powerful policy instrument to exercise influence, to get good neighbours. I agree with Mark Leonard and others on what is called the transformative power of the European integration. The perspective of membership implies a program

of reforms in the applicant countries and it starts long before you enter into the union. You have the road map to follow and you have the restrictions on what you cannot do if you want to join the EU. Therefore it is extremely important that the European Union really keeps a perspective open, not only for Turkey, but also for other countries, such as Ukraine.

What is called “new neighbourhood policy” is a fine construction, but it has not got any real substance, so far. Unless you fill it with content it will not work as an attractive substitute for membership. And if you make the neighbourhood policy work you will come very close to what is in effect the full accession, because it will only work with some sophisticated institutional arrangements of power sharing. The EU cannot expect applicant countries to be satisfied with the Norwegian solution.

The real heart of the matter is the fact that the European integration is based on a community of law and even in a period of reflection it is of crucial importance that the European institutions consolidate this remarkable achievements. It is extremely important to consolidate it in order to make EU competitive in a global economy. A credible single market and a credible single currency give great competitive advantages. Its credibility is also vital to exercise the transformative soft power in relation to the newcomers. But there are alarming signs that some of the governments in old member states are fed up this community of law, because of its obligations. They would prefer more political horse trading and more soft law.

Your accession negotiations are about joining a community of law and when you come into this negotiation process you will face a number of problems. One, which has not been mentioned yet, but I think you are aware of, is the fact that you will have the annual report from the commission it is not a diplomatic product. The assessments are outspoken and rather tough. One of your political problems will be how to manage this in relation to your media. I think the best media policy during the whole process would be the one used by Sweden, openness. It is better to give too much information to journalists than trying to withhold them. Because otherwise what you will experience that someone will find a secret paper, with a secret element and then they will try to distort a story and you will have a problem then to try to deny, try to correct and so on. But if you give them all the details they will never read it, but there will not be any secrets leaking out of Brussels. At the European Commission the civil servants know already that the management of the media information will be a great challenge in this negotiation because it will focus on details and problems. They will overshadow the big picture, what the whole business is all about.

If it will take ten or fifteen years I don't know, but it will be quite an interesting experience. From what I heard this morning I am afraid that some of your syndromes will emerge to the surface, because you have to try to get rid of the perception of “we” and “them”. Even a couple of years after Sweden joined I remember Swedish ministers still talking about European Union as “them”. It changed with the Swedish presidency (2001) because it forced not only the politicians and also the civil servants to think European, not only Swedish.

If the negotiations are seen as “we” against “them” and it's a process of adaptation then all problems settled will of course be perceived as a series of capitulations. And that will be a political problem to manage in Turkey, I imagine.

THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS AND EUROPEANIZATION IN TURKEY

Atila Eralp

Introduction

This paper focuses on the linkage between the more inclusionary approach of the EU after the Helsinki Summit of 1999 and the reform process in Turkey. It examines the reform initiative of the last six years undertaken in Turkey and argues that the incentive of membership in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit was crucial in shaping the reform project in Turkey. It attempts to show how the Turkish reform project is turning from a general process of Westernization to a more concrete process of Europeanization within the context of the EU accession process. The paper concludes by emphasizing the need for further clarification of the time table of negotiations as well as the increasing support of the reform-coalition in Turkey to deepen the project of Europeanization.

The Helsinki Turning Point

The Helsinki Summit overcame the long-lasting ambiguity surrounding the Turkish case, ending the debate over whether Turkey is a European country. Turkey was clearly situated in the present enlargement process along with other twelve candidate countries.⁴⁹ Turkey also became part of the same accession-partnerships as the other candidate countries. This is a clear reflection of the willingness of the EU to provide financial and technical supports to prepare Turkey for membership as for the other candidate countries. On this issue, there was a major difference between Luxembourg and Helsinki Summits. While Turkey was treated separately from other candidate countries and put in an ambiguous European Strategy in Luxembourg, in Helsinki Turkey was offered an accession-partnership. The EU also manifested a clear attitude to treat Turkey according to the same “Copenhagen Criteria” as the other candidate countries. These resolutions regarding Turkey were drastically different from Luxembourg: they were more open, inclusive and less discriminatory. As a result, the Helsinki resolutions were perceived quite positively by the Turkish elites, as resolutions correcting the “mistakes” of Luxembourg.

The Helsinki framework required a major mental shift of orientation in the attitudes of both EU and Turkish officials to create a more cooperative relationship.⁵⁰ This mental shift was not easy, primarily because Turkish and EU officials have long been used to an adversarial relationship and treated each other in bilateral “us-them” terms. It should, however be mentioned that the Helsinki Summit pressured for major political and economic reforms in Turkey. The EU actively stimulated these reforms through the publication of its “Accession Partnership” (AP) document, which was announced in November 2000. This announcement was important because it led to the inclusion of Turkey in the accession-partnership relationship with the EU as with other candidate

⁴⁹ Atila Eralp “Turkey in the Enlargement Process: From Luxembourg to Helsinki”, *Perceptions*, Vol. 5, No. 2, June-August 2000, pp. 17–32.

⁵⁰ Ziya Önis “Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era” in Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (eds) *Turkey and the European Union* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp.9–34 and Mehmet Ugur “Testing Times in EU-Turkey Relations: The road to Copenhagen and beyond” in *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol. 5, No.2, August 2003, pp. 165–183.

countries. The Commission listed the short and medium-term political and economic priorities aimed at the transformation of the Turkish state in line with the Copenhagen criteria. The political measures in the document aimed at creating a more liberal and pluralistic order and the economic measures focused on the achievement of macro-economic stability and an effective regulatory economic structure. In response, to the AP, the Turkish government prepared the “Turkish National Program for the Adoption of the *Acquis*” which was submitted to the EU Commission in March 2001. The National Program was a major attempt to meet the political and economic expectations of the EU. From the EU perspective, the National Program was a significant progress, yet, EU officials emphasized that the state of reforms in the report fell rather short of expectations primarily in the political field.

Turkish authorities focused on the implementation of the National Program in order to meet the political expectations of the EU in the latter part of 2001 and 2002. The government used two main instruments in the implementation of the political reform process: amendment of the Constitution and “harmonization laws”.⁵¹ First, 34 amendments to the Constitution were accomplished primarily in the area of human rights, freedom of expression and freedom of organization. After the constitutional amendments, the Turkish Parliament also adopted a new Civil Code and introduced improvements notably on the fields of freedom of association and the right to assembly, as well as gender equality and child protection. These constitutional amendments were followed by “harmonization laws” designed to translate the constitutional amendments into concrete action by bringing Turkish laws in line with the *acquis*. The first harmonization package focused on freedom of expression and amended previous laws, which were the legal bases for the detention and sentencing of many intellectuals for expressing their views. The second harmonization package extended further the scope of freedom of thought, the freedom of press, the freedom of association and peaceful assembly and also reinforced measures for the prevention of torture and ill-treatment. It further introduced measures against human rights violations by government functionaries.

Clearly, these reform measures were quite dramatic compared to previous efforts and they were engineered by a relatively weak coalition government of three different political orientations, including a nationalist-rightist party (MHP), a nationalist-leftist party (DSP) and a liberal center-right party (ANAP). While dramatic in Turkish terms, critical areas were still left contested between the EU and Turkey, such as the abolishment of the death penalty, extension of cultural rights of “minority groups”, the role of the military and the Cyprus question.

These areas remained thorny not only between the EU and Turkey but they were also at the center of domestic debate in Turkey. Actually, EU issues have been at the center of political debate in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit. While all of the major political parties in Turkey displayed a vague commitment on the issue of EU membership, when it came to the sensitive issues mentioned above, there was a lack of consensus. The coalition was clearly fragmented on these issues. MHP, the nationalist-rightist party opposed the abolition of the death penalty, as well as the extension of cultural rights and took a hard-line on Cyprus. DSP, the nationalist-leftist party, was

⁵¹ For a detailed analysis of the National Program and its implementation by the Turkish governments, see particularly the relevant sides of the web-page of the Secretary General of the EU Affairs, www.abgs.org.

more favorable on the abolition of death penalty, but had serious reservations on other sensitive matters. It was only the liberal Motherland Party (ANAP) which had a clear “pro-EU” attitude. Within this climate, it became increasingly difficult for the government to go ahead in the reform process on these key political issues. These tensions resulted in the disintegration of the coalition government and the call for early elections. The early elections on October 3, 2002 ended the coalition government and led to a change of government with a clear victory of the pro-religious Justice and Development Party (AKP).

In this election climate, the Turkish Grand National Assembly on August 3, 2002 took some historical decisions in its third package on the political reform process in order to show Turkey’s willingness to join the EU. It abolished the long contested death penalty as well as granted the rights to broadcast and learn one’s “mother tongue”. The decisions on the sensitive matters were taken with large majorities in the Grand National Assembly. With these decisions, there was an increasing expectation from the EU to set a clearer timetable to start negotiations in 2003 or at the least in the beginning of 2004.

The AKP government which was formed after the general elections of 3 November 2002 prepared four “harmonization packages” to bring Turkish legislation in line with the EU legislation. During this period, we see the acceleration of the reform process as well as increasing consensus on the harmonization packages both within the Parliament and in the government and bureaucracy. The fourth package of the government focused on the issue of torture and ill treatment and declared, “zero tolerance” against torture. It removed all the legal impediments for the prosecution of public officials who resort to torture and ill treatment. The fifth package focused on the issue of re-trial and expanded the scope of re-trial arrangements on the basis of judgments rendered by the European Court of Human Rights. The sixth and seventh packages were more comprehensive. They tried to respond to the recommendations made in the revised Accession Partnership Document of the EU, which was adopted on the 19th of May 2003 and to the commitments made by the Turkish government in its revised National Programme, which was published on the 24th of July 2003. The government tried to remove all the legal restrictions on the freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of press and assembly. In the sixth package it introduced measures for TV broadcasting in mother tongues other than Turkish in both public and private channels. In the seventh package, the legislative package focused on civilian-military relationship and changed the character of the National Security Council and made it an advisory body. There were amendments on both the functions of the National Security Council to make it a more advisory body as well the procedures for the appointment of the Secretary General of the Council. The amendments opened up the possibility to appoint a civilian as a Secretary General.

The AKP government believed that Turkey had achieved the “critical mass” in terms of legislative harmonization in compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria. The government started to focus more on the process of implementation of these reforms and channeled its energy and resources on this issue. A Reform Monitoring group was established at the highest political level to overview the progress in the implementation of political reforms. This group is chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and comprises of Ministers of Justice and Internal Affairs.

From Westernization to Europeanization in Turkey

In all candidate countries, the political and economic reforms have accelerated as the EU provided clearer signals to their accession. It seems that there is an increasing linkage between the reform process in candidate countries and their accession. As some close observers of the EU integration process have pointed out, enlargement has been one of the most successful foreign policy tools of the EU.⁵² The EU has created an environment conducive to the reform process with the offer of the membership status. The status of membership has been a major incentive provided to the candidate countries and has affected their reform processes positively. As the analysis in the preceding sections suggest, Turkey's reform process has been somewhat "slow" compared to the other accession countries.⁵³ It has been slow in comparison to other countries in the present enlargement process primarily because of the ambivalence of the EU regarding Turkey's accession coupled with Turkey's domestic constraints. Turkey is the only country, which has not fulfilled the political expectations of the EU and therefore it remained the only country without a clear timetable on its accession in the current enlargement process.

Nevertheless, the analysis in the preceding sections also suggests that the reform process in Turkey has accelerated as the EU formulated a more inclusionary framework with the Helsinki Summit and offered a candidate status to Turkey. The reform process has further accelerated after the Copenhagen Summit when it was declared that if the European Council in December 2004 decided that Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU would open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay. While the decisions of the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 did not meet Turkey's expectations; nevertheless there was improvement compared to the previous situation in clarifying the timetable to start negotiations.

In the aftermath of the Copenhagen Summit, the Turkish government has formulated four "harmonization laws" as examined in the preceding section, which focused on more sensitive issues of the reform process such as the civilian-military relationship and cultural-minority rights. Furthermore, the government has increasingly realized that the reform process required not only the promulgation of laws, but also their implementation.

Turkish government functionaries, as was pointed out, were long geared to a perception of the Community/Union in adversarial terms. Recently there is a mentality shift among the government functionaries to see the Union more in cooperative terms. It is quite interesting to note that this shift is taking place when a religious-rightist party is in power (AKP). The AKP government has adopted a clear European stance and has tried to accelerate the reform process in Turkey. This attitude of AKP is dramatically different from the previous religious-rightist parties. In the 1970s, religious-rightist parties such as National Salvation Party depicted the EC as a Christian Community

⁵² For a more comprehensive analysis of EU's foreign policy initiatives see Bruno Coppieters, Michael Emerson et al *Europeanization and Conflict Resolutions: Case Studies from the European Periphery*, Gent: Academia Press, 2004.

⁵³ Atilla Eralp "Turkey and the Enlargement Process of the European Union" in Jody Jensen (ed) *Europe Bound: Faultlines and Frontiers of Security in the Balkans*, Szombathely: Savaria University Press, 2003, p. 283.

organized to undermine the Islamic world and suggested the creation of an alternative Islamic Common Market. This attitude has continued in the cases of Welfare Party as well as of Virtue Party in the 1980s and the 1990s. With the Justice and Development Party, there is a diametrically opposed new approach to the EU. The EU integration is perceived as a process of democratization and the issues of religious rights and freedoms are seen within the context of the processes of democratization of the EU. With this change, we are witnessing the transformation of the religious-right in Turkey. The religious right is becoming more moderate as it adopts a more pro-EU stance. It seems that the EU accession process in Turkey is creating an environment conducive to the transformation of the religious-rightist political tendencies. Such a transformation is quite crucial in an international system where there are all kinds of possibilities of tension along cultural/religious lines. Both the EU and Turkey have important stakes in creating a world of an increasing dialogue between cultures and civilizations, rather than a “clash” of them. The transformation of AKP and the religious right in Turkey opens up a possibility for a meeting of Islam and democracy in the political space. It is quite important in this context that there should be a legitimate place for moderate Islam in the European political space. Turkey’s process of reform within this climate should not be thought merely as a technical process of harmonization with the EU *acquis*. It is a major process of transformation, which is leading to the meeting of Islam and democracy and creating a legitimate place for moderate Islam in the European political space and therefore consolidating the multicultural basis of the European integration process.

We have witnessed critical points and ups and downs in Turkey’s forty-year relationship with the Community/Union. Nevertheless, the EU vocation has helped Turkey’s project of Westernization, which has been the guiding principle of the Turkish Republic. Modernization was defined as Westernization by the Turkish elites and closer association with Europe; above all meant a “civilizing mission” which would bring an increasing section of the Turkish population into contact with Western life styles, behavior and methods. Efforts towards Westernization would also bring economic development and greater political stability. Turkish elites believed that Europe and the West were main sources of economic development as well as models of social change.

The project of Westernization has been quite crucial in the creation and the consolidation of the framework of secularism in the Turkish context. The long-lasting relationship with the Community/Union has also helped immensely in the transformation of the Turkish private sector into a more competitive and global oriented one. These are important accomplishments, but they have to be reinforced by the transformation of political structures and institutions and the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. As the analysis in the preceding sections suggest Turkey has entered a new period of democratization after the Helsinki Summit; the political reform process has accelerated as the EU adapted a more inclusionary approach to Turkey. In this process, the general project of Westernization is increasingly turning into one of a concrete project of Europeanization –a more complex process of not only adapting of common values but also of transformation of political and economic structures and governance systems. With the “harmonization laws” of the last years, Turkey is changing its political practices and institutions as well as its approach to political problems, which require a major mentality shift to think and act within the larger context of the European Union.

This is a slow and a contested process, but there has been an immense progress as mentioned in the more recent reports of the European Commission.⁵⁴

The process has been slower and a contested in the Turkish case because of the ambivalence of Turkey's timetable as well as the availability of less incentives as compared to the other candidate countries in the present enlargement process. It is evident that the most important turning point in the reform process comes with the start of the negotiations.⁵⁵ As the findings related with other accession countries indicate, the reform process becomes irreversible with the opening of negotiations. With the start of the negotiations, as the candidate country harmonizes its institutional system along the lines of the EU *acquis*; we witness the process of Europeanization of institutional structures and the public administration of the country.

The Turkey-EU relationship was at another historical crossroads in 2005. If Turkey started negotiations, the reform process would not only accelerate but also consolidate and become irreversible; if not, the process might slow down and it might not be easy to sustain the process. The EU has made substantial commitments to Turkey and Turkey has channelled important material and immaterial resources to fulfill its requirements in order to start negotiations with the EU. The "EU issue" has been the most important issue on the domestic agenda of the Turkish public opinion. As a result, a negative decision by the EU would not only harm the Union as a credible partner but also would lead to the rise anti-EU feelings in Turkey. The recent discussions related with the possibility to offer a "special relationship" to Turkey would not counterbalance the damage inflicted to the relationship. It was too late to offer this status as the Turkish public opinion was geared to the start of negotiations at the end of 2005.

It was a defining moment in the long lasting relationship with the EU. Within an intense climate of debate all over Europe, the EU Council decided on October 3 that Turkey has met political criteria sufficiently and the EU was willing to start negotiations with Turkey. It also declared that this process was an open-ended one and the outcome would depend both on Turkey's adoption and implementation of the EU *acquis* as well as on the EU's absorption capacity. The EU Council also adopted a different framework for negotiations with Turkey, taking into account both some of the lessons derived from the previous enlargement process as well as emphasizing the difference of Turkey on political, economic, social and other factors. The emphasis by the EU on "difference" created a climate of resentment in Turkey; public opinion formers stated that the EU was not only treating Turkey differently from other accession countries but also in a more discriminatory manner. The emphasis on open-endedness of the accession negotiations, the possibility of referenda in some EU countries as well as the idea of permanent safeguards in some sensitive issues such as free movement of persons, structural funds and agricultural policy are some of the areas of friction in the relationship between the EU and Turkey. In addition to these issues, there is also the problem of Cyprus. Since Cyprus became the member of the EU without the solution of the Cyprus problem, there is a potential for Cyprus to block the process of negotiations with Turkey on the opening and closing of each chapter of the EU *acquis*.

⁵⁴ European Commission, *Regular Report of Turkey's Progress Toward Accession*, 2003, 2004, 2005.

⁵⁵ James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse and Claire Gordon (eds) *Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU's Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: The myth of conditionality*, New York: Palgrave, 2004.

Conclusion

As the literature on Europeanization indicates, this process is different and more difficult in the context of non-member countries.⁵⁶ The EU has mainly used the incentive of membership and formulated more specific financial instruments to implement its principle of “conditionality” in the last enlargement process. This package of incentives together with conditions was quite important in the acceleration of the reform process in the accession countries. It helped the building of a reform coalition in these countries and decreased the political costs in the process.

As argued in this paper the process of Europeanization in Turkey accelerated after the more inclusionary approach of the EU after the Helsinki Summit of 1999. The “limited” clarification of the time table for Turkey after the Copenhagen Summit of 2002 was quite important in the further acceleration of the reform initiative in the last three years. The decision of the EU Council on 3rd of October 2005 to start negotiations with Turkey was also critical in maintaining the incentive of membership for Turkey. However, as I argued, the formulation of a different negotiation framework which emphasizes the open-endedness of this process for Turkey creates difficulties for the consolidation of the project of Europeanization in Turkey. As the accession process in other countries shows, the process becomes more difficult with the rise in the number of losers as well as increase of political costs with the start of negotiations. Governments faced with such difficulties were able to maintain their political will because of a clear incentive of membership in their cases. In the Turkish context, the process becomes increasingly difficult because of the ambivalence of the time table of negotiations and its open-ended nature.

It may take some time but there is a need to increase confidence in the relationship and decrease this ambivalence with the start of negotiations. This could help the building of a stronger reform coalition in Turkey which would own the project of Europeanization internally. It is extremely important for the project of Europeanization to be owned by domestic groups. If there is non-correspondence between the principle of conditionality and the incentives of the EU, there might be the dangerous image of Europeanization as a project imposed by the European Union. This could damage the project of Europeanization, the core of which is the issue of democratization. It could lead to the perception of democratization as something which is imposed from the outside. In the Turkish context, the process of democratization has a long history and a strong internal support base; it is not seen as a process imposed from the outside as in some other countries. The EU should be sensitive during the negotiations to the internal dynamics of this process. In this context, the implementation of the principle of “conditionality” should not be treated as a technical matter; it is a highly politicized matter and has important internal ramifications. It should always be matched with incentives and be sensitive to the internal dynamics of the country. To put it briefly, domestic ownership of the process of Europeanization is extremely important and the EU should give more consideration to this issue if it wants to deepen this process in the acceding countries.⁵⁷ The acceding countries on their part should consider that the

⁵⁶ Roberto Di Quirico (ed) *Europeanization and Democratization: Institutional Adaptation, Conditionality and Democratization in EU's Neighbour Countries*, Florence: European Press Academic Publishing, 2005.

⁵⁷ On this matter of domestication of the process of Europeanization in Turkey, see the article written by Kivanc Ulusoy in this volume.

EU accession process provides many incentives to consolidate their attempts of democratization. This linkage between the EU accession process and the democratization drive is extremely important in the present turbulent international climate and this opportunity should not be missed.

Turkish accession is one of the most challenging cases for the EU. Amid all these problems, Turkey has entered the screening process on several chapters of *acquis* at the end of 2005 and is planning to start negotiations in the first half of 2006. It seems that this process will be a long, contested and a challenging one both for Turkey and the EU. It will be a challenging for Turkey, because Turkey will adopt the multilevel governance system of the EU and will act within the broader context of the EU. Turkey will increasingly define itself within the process of Europeanization in the context of Wider Europe and neighborhood issues. This process will also consolidate the project of Westernization pursued since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923. It is challenging project for the EU, because it will include a country, which has for a long time considered as the “other” of Europe. However, the EU has faced many challenges in the past and has been successful; it can also meet the present challenge.

THE EUROPEAN IMPACT ON TURKEY'S POLITICS, 1987-2004

Kıvanç Ulusoy

Introduction

The Helsinki Summit of the European Council in 1999 marked a turning point for Turkey in its relations with the European Union (EU). Establishing its candidate status and clarifying a concrete membership perspective, the Helsinki Summit placed Turkey within the stream of 'conditionality-compliance' principles. Indeed, the political reforms Turkey implemented to meet the Copenhagen criteria gained significant momentum following the Helsinki Summit. However, there was a gradual political transformation, already taking place in Turkey over the past decades, and the societal pressure behind this transformation. The 'conditionality' argument seriously undervalues the progressive democratisation of Turkey and underestimates the influence of international political conjunctures on the democratic process. This article aims to develop a coherent explanation of the impact of the EU on Turkey's politics between 1987 and 2004, providing an analysis of Turkish political transformation within the framework of its relations with the EU. With an explanatory framework based on Moravcsiks' work on the human rights regime in post-war Europe with Risse's theory on communicative action in world politics, it will be argued that the main dynamics driving recent democratisation in Turkey were its newfound location within the European human rights regime and the increasing power of European argument as an alternative way of resolving domestic political conflicts in Turkey. In section II of this article, I briefly examine the political reforms launched between 1999 and 2004 to start accession negotiations with the EU, and evaluate these changes in light of the literature on conditionality and its impact on Turkey, discussing its strong and weak points. In section III, I establish the analytical framework of study, drawing on the above-mentioned works of Moravcsik and Risse. Section IV of the article provides an in-depth study of the Turkish case, analysing in particular the inclusion of Turkey in the EU legal-institutional sphere with its membership application and the subsequent gradual political transformation that took place from 1987 to 1999. I shall then provide a brief conclusion.

Turkish Political Transformation: The impact of 'conditionality'

The EU accepted Turkey as an official candidate at the European Council Summit in 1999 in Helsinki. Promising that it would be judged by the same objective criteria put to other candidates, the EU found it rather difficult to postpone taking a definitive decision on Turkey, which completed the reform packages in a short time. Based on the Commission's statement that Turkey sufficiently completed the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Council on 17 December 2004 decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. The accession negotiations effectively started on 3 October 2005. It is commonly accepted that the recent political reforms were engineered especially with increasing likelihood of EU membership as an attainable option in the near future. Turkey's democratisation process took a remarkable turn with the acceptance of Turkey's candidacy at the Helsinki Summit.

What was long lacking in the Turkey-EU relations was the establishment of contractual relations based on the effective monitoring both of Turkey's convergence towards EU standards, and the EU's compliance with its own obligations to automatically grant

rights or impose sanctions when a candidate country does or does not fulfil its requirements.⁵⁸ The EU failed as an effective anchor for political reform, and Turkey was not completely committed towards Europeanisation. That is why the basic principle of ‘conditionality’,⁵⁹ drawing the general framework for EU membership, was not put into practice in Turkish case. However, the Helsinki Summit confirmed Turkey’s candidacy for membership and established an accession partnership between the EU and Turkey with regard to the burden of convergence. Turkey was expected to meet the 1993 Copenhagen criteria for candidate countries’ convergence towards EU norms in the economic and political spheres. Furthermore, it was charged with resolving border problems with other candidate countries or EU member states in light of the Charter of United Nations. Where resolution cannot be found, Turkey agreed to bring the issues before the International Court of Justice. The offer made at Helsinki asked for political reforms and peaceful resolution of disputes and promised the reward of starting accession negotiations.

Turkey has been subject to the same conditionality regime, targeting both basic norms of liberal democracy—particularly the civilian control of military and the minority rights, as CEE countries since the recognition of the Turkish candidacy in 1999. However, attempting to measure the effectiveness of EU conditionality on Turkey through comparisons with Latvia and Slovakia, considered as ‘hard cases’, Schimmelfenning, Engert and Knobel diagnose an essential conflict between *Kemalism*, defined as the statist and nationalist doctrine of the Turkish state, and European democracy and human rights norms.⁶⁰ They identify the first significant effects of conditionality since Turkey’s promotion to candidate status in the legislative package its parliament passed in August 2002. Although, these authors accept that the concrete membership perspective linked with obtaining candidate status in 1999 was the driving force behind the domestic political process that led to partial compliance in the summer of 2002, the domestic cost of adaptation defines the effectiveness of conditionality in the sense that the recent reforms in Turkey do not directly affect the core of the state power. They underline that the timing of the reforms, particularly in 2001 and 2002, demonstrates the political cost-benefit calculation Turkey made with regard to engaging the political reform process. Finally, for them, the many years of unsuccessful influence by the Council of Europe and the EU to improve the human rights situation in Turkey demonstrate that social pressure and trans-national mobilisation were ineffective.⁶¹

In fact Turkey faced a radical democratic break in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit of 1999 under the pressure of completing the political reforms to start accession negotiations. As underlined in the Commission’s *Regular Report* in 2000, Turkey fails to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, particularly because of its poor respect for human rights and the rights of minorities, the situation of the Kurds and the constitutionally-backed role of the armed forces in political life via the National Security

⁵⁸ M. Ugur, 2000. ‘Europeanization and convergence via incomplete contracts? The case of Turkey’, *Southern European Society and Politics*, 5(2), pp. 217–242.

⁵⁹ H. Grabbe, 2002. ‘European Union Conditionality and the *Acquis Communautaire*’, *International Political Science Review*, 23(3), pp. 249–268.

⁶⁰ F. Schimmelfenning, S. Engert and H. Knobel, 2003. ‘Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 41(3), pp. 495–518.

Council.⁶² The *Report* was followed by the Accession Partnership for Turkey, clarifying a road map for Turkey with the short- and medium-term measures, emphasising the immediate priorities drawn by the political and economic aspects of the Copenhagen criteria and the importance of Turkey's capacity to adopt the *acquis communautaire*.⁶³ In response to these developments Turkey issued her *National Programme for the Adaptation of the Acquis* in March 2001, mostly regarded as an unconvincing document as it dealt extensively with the technical and legislative aspects of EU practices, but largely downplayed the significance of democracy and human rights and showed little commitment to reforms in the fields of minority rights, fundamental freedoms and the abolition of death penalty. However, the *National Programme* showed that the adaptation to EU criteria concerns more than single market rules, and affects sectors such as communications, cultural policy, education, law, welfare, security, justice and foreign policy.⁶⁴ In the subsequent period, Turkey's challenge was to come to terms with the fact that the EU introduces standards and practices to which members and candidate countries must conform.

The *National Programme* was followed in October 2001 by the first reform package, comprising 34 amendments to the Constitution in line with the Accession Partnership's quest for short-term measures to strengthen legal and constitutional guarantees for a range of human rights. It aimed to provide the guarantees expressed in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), relevant for individuals who had been imprisoned for expressing non-violent opinions. The coalition government, composed of Democratic Left Party, Motherland Party and the Nationalist Action Party, initiated the second package of legislative reforms in January 2002. This package brought about a number of small changes to the severely criticised articles of the Turkish Penal Code (Articles 159 and 312) and Article 8 of the Law for the Struggle against Terrorism (No. 3713), which the courts used to restrict freedom of expression. The government's efforts culminated with the radical reforms of August 2002, including the abolition of the death penalty, extension of the rights over religious property of the non-Muslim minorities (Greeks, Armenians and Jews) and rights of broadcasting in languages other than Turkish—particularly referring to regional dialects and the Kurdish language.⁶⁵ Under the stress of these reforms the coalition government collapsed. The Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, announced a general election for 3 November, three days before the issue of the last reform package.

The elections of November 2002 completely changed the political landscape by wiping out not only the parties of the coalition government but also the radical parties of the opposition. The newly established Justice and Development Party (AKP) with 363 of the 541 seats and Republican People's Party (CHP), widely known as Ataturk's party, with 178 seats became the major parties of the parliament. The key themes of the election campaign centred on realising the economic reforms proposed by the IMF and

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp.506–509.

⁶² EC, 2000. *Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*.

⁶³ EC, 2000. *Accession Partnership for Turkey*.

⁶⁴ G. Demirok, 2001. *How Could the Relations between Turkey and the European Union be Improved?*, Basel: Europeainstitut der Universitat Basel.

⁶⁵ P. Tanlak, 2002. *Turkey EU Relations in the Post Helsinki Phase and the EU Harmonization Laws Adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in August 2002*, Sussex European Institute Working Paper No. 55, Brighton.

on following through on the political reforms necessary for starting accession negotiations with the EU. Unlike their opponents, who frequently resorted to radical positions on these issues, both the AKP and the CHP were successful due to their moderate stance and open support of the economic and political reforms required by the IMF and EU.⁶⁶ The elections demonstrated how boundaries between foreign policy and domestic politics become blurred under the influence of global economic realities (symbolised by the IMF) and within the regional political framework defined by the EU.

The Commission issued its regular report on Turkey in October 2002. Praising the reforms made after the issue of the regular report in 2001, and particularly underlining the significance of the reforms made in August 2002, the report stated that Turkey still didn't fully meet the Copenhagen criteria.⁶⁷ However, within less than a month's time following the report, the political landscape of Turkey was deeply transformed as a result of the 3 November elections. After decades of coalition governments Turkey had a single party government formed by the AKP Party, showing a great determination to accelerate the pace of reform. The Copenhagen European Council in December acknowledged the significance of recent reforms and supported the new government's determination to take further steps on this path.⁶⁸ The new government, with strong international support, quickly adopted four major packages on political reform from January to June 2003, bringing far-reaching changes to the political system and taking important steps to ensure their effective implementation. Some of the major political reforms accepted in these packages included: changing the anti-terror law used to restrict freedom of thought and expression; paving the way for private schools to teach Kurdish and private television and radio stations to broadcast other languages commonly used in Turkey; removing the National Security Council's executive powers and turning it into an advisory council; increasing parliamentary control over the defence budget; lifting the state of emergency in the southeast; granting partial amnesty to Kurdish militants; and, finally, improving the rights of non-Muslim minorities.

During this period, relations with the EU gained clear momentum with the meeting of the *Association Council* in April, the acceptance of revised *Accession Partnership* in May, and revisions to the *National Programme* in July. In its regular report on Turkey, the European Commission celebrated the government's aim of streamlining the functioning of the public administration with a view to promote a more transparent management of human resources in the public service, which would serve to strengthen the fight against corruption.⁶⁹ It also noted that some of the reforms carried particular political significance in the Turkish context, and that many priorities under the political criteria in the revised *Accession Partnership* had been addressed. However, though mentioning the government's good intentions to ensure the implementation of reforms through the establishment of a reform monitoring group, the report noted that implementation had actually so far been uneven, particularly because of the executive and judicial bodies' narrow definition of scope, which hindered the attainment of the original objectives.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ The author of this paper observed the election campaigns for *El Pais*, Spanish daily.

⁶⁷ European Commission, 2002. *Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*, pp. 15–44.

⁶⁸ European Council, 2002. *Presidency Conclusions*, Copenhagen.

⁶⁹ European Commission, 2003. *Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*, pp. 12–43.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

Therefore, in 2004 Turkey was expected to demonstrate that the reforms had been implemented. During the following months the European pressures obtained its first results with the start of broadcasting in Kurdish. Then, the Kurdish deputies – Leyla Zana and her associates – were released from prison and the rights of non-Muslim minorities were widely expanded. The President Ahmet Nejdet Sezer accepted a new reform package that extended freedom of expression, and established the independence of the judiciary and civilian control of the military. These reforms were all passed so that the EU would not have any pretext for postponing the start of accession negotiations. After the Commission's report in 2003, Turkey undertook serious measures to ensure the proper implementation of the reforms with a zero tolerance policy in the fight against torture and ill-treatment of prisoners, and stronger commitment to the implementation of provisions relating to the freedom of expression, freedom of religion, women's rights, trade union rights and minority rights over the last twelve months.⁷¹

In its 2004 *Communication to the Council and the European Parliament*, the Commission finally expressed its opinion on Turkey, stating that the country had sufficiently fulfilled the political criteria. The Commission recommended the opening of accession negotiations but also underlined that 'the irreversibility of the reforms process, its implementation in particular with regard to fundamental freedoms, will need to be confirmed over a long period of time.'⁷² Commission concluded that regardless of its outcome the negotiation process is essential to reinforce and guide further reforms in Turkey, particularly in relation to the 'continued fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria'. It further emphasised that the relations between the EU and Turkey must ensure that Turkey remains fully anchored in European structures.⁷³ With respect to the Commission's report and advice, the European Council decided to open the accession negotiations with Turkey on 17 December 2004. The accession negotiations started on 3 October 2005.

When examining the recent reform process in Turkey, particularly with respect to the timing after the acceptance of the Turkish candidacy at the Helsinki Summit in 1999 and its increasing pace in the last two years, it can be clearly seen that EU conditionality as a strategy of 'reinforcement by reward' operates. However, it would be misleading to argue that societal influence and transnational mobilisation were ineffective, and that the low domestic political cost of compliance was what really mattered (since so far significant change has been reserved for issues that do not directly affect the core of state power).⁷⁴ Furthermore, although the impact of EU conditionality—with the expectation of EU membership in the foreseeable future—cannot be negated with regard to recent political changes, it would be an exaggeration to accuse Turkey of being a 'reluctant democratiser *par excellence*'⁷⁵ or to argue that the EU is engaged in 'social engineering' and 'transforming society' in Turkey.⁷⁶ Being conscious

⁷¹ EC, 2004. *Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*. Brussels: SEC 1201, pp 29–44.

⁷² EC, 2004. *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament*. Brussels: COM, 6 October, (656 final), p. 9.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁷⁴ F. Schimmelfenning et al., 2003. 'Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 41(3), p. 509.

⁷⁵ T.W Smith, 2003. 'The Politics of Conditionality: The European Union and Human Rights Reforms in Turkey', in P. Kubicek (eds.) *The European Union and Democratization*. London: Routledge, pp. 127–128.

⁷⁶ G. Dorronsoro, 2004. 'The EU and Turkey: Between Geopolitics and Social Engineering' in R. Dannreuther (ed.) *European Union Foreign and Security Policy*, London: Routledge, pp. 58–59.

of the significance of the recent political reforms and the societal demands behind them, Ugur provides a wider framework of analysis, claiming that Turkey's democratisation reform output in 2000, 2001 and 2002 has been the highest since 1970. He states that after Helsinki the EU provided an external anchor in three ways: first by tying the hands of the government by reducing the scope for discretion and policy reversals; second by enabling the governments to engage in externalisation justifying the reform process as a requirement imposed by external constraints; and third by allowing both the government and the pro-reform societal groups to legitimise the democratisation reforms.⁷⁷

In fact, as verified in the Commission's last two regular reports on Turkey (2004 and 2005)⁷⁸, the recent structural changes in Turkish politics are actually a result of the mobilisation of sub-national ethnic and religious groups in Turkey at the European level. This situation is particularly evident in statements regarding legal personality, property rights and internal management of the non-Muslim religious communities, the status of Alevis and the broadcasting of Kurdish and other languages. The EU challenges the centrality of the nation-state and creates an institutional basis at which sub-national ethnic and religious groups in Turkey aim to put their political demands and even establish linkages in Brussels. I would argue that Turkey is going through an extremely serious and delicate process of democratic transition, and that this transition is actually a political response to economic changes and political problems that were giving rise to violence and social unrest of previous decades. The political reforms, for which the EU provided a significant dynamic, were the initial response to these problems, which would have continued had the political regime established in 1980 not taken action. These reforms, however, including the abolition of the death penalty, the recognition of languages other than Turkish, the release of Kurdish deputies and the reform of public administration have had extremely serious repercussions for the conceptualisation of national identity, political community, state structures and governance. In fact the recent reforms seriously challenge the whole political project upon which the Turkish Republic was established in 1923. The section IV will deal more in-depth with these aspects of the political reforms in Turkey, however, we will first establish an alternative framework to analyse the dynamics of transformation in Turkey.

Dynamics of Transformation: Alternative Framework of Analysis

The previous section outlined the reform process initiated by the Turkish governments to start accession negotiations with EU. It was also underlined that explaining the recent political changes in Turkey solely in terms of European conditionality seriously under-values the gradual political transformations that were already underway in the country, and the social pressures motivating them. Furthermore, it contended that explanations based completely on the European perspective are risky, as the democratic process is still extremely vulnerable to international political conjunctures and particularly to the still ambiguous European approach to Turkey – even after the negotiations started on 3 October 2005. The following pages aim to provide an alternative framework of analysis

⁷⁷ M. Ugur, 2003. 'Testing Times in EU-Turkey Relations: the Road to Copenhagen and Beyond', *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 5(2), p. 176.

⁷⁸ EC, 2004, *Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*, 6 October 2004, Brussels; EC, 2005, *Turkey: Progress Report*, 9 November 2005, Brussels.

for the Turkish political transformation of the last two decades. It integrates two explanatory structures: Moravcsik's approach to analysing the human rights regime in post-war Europe, and Risse's work on communicative action in world politics.

Risse claims that the power of better argument operates in international relations through two strategies: 'friendly persuasion' and 'socializing human rights norms into domestic practices'.⁷⁹ He states that constituting an essential feature of the negotiation process, arguing is key for reaching optimal solutions to commonly perceived problems, and for agreeing on a common normative framework in international relations. The essence of this approach lies in the belief that actors are prepared to change their own worldviews, interests and identities.⁸⁰ Referring to Habermas' notion of communicative action, Risse concentrates on the growing primacy of argumentative power-rationality rather than instrumental rationality – maximising self-interest in international relations – as a result of the institutionalisation of world politics. Using the EU and the transatlantic community as examples, he underlines the possibility of a communicative consensus among the actors and 'common life-world' defined by regulative action, rule-guided behaviour, collective identity and shared values in international relations.⁸¹ Risse's contention is that a learning and socialisation process takes place through the communications between norm-violating governments and transnational as well as domestic advocacy networks, creating a public discourse affecting the audience composed of Western states, Western publics, international organisations and the society of the target state. Finally, human rights as an indispensable feature of a 'common life-world' of contemporary international relations actually define a 'civilized state'. Acknowledgement of this by the norm-violating country shows that the logic of arguing prevails in international relations.

Moravcsik studies the international mechanisms that seek to enforce human rights, such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights and the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. He states that the distinctive feature of these regimes is their empowerment of individual citizens to challenge the domestic activities of their own government in courts of law. Whether dictatorial or democratic, governments become subject to the judgments of independent courts and commissions for their domestic practices – an event that seriously challenges not only the Westphalian ideal of state sovereignty, but also the liberal ideals of direct democracy and self-determination.⁸² The object of Moravcsik's inquiry is: why would any government – democratic or not – accept such normative and institutional constraints on its sovereignty?⁸³

Analyzing the origins and the development of the human rights regime in post-war Europe around the ECHR, Moravcsik claims that governments accept the 'sovereignty cost' of membership to reduce domestic political uncertainty. States figure that membership in the human rights regime grants greater stability to the domestic

⁷⁹ T. Risse, 2000. 'Let's Argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics', *International Organization*, 54 (1), pp. 1–39.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* pp. 5–19.

⁸² A. Moravcsik, 2000. 'The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe' in *International Organization*, 54 (2), pp. 217–252.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

political *status quo* against non-democratic threats.⁸⁴ Showing that many European governments in the post-war period subsequently incorporated the convention into their domestic laws, Moravcsik particularly underlines the newly established democratic governments' willingness to shoulder the 'sovereignty cost' to establish reliable judicial constraints on future undemocratic governments or on democratically elected governments that may seek to subvert democracy from within.⁸⁵ He claims that governments accept the constraints international human rights regimes place on their sovereignty not because of coercive politics or socialisation to idealistic norms – as claimed by mainstream international relations theories, but, rather, a 'two-level game' that governments of newly established democracies play to tie the hands of future governments and thereby enhance the credibility of current domestic policies and institutions. In fact, the democratic regimes simply seek to prevent political regression into tyranny in the future.

The analytical junction of the conceptual apparatuses employed by Moravcsik and Risse provides us a new framework of analysis to work on recent democratization process in Turkey. They constitute a basis for our major argument that the main dynamic propelling Turkey towards greater democratization was actually its inclusion in the European human rights regime in 1987, just prior to its EU membership application, when it granted the right for individual petition to ECHR. Furthermore, during this same period, we also witnessed the increasing power of European argument as an alternative way of resolving domestic political conflicts in Turkey.

Turkish Transformation Reconsidered

Turkey's pursuit of European candidate status during the period of 1987–1999 provides an interesting case study for the above-established analytical framework. Briefly stating, Turkey's vulnerability to the impact of the European human rights regime, together with the growing denationalisation of civil society in the post 1980 period, came just when the 1987 membership application opened the way for the use of European argument as a technique for resolving domestic political conflicts. From the early 1980s until the official acceptance of Turkish candidacy in 1999, the socialisation of the Turkish governing elite with regard to human rights norms was so extensive that, in a speech at the parliamentary meeting organised after Turkey's recognition as a candidate in Helsinki Summit, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit stated that 'in fact, the Copenhagen criteria, are the guarantee of the lifestyle that we think that we are worthy of, not an imposition from foreigners on us.'⁸⁶

Ecevit himself was one of the political leaders, banned from politics after the military coup of 1980. The first serious European pressures concerning human rights in Turkey followed the coup. The Council of Europe, the European Community (EC), Amnesty International, trade unions, human rights organisations and individual countries insisted on an immediate restoration of democracy and took a critical stance towards the human rights abuses of the military regime.⁸⁷ Turkey's historical commitment to Westernisation and its quest for political, economic and cultural integration into Europe was the key reason pushing the Generals to declare their aim of restoring

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p.228.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 230-243.

⁸⁶ *Turkish Grand National Assembly*, Parliamentary Debates, 14 December 1999.

⁸⁷ I.D. Dagı, 1996. 'Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980–1983: The Impact of European Diplomacy' in S. Kedourie (ed.), *Turkey: Identity, Democracy and Politics*. London: Frank Cass, pp. 123–140.

democracy from the beginning. Although the Generals often interpreted the human rights criticisms as external meddling in their domestic politics, Turkey's membership in European political, economic and defence organisations constituted international institutional constraints on the military regime, making it more receptive to European criticisms.⁸⁸ Despite the European Parliament's (EP) criticisms, the Commission and the Council were actually relatively tolerant of the military regime, explaining Turkey's limited return to democracy.⁸⁹

The rise of the EC's critical stance towards the human rights situation in Turkey and its displeasure concerning the country's disputes with Greece corresponded with Turkey's declaration that it intended to apply for membership in February 1986. This decision also increased European public interest in Turkey's domestic politics, leading to greater public scrutiny of human rights problems. Turkey's aspiration for membership provided an opportunity for the EC, particularly for the EP, to increase its influence on specific political and legal reforms regarding human rights and democratisation. Just after Turkey's application for membership, the EP issued several resolutions on Turkey specifying that Turkey's policy towards the Armenians and Kurds, that its disagreements with Greece and Cyprus, and that its lack of parliamentary democracy and poor record on human rights were unavoidable barriers to Turkey's accession to the EC. The EP first addressed Armenian issue in 1987,⁹⁰ and subsequently brought the Cyprus issue to the agenda on 20 May 1988, emphasising that it was one of the most serious obstacles to the progress of relations between the EC and Turkey.⁹¹ This was followed by another resolution on 'The Situation of the Kurds in Turkey' on 9 April 1992.⁹² The cumulative effect of these resolutions was that the governing elite began to suspect the EC's final intentions, and the Turkish public began to criticise the EC, citing its lack of good faith towards Turkey and its secret aim to disintegrate the country.⁹³

On the eve of the membership application and even after the negative verdict of the Commission on 17 December 1989,⁹⁴ Turkey made several improvements in the area of human rights.⁹⁵ Between September 1988 and the Spring of 1991, the EP delegation to the Joint Parliamentary Committee raised a number of further human rights issues and compared Turkey's performance with specific targets such as the abolition of Articles 141, 142 and 163 of the Turkish penal code, which prevented the organisation of communist or religious parties; the commutation of the death penalty into life sentences; restoration of full trade union and association rights; amnesty for prisoners with long

⁸⁸ Interview with Ilter Turkmen (ex-Ambassador) (10 June 2002, Istanbul).

⁸⁹ M. Ugur, 1999. *The European Union and Turkey: An Anchor/Credibility Dilemma*. Aldershot: Ashgate, p.225.

⁹⁰ European Parliament, 1987. 'Resolution on Political Solution to the Armenian Question', *Official Journal of the European Communities*, C190, Brussels.

⁹¹ European Parliament, 1988. Resolution on 20 May, pp. 205-207.

⁹² *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No C 125, 18 May 1992, pp. 218-219.

⁹³ Interview with Gunduz Aktan (ex-Ambassador, well-known columnist) (18 April 2002, Ankara).

⁹⁴ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 12-1989, p. 88.

⁹⁵ Some of the reforms include repealing the 1964 decree that had frozen the assets of the Greek minority in Turkey since the first Cyprus crisis of 1963; amendment of electoral law that had banned Turkish citizens from voting on the grounds that they failed to vote in the constitutional referendum of 1982; ratifying the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment of Punishment; signing the European Convention on the Prevention of Torture in January 1988 which provides for the investigation complaints about torture by independent experts and allowed for visits to prisons as well as police stations. Finally, a parliamentary committee was established within the national assembly to monitor developments in the field of human rights.

sentences; and the amendment of the procedural code for criminal offences, providing a basis for torture in police stations.⁹⁶ The EC not only began to raise more political issues but also wanted Turkey to bring its human rights regime in line with European norms. For the Commission, Turkey's application could not be seriously considered until there was a full restoration of institutional democracy. A few months later in its 5 February 1990 decision on Turkey, the Council of Ministers underlined the same issues accepted by the Commission.⁹⁷

Turkey did improve her legal system towards convergence with European standards. The most important legal reform, which seriously challenged the traditional understanding of sovereignty in Turkey, was granting Turkish citizens the right of individual petition before the ECHR. Turkey granted this right in January 1987, just two months before the membership application, for a period of three years.⁹⁸ It was again renewed just two months before the Commission's opinion on the membership application was made public. The significance of this decision, as claimed by Moravcsik, was its 'self-binding' nature and the 'sovereignty cost' that it brings to the government of a country.⁹⁹ With this decision Turkey actually agreed to be bound by European legal structure and Turkish politics became subject to the European institutional and structural challenge. As a result of this decision, the traditional distinction between Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy became unsustainable.

The Cyprus issue, occupying a central place in Turkey-EC relations after Turkey's membership application – especially due to the efforts of EP¹⁰⁰ – also fits into the novel analytical framework discussed above. The situation was further complicated after the membership application of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU on 4 July 1990, since the conflict on the island fell under European jurisprudence. As diagnosed by Moravcsik, particularly with reference to the ECHR ruling in the *Loizidou v. Turkey* case of 1995 over property in Kyrenia, Turkey's decision to grant the right of individual petition immediately paved the way for legal questioning of Turkish presence in Cyprus since the convention was 'a constitutional document of European public order' as cited in the legal document of the case.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ In response to the charges coming from Europe and with the expectation of the improvement of the relations with the EC, Turkey introduced a number of improvements in 1991, which included reducing the number of criminal offences punishable with capital punishment from 29 offences to 13; granting permission to use the Kurdish language in publications from February 1991 onwards; nullifying Articles 141, 142 and 163 of the penal code on 12 April 1991; commuting death sentences to 20 years and life sentences to 15 years, also in April 1991; and providing for the early conditional release of a large number of political prisoners on 16 July 1991. In addition, the new government formed after the elections of October 1991 included in its program a catalogue of targeted improvements in the area of human rights.

⁹⁷ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 1990. 1/2, p. 78.

⁹⁸ I. Cameron, 1988. 'Turkey and Article 25 of Human Rights' *International Law and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 37.

⁹⁹ See Moravcsik, *supra* note 30, at p. 220.

¹⁰⁰ P. Green and R. Collins, 2003. *Embracing Cyprus: The Path to Unity in the New Europe*. New York: I.B. Tauris, pp. 27–41.

¹⁰¹ See Moravcsik, *supra* note 30 at p. 218. The ECHR ruled in the *Loizidou* case (*Loizidou v. Turkey*, 310 ECHR, ser.A, 1995) over property in Kyrenia that the Turkish government was accountable for the physical and psychological deprivation involved. In a report on the recent EU-UN initiative on a settlement in Cyprus, William Wallace underlines that the decisions by the European Court of Justice and ECHR on trade between northern Cyprus and the EU and on the restitution of property in northern Cyprus respectively (and the possible accumulation of comparable cases awaiting adjudication) make a political resolution urgent. W. Wallace, 2002. *Reconciliation in Cyprus: the Window of Opportunity*, Mediterranean Programme Report, Florence: RSCAS, pp. 4–10.

In addition to the Cyprus issue, the Kurdish question was also brought to the forefront as a result of Turkey's agreement to grant citizens the right of individual petition before the ECHR. The Kurdish question became a major point of contention in EC-Turkey relations in post 1980 period until today especially because of its growing denationalization with networks in most of the European countries, including a parliament in exile, media, financial contributions to guerilla movement in Turkey from the Kurds living in European countries, drugs traffic, activities of cultural institutes and the alleged support of some European politicians.¹⁰² The Kurdish question is actually no longer just Turkey's problem. It is also Europe's problem. This is evident in the increasing number of the individual applications to the ECHR originating from southeast Turkey even before legal channels within the country have been exhausted.¹⁰³ As observed by an eminent Turkish professor of international law, some cases demonstrate that the impact of ECHR on the Turkish political and legal system is such that no part of the Turkish state organisation or law, including the constitution, is exempt from European supervision.¹⁰⁴ Claiming its decisions might lead to the erosion of the Turkish constitution to the extent that the latter is not in accord with the ECHR judgments, he goes so far as to state that the human rights regime turns to be a new capitulatory regime in Turkey.¹⁰⁵

In addition to the long-term democratising effects of granting the right of individual petition to the ECHR, the membership application also initiated a new era in Turkish politics. Taken as an unexpected move both inside and outside of Turkey, the membership application engineered by the Motherland Party, led by Turgut Ozal, was a strategic move to consolidate the newly established democracy in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup.¹⁰⁶ Granting citizens the right of individual petition before the ECHR was a key instrument of this strategy. The parliamentary deliberations in Turkey on the eve of the application and in its aftermath gave crucial clues regarding this conclusion. On the day of the membership application the government put forward the economic benefits of membership in parliament. Debates soon shifted to the political progress that Turkey would have to make before membership could be taken up. This was the major reason why the opposition parties warmly celebrated the government's initiative.¹⁰⁷

The Motherland Party played a key role in uniting all the parties behind the initiative. The most significant factor behind the parties' support, however, was the coup of 12

¹⁰² M. Van Bruinessen, 1998. 'Shifting National and Ethnic Identities. The Kurds in Turkey and the European Diaspora', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 18(1), pp. 39-52. M. Van Bruinessen, 2000. *Transnational Aspects of the Kurdish Question*, Florence: RSCAS, pp. 27-28; A.J.Lyon and E.M. Ucarer, 2001. 'Mobilizing ethnic conflict: Kurdish separatism in Germany and the PKK', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24(6), pp. 925-948.

¹⁰³ Functioning as a court of first instance with respect to an increasing number of cases on the grounds that the local remedies in the southeast are not effective, the ECHR seems to have formed an *a priori* opinion of Turkish culpability since instead of requiring the plaintiffs to prove their allegations against the government, it invites the Turkish government to prove its innocence.

¹⁰⁴ A. Gunduz, 2001. 'Human Rights and Turkey's Future in Europe', *Orbis*, 45(1), pp. 18-20.

¹⁰⁵ A. Gunduz, 1998. 'Insan Haklari Derken Yeni Bir Kapitulasyonlar Rejimine Dogru mu Gidiyoruz?', *Marmara Journal of European Studies*, 6(1), pp. 77-82.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Ozdem Sanberk (ex-Ambassador), (5 April 2002, Istanbul). See also Ozal's account of the membership application, T. Ozal, 1988. *La Turquie en Europe*. Paris: Plon, pp. 221-234.

¹⁰⁷ Turkish Great National Assembly, *Parliamentary Debates*, 14 April 1987.

September 1980. This coup had seriously damaged Turkish politics, and left the nation feeling isolated from Europe during the period from 1980 to 1987.¹⁰⁸ Immediately after the negative response of the Commission, some deputies such as İrfan Demiralp from the True Path Party, criticised the government, arguing that the application was simply made for domestic political purposes, propaganda and political calculations before the November 1987 elections. The opposition parties generally shared the ideas on democratisation underlined in the European response, and accepted the political and economic conditions as the immediate task that the government had hitherto ignored but in the end came to table with the EC decision on Turkey.¹⁰⁹

When the Council accepted the Commission's decision on Turkey, parliamentary debates reflected furious reactions from all the parties. The strongest objections regarded two particular points of the EC's decision: the resolution of the Cyprus issue as a precondition for membership and the recognition of minorities other than those mentioned in the Lozan Treaty.¹¹⁰ Kamran İnönü, then the State Minister, also argued that recent developments in Europe, particularly the Single European Act and German unification, created a situation that would keep Turkish membership off the European agenda for a significant period.¹¹¹ However, Turkey was already 'locked in' to the economic and political targets underlined in the European response to the Turkish application. The Customs Union and the promotion of human rights and democratisation became the major topics of the Turkish economic and political agenda after the membership application.¹¹²

The membership application highlighted two major issues occupying the political agenda in post-1980 Turkey. The first one is the issue of cultural identity. How does one reply to the challenging question of where Turkey belongs? Europe? Asia? The Middle East? As early as 1983 the State Planning Organisation had issued a report entitled 'Report on National Culture', outlining the main ideological tendency projected in the post-1980 period as the 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis'.¹¹³ This cultural policy was actually engineered by the military regime to resolve the identity crisis, cleaving Turkish society and spurring inter-communal clashes and anarchy in the 1970s, and that made the eventual 1980 military coup to restore political order inevitable.¹¹⁴

Deringil claims that Özal's so called 'new vision' in foreign policy, which defines Turkey as a Muslim member of the European Club, an economic and political leader in the Middle East, and a leader of the Turkic people in the disintegrating Soviet Union, illustrates the recurring identity crisis that Turkey has had since the fall of the Empire – particularly in times of economic, social and political strife.¹¹⁵ The member-

¹⁰⁸ H. Yalçınsoy and A. Asirim, 2000. *Türkiye'deki Siyasi Partilerin Avrupa Birliği'ne Bakışı*. Ankara: SUDE, p.166.

¹⁰⁹ Turkish Great National Assembly, *Parliamentary Debates*, 22 December 1989.

¹¹⁰ Turkish Grand National Assembly, *Parliamentary Debates*, 30 December 1990.

¹¹¹ Interview with Kamran İnönü (ex-Diplomat and ex-Deputy) (12 April 2002, Ankara).

¹¹² Interview with Ali Bozer (Ex-Minister), (15 May 2002, Ankara).

¹¹³ State Planning Organization, 1983. *Report on National Culture*. Ankara: SPO, [in Turkish].

¹¹⁴ Turkish General Staff, 1981. *The Development of Anarchy and Terror in Turkey and its Prevention by the Security Forces*. Ankara: Turkish General Staff [in Turkish].

¹¹⁵ S. Deringil, 2000. 'Turkish Foreign Policy since Atatürk', in S. Deringil (ed.), *The Ottomans, The Turks and World Power Politics*. Istanbul: ISIS, 248–249.

ship application to the EC had a certain cultural dimension to secure the secular character of the regime and consolidate the fragile democracy. This decision was backed by the Foreign Ministry, which was annoyed by the Islamization of society, and by big business, which resented the Islamic capital of Anatolia and unstable middle-eastern markets. Finally, the new democracy in Turkey witnessed the crucial role that the EC had played in the consolidation of democratic regimes in Greece, Portugal and Spain.¹¹⁶

The second major issue that the membership application highlighted was the growing voice of the private sector in political matters such as state reforms and democratisation in the post-1980 period. In addition to a new political system with a new constitution, the military regime introduced a new economic system radically different from the previous one, which had been based on a closed model of import substitution industrialisation. The new system was based on export orientation, and was encouraged by the Istanbul business community, which strongly pressed for the opening of the economy during the late 1970s.¹¹⁷ The membership application by the Ozal government was actually a strategic decision in terms of opening European markets to Turkish exporters. Emphasising Turkey's lateness in recognizing its need to position itself in a global economy, divided among the competing economic blocks led by the US, Japan and the EC, Cem Duna, an ex-ambassador and a prominent member of the Istanbul business community, stated that the reason behind the membership application was actually a geographical choice, beyond the export advantages.¹¹⁸

The business community increasingly recognised the need to conform to global norms not only in the economic sense but also in the political sense, by the total restoration of democracy in Turkey. When the opening of the economy brought its first serious social and political backlashes and the strife between the military forces and the separatist Kurdish guerrilla forces in the southeast intensified during 1990s, TUSIAD – the leading organisation of big business in Istanbul – emerged as a major pro-democratising force. TUSIAD first attempted to introduce the idea of consensus in Turkish political culture in during the period of unstable coalition governments, increasing social conflicts and violence in the country.¹¹⁹ This was followed by arguing the necessity of state reform¹²⁰ and decentralisation of government for a more efficient governance to carry out the liberalisation of the economy and institutional rationalisation, considered necessary in increasingly competitive global markets.¹²¹ Finally the report on democratisation, which included a wide range of proposals including constitutional reform, reform of the party system, the nature of the civilian-military relations and the language rights to Kurds, was issued. The report also underlined the

¹¹⁶ A. Eralp, 1990. 'The Politics of Turkish Development Strategies' in A. Finkel and N. Sirman (ed.), *Turkish State, Turkish Society*. London: Routledge, pp. 250-252.

¹¹⁷ Y. Arat, 1991. 'Politics and Big Business: Janus-faced Link to the State' in M. Heper (ed.), *Strong State and Economic Interest Groups: The Post-1980 Turkish Experience*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp.135-148.

¹¹⁸ Interview with Cem Duna (ex-Ambassador, well-known businessman) (17 May 2002, Istanbul).

¹¹⁹ Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD), 1992. *Sanayilesmede Yonetim ve Toplumsal Uzlasma*. Istanbul: TUSIAD; TUSIAD, 1992. *Ulusl Katilim ve Uzlasma Sempozyumu*. Istanbul: TUSIAD.

¹²⁰ TUSIAD, 1995. *Optimal State: Towards a New State Model for the 21st Century*. Istanbul: TUSIAD.

¹²¹ TUSIAD, 1996. *Local Government in Turkey: Problems and Solutions*. Istanbul: TUSIAD.

significance of Turkey's European perspective and socialisation with basic EU norms in the areas of political and social liberties.¹²²

On the other hand, MUSIAD – the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen – emerged as a competing business organisation to TUSIAD by uniting a large number of enterprises of different sizes from different regions in Turkey.¹²³ Mainly supported by the Anatolian capital and the religious communities, it also had close ties with political Islam, mainly represented in Turkey by religious parties such as the Welfare Party since the 1980s. In the post-1980 period there was a visible Islamisation of social and economic life, culminating with the rise of the Welfare Party in the political scene.¹²⁴ This also was reflected in Turkey-EU relations as Tansu Ciller, Prime Minister during the realisation of the Customs Union, argued to her European counterparts on several occasions that the isolation of Turkey from Europe would lead to the rise of fundamentalism similar to trends in the rest of the Middle East. She underlined that the improvement of the relations with the EC through the Customs Union would bolster the 'Europeanness' of Turkey against the challenges coming from the Islamists.¹²⁵ The relations with the EC crystallized the domestic power struggle and the political clashes of the 1990s, painfully surfaced in parliamentary debates on the eve of Customs Union.

The initial debates on the Customs Union again concentrated on a single problem: whether Turkey's concessions in Cyprus were made solely to enter the Customs Union with the EU.¹²⁶ In response to accusations, and calling the Cyprus issue a 'national cause', Murat Karayalcin, the Foreign Minister of Social Democrat People's Party (SPP) and True Path Party (TPP) coalition, stated that Turkey would definitively step for unification with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in case the government of southern Cyprus is taken to the EU. The government's expectations from the Customs Union were high. It was considered not merely as an economic affair but as the final step leading to full membership. It was taken as a sign of deeper political convergence with the EU. However, Bulent Ecevit, leader of the Democratic Left Party, criticised this approach, finding it over-optimistic, as the EU was not bound to anything.

Three months later, the objections coming from the circles of the Welfare Party concentrated on two major points: the Cyprus issue (and Turkey's sovereignty) and Turkey's identity. Oguzhan Asilturk, a deputy of the Welfare Party, underlined Turkey's loss of independence by entering into the Customs Union with the EU, which would prevent Turkey from continuing its special relations with TRNC. Necmettin Erbakan,

¹²² TUSIAD, 1997. *Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey*. Istanbul: TUSIAD. From the mid-1990s onwards there was growing pressure from some other economic associations for the political solutions on the Kurdish question, since the conflict became so serious that none of the organizations with an interest in economic development which could be provided with the domestic stability could stay silent on the question. See Turkish Association of Young Businessman (TUGIAD), 1995. *The Approximations to the major problems of Turkey towards 2000 XII: Human Rights and democratization*. Istanbul: TUGIAD [in Turkish]; Turkish Union of Chambers and Stock Exchanges (TOBB), 1995. *The Eastern Question: Diagnoses, Resolutions*. Ankara: TOBB [in Turkish].

¹²³ A. Bugra, 1999. *Islam in Economic Organizations*. Istanbul: TESEV.

¹²⁴ Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 1996. *An Investigation on the Welfare Party*. Ankara: Konrad Adenauer Foundation [in Turkish].

¹²⁵ M. Eder, 1999. 'Becoming Western: Turkey and the European Union', in J. Gruel and W. Hout (eds.), *Regionalism across the North-South Divide*. London: Routledge, pp. 79–94.

¹²⁶ Turkish Grand National Assembly: *Parliamentary Debates*, 21 February 1995.

the head of the Welfare Party, vehemently reacted to the realisation of the Customs Union by arguing that the EU was nothing more than a Christian club aimed at suppressing Islam, and that the decision was a step forward towards this aim. He further claimed that the government's decision to enter the Customs Union with the EU was to prevent the Welfare Party from coming to power.¹²⁷ Finally, in response to the questions coming from the parliamentarians on the parts of the Customs Union treaty related with human rights and democratisation of Turkey, Erdal Inonu, the head of coalition partner SPP, stated that "they were not concessions to the Europeans, but political parties' and voters' desire to have European standards and norms in all areas of life in Turkey".¹²⁸ This statement by Inonu was a sign of gradual maturation of Turkish governing elite as an important factor behind the democratic reforms rather than short-term political and economic interests.

On 13 December 1995, the Turkish parliament accepted the implementation of the Customs Union from 1 January 1996 onwards. On the same date it decided on the democratic reforms programme. The Turkish Foreign Ministry opposed the ratification of the Customs Union treaty by the EP, stating that it was a part of the process starting with the Ankara Treaty. However, the EU claimed that prior to 1995 significant changes occurred in the Europe and the EP should have a word on the relations with Turkey. From the Customs Union decision in March 1995 in the Association Council to its debate in the EP in December 1995, the EP played a key role in EU-Turkey relations by insisting on progress in democracy and human rights.¹²⁹ In July 1995 the government issued a package of constitutional reforms, removing text in the preamble of the 1982 constitution, which praised the military coup of 12 September 1980. Amending Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law, it allowed students to become members of political parties and granted public sector employees the right to collective bargaining without granting the right to strike.

Just after the initiation of the Customs Union the Turkish political landscape changed again with the establishment of a surprising coalition government between the True Path Party and the Welfare Party. Ciller has argued on various occasions that the Customs Union would be a crucial European support for secularists in Turkey to prevent the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. In fact, the establishment of a coalition government with an allegedly Islamist political party did cause a serious decline of the Turkish government's credibility in European eyes.¹³⁰ The 1990s saw a period of

¹²⁷ Turkish Grand National Assembly: *Parliamentary Debates*, 2 May 1995.

¹²⁸ Turkish Grand National Assembly: *Parliamentary Debates*, 2 May 1995.

¹²⁹ In particular, the EP underlined three conditions to be met by Turkey for its admission to the Customs Union: completing constitutional amendments to eliminate legal and constitutional restrictions on civil society and political participation, including freedom of association and the freedom of trade unions; changing or abolishing Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law which forbade the issue of written or verbal propaganda and demonstrations which had the aim of violating the political, legal, social, secular and economic order of the country so as to impair the integrity of the Republic of Turkey, its territory and its nation; and finally releasing all the DEP representatives in prison. See, European Parliament, 1995. *Resolution on the Draft Agreement of the Customs Union between Turkey and European Union*. DOC.PE 187.047.

¹³⁰ In fact, this strategy of demonizing Islamists to attain advantages from the EU completely collapsed with the rise of AK Party to power, completing a series of reform packages radically democratizing Turkey. AK Party's moderate stance provides it with clear legitimacy and credibility in European eyes and challenges the traditional image of the Islamists, projected towards the rest of the world by the ardent secularist sectors in Turkey.

political and social fragmentation under ethnic separatism, Islamic fundamentalism and economic crisis, culminating in a questioning of the basic principles upon which Turkey's republican ideals were built.¹³¹ From the early 1990s onwards, the conflict with the Kurdish separatists in the southeast intensified, and human rights violations became even more widespread. There was consequently an unprecedented number of disappearances and extrajudicial executions, which can be substantiated in human rights records from international organisations with first-hand knowledge of the civil war-like situation in the southeast.¹³²

This situation was exacerbated with the Islamization of society, economy and the state. This situation derived the military's reaction against the rise of Islamic schools and their activities.¹³³ The coalition government finally was deposed from office on the advice of the National Security Council, on 28 February 1997.¹³⁴ In July 1997 the European Commission published its package entitled 'Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union', outlining the recommendations for the EU's financial framework for the period 2000–2006 on the cohesion and structural funds and the Common Agricultural Policy, and on the enlargement strategy. Turkey was not included in this project and its exclusion from the new European enlargement process, which included Malta and Cyprus and the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, became definitive at the European Council in December 1997.

In Turkey, this event created a nationalist reaction, fuelled by frustrations at being overtaken by some Central and Eastern European states, not to mention Cyprus, as well as a certain fear of isolation from rapidly changing global political and economic relations. The country was further shaken by the devastating earthquake of 17 August 1999. Although Turkish anxiety was somewhat relieved with the recognition of Turkish candidacy at the Helsinki Summit, it still had to deal with the economic crisis of February 2001, the worst in Turkish history. This series of events exhausted the state, and its image as a 'strong state' crumbled, as did its credibility as a 'Daddy State' in the eyes of Turkish people. They also paved the way for the groundbreaking reforms of August 2002 and the subsequent opening of the political regime.¹³⁵

¹³¹ Many intellectuals in Turkey took the political crisis of the 1990s as the crisis of Turkey's modernisation project. They considered the main reason behind the crisis of the modernisation project under the stress of globalisation to be the inevitable rise of a multiplicity of political discourses, particularly based on diverse claims of identity in competition with the all-encompassing Turkish national identity. For instance, Kasaba claims that the current struggle in Turkey seems to be between the old-authoritarian-modernisation, paternalistic state, with its crumbling nationalist and populist legitimisation, and a modernist conception of political liberalism and citizenship. See R. Kasaba, 1997. 'Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities' in S. Bozdoğan and R. Kasaba, (eds.), *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, Washington: Washington University Press, pp. 15–36.

¹³² For an excellent journalistic account of the Kurdish problem stressing the impact of the 1980 military coup and expanding violence throughout the region by the guerrilla warfare, contributing extensively to the exacerbation of the Kurdish problem by terrorizing the southeast region, see, H. Cemal, 2003. *Kurds*. Istanbul: Dogan Kitap, pp. 553–554, [in Turkish].

¹³³ Turkish General Staff, 1996. *The Relationship between Religious Reactionary Movement and Terrorism in Turkey*. Istanbul: War College Publications [in Turkish].

¹³⁴ However, this was not completely a military involvement since a large section of society put forward their extreme dissatisfaction from the economic policy and foreign policy (exceedingly militant following Erbakan's visits to Libya and Iran) conducted by the government through turning off the lights ten minutes overnight.

¹³⁵ For the erosion of the image of the state in Turkey see, S. Ozel, 2003. 'After the Tsunami', *Journal of Democracy*, 14(2), pp.80–94.

Conclusion

This article has argued that ‘conditionality’, the EU’s main instrument to bring accession countries in line with their standards, does not completely explain the recent political transformation in Turkey. Although Turkey’s democratisation did gain significant momentum with the acceptance of Turkish candidacy at the Helsinki Summit of the European Council in 1999 and the time schedule tied to that, it would be mistaken to disregard the influence of other social and political factors. Apart from integrating a broader contextual approach to explain the European impact on Turkey’s politics, the article puts forward two other conceptual frameworks in a complementary way. It argues that both Turkey’s acceptance of the right to individual petition to the ECHR on the eve of the membership application in 1987, and the growing socialisation of Turkey with the European human rights norms in its aftermath, played a crucial role in furthering the political reforms. The socialisation of the Turkish governing elite and society-at-large with European human rights discourse in recent decades encouraged peaceful means of resolving domestic political conflicts, leading to the initiation of the ground-breaking reforms of August 2002 and the subsequent reform packages passed in the last two years.

It is indisputable that the possibility of obtaining EU membership was crucial for mobilising a pro-democracy coalition of forces in Turkey that would back the democratic reforms. However, it would be extremely short-sighted to disregard how the attitudes of the Turkish governing elite were influenced by their communications with their European counterparts, by the pressures exerted on them by transnational human rights associations and domestic civil society groups, and finally by the continuing violence over the past two decades which has politically and economically exhausted the state. The aim of this article is to highlight not only the conceptual weakness but also the inherent danger of relying completely on the framework of ‘conditionality’ to explain the recent political transformation in Turkey – an approach that would make the whole process extremely vulnerable to political conjuncture, depending on the still ambiguous European attitude towards Turkey. Given the scope of legal changes effected with the reforms, which practically eroded the 1982 Constitution written under the tutelage of the military regime and initiated a democratic regime radically different from the previous one in terms of the basic features of political community and national identity, the main problem for Turkey right now is preserving the domestic stability of this new regime. Situating the recent radical political changes within the broader context of the regime transformation and gradual democratization that Turkey faced with a European perspective during the post-1980 period can help to avoid the above-mentioned vulnerability.

FROM POLICY TAKERS TO POLICY MAKERS

Adapting EU Cohesion Policy to the Needs of New Member States

Jonas Eriksson

The study I am about to present, “From Policy Takers to Policy Makers: Adapting EU Cohesion Policy to the Needs of the New Member States”, examines the European Cohesion Policy in five of the ten Member States that joined the Union in 2004. The involved institutes and researchers come from Latvia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Austria.

Why did we decide to look at the Cohesion Policy in the new Member States? First, because it has not been done in a coherent way by independent researchers from the new members before. Even more importantly; while earlier enlargements have carried with them fundamental changes to the policy as such, the changes in the most recent enlargement were confined mainly to adjustments and phasing-in: the new members had no real say as to the future of the ECP.

Furthermore, with the problems the EU Member States have had concluding the negotiations on the next Financial Perspective, we felt that this would be the perfect opportunity to discuss the policy with a special attention paid to the Member States where the resources are most needed.

The table shown below, which is a simplified version of Table A.2a in Appendix A, depicts this need rather nicely. The table is described in detail in chapter 3 and shows national as well as regional GDP per capita in, respectively, the richest and poorest NUTS 2 regions; it also shows GDP per capita relative to the EU25 average. It is clear from that the disparities are much more pronounced than in the old Member States.

An interesting aspect, which is hidden in this table, is the consequence of the artificial NUTS 2 classification: the differences would be much larger had the boundaries been drawn differently than according to the current NUTS 2 definition. This is particularly the case in Hungary, where Budapest “distorts” the indicators – by which I mean that the county Pest, being part of Central Hungary, is well below the 75% threshold that would make it eligible for support under Objective 1 of the Structural Funds and the Convergence objective following the Commission’s reform.

The researchers in this project have been asked to answer four questions:

1. Which implications for the European Cohesion Policy can be derived from the pre-accession instruments (PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD)?
2. Which were the positions and wishes expressed in the accession negotiations?
3. Will the policy in its current shape cause problems with respect to its design?
4. If the country under scrutiny could dispose freely of the sum foreseen for it in the Commission’s proposal – given its own priorities for national development – how would these resources be used?

The first two questions have received straightforward answers. The pre-accession programmes have generally had a positive impact in the five Member States under scrutiny, albeit with moderations. For example, they have not adequately prepared Latvia for support from the Structural Funds and in Poland the funds seem to have

NUTS2 Regional GDP per capita at PPS
(richest and poorest regions)

	GDP per capita at PPS		% of EU25
	1995	2002	
EU25	15,232.6	21,171.6	100
EU15	16,869.1	23,163.9	109.4
Czech Republic	10,660.4	14,314.6	67.6
Praha	19,568.8	32,348.4	152.8
Strední Morava	9,032.1	11,094.5	52.4
Estonia*	5,413.1	9,868.3	46.6
Hungary	7,548.0	12,398.2	58.6
Közép-Magyarország	10,898.5	20,323.2	96
Észak-Magyarország	5,494.5	7,899.4	37.3
Lithuania*	5,195.0	8,974.9	42.4
Latvia*	4,543.1	8,246.3	38.9
Poland	6,206.9	9,661.3	45.6
Mazowieckie	7,823.1	14,713.7	69.5
Lubelskie	4,793.4	6,762.4	31.9
Slovenia*	10,422.6	15,936.9	75.3
Slovakia	6,779.8	10,854.2	51.3
Bratislavsk_	14,366.6	25,343.9	119.7
V_chodné Slovensko	5,127.0	8,198.2	38.7

* Entire country is classified as a NUTS 2 region

Source: Eurostat, NewCronos Database, wiliw calculations

been inadequate. Another noteworthy experience is the Hungarian attempts to focus on an upgrading of the roads network, while the EU preferred railway modernization instead; this was probably in large part a consequence of the fact that certain issues are deemed as important in the old Member States but they basically ignore the reality in a country like Hungary.

However, the most important conclusion from the examination of the pre-accession programmes is that there are huge administrative, managerial and institutional shortcomings – which, although improvements are under way, must be dealt with in the future – in terms of institution building, training and education.

The answers we received on the second question provided for rather a depressing reading, even though we should not have been too surprised. The accession negotiations mainly concerned operational issues, the CAP and, in some cases, overall financial issues; but not the policy as such.

Turning now to the question as to whether the policy will cause problems with regard to its design. Not surprisingly; it will. First, there is an obvious goal conflict between having to co-finance the Structural and Cohesion Funds programmes on the one hand and meeting the rather stringent Maastricht criteria on the other. Having said that, it has to be recognised that this might force some governments in the NMS to implement much needed budget reforms.

There is also a second conflict inherent in the proposed decentralisation of the management and implementation of projects. The conflict is primarily caused by the fact that the policy is entangled in much red tape. As noted above, there is a lack of

readiness at the receiving end and this implies that the poorer the region, the greater the problem. Moreover, as funds are reimbursed late in the project cycle we may also witness severe liquidity crises arise for small enterprises and municipalities.

Third, there is widespread concern regarding the $n + 2$ rule, i.e., that the financial resources assigned for a given year must be absorbed by the country in question within the next three years. The rule is to be extended to the Cohesion Fund and the Polish chapter in particular warns that “a large proportion of granted resources may not be used in the required spending period”. There’s even a new fund proposed in the Commission’s proposal which is assigned to handle resources that have not been absorbed, so, apparently, the Commission is conscious of the problem. However, it is also true to say that the $n + 2$ rule creates an incentive to go for larger projects and projects that are simple to manage.

Fourth, the mono-fund approach that the Commission has proposed for the future ECP, i.e. that there should only be one fund per programme – with a threshold set to 5% for cross-financing – might imply that possible synergy effects between hard and soft investments are lost (infrastructure investments may for example benefit from investments in training attached to the same project).

Although there are several other aspects that are perceived as problematic, there are also aspects that are more generally applicable to the Cohesion Policy. First, the Sapir report recommended to focus on low-income countries (rather than on low-income regions). This has been ignored by the Commission.

Another problem with the policy is that it strives towards reaching too many objectives, and with too many instruments. Notwithstanding the traditional wisdom that maximum efficiency is reached when there is one instrument for each objective, the current approach makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate and pin down the real effects of the policy. Even though improvements have been achieved in the proposal for the future Cohesion Policy, we have some way to go still.

So what would be the priorities of the new Member States, were it up to them to formulate the policy? There is an overwhelming support for human resources development. The researchers argue, quite strongly (in particular in the chapter on Latvia), in favour of horizontal rather than sectoral remedies, and human resources development is perceived as an investment that does not distort markets and which also has effects after funding has ceased.

Second, the country specific chapter argue in favour of R&D investments, mainly for two reasons. Not only would more money be spent on R&D in the current and future framework for Objective 1 regions, there is also widespread discontent in the country specific chapters with the fact that most regions in the new Member States are excepted from the Commission’s new Competitiveness objective. As the Commission’s proposal stands, only Prague and Bratislava will receive support under this objective.

The third priority would be institution building, not least because it is essential to ensure that the transmission mechanism works (i.e., that there is readiness to receive funds in the new Member States) and that funds are utilized efficiently.

A fourth priority, pronounced stronger in certain chapters, is cross-border cooperation, as it is seen as an effective means a) to ensure that the funds are not used for national

prestige projects and b) to reap the full benefits of the new Member States' geographic location.

Finally, focus should lie on the “neediest” countries – and there should be more national control and management flexibility. Some chapters in the study explicitly address the Sapir recommendations of a national rather than a regional approach, i.e., that national growth should be the overriding priority and that regional initiatives should be the responsibility of the Member States. This is pronouncedly stronger in the Hungarian and Polish chapters, but all would prefer to see more national control over policy.*

* The Sieps report “*From Policy Takers to Policy Makers: Adapting EU Cohesion Policy to the Needs of the New Member States*” is available at www.sieps.se



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