A wider European security threat? Ukraine, EU accession and organized crime risks

While Ukraine moves closer to EU membership, Ukrainian organized crime risks undermining the country’s European integration and threatening the Union’s security. To address this problem, this analysis recommends that the EU should strengthen the links between reforms and financial assistance and deepen its cooperation with the Ukrainian judicial system.

Summary

The landscape of organized crime in Ukraine has changed significantly since February 2022. Adapting to the full-scale war and martial law, Ukraine’s criminal actors have reshaped traditional activities to meet new operating environments and expand operations elsewhere, taking advantage of new tools and marketplaces. Alongside this evolution, Ukraine has also formally applied for European Union (EU) membership – a path that promises to benefit Ukrainians and anchor their future in the EU and wider West. However, organized crime and the shadow structures that enable it could play a spoiler role. This article examines the risks posed by organized crime for both Ukraine and the EU as part of Ukraine’s EU accession process.

This European Policy Analysis looks at three inter-linked areas: the state of organized crime in Ukraine, organized crime risks around the ongoing EU accession process for Ukraine and the EU, and how the EU and its Member States can prepare to address them and mitigate the impact of Ukrainian organized crime in Ukraine and within their own borders. The analysis ultimately recommends that the EU strengthen the use of conditionality as an early risk management tool, expand joint enforcement exercises coordination between Ukraine and EU Member States, where possible, and heed the lessons learned in other accession processes. 

About the author

Brian Lee is the Head of the Observatory of Illicit Economies in Eurasia at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), leading its engagement across the region on issues related to organized crime and criminal actors, illicit markets, and the enabling conditions in the Eurasia region.

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author.

1. Introduction

This article provides a short examination of the risks posed by organized crime for both Ukraine and European Union (EU) Member States as part of the country’s ongoing EU accession process. The landscape of organized crime in Ukraine has changed significantly since February 2022. Mirroring Ukraine and Ukrainians as a whole, the country’s criminal actors have also demonstrated a high-level of resilience. They have adapted to the full-scale war and martial law, continuing to reshape more traditional criminal activities to meet new operating environments, all the while identifying and capitalizing on new opportunities that have emerged as a result of both the war and new, emerging technologies.

Ukraine has also committed itself towards full EU membership. Formally applying for membership in June 2022 under a set of unprecedented circumstances, the country successfully completed the legislative screening process in September 2025, and the EU presented Ukraine with the full roadmap for all six negotiation clusters in March 2026, thus providing a complete set of conditions to meet before becoming an EU Member State. However, areas of concern remain, particularly in relation to the criteria of the roadmap’s Chapter 23 ‘Judiciary and Fundamental Rights’ and Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’. The status of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine (SAPO) – two of Ukraine’s flagship independent anti-corruption institutions – is one example of concern. The attempt to remove the independence of NABU and SAPO for a short period in the summer of 2025, before shifting course, was a striking reminder that, in Ukraine, rhetoric does not always match reality. The rapid reversal, by contrast, illustrated the salience of EU conditionality and domestic pressure, even if other motives, such as the need to sustain external financial support, also shaped the decision.

Operation Midas (the NABU and SAPO investigation from late 2025 into high-level corruption linked to the energy sector and certain members and associates of the President’s Office) and subsequent developments have confirmed this.1 As the investigation has widened, so have the implications. It has triggered senior resignations and a cabinet reshuffle, several indictments and arrests, as well as the departure of certain individuals from Ukraine. While viewed by many as proof that the institutions are working, it also demonstrates that Ukraine’s shadow structures and their drivers remain powerful actors helping to shape events in the country.2

As Ukraine advances towards EU membership, organized crime and criminal actors will continue to play a key role in determining the country’s ultimate success in this endeavour. The main risk lies not in any single market or actor, but in the enabling environment that lets criminal actors exploit the system. This includes unclear rules, slow and uneven enforcement, and weak inter-agency coordination. Although full state capture is a useful prerequisite, organized crime does not require it; rather, it thrives in the gaps between enforcement and governance. It is ultimately driven by incentives, with profit being a superior motivation, with measures that reduce profits or raise the costs of business helping to reduce crime levels in many cases. However, profit alone is not sufficient, as criminal actors also need opportunity, which weak enforcement and governance gaps supply.

The persistence of organized crime in high-income settings with strong institutions, such as Sweden, underscores that EU accession and prosperity do not suppress crime levels in their own right. While not intentional, the EU accession process and required reforms insert opportunities for these enforcement and governance gaps to emerge, which can quickly multiply if effective steps are not taken to address them. Hence, the EU’s increased focus on the rule of law, security and corruption, and whether related institutions and agencies – such as the judicial system, anti-corruption bodies and law enforcement – are able to function consistently and effectively is well-founded.

The outcome of this accession process and how Ukraine addresses its own issues around organized crime will have direct implications not only for Ukraine and its accession process, but also for its EU neighbours, their security and overall institutional integrity. Steps therefore need to be taken to both better understand Ukraine’s organized criminal landscape and the risks it poses, and to develop appropriate responses.

The following analysis is organized around three questions. What is the current state of organized crime in Ukraine, and how has it evolved since February 2022? What risks posed by organized crime does the accession process create for Ukraine and for the EU? And how can the EU, working with Ukraine, address these risks and their impacts? These three questions are examined in Sections 2–4. Section 5 draws these three threads together.

2. Organized crime in Ukraine: Post-February 2022 developments

This section outlines how organized crime and criminal markets have evolved since February 2022. It highlights the key developments and changes in the actors, illicit markets and drivers of Ukraine’s shadow economy.

Ukraine’s criminal ecosystem underwent notable shifts after February 2022. Russia’s full-scale invasion caused a rift between Ukrainian and Russian organized crime networks. Whereas these two groups had often partnered in the post-Soviet underworld, the events of 2022 drastically re-shaped this dynamic and caused Ukrainian organized crime to demonstrate a patriotic side that they had previously downplayed in favour of illicit profits.3 Traditional trafficking routes were also disrupted due to the sudden emergence of new and expanded frontlines, imposed sanctions, and the closure of borders across Eastern Europe, as well as stymied commercial traffic in the Black Sea due to the closure of the Odesa sea port and a short-lived Russian naval blockade.4 Further, the imposition of martial law in February 2022 expanded the power of law enforcement and state security agencies over society, which had an inhibiting effect on crime in the early days of the full-scale invasion. Curfews made night-time business challenging, and frequent official check points obstructed the illicit movement of goods.5

In response, crime did not disappear, however; it adjusted over time and found ‘workarounds’ to adapt to constraints.6 For instance, many criminal groups engaged in curfew breaking, and others turned to new products to replace those that had disappeared, demonstrating that market forces remained alive and well. The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime’s (GI-TOC) fieldwork has revealed that some organized criminal actors have migrated from ‘hot’ spots in Eastern Ukraine such as Kharkiv to new locations such as Odesa, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Transcarpathia and Lviv, bringing their criminal enterprises and business practices with them.7

On the illicit drug market, cocaine flows adapted to the ongoing war scenario after an initial disruption, heroin disappeared from the market, and synthetic stimulants such as alpha-PVP and mephedrone became increasingly accessible, with organized crime groups such as Khimprom playing a key role in the production and trafficking of these illicit substances.8 More recently, synthetic cathinones (‘salts’) have risen in prominence, with devastating effects across different sectors of society. Ongoing research is showing that the new synthetic drugs are far more affordable than the drugs they replaced, especially for young people, which makes them more attractive. In addition, criminal groups have turned to new tools such as Telegram and other online marketplaces to engage their customers, using contactless delivery methods such as dead drops and parcel services to complete the transaction.9 GI-TOC research has also shown that the war and its impact has driven demand, as soldiers on the frontline, for instance, cope with a complex mixture of factors, including physical pain, psychological trauma, pre-existing dependency and the extreme demands of combat.10

In Odesa – a city considered a barometer for the health of organized crime in Ukraine – the current portfolio of illicit activity reflects the opportunities on the black market that have emerged in recent years. For instance, the booming grain trade – critical for Ukraine’s economy – is plagued by fraud, shell companies and collusion with sanctioned actors, depriving the Ukrainian state of an estimated USD 3 billion between May 2022 and May 2024, an amount that has likely increased since.11 In addition, scam call centres now constitute one of the city’s most profitable illicit ventures, reflecting a wider trend across Ukraine. Whereas Dnipro and Kharkiv were the traditional powerhouses for scam call centres in Ukraine, these cyber-enabled professional operations can now be found in each of the country’s 24 oblasts, thus reflecting a broader shift from kinetic crime (involving physical force or violence) to fraud following Russia’s full-scale invasion.12 These scam centres are consolidated into several networks or ‘grids’, which are run by organized crime groups including Khimprom, which has expanded past its role as a producer and supplier of illicit drugs.13 Whereas many of these scam call centres have targeted Russians, the majority of their targeted victims are now located across the Global North in North American and Europe according to recent GI-TOC research.14

In the West, Transcarpathia shares a border with four EU countries – Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania – a feature that, together with the dearth of well-paying local jobs, has given rise to a flourishing smuggling economy, mainly consisting of tobacco products, various other goods, drugs and people. Although not as prominent as the smuggling economies in the Lviv, Volyn or Chernivtsi regions – according to former Ukrainian customs officials – Transcarpathia profits from well-enriched local elites, extensive cross-border networks and established verticals of corruption. While Russia’s full-scale invasion recalibrated this ecosystem, it has adapted in response. For instance, when migrant smuggling collapsed, a new human-centred economy – conscript smuggling – took its place; this has proved highly lucrative, with the cost of a trip reaching upwards of €10,000 or more according to recent estimates.15 Environmental crime such as the illegal timber trade and illegally mined amber are also on the rise, and the illicit tobacco trade is still active, although a notable amount of underground manufacturing or ‘guerrilla production’ has migrated westward closer towards consumers in France, the UK and other western European markets.16 According to November 2025 estimates from the Institute for Social and Economic Transformation, CASE-Ukraine and the Economic Expert Platform of Ukraine, schemes involving the smuggling economy and grey imports have cost Ukraine between UAH 105 and 120 billion per year, a sizeable portion of which does through Transcarpathia and Ukraine’s western provinces that face the EU.17

While Ukraine has a history of arms trafficking, the ongoing war has re-shaped the illicit weapons market in Ukraine and its immediate neighbourhood.18 Key factors have been the influx of Western weaponry for use on the battlefield and the number of trophy weapons – estimated at upwards of over 5 million. The government of Ukraine has taken steps – albeit fragmented – to track the weaponry coming into the country and safeguard against potential risks for the time being.19 However, whether these measures will be adequate to stem initial flows westward once the conflict enters a new phase (e.g. a negotiated peace or a ceasefire) remains to be seen. Historic precedent indicates that the majority of the weapons will remain in Ukraine due to warranted fears of a renewed conflict. However, it is highly likely that some criminal groups will look to engage in illicit arms trafficking to meet demand in Europe or farther afield.20

Further, the use of technology has not only proved to be an enabler for new criminal markets and modes of operation, but it has also significantly shaped the current battlefield in the Russo-Ukrainian war, especially in the case of drones. In the civilian realm, organized crime has already been quick to adopt drones, mainly for surveillance and smuggling to date, but the innovations of the war – both tactical and technological – may well bring about a paradigm shift in how organized crime operates in the near future. There are already cases of drones being used by criminal groups in Ukraine and around the world to conduct surveillance, smuggle contraband across borders, gather intelligence on law-enforcement movements and, in some cases, carry out targeted attacks. Battlefield first-person view (FPV) piloting skills are already migrating to criminal use, including a reported case of a cartel operative trained in Ukraine. Current trends demonstrate that the number of such cases is highly likely to increase with time. As a result, there exists the risk that organized crime groups will recruit drone pilots and military technicians for their expertise and specialized knowledge, both of which are highly sought after transferable skills outside the military.21

Organized crime in Ukraine has not contracted since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 and the subsequent imposition of martial law. It has adapted, demonstrating the resilient spirit many now associate with Ukraine. Criminal actors have rapidly adapted to changes in markets across the criminal ecosystem, identified and capitalized on new opportunities, and proved adept at adopting new technologies and modes of operation that increase their effectiveness and transnational reach. The next section looks at organized crime risks related to Ukraine’s EU accession and their implications for both Ukraine and the EU itself.

3. Ukraine’s EU accession process and relevant organized crime risks

This section outlines Ukraine’s current path towards EU accession, steps taken and potential challenges along this path. In addition, it outlines relevant organized crime–related risks for both Ukraine and the EU, highlighting key issues and their implications as Ukraine progresses in the accession process.

Organized crime in Ukraine is well-entrenched and, by many accounts, thriving not merely in spite of the war, but in several respects, because of it. As outlined in the previous section, the war has changed the criminal landscape in Ukraine and the immediate region, presenting new opportunities. Organized crime has proved nimble and resilient, able to adjust to and capitalize on sudden market changes, the conditions of martial law and the emergence of new technologies.

When looking at the overall criminal ecosystem, it is important to focus on this ability of criminal actors to exploit, adapt and take advantage of opportunities rather than focusing any single illicit market, a specific actor or technology. Targeting a single illicit market such as synthetic drugs or arms trafficking is attractive and can produce visible political wins. For instance, a certain legislative solution or regulatory framework can be viewed in a positive light. However, such targeted interventions all too often fail to reduce overall criminality, because criminal actors adapt faster than the measures aimed at them.22 They simply displace the problem as organized crime switches commodities, exploits a new loophole or moves operations across a border.

The more durable approach targets the enabling environment and underlying elements such as enforcement capacity, personnel and judicial integrity and execution, as well as inter-agency and cross-border coordination. There remain risks in this approach, as reform itself reshuffles opportunities, with each change in rules and institutions – including those required for EU accession – potentially creating a new configuration that an adaptive ecosystem will test, as the post-2022 shift outlined in Section 2 illustrates. However, a more holistic approach creates fewer opportunities for adaptation than targeted interventions focused on a single market, commodity or criminal actor.

Taking a holistic approach to addressing organized crime is an important consideration when reviewing Ukraine’s progress towards EU membership. For Brussels and EU Member States, the understanding that organized crime persists through an adaptive enabling environment, not through any one market or actor, should inform the decision-making process when reviewing further tranches of financial assistance in line with the Ukraine Facility Plan, as well as further interventions aimed at supporting the country’s continued institutional reform and integration with European frameworks and the wider West.

3.1 Ukraine’s progress towards EU accession

Ukraine began and has continued the formal EU membership process amidst an ongoing, full-scale attack on its sovereign territory. The country submitted its formal application for membership in June 2022, and in December 2023 the European Council agreed to open accession negotiations once further progress was made on governance and rule of law reforms.23 The requisite screening of Ukraine’s legislation for compliance was completed in September 2025. This was followed by the EU presenting Ukraine with the full roadmap for all six negotiation clusters in March 2026, with negotiations on the so-called ‘fundamentals cluster’ being opened on 15 June 2026.24

This rapid progression along the accession pathway demonstrates Ukraine’s commitment to the principles and values – human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law and human rights – of the EU as laid out in its founding agreements (i.e. Article 2 of Lisbon Treaty and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). The circumstances surrounding its accession journey could also be considered unusual, as Ukraine is being asked to implement deep institutional reforms while prosecuting a defensive war and governing under the umbrella of martial law and emergency decision making.

Against this backdrop, one could inquire as to the necessity for the accelerated speed of the process, the level of rigour being applied in reviewing and measuring reform progress, and other questions related to Ukraine’s capacity to meet the extensive requirements, especially considering the EU’s comparative experiences with the accession process elsewhere (e.g. the Western Balkans, Georgia and Turkey, as well as former candidate countries such as Bulgaria and Romania). Unlike previous rounds, though, Ukraine’s accession is being driven by an overriding security logic, which is understandable. However, one should be careful that these geostrategic interests do not lead to a case of premature accession, which could create a situation where the EU imports organized crime problems it might then struggle to contain. Ukraine’s accession should not be slowed for its own sake, but the existing political urgency should ensure that rigorous attention to the fundamentals is treated with the attention it deserves.

For instance, even if Bulgaria and Romania are now EU Member States, these experiences show that attempted rapid alignment with the EU acquis communautaire do not always create circumstances where corruption and its impact are diminished and the rule of law and security are improved. In the case of Bulgaria and Romania, the EU established the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) in 2007 to monitor progress in the fields of judicial reform and anti-corruption, as well as on organized crime for Bulgaria.25 While the CVM was deemed necessary to ensure that work continued on implementing commitments made upon acceding to the EU in 2007, it should serve as a lesson on the consequences and subsequent investment required post-accession should a prospective EU Member State fail to fully meet its obligations upon entry. Not only could pre-mature accession to the EU permit certain criminal actors and associated behaviours to perpetuate within Ukraine, but it would in essence allow entry to the very elements that Brussels desires to keep out and suppress – inviting the fox to guard the hen house one could argue. Using the experience with the CVM as a lesson, the enlargement process and conditions around accession have been reformed as a result with the aim of avoiding similar experiences in the future.

For its part, the EU has placed particular emphasis on the ‘fundamentals’ cluster in the negotiation process, in particular Chapter 23 ‘Judiciary and Fundamental Rights’ and Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’. These chapters cover the courts, anti-corruption measures, internal security and fundamental rights, financial oversight, and checks on executive power. Defined as being the first chapters opened and the last ones closed, they effectively determine progress across the remainder of the accession process.26 Rather than being treated as a technical requirement, these areas form the core engine driving Ukraine’s path to EU accession.

This is concerning when looking at recent scores for Ukraine related to governance across recent scores from reputable indices such as Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perception Index, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s (EBRD) Transition Report and the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index assessment.27 While they indicate slight improvements over recent years, the country’s governance scores compare poorly with most European countries and other EU candidate countries. For instance, Ukraine’s score in TI’s Corruption Perception Index only improved from 35 to 36 (on a scale of 100), and its governance index score on the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index assessment improved from 6.04 (2024) to 6.58 (2026) (on a scale of 10).

These scores reflect the findings of the European Commission’s (EC) Ukraine 2025 Report, which are outlined in more detail in the following section. The Ukraine 2025 report documents modest progress in recent years when compared to the EC’s Analytical Report on Ukraine’s alignment with the EU acquis from February 2023 and the Ukraine 2023 and 2024 reports, respectively.28,29,30,31 The GI-TOC’s Global Organized Crime Index, which measures a country’s overall criminal landscape and then its resilience to crime or its ability to mitigate and address its impact, also echoes these findings. For instance, in the 2025 edition of the Index, Ukraine’s criminality score stood at 6.45 and its resilience score at 4.54 (out of 10), while Sweden’s criminality score measured 4.73 and its resilience score 7.38. To expand the comparison, Europe’s overall criminality score is 4.74, and its resilience score is 6.28. This demonstrates that Ukraine still lags behind its European neighbours, experiencing high levels of criminality and comparably lower levels of resilience.32,33,34 While highlighting progress and areas for improvement, these indices also serve an important purpose – they illuminate the main risks associated with organized crime and Ukraine’s EU accession.

3.2 Ukraine’s EU accession: Organized crime–related risks and internal implications for Ukraine

For Ukraine, the crime-related risks around its EU accession process highlight three areas requiring attention by the Ukrainian government, international and Western partners – including the EU – civil society, the private sector, and other key stakeholders. These include rule of law reforms and enforcement in practice, corruption and organized crime–related risks together with spillover effects for the European Union. In line with discussions earlier in this section, these risks do not focus on a specific market or type of criminal actor. Instead, they take a wider approach, looking at the broader criminal ecosystem and risks therein, especially since the full-scale invasion of February 2022, and highlighting systemic areas for engagement that have a potential catalytic effect.

Risk I: Enforcement capacity and loopholes remain and are exploited – Rule of law reforms and enforcement in practice

The EC’s Ukraine 2025 Report shows that Ukraine’s progress towards EU accession remains largely dependent on Chapters 23 and 24, two key chapters of the ‘fundamental’ cluster that underpin other ongoing reforms. These have continued despite the ongoing war and martial law, with Ukraine moving forward with reforms within the framework of the Ukraine Facility.35 However, the EC makes clear that the implementation of these reforms and their enforcement vary widely in practice between institutions and sectors.

For instance, as pertains to Chapter 23, several vacancies remain open on the High Court of Justice (HCJ) and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU), alongside many staff positions. This impedes timely judicial proceedings and delays decisions. Coupled with a lack of resources resulting from the wartime state budget, judicial efficiency has suffered, something which is exacerbated by both a lack of uniformity in court practice across instances and the need for procedural reforms that further streamline and codify procedures in line with EU best practices. In addition, when a judicial decision is reached, it is highly likely to remain unenforced in most cases, a loophole that the EU is already calling to be closed. The Ukraine 2025 Report also states that the country continued to make progress on building a track record in the fight against high-level corruption, but that such efforts could be bolstered by a whole-of-government engagement under the forthcoming 2026–2030 Anti-Corruption Strategy and State Anti-Corruption Programme (SACP).36

Under Chapter 24, implementation across law enforcement agencies under the overarching strategic plan on law enforcement reform (OAS AP) has begun, but within frameworks more in line with the EU acquis communautaire. This includes a range of sectors, including financial investigations, anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, as well as cybercrime, firearms and trafficking in persons. Enforcement capacity varies across sectors, but it remains overall more positive than in recent years. However, corruption among law enforcement officials remains a serious concern, with several high-ranking cases emerging in recent years.37 Although reforms are underway, implementation is scattered and uneven. Progress on updating policy frameworks remains staggered and stalled in many cases, and institutional capacity varies significantly across entities, with concerns around corruption within law enforcement ranks being a recurring issue.

As it currently stands, the process of reform presents myriad opportunities for organized crime to approach and co-opt the system and actors within. If Ukraine is going to disrupt criminal elements, it needs to ensure that the reform process continues and is implemented as evenly as possible across entities and sectors. While Ukraine’s priority is prosecuting the war, it must also work to fend off internal disrupting elements for stability and the rule of law as outlined in Section B, which risk derailing reforms and the subsequent EU accession process.

Risk II: Corruption – Opportunities for misappropriation and state capture

Corruption risks remain in Ukraine. Events surrounding NABU and SAPO in the summer of 2025, Operation Midas and its fallout, and the resignation of Andrii Yermak from the President’s Office last November directed a spotlight on corruption, the continued scourge within the system. While the independence of both NABU and SAPO were eventually restored, many within government, business and influential law enforcement circles remain uncomfortable with their sweeping authority, as they are in a position to play a spoiler role for Ukraine’s shadow networks and structures, which allegedly operate synonymously with organized criminal actors. While efforts have been made to clean up the government following Operation Midas, including another cabinet reshuffle in January 2026, concerns persist.38

Ukraine’s future will be largely determined by how effectively it can address the issue of corruption. While not a simple matter to address during a full-scale war and under the umbrella of martial law, more concerted action is needed. If not, larger problems loom on the horizon.39 As one looks to the future of Ukraine, one is hopeful that a cessation of the war will be concluded soon, ushering in circumstances far more favourable for large-scale reconstruction of the country. However, if current systems of corruption and their enablers persist, it seems likely that any period of reconstruction will be captured – to some extent – by the shadow system, siphoning off incoming financial assistance and investment into the hands of various criminal actors and enablers, including organized crime groups.40 It is therefore important for the EU and its Member States such as Sweden continue to put in place measures to safeguard against such a capturing of the reconstruction process, including demands around increased transparency, oversight and accountability; a strengthened civil society to serve as a watchdog; and encouragement for private sector compliance, alongside conditionalities in current and forthcoming aid agreements.

Risk III: Crime as a chameleon – The adaptability of organized crime

As outlined in the first section, successful organized crime groups have an innate ability to adapt and shape their surroundings. This is true for Ukrainian organized crime and other criminal elements from across the post-Soviet space and further afield. They are some of the first to identify and exploit new opportunities, as well as being willing and able to adjust operational modalities and to use new tools to their advantage. Many are also very opportunistic and nimble, willing to switch out commodities and products as shifts in the market take place in real time. A notable example in the case of Ukraine is that of conscript-smuggling, a human-centred illicit market which quickly became a very lucrative business. Such traits have helped organized crime groups in Ukraine to survive over the last four years, shifting and shaping to fulfil the new demands of the illicit markets, navigate the changing geopolitical landscape and internal structural reforms, and hedge its bets against future developments in a post-war Ukraine and region. They are active players who will continue to play a role in Ukraine. The question is what role – and its size.

While criminal actors can easily be overlooked by Ukraine and its international partners, such as the EU and its Member States, they would benefit from further internalizing this understanding about the nature of criminal actors, as a heightened awareness around organized crime, its character, and its impact in Ukraine and the immediate region could help to pre-empt certain developments and avoid unintended future consequences. Yes, there exists a concern and understanding amongst the general public around organized criminal actors in Ukraine, but that understanding could be described as frozen in time, viewing the phenomenon from an outdated lens that does not take into account the chameleon-like nature of these groups. This is particularly important, as organized crime and its activities in Ukraine often involve state-embedded actors and the complacency of the state to some extent. Increased understanding and continued vigilance is therefore needed.

3.3 Ukraine’s EU accession: Organized crime–related risks and spillover effects for the European Union

From an EU perspective, the organized crime–related risks linked to Ukraine’s EU accession process extend beyond internal reforms in the candidate country and into the EU’s shared economic and security space. Experience globally shows that where corruption and weak enforcement persists, illicit activity often follows, as illustrated by the 2025 edition of the GI-TOC’s Global Organized Crime Index.41 Criminal actors are difficult to contain and move quickly to exploit identified loopholes and opportunities where they exist. Whereas the organized crime–related risks pertaining to Ukraine are focused on procedural areas and systemic interventions, this section outlines the potential concrete implications for markets, individuals and overall security and institutional integrity within the EU.

Risk I: Corruption, smuggling and trafficking risks on the EU’s eastern border

Transcarpathia and Ukraine’s border regions

Ukraine’s western borders have long served as transit routes into Western Europe for both licit and illicit activities. In its report ‘Smuggling Inc., Illicit trade between Ukraine’s Transcarpathia and the EU’, the GI-TOC outlined the use of Transcarpathia as a transit bridge that serves as a key node for illicit commodities passing between Eastern Europe in one direction and the EU in the other. Transcarpathia can serve in this role due to vertically integrated corruption networks linking border guards, customs officials, law enforcement bodies and political actors. Instead of operating outside the state, these networks work through it. Smugglers regularly use official border crossings, rely on falsified or manipulated customs declarations, and benefit from inspections that are deliberately superficial or skipped altogether.42 This is problematic for the EU, because illicit goods are not entering through hidden routes but are moving through the same systems meant to regulate lawful trade.

Transcarpathia is not unique in this. Other western cities and towns located in the Lviv, Volyn or Chernivtsi regions also engage in this type of trade. As the war continues and Ukraine progresses further towards EU membership, these crime-related risks emanating from cross-border smuggling will remain. Until effectively disrupted, smugglers will continue to employ these corrupt vertical networks to ensure the passage of illicit goods into the Schengen Zone. There are two further organized crime–related trends to monitor in this area.

Migration of illicit production facilities and factories

The first is the continued westward migration of production facilities for illicit products such as synthetic drugs and illicit tobacco.43 In the case of synthetic drugs, production is moving closer to where necessary inputs (e.g. precursor chemicals) are available, and in the case of illicit tobacco, operators are moving ‘guerrilla production’ closer to consumers in the EU and closer to an experienced labour force that have also moved westwards as refugees or for other reasons.

In transit: Role of Moldova

The second is the increased use of Moldova as a staging and transit area for shipments of illicit commodities such as drugs, firearms and weapons, people, tobacco and other commodities into the EU and further afield. In this scenario, Transnistria continues to serve a spoiler role, as the Moldovan authorities lack control over the breakaway territory and its roughly 500-km border with Ukraine. The influx of illicit commodities overwhelms the existing capacity of Moldovan law enforcement authorities, thus serving as a potential destabilizing factor there, a country where the EU is heavily engaged through its Delegation and the EU Partnership Mission in supporting continued reforms, the capacities to respond to hybrid threats and another EU accession process.44

Immediately following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the EU and its Member States welcomed Ukrainian refugees with open arms, providing a range of unprecedented benefits through the temporary protection status (TPS), including residence, work rights, education and healthcare access until 4 March 2027. According to Eurostat, the total number of non-EU refugees from Ukraine possessing TPS was 4,376,125 individuals in January 2026.45

Many of these refugees have been successful in adapting to their environments due to the active efforts of NGOs and hosting states, but they depend on the TPS for their residency in the EU. Should this not be renewed after hostilities cease, Ukrainian refugees may find themselves without legal status in their host countries. Provided that less than half of refugees state that they intend to return to Ukraine, where jobs are few and comparatively poorly paid, some may choose to go ‘underground’, working in the shadow or outright illicit economy, which raises the risks of exploitation in forced labour or sex trafficking.46 This is where risks around organized crime emerge. There have also been reports that refugees might be employed in scam call centres that have been set up in Europe, employed as ‘money mules’ to help facilitate money flows and potentially money laundering schemes, or work in the ‘guerrilla production’ of illicit tobacco products.47 Further, it is estimated that the number of veterans stands around 1.3 million, with the projected future number being upwards of 5–6 million. Should even a small portion of this number choose to migrate to the EU, it could be an issue, as they will likely bring skills, trauma and other experiences that may affect organized crime in Europe, such as providing training in drone use, muscle and operational/logistical expertise – and potential recruitment by malign state actors.48

Risk III: Increased presence of Ukrainian organized crime in the EU

Ukrainian criminal actors have been active in the EU for years. As evidenced by GI-TOC research, they have been engaged in a range of criminal activities, from illicit drug trafficking to migrant smuggling to illicit tobacco production and other sectors of the shadow economy. As mentioned earlier, there has also been evidence that Ukrainian organized crime groups have shifted their operations westwards into the EU since the full-scale invasion in February 2022, especially in relation to synthetic drugs and illicit tobacco production, to be closer to inputs and end markets.

This is a process that will not end, especially as organized crime is adept at identifying and seizing on opportunities as they emerge. Thus, the process of EU accession for Ukraine will not open the EU and its Member States to decidedly new organized crime risks as relates to Ukrainian criminal actors, although this could change depending on the next stage of the war and its impact. It instead stands to be a force multiplier. Organized crime with origins in Ukraine or with Ukrainian members already operate within the borders of the EU. The concern should be that further Ukrainian alignment with the EU acquis communautaire and potential future membership could provide opportunities for increased efficiencies and expanded profits for Ukrainian criminal groups. This means increased access to EU markets and inputs, people, and transnational networks – all reasons to expand existing bases of operations and market presence.

4. Ukraine’s and the EU’s value-add: Addressing organized crime–related risks in the EU accession process

As Ukraine moves along the accession process, the main challenge for the EU and its Member States is agreeing on which risks are the most pertinent and acting to address them together. The previous section outlined several organized crime–related risks – three risks having internal implications for Ukraine and its subsequent EU accession journey and three risks or potential spillover effects for the EU. Based on shared characteristics, this article articulates three recommendations to address these crime-related risks, disrupt the criminal ecosystem in Ukraine, and ensure that the EU’s security and institutional integrity are strengthened as Ukraine advances along its reform process.

Recommendation I: Continued use of conditionality as an early risk management tool. Conditionality is central to the EU accession process and the provision of continued financial assistance. The EU and its Member States should enhance their use of conditionality within the Ukraine Facility Plan where appropriate and more stringently, where possible, in addition to increased access to EU markets, for instance within the framework of the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. This does not mean advocating for increased conditionality but instead conceptualizing it as a tool for preventing organized crime by linking reform benchmarks and financial assistance not only to formal alignment, but also to implementation capacity, institutional resilience and enforcement outcomes.

Such steps could help to shore up gains and address issues before they materialize in the case of Ukraine’s accession process. This is especially true for Chapters 23 and 24 of the ‘fundamentals cluster’, which focus on the judicial system, anti-corruption bodies, financial oversight and internal security, in addition to ensuring checks on executive authority. Instead of targeting criminal actors and illicit activities directly, they shape how the state functions and upholds the social contract, exercising its authority to protect its citizens and guarantee civil liberties and rights.

When courts are slow or are captured by certain interests, investigations stall and laws are applied unevenly, if at all, opportunities arise for organized crime to co-opt political institutions and corrupt actors within the system.49 Ukraine’s accession process is taking place under a unique set of circumstances brought on by an ongoing war and the related imposition of martial law. This makes effective enforcement even more important than formal reform, as existent emergency powers and centralized decision-making risk undermining any reform process for a number of reasons.50 The use of conditionality, while potentially painful in a financial and budgetary sense, can be an effective tool and help reduce tolerance for long-term inaction and delays, making weak implementation and inconsistent application more costly.

Recommendation II: Move from mere exchanges to more enhanced joint enforcement exercises, where possible. Although Ukraine lacks full access to EU institutions and mechanisms as it is not an EU Member State, the EU and its Member States should increasingly use existing coordination and information exchange mechanisms, where possible, to carry out and implement joint enforcement exercises. These mechanisms include the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) or Europol’s Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) and SIENA-CT. This will help ensure that networks between relevant enforcement agencies are adequately established, building out trust, understanding and a genuine working relationship. This will also help align operational frameworks and standard operating procedures (SOPs) based on real-time lessons and feedback, while helping to formalize and reinforce the ongoing reform process in Ukraine as it relates to both internal law enforcement agency reform and cross-border investigations and information exchange.

As Ukraine moves closer to joining the EU, one of the main organized crime–related risks is not a lack of laws or crime-focused strategies according to practitioners, but gaps in how government authorities do or do not work together to address mutual challenges. The EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) shows that organized crime now works through networks that mix physical activity with digital tools that extend across legal systems.51 In practice, this means investigations linked to Ukraine will rarely stay within one country and jurisdiction, as evidenced by the growth of cases targeting scam call centres in Ukraine whose victims are increasingly separated from the actual perpetrators of the crime by hundreds of kilometres.52

Effective cooperation in these cases requires Ukraine and EU agencies to collaborate on the same investigation in tandem, using recognized procedures from the start. EMPACT is an important mechanism in this process, as it supports sustained joint operations, where Ukrainian authorities can be included in ongoing investigations rather than treated as external partners. This matters most in multi-jurisdictional cases, where cooperation and systems need to be in sync. A February 2026 joint operation between Poland, Ukraine and Moldova with the support of Europol targeting a transnational synthetic drug network is a recent success story, highlighting how effective cooperation can lead to real results.53 However, such successes need to be built on, and their modus operandi should be systemically replicated, where possible. If not, these gaps are exactly what criminal networks rely on to succeed.

Recommendation III: Apply lessons learned from previous EU enlargement rounds and other EU accession examples. Lessons learned from addressing organized crime–related challenges from previous enlargement rounds and accession negotiations need to be adapted and applied in the case of Ukraine. The EU incorporated lessons learned from the CVM in Bulgaria and Romania to reform the enlargement process and conditions around accession. These previous candidate countries and now EU Member States were affected by organized criminal actors, even after gaining membership. In many cases, they continue to be.54 It is evident that organized crime–related risks do not disappear once formal accession steps are initiated. They evolve and mature. As such, it is important to remain vigilant.

Experience from the Western Balkans shows that integration altered how crime works rather than prohibiting it. For instance, when borders opened and trade increased, criminal actors shifted from using hidden transit routes to legal transit routes and infrastructure, employing many legal businesses to move goods and money, even if the documentation was still falsified. For law enforcement, this required a shift in understanding and operational tactics, improving collaboration with other government offices where relevant. In essence, law enforcement has had to adapt in the same way that the criminals did. Smuggling along the Danube is a clear example of how licit and illicit activity can operate side by side for long periods when controls are fragmented and coordination across countries in uneven.55

In Bulgaria and Romania, accession pushed both states to adopt EU laws quickly. However, this did not mean that these rules were applied uniformly after entry, thus providing opportunity for organized crime to continue to exploit the system and its loopholes. The CVM was therefore established to monitor progress towards fully implementing commitments regarding the judicial system and corruption in the two countries, as progress on paper did not match actual practice.56 The case of Georgia shows how reform can be real and still be fragile. The government acted quickly on policing and public administration, which had a visible impact early on. Only later did questions around judicial independence and the selective use of power arise. Although the formal EU accession process with Georgia has been formally suspended as of late 2024, this does not negate the lessons learned along the way, especially considering the post-Soviet legacy that still exists to varying degrees in both Georgia and Ukraine.

For Ukraine, the question is not to copy or adhere to the example of one candidate country or another. It is to understand that speed and visibility do not guarantee durability and sustainable reforms, thus reflecting a wider internal EU discussion as to what measures can help reinforce this process. Across all these cases, a transferable lesson emerges that is structural rather than technical. EU accession and the coming reconstruction will increase financial inflows, the movement of people and administrative pressures simultaneously. It is recognized that Ukraine’s reconstruction will be an immense undertaking, with the latest World Bank estimate being over €500 billion.57 While this investment will help build Ukraine’s future prosperity, it will also place an added burden on internal systems that are already strained due to wartime pressures. The EU has been supporting Ukraine and its international partners to prepare for the country’s reconstruction through several channels. This includes the Ukraine Facility and participation in the Ukraine Donor Platform, but also financial commitments under the Ukraine Investment Framework and the European Flagship Fund for the Reconstruction of Ukraine with an initial capital of €200 million, which was launched at the Ukraine Recovery Conference in late June 2026 in Gdańsk, Poland.58 The EU has also been supporting Ukrainian government agencies and municipalities to strengthen administrative and governance capacities in line with EU homologues, working to ensure that Ukraine has the financial oversight capacity to manage incoming funds and investments.

While these are promising developments for Ukraine’s future and its path towards EU accession, the influx of funds for reconstruction also provides ample opportunity for criminal elements to profit, especially considering that the construction sector has a rich history of being a hotbed for illicit activity and organized crime in Ukraine, including inflated contracts and forced labour.59 If implementation and enforcement capacity do not keep pace, organized crime will identify and exploit gaps. The EU’s focus on Chapters 23 and 24 reflect this understanding, but past cases show that progress needs to be measured through practice and functional operations on behalf of Ukrainian government offices and agencies, not formal structural and institutional alignment, to ensure that criminal activity cannot access the necessary pathways, enablers and corrupt structures it needs to thrive.

5. Conclusion

This analysis has examined the risks that organized crime and criminal actors pose for both Ukraine and the EU as part of Ukraine’s EU accession process, focusing on three core questions: What is the current state of organized crime in Ukraine? What risks posed by organized crime does the EU accession process create for Ukraine and the EU? How can the EU, working with Ukraine, address these risks and mitigate their impact on Ukraine, the EU and its Member States, and their respective populaces?

Ukraine’s criminal landscape underwent a significant shift following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, highlighting its chameleon-like nature. Organized crime capitalized on new opportunities created by the war and martial law to reshape its traditional activities to meet new operational environments and expand operations elsewhere – both geographically and in the digital space. At the same time this criminal market evolution was taking place, Ukraine started taking formal steps to acquire EU membership, receiving the full roadmap for all six negotiation clusters in March 2026 and opening negotiations on the so-called ‘fundamentals cluster’ on 15 June 2026. In line with this process, the country has implemented several reforms focused on strengthening rule of law and security institutions, eradicating corruption, and addressing elements across sectors that have permitted its shadow structures and related criminal actors to thrive since the early 1990s.

If Ukraine is to be successful in its bid to join the Union, then it must continue to take steps to reform its criminal justice and security sectors, as well as to instil a culture of integrity and accountability along the way. The continued support of the EU and its Member States in this process is important, as they play a key role in any potential successful outcome. Not only does organized crime pose an existential risk to Ukraine’s European hopes, but it presents a threat to the Union’s overall security and wider systemic integrity. Without continued support – and just as important – continued attention to the reform process, it is possible that the reforms could stall or cease, thus undermining Ukraine’s accession path altogether. Further, enlargement is a gradual process, with eventual admission to the EU only possible following a long road of committed reforms, the improvement of systems, and a change in culture and way of conducting business. Long-term commitment and support by the EU and its Member States are crucial if an eventual enlargement that includes Ukraine as a Member State is to become a reality.

As mentioned in an earlier section, criminal actors can be overlooked by Ukraine and its international partners, including the EU and its Member States. However, they would benefit from further strengthening their understanding around organized crime in its entirety, as an increased awareness around its nature and its impact in Ukraine and the immediate region could help to pre-empt certain developments and avoid undesired future consequences. This involves more than simply a set of individual criminal markets or actors; it is a highly adaptive ecosystem that exploits governance gaps and thrives in the right enabling environment, able to seize opportunities quickly as they emerge.

In addressing these organized crime–related risks, both the EU and Ukraine need to understand that speed and visible, overt gestures do not guarantee that reforms will achieve the desired, long-term results. It is understood that Ukraine is prosecuting a war in defence of its sovereignty. However, if steps in implementation are rushed and enforcement capacity continues to vary across institutions, organized crime will seize the opportunity to co-opt governing institutions and corrupt entities within the system. It should be noted that the risks identified are not inherent to Ukraine’s accession process per se; rather, they emerge from the vulnerabilities created during periods of rapid transformation, which resourceful and adaptive criminal actors may seek to exploit. To prevent such a scenario, the EU and its Member States – in collaboration with Ukraine – should increasingly use conditionality as a tool for organized crime prevention and as an early risk management tool. This would include the stricter use of existing safeguards, stronger links between reform benchmarks and financial assistance, and more systematic monitoring of organized crime–related indicators. Formal alignment is one thing, but actual implementation capacity, real enforcement, and institutional and operational resilience are another entirely.

Ukraine’s future will be significantly determined by how effectively it can address the issue of corruption. Since 2014, the country has taken many steps to do so. However, corruption among law enforcement officials remains a serious concern, with several high-ranking cases emerging in recent years. Although reforms are underway, implementation is scattered and uneven. Progress on updating policy frameworks remains staggered and stalled in many cases, and institutional capacity varies significantly across entities, with concerns around corruption within law enforcement ranks being a recurring issue. Joint enforcement exchanges and exercises between relevant law enforcement and government agencies should become commonplace, where possible, working to further integrate Ukraine and its law enforcement agencies into existing coordination mechanisms such as EMPACT. This would also help to build trust and operational capacities between agencies, as well as to align Ukrainian SOPs with EU frameworks and help reinforce ongoing internal reforms.

Finally, the EU needs to ensure that lessons learned from preceding accession processes are heeded, especially as it relates to speed and developed frameworks versus actual implementation. While each country’s path is different, there are core lessons that should be heeded to avert foreseeable challenges for both the EU and the applicant country, in this case Ukraine. If followed in an informed and tactful manner, then the recommendations outlined permit the EU to more effectively address the existing organized crime–related risks associated with Ukraine and support the country in disrupting its criminal ecosystem and further its EU membership aspirations, all the while safeguarding the institutions and structures of the Union.


1 For further information on Operation Midas and the investigation, please refer to the following information from the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine: https://nabu.gov.ua/en/news/operatciia-midas-vykryto-vysokorivnevu-zlochynnu-organizatciiu-shcho-diiala-u-sferi-energetyky/ (Accessed 31 July 2026).

2 A. Goodwin. ‘After Yermak, Why Ukraine must seize this moment to free itself of the shadow system’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), Geneva, December 2025, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/why-ukraine-must-seize-this-moment-to-free-itself-of-the-shadow-system/, (Accessed 17 March 2026).

3 A. Kupatadze and E. Marat. ‘Criminal Geographies: How The Russia-Ukraine War has Reshaped Global Crime Networks’, Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC-ACE) Research Programme, Birmingham, March 2026, p. 18.

4 A. Kupatadze and E. Marat. ‘Criminal Geographies: How The Russia-Ukraine War has Reshaped Global Crime Networks’, Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC-ACE) Research Programme, Birmingham, March 2026, p. 18; ‘Port in a storm, Organized crime in Odesa since the Russian invasion’, The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Geneva, September 2023, p. 1; ‘Ukraine: Organized Crime Dynamics in the Context of War’, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, July 2025, p. 3.

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