The 2024 European elections resulted in a more right-leaning European Parliament. Contrary to some expectations, this has not produced a stable right-wing majority: the traditional pro-European coalition remains the Parliament’s main decision-making engine. Another key finding is that the centre-right EPP has gained greater leverage against other groups.
The 2024 European Parliament elections strengthened the European People’s Party (EPP) and expanded the radical right. Many expected a decisive shift to the right and the weakening of the pro-European centre. But the centre is holding; reports of its collapse have been overstated. The Parliament has become more flexible, not fundamentally different.
This European Policy Analysis shows how political groups have formed coalitions and shaped decision-making since the elections, based on 5,282 roll call votes between July 2024 and June 2026. Three findings stand out. First, the traditional pro-European coalition remains the Parliament’s main decision-making engine. The EPP continues to work primarily with the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), Renew Europe (RE) and often the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA). Second, the EPP’s stronger position and its ability to look to the right have increased its negotiating leverage, especially on environmental regulation, migration and business policy. Third, coalition patterns vary across policy areas, but broad compromises still underpin most votes.
The radical right has gained influence but remains fragmented and an unreliable coalition partner. As a result, right-wing alternatives have strengthened the EPP’s hand without producing a stable right-wing majority. In climate policy, this has helped prevent a broader rollback.
Whether the centre continues to hold will depend on the EPP’s strategy, the cohesion of the radical right, cooperation among centrist and centre-left groups and political developments in member states. This, in turn, will impact the overall development of European integration.
The European Parliament (EP) that was elected in June 2024 is the most fragmented in decades, politically the most rightward-leaning and the one that has voted on most motions of censure against the European Commission (four motions in two years, compared to nine motions between 1979 and 2024). The past two years have seen many doubts as to whether the “cordon sanitaire” against the extreme right is still holding or whether the European People’s Party (EPP) is cooperating with the groups to its right.
Unlike in most national political systems, there is no clear split between governing parties on the one hand and opposition parties on the other in the European Union (EU). Majorities are instead formed issue by issue and vary across policy areas. Voting in the EP by roll call reveals how each individual Member of the European Parliament (MEP) has voted, and thus how national party delegations within the groups in the EP, as well as entire political groups, have positioned themselves on everything from minor procedural questions to huge trade deals. These data form the basis for our analysis, whose aim is to examine how the majorities in the EP have been composed in the first two years of the term. These majorities determine which political groups shape the EU’s legislative agenda, how power is balanced between EU institutions and whether policies, such as on climate, migration or the economy, can pass or stall.
This first section presents the seat distribution and the coexisting coalitions and majorities in the EP. Section two turns to the general picture with coalition patterns, the cohesion of the political groups and being on the winning side. The third section takes a closer look at ten key votes in the current term that have caught public attention and reveal how legislative politics functions. Section four discusses the dynamics. The final section concludes the analysis.
The largest group in the current Parliament as of July 2026 is the EPP with 184 seats (25.6%), with the second largest being the S&D with 135 (18.8%). In third position are the Patriots for Europe (PfE) with 85 seats (11.8%), while the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group follows closely with 84 seats (11.7%) and Renew Europe (RE) has 78 (10.8%). The Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) has 53 seats (7.4%) and The Left holds 45 (6.3%). The number of seats held by the Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) group is 27 (3.8%), while there are 28 non-attached MEPs (3.9% of the total number of MEPs) (see Figure 1).
The EPP is the pivotal group: the “median MEP” sits with the EPP. This means that the EPP, as predicted in our previous analysis (Hix et al. 2024), is the kingmaker in the 2024–29 Parliament, a role that RE held in previous parliamentary terms, as it was the group that could vote either with the left or the right and tip the balance for a majority.
The 2024 elections marked a significant shift rightwards: radical right parties were strengthened and so was the mainstream right (EPP). RE and the Greens/EFA stood out as the main losers. The combined size of the two largest groups (EPP and S&D) continued to decline: down from a peak of 66% of the seats in the Parliament in 1999, they lost their combined majority in 2019 and reached an all-time low of 44.3% five years later.
After the 2024 election, the far-right national parties and MEPs reorganised themselves. Alongside the previously existing national-conservative ECR, two new groups were formed, namely PfE and ESN, succeeding the ID group of the 2019–24 legislature.
In terms of possible coalitions and majorities, the threshold for an absolute majority is 361 seats. By “coalition” we do not mean any formal agreement between political groups prior to a vote or set of votes, but rather the “revealed coalitions” that are observed in votes, on the basis of which way the majority of the MEPs in each group voted in a vote.
In seven prominent configurations, the EPP achieves a majority with the addition of other groups (see Figure 2). The EPP’s traditional “grand coalition” with the S&D can be extended to RE (also known as the “von der Leyen coalition” as three groups clearly supported the election of the Commission President) and, possibly, either the Greens/EFA (then called by us the “von der Leyen plus coalition”) or the ECR or both groups:
Or the EPP turns right and forms majorities with the ECR and PfE, including either RE or ESN, or with both groups:
The name “Venezuela coalition” was coined after this kind of majority first occurred in a resolution on the political situation in that country in September 2024.
Majorities with fewer than 400 seats might not always be enough given a defection rate of 10% or more. Other coalitions do not reach the absolute majority of 361, but relative majorities are often sufficient.
After introducing composition and possible majorities, we now turn to coalition patterns, the cohesion of the political groups and being on the winning side.
We start our analysis by looking at the pattern of coalitions between the political groups in all recorded (roll call) votes in the EP between the first plenary session of the new EP, in July 2024, and June 2026. If, in a vote, the majority of the MEPs in the S&D group, in the Greens/EFA group and in The Left group each voted “For” while the majority of the MEPs in the EPP group, in the RE group and in the ECR group each voted “Against”, then we say that in that particular vote, we observed a “Left coalition” (of S&D, Greens/EFA and Left) against a “Right coalition” (of EPP, RE and ECR).
We calculated coalition patterns for all 5,282 votes and in all the votes in nine major policy areas: agriculture; budget; constitutional; environment; external trade; foreign and defence; freedom, security and justice; market regulation; and social policy. We present the coalition patterns across each of the policy areas in Figure 3.
Figure 3 shows the pattern of coalitions across all roll call votes. We categorise the coalitions into four types:
On average, voting coalitions split along left-right lines about 66% of the time, a pro-European centrist bloc voted together against the groups to the left and right of the centre about 16% of the time, a centre-right coalition formed against the other groups about 3% of the time and some other pattern of coalitions was observed about 15% of the time.
Within these broad patterns, the most common coalition split, by quite a large margin (36% of the time), saw the majority of the MEPs in the EPP, S&D, RE, Greens/EFA and the Left voting one way and the majority of MEPs in the ECR, PfE and ESN voting another way. The next most common split (but only 7% of the time) saw the EPP switch sides and vote with the ECR, PfE and ESN against the S&D, RE, Greens/EFA and Left. The third and fourth most frequent coalitions (occurring approximately 6% of the time) were two other, and very different, left-right patterns: where votes split between the Greens/EFA and the S&D (i.e. The Left+Greens/EFA vs the S&D and all the other groups); and where votes split between the ECR and PfE (i.e. PfE+ESN vs all other groups).
Each row is a coalition type drawn as a fold across the eight groups (Left→ESN). Blue = the pro-EU / centre / winning side; orange = the opposing flanks. Vertical breaks mark the cutting lines. Pick a policy area to re-weight how often each coalition forms.
Reading the strips: a single break is a left–right cut; a blue centre flanked by orange on both ends is a Centre-vs-Periphery vote (the Eurosceptic left folding onto the radical right); a blue centre-right block with orange on the left and at the far-right edge is a Centre-Right-plus coalition. "Other / realignment" pools votes with no single fold geometry.
In contrast, the most common Centre vs Periphery split, which occurred about 5% of the time, was the EPP, the S&D and RE plus the Greens/EFA and ECR voting together against the Left, PfE and ESN. The only difference between this coalition pattern and the most common Left-Right split was the Left group breaking away from the other four centre/centre-left groups and voting with the three groups to the right of the EPP. Together, these two types of coalitions occurred more than 40% of the time across all votes in the current EP.
Aggregating several of these coalition patterns, the centrist “von der Leyen coalition”, of the EPP, the S&D and RE voting together (either alone or with other groups), occurred 78% of the time. Beyond this coalition, the “von der Leyen plus coalition” (either alone or with other groups added) occurred 67% of the time, and the “von der Leyen plus coalition” plus the Left (with or without other groups) occurred 52% of the time.
Finally, coalitions with the EPP voting with the groups to its right against the S&D, the Greens/EFA and the Left occurred approximately 14% of the time. There were three different patterns here: the EPP and the groups to its right against RE, the S&D, the Greens/EFA and The Left (7% of the time); a “Venezuela coalition”, with RE joining the EPP and the groups to their right against the S&D, the Greens/EFA and The Left (4%); and the EPP and the ECR voting together against some combination of the other groups (3%).
Put together, as the pivotal group in the Parliament, the EPP has the numerical ability to form winning coalitions either by “leaning left” or by “leaning right”. In practice, though, the pattern of roll call votes reveals that the most frequent coalition has been the EPP leaning left, to form coalitions with RE and the S&D, and then adding the Greens/EFA and even The Left, rather than leaning right, to form coalitions with the ECR, PfE and ESN.
This coalition behaviour of the EPP is also illustrated by the frequency with which the EPP voted the same way as each of the other political groups individually. The EPP voted with RE 87% of the time, with the S&D 80%, with the Greens/EFA 69%, with The Left 54%, with the ECR 52%, with PfE 38% and with ESN only 32% of the time. In other words, the EPP has been slightly more likely to vote with The Left than with the ECR. Across all the votes in the previous 2019–24 term of the Parliament (Hix and Noury 2024), the EPP was less likely to vote in the same way as the S&D (72%) than in the current Parliament and was more likely to vote with the ECR (62% of the time in 2019–24) than with either the Greens/EFA (61%) or The Left (51%). To put it another way, despite its new pivotal position, the EPP is more likely to lean leftwards in this Parliament than in the last one.
Looking at coalition patterns in specific policy areas, the key differences to these main patterns can be summarised as follows:
Agriculture – a very mixed pattern of votes, but with the EPP more likely to vote with the groups on the right against the groups on the left than on average (almost 18% of the time, compared to 14% on average);
Budget, constitutional, and freedom, security and justice – these areas followed the general patterns, but with the most common coalition (of the EPP, RE, S&D, Greens/EFA and Left) occurring approximately 50% of the time (compared to the average of 36%);
Environment, market regulation and social policy – more likely to see left-right splits than on average (78%, 72% and 79%, respectively, compared to the average of 66%), but the EPP is more likely to vote with the groups on the left on environment (60% of the time) than on market regulation (44%) and social policy (49%);
External trade – more likely to see a Centre vs Periphery coalition than on average (35% of the time, compared to the average of 18%), but the “von der Leyen plus coalition” (of the EPP, S&D, RE and Greens/EFA) occurred only 47% of the time (compared to the average of 67%), because the Greens often voted with The Left and the radical right groups against the “pro-globalisation” centrist groups; and
Foreign and defence – similar to external trade, with a Centre vs Periphery coalition being the most common overall type (27% of the time), and the “von der Leyen plus coalition” occurring 65% of the time, often with the ECR joining this bloc.
Furthermore, in general, only 8% of votes in the EP were “closely contested”, with less than a 10% difference between the number of MEPs on the winning side and on the losing side in a vote. However, there was considerable variation across policy areas, with 13–14% of votes being closely contested on external trade and social policy; 9–11% on agriculture and environment; and only 5–6% on foreign and defence, constitutional, budget and (perhaps surprisingly) market regulation. This pattern relates to the coalition patterns we see across the policy areas, in that there have been more contested votes in those policy areas where the EPP has been more likely to break away from the centrist or “von der Leyen coalition”, in search of an alternative majority, with RE and/or the ECR plus the groups on the radical right (PfE and ESN).
Turning to other aspects of voting, we next focus on the relationship between internal group cohesion and whether a group was on the winning side in a vote. We know from studying voting in previous terms of the EP that larger groups are more likely to be on the winning side than smaller ones and are also more able to enforce internal group cohesion. This might seem counterintuitive, as larger groups are more heterogeneous, both nationally and ideologically. However, there is a positive relationship between being on the winning side, and internal voting cohesion (Hix et al. 2005). Larger groups are able to enforce more group cohesion precisely because they are more likely to be on the winning side. In previous parliaments, if a group increased its size over time, this correlated with higher internal voting cohesion.
The average pattern of being on the winning side and internal group cohesion is shown in Figure 4. In the top right quadrant of the figure are the four groups in the “von der Leyen plus coalition” (EPP, S&D, RE and Greens/EFA), all with a higher proportion of being on the winning side and with high levels of internal voting cohesion. The cohesion of the Greens/EFA is the highest (93.6), followed by the S&D (93.2) and RE (90.4), with the EPP slightly lower (88.0). Notably, given its “pivotal” position in the 2024–29 Parliament, the EPP has been on the winning side more than any other political group – in contrast to the 2019–24 Parliament, when RE was on the winning side most (and was also the pivotal group in that term). Interestingly, The Left and ECR groups have both been on the winning side slightly more than on the losing side. The internal group cohesion of the ECR (80.9) is much lower than that of the four centrist groups, while The Left (87.3) is only slightly behind the EPP in terms of cohesion.
Looking at the different patterns of winning and internal cohesion by policy area, we find significant variations. Here are a few highlights.
EPP cohesion is considerably lower than its average level on agriculture, environment, and freedom, security and justice. Nevertheless, the EPP has still been on the winning side more than any other group in all these policy areas, except for votes on freedom, security and justice issues, where RE has been on the winning side slightly more than the EPP.
Group cohesion scores run from 0 (if the MEPs in a group split 50-50 in all votes) to 100 (if all MEPs in a group voted the same way in all votes).
With regard to the other groups, the S&D has been on the winning side most often on budget, constitutional issues, environment, external trade, foreign and defence, and freedom, security and justice. It has also been highly cohesive in all these policy areas except for external trade, where its internal cohesion fell well below the average of the group.
In general, the overall pattern of being on the winning side by political group reinforces what we observed with the coalition pattern analysis. The EPP is pivotal, as it is on the winning side more than any other group, and the further a group is from the EPP, the less likely it is to be on the winning side. However, the groups to the left of the EPP have been on the winning side more often than those to the right – which results from the fact that the EPP has tended to build coalitions to its left more than to its right.
Votes on environment issues have exhibited a particular pattern. The “pro-environment” groups (Greens/EFA, S&D, RE and The Left) have all had very high levels of cohesion and been on the winning side considerably above their average levels. However, despite being far less cohesive on this policy issue, the EPP has managed to be on the winning side more frequently than these other groups.
The ECR, in contrast, has been most cohesive on environment, market regulation, and freedom, security and justice but has been on the losing side on these issues, as the group has tended to vote cohesively against the “von der Leyen (plus) majority”.
PfE has been on the winning side in agriculture more than in any other policy area and have also been the most cohesive on this policy issue. It has been more cohesive on environment but has mainly been on the losing side on this policy issue. PfE has been deeply divided on foreign and defence policies – with the lowest levels of cohesion of any group on any policy issue.
Like PfE, ESN has been more cohesive on environment but lost many more votes than it has won. It has also been highly cohesive on freedom, security and justice issues (such as immigration and asylum) but again has mainly been on the losing side. ESN has been most split on external trade.
The Left group, meanwhile, has been most cohesive on environment, social policy, and freedom, security and justice, with cohesion breaking down on foreign policy and defence. The Left group has also been least successful on external trade, and foreign and defence.
We have also looked at which national delegations (as a proxy for national parties) have voted against their group lines the most, and on which policy issue. One particularly interesting policy area is external trade, as shown in Figure 5. The national split in both the EPP and the S&D is clearly evident here, with the French MEPs in both groups being far less likely to vote with the group (in support of free trade agreements) than the other delegations. In parallel, in PfE, the French delegation is more likely to shape the position of the group on external trade issues (against free trade agreements), which then leads the more pro-free trade national delegations in PfE to vote against the group.
Each dot is a national delegation, positioned by the share of votes in which its voting behaviour matched with the group. Dot sizes are relative to the number of MEPs in a national delegation. Clicking on a dot reveals more information. For each group, the short horizontal line shows the group’s MEP-weighted mean loyalty. The dashed line shows 80% loyalty. Delegations of 10+ MEPs, plus current outliers (below 80%, or the group’s lowest) are displayed. Pick a policy area to see how national delegations’ loyalty varies from one area to another.
After having looked at the overall patterns in the previous section we now examine ten key votes in the European Parliament between 2024 and 2026: The first six votes show the “von der Leyen coalition” and its variants in action, while the following four votes reveal cases in which the EPP turned rightwards or other majorities emerged.
The EP elected the European Commission in a roll call vote on 27 November 2024. The investiture of the Commission required a simple majority of votes cast. Ursula von der Leyen had been elected for a second term as Commission President in a secret ballot, with 401 votes in favour, on 16 July 2024. The winning “von der Leyen coalition” for the investiture united the EPP, the S&D and RE, as well as parts of the ECR and the Greens/EFA (see Figure 6). Opposition came from The Left, PfE and ESN. The 370 votes in favour confirm the centrist majority but highlight its reliance on additional support because of significant defections in the EPP and S&D. In each group, 25 MEPs voted against: the Spanish delegation in the EPP unanimously opposed the College, while the French delegation in the S&D also voted against, and the German delegation in the S&D mostly abstained. The Commission took office on 1 December 2024.
Since taking office, the Commission has survived no fewer than four motions of censure, all falling far short of the required two-thirds majority. MEPs rejected the first censure motion against the von der Leyen II Commission on 10 July 2025. The motion was tabled by Romanian ECR MEP Gheorghe Piperea and officially supported by 72 far-right and Eurosceptic MEPs. It mostly accused the Commission of lacking transparency and misusing funds in relation to COVID-19 vaccine contract negotiations and recovery funds. The EPP, the S&D, RE and the Greens/EFA voted overwhelmingly against censure, while PfE and ESN largely supported it (see Figure 6). The ECR and The Left were split between supporters and abstainers. The 360–175 result relied on EPP+S&D+RE with the Greens/EFA providing crucial support (“von der Leyen plus coalition”). Quite a significant number of MEPs, including the entire Italian ECR delegation, did not cast their ballot. This vote set a precedent for subsequent censure attempts, all of which would similarly fail.
The EP adopted its negotiating position on the EU’s multi-annual financial framework (MFF) for 2028–34 in a vote on 28 April 2026. The size, the priorities and the revenue sources of the budget were at stake. MEPs demanded a 10% increase over the Commission’s proposal, with enhanced funding for defence, competitiveness, green/digital transitions and external action, while protecting cohesion and agriculture. They also insisted on new own resources generating €60 billion annually. A total of 370 MEPs from the EPP+S&D+RE+Greens/EFA coalition (the “von der Leyen plus coalition”) voted in favour (see Figure 7). The Swedish delegations in both the EPP and the S&D unanimously defected from their groups and voted against. MEPs from frugal countries were generally more likely to abstain or oppose the resolution. The ECR was split, with the Polish delegation voting against and the Italian delegation abstaining. Opposition came from PfE, The Left and ESN, who criticised the budget’s size or priorities.
A narrow majority of 334 to 324 votes with 11 abstentions adopted a resolution demanding a Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) legal opinion on whether the EU–Mercosur trade deal conforms with EU treaties on 21 January 2026. This was seen as a vote against the position of the “von der Leyen coalition”. PfE, the Greens/EFA, The Left and ESN voted in favour and were joined by a high number of MEPs defecting from the EPP, the S&D, RE and the ECR (see Figure 8). The far right and far left opposed the deal on environmental and social grounds, while a majority of Greens/EFA rejected the agreement over insufficient sustainability guarantees. The German delegation in the Greens/EFA (8 votes in favour, 5 against, 1 abstention, 1 did not vote) received a lot of the blame, even though the Polish or French delegations in the EPP (with 21 and 5 votes, respectively, in favour of the referral) would have tipped the balance too. The resolution did not delay the agreement because of the Commission’s decision to provisionally apply it. However, the vote highlights deep divisions over trade within the groups of the “von der Leyen coalition” and in the ECR.
Another important trade policy vote took place on 16 June 2026 when the EP overwhelmingly approved legislation implementing EU tariff commitments under the EU–US trade deal also known as the “Turnberry deal”. The EPP, the S&D, RE and the ECR voted in favour, emphasising economic benefits and strategic alignment. Opposition was limited to PfE, The Left and parts of the Greens/EFA, who criticised the insufficient labour and environmental protections (see Figure 8). Both PfE and the Greens/EFA experienced three-way splits: Dutch and Czech PfE delegations defected from their group line (opposed) by voting in favour, while among the German delegation in the Greens/EFA, 11 voted in favour and three against. ESN mostly abstained. The 440–151 result demonstrates strong cross-party consensus on concessions for alleviating the impact of unilateral tariffs on EU–US commercial relations, with only the far right and far left opposing significantly.
The European Council agreed to resort to enhanced cooperation for a €90 billion EU loan to support Ukraine’s war effort and reconstruction on 18 December 2025. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia remained outside and did not block the “EU24”, although Hungary’s resistance against the necessary unanimous modification of the MFF regulation could only be overcome after its change in government. The EP had to authorise enhanced cooperation under Article 20 TEU. The EU’s financial commitment to Ukraine amid Russia’s ongoing invasion and its credibility were at stake. A super-grand coalition of the EPP, the S&D, RE, the ECR and the Greens/EFA backed the measure on 21 January 2026, stressing Ukraine’s strategic importance and European solidarity. Opposition came solely from PfE, ESN and non-aligned MEPs (see Figure 9), who criticised the size of the loan or the use of enhanced cooperation. The 499–135 majority underscores broad cross-party consensus on supporting Ukraine, with even the ECR joining the centrist groups despite its usual scepticism on EU financial mechanisms.
On 14 November 2024, even before the new College had been voted into office, the EP adopted a one-year delay to the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), which requires companies to prove that their products do not contribute to deforestation. A 371–240 majority prioritised business concerns about implementation challenges over environmental urgency. The “Venezuela coalition” (EPP, RE, ECR, PfE, ESN) voted in favour of the delay (see Figure 10). The internal cohesion of the political groups was high with few defections, except for RE, which was split almost equally between yes, no and abstain. The French RE delegation, for instance, almost entirely abstained, while all RE MEPs from Germany voted in favour. The S&D, the Greens/EFA and The Left were opposed, warning it would weaken the EU’s climate leadership. The vote demonstrates a growing influence of business-friendly centrists and far-right groups in softening environmental regulations.
In the push to simplify sustainability reporting (Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, CS3D), a deal between the EPP and the S&D broke down in November 2025 due to defections in the latter. This led to a majority of the EPP, RE, ECR, PfE and ESN groups, also known as the “Venezuela coalition”, adopting the Parliament’s position (see Figure 10). On 16 December 2025, the 428–218 majority signed off the provisional agreement with the Council to reduce both corporate accountability and the administrative burden for businesses. The vote reflected a shared preference for lighter regulation. The S&D and Greens/EFA were opposed, arguing that the rules had become too weak. The vote highlights a growing centrist–far-right alignment on deregulation, marking a shift from traditional EPP+S&D+RE cooperation (“von der Leyen coalition”) on regulatory issues.
In June 2026, the EP also approved a new EU system for the return of third-country nationals who are in the EU illegally, with a view to streamlining and toughening deportation procedures in order to achieve more effective migration management. Once again, the “Venezuela coalition” (EPP, RE, ECR, PfE, ESN) backed the deal, framing it as necessary for a credible migration policy. The S&D, the Greens/EFA and The Left voted against (see Figure 11), citing insufficient judicial safeguards. RE, once again, was deeply split internally. MEPs from central and eastern Europe were more likely to vote in favour – including, for example, almost all Czech and Polish MEPs. The 418–218 vote reflects a growing consensus among centrist and right-wing groups on migration enforcement, with a very high level of cohesion in the EPP, the ECR, PfE and ESN.
Finally, the 2040 climate target is an example of a particularly complex voting situation: the EP ultimately voted to back a binding 90% net emissions reduction target by 2040, a crucial milestone in the EU climate law. The balance between climate ambition and economic competitiveness was at stake. The S&D, RE, the Greens/EFA and The Left aligned with parts of the EPP to pass the target (see Figure 12) and successfully block a far-right push by PfE to scrap the goal entirely. However, to secure the deal, the S&D, the Greens/EFA and RE had to accept a heavily watered-down text and concessions, such as allowing international carbon credits and delaying the transport/heating carbon market (ETS2) until 2028. Opposition came from parts of the EPP and from PfE, the ECR and ESN. Within the heavily divided EPP, the Polish and Spanish delegations were the most strongly opposed to the target. The 379–248 result shows that the EU climate ambition has been preserved, but at the cost of weaker implementation measures.
As we pointed out following the 2024 elections in the analysis “A new political landscape: Europe after the elections” (Hix et al. 2024), there were several significant changes in the make-up of this Parliament compared to the previous 2019–24 one: there was a significant shift to the right, with the EPP being the “pivotal” group on the left-right spectrum for the first time and a rise in the number of MEPs to the right of the EPP; and there was increased fragmentation, with a further decline in the size of the two largest groups and a significantly weaker “von der Leyen coalition” between the EPP, the S&D and RE.
Notwithstanding these changes, the overall structure of politics in the new Parliament – in terms of the types of coalitions that form and the patterns of internal party cohesion – seems to be relatively stable, albeit with some subtle shifts.
The EPP is clearly the pivotal group – as the MEP numbers at the start of the Parliament suggested. It can form a majority either to its left or to its right, and it can also lead a centrist coalition against the radical left and radical right “periphery” groups. Put another way, it is effectively impossible to form a winning majority in the Parliament without the EPP. As a result, across all votes, and in all policy areas except one (freedom, security and justice), the EPP has been on the winning side in votes more than any other political group and benefits from structural advantages such as committee chairmanships and rapporteur assignments alongside a dominant role in the other key EU institutions, the Council and the Commission.
Nevertheless, the centrist RE and the two centre-left groups, the S&D and the Greens/EFA, have also done remarkably well in this new Parliament – winning in many votes, including in some key policy areas, such as environment, external trade, foreign and defence, and freedom, security and justice. The reason for this is that the EPP has chosen to “lean left” when looking for coalition partners, rather than to “lean right”. As a result, we see that by far the most frequent voting coalitions have been the “von der Leyen coalition” (of the EPP, the S&D and RE), with the “von der Leyen plus coalition” (of the EPP, the S&D, RE and the Greens/EFA) not far behind.
This comes as something of a surprise, given the signals coming from the 2024 election: of a push back from the voters against the European Green Deal, a significant increase in support for national parties in the ECR and PfE, the formation of the new ESN group, and signals from several prominent EPP politicians that they would need to “do business” with parties and groups to their right rather than relying on the centre and centre-left to “govern” in Europe.
The explanation for this pattern comes in part from the fact that, in practice, the EPP does not have an “alternative coalition” to the “von der Leyen coalition”. The ECR has become a more reliable partner, although it still tends to have a lower level of cohesion in votes than groups to the EPP’s left. Also, the EPP plus the ECR plus PfE does not comprise a majority (see Figure 2 in section 1). Moreover, PfE and ESN are deeply internally divided, so they are not reliable partners – not to mention the political sensitivity for many EPP parties of being seen to do deals with radical right parties in these groups.
As a result, the “von der Leyen coalition” remains the central driving force in the Parliament. When other groups need to be added to secure a majority – for example, if the internal cohesion of one or other of the three centrist groups breaks down in a key vote – the Greens/EFA has been willing to support this coalition on many key issues, as it did in the previous Parliament. And if the Greens/EFA is not willing to come on board, then the ECR has been a possible partner on some key issues.
The strategic calculations of the S&D and Greens/EFA also matter: it would seem that the S&D and Greens favour suboptimal (and EPP-close) compromises as the alternative is worse (a “Venezuela majority”). However, within the S&D, there are discussions about taking a more clearly defined role in opposition. And, in turn, would the EPP rely on the capacity to form majorities leaning to the right? Can they rely on the cohesion of the ECR and PfE? Until now, though, the EPP seems to have decided that the EPP, S&D, RE and Greens/EFA coalition (“von der Leyen plus”) is a more viable and reliable partnership than that between the EPP, RE, ECR and PfE. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in several salient votes and as publicly debated (CS3D sustainability reporting, Return Regulation), there was a “Venezuela majority” of centre-right, conservative right and radical right.
Finally, in EU politics, it is often helpful to position actors relative to the policy status quo (i.e. what would continue as policy if no vote were taken). New, or a revision of existing, legislation can then lead to more or less Europe in relation to the status quo, to more regulation or deregulation, and push policy politically leftwards or rightwards. For example, in the previous Parliament, the European Green Deal established a lot of policies favoured by the left, with the parties on the right wanting to move these status quos rightwards in the new Parliament.
If we consider the last four of the ten key votes of Section 3 in this way, we can see that the simplification of sustainability reporting meant less regulation than the status quo. As a result, the S&D, the Greens/EFA and The Left were opposed to this move. RE, the EPP and the groups to the EPP’s right favoured less regulation. The same logic applies to delaying the deforestation regulation. In both cases, the left preferred to protect the existing policy status quos but failed.
For migration policy and the Return Regulation, a more effective migration management meant more regulation and more right-wing policies, and was supported by the centre-right and radical right. Cohesion was high in the EPP and the groups to its right. The overall majority was clear. However, we see that the “Venezuela coalition” can lose if EPP cohesion breaks down. An example of achieving more regulation that is favoured by the centre-left was the vote on the 2040 climate target: the binding 90% net emissions reduction target was supported by parts of the EPP and secured a majority because of presumably painful concessions by the centre-left. As a result, a rollback of climate policy was avoided.
The first two years of the 2024–29 EP suggest that reports of the collapse of the political centre have been overstated. Although the elections produced a more fragmented Parliament and strengthened the parties to the right of the EPP, the dominant pattern of legislative politics remains one of broad pro-European cooperation in the centre of the political spectrum. The EPP has emerged as the pivotal actor, but it has generally exercised this position by maintaining the “von der Leyen coalition” rather than replacing it with a stable majority to its right. In that sense, Ursula von der Leyen’s statement – “the centre is holding” 1 – made after the 2024 European Parliament election, has so far been confirmed: the dominant pattern of coalition-building is left-right.
At the same time, the political landscape has clearly changed. The credible possibility of alternative right-leaning majorities has strengthened the EPP’s bargaining position and shifted the terms of compromise in several policy areas, particularly on migration, environmental regulation and competitiveness. This is illustrated in three of the key votes when the EPP turned right (on Deforestation Regulation delay, Simplified sustainability reporting and the Return Regulation) and in the key vote when the EPP was internally divided (on the emissions reduction target). The centre has therefore not fractured, but it has become more dependent on strategic compromise and more vulnerable to the EPP’s shifting majority preferences.
Looking ahead, this balance may become more difficult to sustain. As the Parliament approaches the second half of the legislative term and attention increasingly turns to the 2029 European elections, electoral incentives may encourage greater political differentiation and reduce the willingness of groups to support broad cross-party compromises. Domestic political developments in key member states and the evolving strategic relationship between the EPP and its centrist partners will influence coalition dynamics.
Whether the current pattern of cooperation endures will be one of the defining questions for EU policymaking over the remainder of this parliamentary term.
More broadly, these developments have implications for how the EU functions as a political system. Rather than signalling institutional gridlock, fragmentation has increased the importance of political brokerage. In this environment, pivotal actors – most notably the EPP, but also the Commission – play a central role in seeking compromises and assembling majorities across different policy areas. This makes EU policymaking more adaptable, but also more contingent. The EPP dominates all institutions and its strategic choices will be key to the future development of the EU. Legislative outcomes are likely to depend increasingly on the ability of the mainstream political groups to sustain cooperation despite growing ideological and electoral pressures.
Hix, S. & Noury, A. (2024). The 2024 European Parliament Elections: Potential Outcome and Consequences, SIEPS European Policy Analysis.
Hix, S., Kreilinger, V. & von Sydow, G. (2024). A new political landscape: Europe after the elections, SIEPS European Policy Analysis.
Hix, S., Noury, A. & Roland, G. (2005). Power to the parties: cohesion and competition in the European Parliament, 1979–2001. British Journal of Political Science, 35(2), 209–234. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123405000128
HowTheyVote.eu. (n.d.). European Parliament vote results. Retrieved 25 June 2026, from https://howtheyvote.eu/
All roll call votes between July 2024 and June 2026 as well as the 10 key votes, listed chronologically here:
1 Ursula von der Leyen declared “the centre is holding” on election night: https://www.independent.ie/videos/european-commission-president-says-centre-is-holding-despite-election-gains-by-left-and-right/a/129707760.html
Since the 2024 election, the European Parliament has seen stronger right-wing groups. How are decision-making majorities formed in this political landscape? This is the subject of a new SIEPS-analysis, which will be presented at a seminar in Stockholm on 9 October.