Budget Allocation in an Expanding EU (2006:11)
In the negotiations on the Union’s annual expenditures decision is taken by qualified majority voting (QMV). In this report Professor Mika Widgrén investigates the relationship between the Council voting rules and EU budget transfers by using a power politics model.
According to this view, budget allocation is determined by the desire of Member States to maximize their receipts. The main claim of the power politics view is that the distribution of voting power in the Council alone is sufficient to explain budget allocation.
The report also concludes that the voting rules that are used according to the Nice Treaty will result in a smaller budget than under the Constitutional Treaty. However, the outcome is reversed when Turkey accedes the Union, as Turkish accession would result in a smaller budget burden for incumbent Member States under the Nice Treaty rules. This is explained by Turkey’s size and relatively low income levels.
The report was presented at the seminar Budget Allocation in an Expanding EU and is a part of the research project The EU Budget.
2006:11 Budget Allocation in an Expanding EU (299.98 kB)